

PRIME MINISTER

It is a good paper.  
We should have a preliminary  
discussion first. We need some  
competent military  
advisers.  
mb

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT CHANGES IN EAST/WEST  
RELATIONS

I attach a paper by the FCO on the implications for NATO's strategy of current trends in the Alliance and East/West relations. It is an important paper and warrants close attention - and eventually discussion. It is in essence the political/strategic background for the paper on which the MoD are working on the restructuring of our forces.

The paper's message is that the <sup>present</sup> decline of the Soviet threat, the likely further reduction of US forces in Europe (perhaps to 100,000) and the inclination of many of our Allies to stop taking defence seriously will make it much more difficult to keep NATO together and maintain public support for defence spending. Yet we shall continue to need NATO and strong defence in the more uncertain and unstable world on which we are entering. The paper judges that we shall only achieve that by making a hard-headed assessment of what we can realistically get our Allies to accept. It will be no good just digging in and trying to defend the status quo.

George  
Bush does  
not see  
this  
life is different  
to how NATO  
operates

Thus, the paper suggests that:

- we should be looking to a reduction of our own forces in Germany to about 25,000; - overall, in any only
- we should support the idea of organising stationed forces as multi-national units, to make them more acceptable to Germany; *language problems?*
- we should avoid a self-defeating row with the Germans over SNF modernisation (ie we should give up the idea of a follow-on to LANCE). We should accept the inevitability (desirability in German eyes) of SNF negotiations;

Then what nuclear weapons  
are the U.S. going to  
retain in Germany?  
mb

- we should embrace the concept of minimum deterrence for theatre nuclear weapons, reducing total NATO holdings (artillery shells, bombs and - eventually - stand off missiles) to 1,000 warheads, to be matched by the other side;
- Britain and France should be ready to consult with Germany on nuclear matters to achieve an extended European deterrence. This is not further explained but presumably would not (must not) involve German access to nuclear weapons;
- we should accept, indeed embrace, the inevitability of further CFE negotiations after a CFE I agreement, and focus on getting the right mandate and conditions for them;
- we should favour a major review of NATO strategy, not leaving it only to the military;
- we should build up The Four (US, UK, France and Germany) as a steering group for NATO;
- but we should not try to give NATO a political role at the expense of political co-operation among the Twelve; *Then we have to give the political role to an extended Helsinki agreement.*
- we should maximise Anglo-French defence co-operation;
- we should in parallel try to strengthen European defence co-operation within the Alliance, with the long term aim of grafting it onto the European Community;
- we should develop the CSCE as a supplement to (but not a substitute for) NATO.

Several of the conclusions are controversial. They are based on the premise that we need to cut our losses in certain

areas, in order to preserve the essentials of NATO and our defence policies. The issues do need to be faced, and the paper does an important service by bringing them forward - although there are admittedly more questions than answers, more about what we have to give up than what we might put in its place.

You may like to discuss with the Foreign and Defence Secretaries.

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL

3 March 1990

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*file*  
*bcpc*

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

5 March 1990

*Daw High.*

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT TRENDS IN THE ALLIANCE  
ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS

Thank you for your letter of 2 March enclosing a paper on the strategic implications of current trends in the Alliance and East/West relations. The Prime Minister has read the paper and commented that it is a good one. She would like a first discussion of it with the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary before deciding how best to take the work forward. We will arrange for this.

Meanwhile, you may find it helpful to be aware of the Prime Minister's marginal comments:

- on para. 1, she has commented that our assessment of a reduced Soviet military threat is very dependent on Gorbachev remaining in power;
- on para. 2, she has noted that the US not Germany is the lynch-pin of NATO;
- on para. 4, she has commented that the description of the Soviet military threat underplays the nuclear and chemical elements;
- on para. 5A, the Prime Minister suggests that the starting point for NATO's force planning should be a new military strategy rather than bland acceptance of force cuts by some NATO members. She maintains her scepticism about the practicality of multinational forces. And she underlines the importance of keeping some nuclear weapons in Germany;
- on the reference in 5B to a German-dominated Mitteleuropa, she has commented that we must not let this happen. She has also suggested (in relation to the last indent) that the survival of the Warsaw Pact could be politically helpful for us as well as for Gorbachev;
- on 5C, the Prime Minister has expressed concern about the reference to the Germans consulting with Britain and France on nuclear matters and has asked what is meant by this. She would not want to see the Germans have a nuclear role.


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- 2 -

On a more general point, the Prime Minister warns against making assumptions e.g. about the eventual size of US forces in Europe, the likelihood of further CFE negotiations, which could all too easily become accepted as inevitable.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,  


(C. D. POWELL)

J. S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

Charles  
Fixed  
for 11.30  
on Thurs  
15 March

AD  
5/3

Amadeo

The PM with a

meeting - 45

minutes - 15

Douglas Hurd &

Ten by 3

San or 15 11

did to 10 10

discuss 10 10

paper on Strategic  
Implications of  
Current Trends in  
the Alliance &  
East/West relations.

