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EC/WEU/NATO ENLARGEMENT: BRAITHWAITE/NEVILLE-JONES TALKS IN  
WASHINGTON, 24 JULY

SUMMARY

1. MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS FROM THE AMERICANS, WHO ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROBLEM BUT SEEMED RELUCTANT TO ENGAGE IN ITS SOLUTION. BUT THE TALKS MAY HAVE USEFULLY JUMP-STARTED US THINKING. AGREEMENT TO PURSUE AT EXPERT TALKS IN LATE AUGUST, WITH BOTH SIDES MEANWHILE TO DEVELOP CONCRETE PROPOSALS ON MEANS TO DIMINISH RUSSIAN CONCERNS.

DETAIL

2. WISNER (DEPUTY SECRETARY, STATE) CHAIRED A SENIOR LEVEL INTER-AGENCY MEETING WITH SIR R BRAITHWAITE AND MS NEVILLE-JONES. THE UK TEAM PRESENTED MINISTERS' THINKING ON THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF EC ENLARGEMENT AND THE CONSEQUENT NEED TO KEEP WEU MEMBERSHIP IN LINE WITH NATO'S. THEY EXPLAINED THE UK'S CONSIDERATIONS ON TIMING AND EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR AN ACTIVE US ROLE.

3. THE AMERICANS AGREED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PREVENT A DIVERGENCE BETWEEN WEU AND NATO MEMBERSHIP. THEY SHARED THE UK PREFERENCE FOR TACTICS OF DEVELOPING A CLIMATE IN WHICH WEU MEMBERSHIP NATURALLY IMPLIED NATO MEMBERSHIP, RATHER THAN TAKING A MORE DIRECT, OVERT APPROACH. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE RUSSIANS PRESENTED A PROBLEM ON WHICH FURTHER THINKING WAS REQUIRED.

4. REFLECTING THE LACK OF INTER-AGENCY AGREEMENT, THE AMERICANS

## POSED A VARIETY OF QUESTIONS:

A. HOW MANY EFTANS, REALISTICALLY, WOULD ACCEPT FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP? HOW MANY EXCEPTIONS TO THE PROPOSED WEU/NATO LINK WOULD BE TOLERABLE? IT WAS AGREED SWEDEN WOULD BE KEY. THE AMERICANS CLEARLY FEARED THAT MOST EFTANS WOULD ACCEPT FULL WEU MEMBERSHIP BUT NOT JOIN NATO.

B. WHAT WOULD THE UK DO IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES? REPEATED US QUESTIONS MADE PLAIN THAT THE AMERICANS ATTACHED CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO THE ANSWER. SIR R BRAITHWAITE SAID THE UK WOULD WANT TO PREVENT NEW EC MEMBERS FROM TAKING FULL WEU MEMBERSHIP IF THEY COULD NOT AGREE TO JOIN NATO. BUT WE WOULD NEED POLITICAL SUPPORT IN THIS. OUR IDEAL WOULD BE FOR ALL EC MEMBERS TO ACCEPT FULL WEU AND NATO MEMBERSHIP. BUT WE WOULD PREFER A NUMBER OF EC MEMBERS WITH WEU OBSERVER STATUS RATHER THAN HAVING THEM BECOME FULL WEU MEMBERS AND NOT JOIN NATO.

C. THE AMERICANS WERE KEEN TO ESTABLISH THAT EC MEMBERSHIP WOULD NOT IMPLY AN AUTOMATIC RIGHT TO JOIN NATO. THE UK TEAM STRESSED THAT NATO WOULD OF COURSE HAVE THE RIGHT TO DECIDE. BUT EC MEMBERSHIP HELPFULLY RESOLVED SOME OF THE CRITERIA REQUIRED FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP. IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE WAS FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON WHAT SHOULD BE SAID TO POTENTIAL APPLICANTS ABOUT THE CONDITIONS FOR JOINING NATO.

D. NILES (ASSISTANT SECRETARY, STATE), AND AT SOME POINTS GOMPERT (NSC), QUESTIONED THE NEED FOR EARLY DECISIONS ON WHO COULD JOIN NATO. SIR R BRAITHWAITE REITERATED THAT THE POLITICAL REALITIES REQUIRED US AND UK ANSWERS THIS AUTUMN.

E. POTENTIAL RUSSIAN REACTIONS WERE A PROBLEM. THE AMERICANS SEEMED INTERESTED IN THE IDEA OF POLITICAL UNDERTAKINGS ABOUT RUSSIA'S WESTERN BORDERS. WISNER POINTED TO FUTURE RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN A GLOBAL PROTECTION SYSTEM AS A CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE IN THE NATO CONTEXT. BOTH SIDES AGREED NATO NEEDED TO PERFORM REAL POST-COLD WAR FUNCTIONS SUCH AS CSCE PEACE-KEEPING AND THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO BRING THE RUSSIANS INTO SUCH ACTIVITIES. THE NACC NEEDED TO BE DEVELOPED. NILES MENTIONED THAT AFFANAFIEVSKY (RUSSIAN NACC REPRESENTATIVE) HAD COMPLAINED THAT NO CONSIDERATION HAD BEEN GIVEN TO POSSIBLE RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE WEU AND NATO NAVAL MONITORING IN THE ADRIATIC.

5. SIR R BRAITHWAITE POINTED TO THE PROPOSED FCO/MOD VISIT TO WASHINGTON AT THE END OF AUGUST AS THE NEXT STEP IN THE DIALOGUE. HE SECURED WISNER'S AGREEMENT THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD IN THE MEANTIME WORK UP CONCRETE IDEAS ON HOW BEST TO ENGAGE THE RUSSIANS IN THE BROADER EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND THUS DEFUSE CONCERNS IN MOSCOW OVER NATO ENLARGEMENT.

## COMMENT

6. AT THE OUTSET WISNER STRESSED THE VERY HIGH US INTEREST IN PREVENTING US/EUROPEAN DIVERGENCE IN THE SECURITY FIELD, AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS GROWING US/EC DIFFICULTIES ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT AND RECENT INSTANCES OF COMPETITION BETWEEN THE WEU AND NATO. BUT IN THE COURSE OF THE MEETING DOUBTS WERE EXPRESSED BY NILES AND GOMPERT ABOUT HOW HIGH PROFILE THE US SHOULD BE IN PRESSING THE CASE FOR CONVERGENCE OF WEU/NATO MEMBERSHIP. THE MEETING LEFT A SENSE THAT, WHILE WASHINGTON MIGHT ACCEPT UK ARGUMENTS INTELLECTUALLY, THEY REMAINED DOUBTFUL ABOUT OUR CHANCES OF SUCCESS AND HAVE THEREFORE YET TO DEVELOP MUCH ENTHUSIASM FOR DEVOTING ACTIVE US DIPLOMACY TO THE PROBLEM.

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