ADD  
5/3

CCP



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 March 1990

Jean Charles,

Strategic Implications of Current Trends in the Alliance  
and East/West Relations

MAP PTTG  
Following the meeting recorded in your letter to me of 28 January, we were asked to do further work on the implications of developments in Eastern Europe for NATO strategy. I enclose a paper, approved by the Foreign Secretary, which tries also to take account of relevant trends in the West.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Simon Webb (MOD), Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office) and John Gieve (HM Treasury).

Jans.  
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT TRENDS IN THE ALLIANCE AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS

1. The collapse of the Soviet system challenges the three pillars on which British security policy has been based since the 1940's:

(i) a clear sense of threat. The risk of a major military attack with strategic objectives on Western Europe will, after CFE, be negligible; and the spillover from local conflicts should be containable.

(ii) a strong commitment to collective security and the transatlantic link. The most likely trend is that cement binding the Alliance will weaken and that US forces by the mid 90's will be below the figure of 225,000 projected by Bush.

(iii) a willingness to bear high defence costs. The problems of defence budgets are likely to become more acute for all allies as they are caught between rising unit costs and the public wish to share in the peace dividend.

2. In all three areas, the outcome will be determined by factors largely outside our control: German unification, US domestic trends and the evolution of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. But we should not jettison the basic elements of NATO:

- its membership, with Germany as the lynchpin;
- the integrated structure, including some stationed forces,
- a mix of conventional and nuclear forces, tying in the US strategic commitment.

These elements still offer the best means of insuring ourselves against the uncertainties of the 1990's and beyond.

3. But it does mean that:

- if the Alliance is to preserve its key elements, it will have to change radically and quickly: defending the status quo is the surest way of ensuring that it goes the way of CENTO and SEATO (and the Warsaw Pact). It would also bring closer the danger that German unification took place outside the Alliance, thus making the US presence and NATO strategy untenable;

- if the UK is to retain the influence which the Alliance confers on us, we will have to be ruthless in adapting the inessential elements of our present policy to the changed circumstances and the changed threat.

*Provided G is elected in 1992*

*NATO is not an only option. As long as we can live with the exposure.*

*no US*

4. The threat is being replaced by risks of war of different kinds and levels of probability:

- instabilities within and between Eastern European countries could lead to conflict and to calls for help from other countries. It is difficult to envisage circumstances in which the West would be drawn militarily into such disputes so long as they did not directly involve a Western State (e.g. Germany or Turkey); but the possibility of indirect involvement (e.g. through "volunteers" or aid) cannot be excluded;

- the Soviet capability to launch a strategic conventional offensive into Europe will have effectively been removed when the CFE agreement is implemented; but they would continue to be capable of conducting an offensive with limited objectives, though with a warning time of several weeks;

*Nuclear?  
Chemical?*

- in the longer term the Soviet Union could re-arm to pose a threat to the whole of Europe. This would probably take years rather than weeks or months;

- also in the longer term parts of Europe may face - for the first time since the 17th century - a threat from the South, combining a hostile ideology (Islamic fundamentalism) with sophisticated weapons (missiles, CW and, conceivably, nuclear).

*then nuclear  
or military  
capabilities will  
remain sharp*

5. The changed circumstances and their implications for our security policy are considered under four headings: Alliance strategy; Alliance role and politics; European security; and Arms Control.

**A ALLIANCE STRATEGY AND FORCE PLANNING**

Likely evolution

- NATO strategy will be based on countering the post-CFE Soviet threat, with more generous warning time, and on various risks of more limited conflict within Europe. Flexible response and forward defence will remain politically necessary as concepts, but their implementation will change radically;

- NATO force planning will need to adapt to:

*Then have to  
be decided in the 2nd 4.  
of the new military  
strategy.*

- significant cuts in US, FRG, Benelux and Canadian forces;
- fewer in-place forces, probably none in the eastern part of Germany;
- fewer theatre nuclear weapons (less than 1,000 warheads, mainly air delivered: possibly none in Germany);

- lower tolerance of exercises, low flying and Wintex-type exercises.

Implications for the UK

- deterring any use or threat of force against Western Europe will remain an overriding aim, since even limited war involving the Soviet Union would devastate Europe;

Why?

- we will therefore need to keep US forces in Germany and thus to preserve the integrated structure. We should assume that stationed forces will be halved (to perhaps 100,000 American and 25,000 each UK and French). The emphasis will be on mobility, rapid mobilisation of reserves and interoperability; *rather than which have been achieved.*

As?  
Political effects?

- it would help, in keeping German forces integrated and making allied forces acceptable on German soil, if in-place forces could be organized multinationally. There is a strong political case for integrating on the basis of national brigades though this would carry operational costs (separate MOD paper);

We must keep nuclear response viable

- we should accept major adjustments to keep Germany in NATO (separate paper). We should avoid a self-defeating row with Bonn over nuclear missiles and artillery. The British presence (four power rights, exercises) must not be allowed to become an obstacle to German unity or a major source of friction with FRG;

✓

- the balance of the UK's defence effort is likely to shift, with fewer in-place forces on the Central Front (separate MOD study);

✓

- in relation to the flanks, the focus for the UK will remain on the North rather than the South;

✓

- we will retain the need to protect our interests overseas, but we should aim to avoid solitary policing roles in unstable parts of the third world (especially Middle East and Gulf);

Review in the nuclear deterrence

- to sustain the nuclear element, we should take over the concept of minimum deterrence and define it as requiring, in the theatre, perhaps 1,000 warheads including a stand-off missile. We should make clearer that we rule out nuclear war-fighting. Instead of trying to force nuclear roles on reluctant Europeans, we should confront them with the choices they face: do they want extended deterrence and a role in NATO strategy or not? *What is extended deterrence?*

- there is no need for a new Harmel Report, since the existing defence/détente doctrine remains valid. But NATO military strategy will need to be reviewed. A strong military input will be needed, but it should not be entrusted solely to the Pentagon or the Military Committee. The first step is to clarify our own thinking and discuss with close

allies at the political level and with SACEUR. The approach agreed there should then be sold sensitively to other allies.

- in order to preserve the essential elements of the integrated structure, we should be ready to adapt or even abandon some of its features (eg defence spending guidelines and Wintex-type exercises);

## B. ALLIANCE ROLE AND POLITICS

### Likely evolution

- increased emphasis on regional groupings in Europe as a whole: Baltic, Balkan and Mediterranean, plus a German-dominated Mitteleuropa; *- we must NOT let this happen*

- more doubts about NATO's relevance as the threat becomes less visible and the Warsaw Pact disappears;

- a more political NATO (for many this means "a less military NATO");

- a more variegated membership, with more passengers (Canada and Belgium) and more members with special status (France, Spain and, in a different sense, Germany);

- competition between EPC and the Alliance as fora for consultation;

- continuing US penchant for unilateral initiatives, bilateral US/Soviet deals and gestures to keep Germany on-side;

### Implications for the UK

- the basic tactic for the UK is to cooperate with the key players (France, US and Germany). We must avoid being type-cast as the "anchor to windward" or as the focal point for vulnerable but less important allies (Turkey, Norway, Portugal). We need to reinforce the Berlin Four as the Alliance's Steering Group, for example through Representatives at NATO and by setting up a pol-mil group under the Four Political Directors (e.g. on Germany/NATO and the future of conventional and SNF arms control);

- we should build up political roles for NATO where credible (e.g. for coordination of verification and management of arms control). Woerner should be encouraged to maintain a high profile;

- we should give priority to consultation at 16 in areas where it can be productive (East-West security issues and non-proliferation) but not where Europe and the US have different approaches (Middle East and Central America). We should not allow the Alliance to bid to become the main forum for consultation with the US on issues handled in EPC, since

U.S.  
USSR  
UK  
FR.

it is doomed to lose. We therefore need a clear division of labour in relation to CSCE, with the Alliance running the security (and perhaps "democracy") aspects;

- we should not encourage the Alliance to seek new roles in relation to the environment, terrorism, drugs etc. But an ability to respond to natural disasters would be a powerful PR asset;

✓ - we should optimise Anglo-French cooperation, both for its own benefits and to discourage Germany from becoming the leader of the wet tendency in the Alliance. Given the extent of change in the Alliance and French concerns about Germany, we should look to the French to be more flexible in cooperating within the Alliance (though outside the integrated structure);

- we need a more sophisticated and credible presentation based on insurance against uncertainty and risk rather than on nuclear deterrence against a hypothetical Soviet attack on the central front (separate paper);

*But that will need an alliance and joint*

- in relation to the Warsaw Pact, what matters most is that Eastern Europeans should regain control of their own security policy. We should encourage that ethos in CSCE (no stationed forces without democratic sanction) and avoid treating the two alliances on the same footing. On that basis the survival of the Warsaw Pact would be no military threat and could be politically helpful, especially for Gorbachev. But the scope for real dialogue between the alliances as such (through "Secretary Generals" or between the 16 and the 7 as groups) remains very limited.

## C EUROPEAN SECURITY

### Likely evolution

✓ - growing interest in "cooperative security" (CSCE) first as a supplement and later as a substitute for the alliances;

✓ - US pressure for a stronger European role as part of the "New Atlanticism";

- a preference among European public opinion for European rather than NATO labels on defence activities.

### Implications for the UK

✓ - we should seek, with the French, to boost European defence cooperation as part of a more European Alliance, as an insurance against NATO's demise and as a corrective to pan-European enthusiasms. The prospects currently look poor. But in the long run as US forces reduce the Alliance may have to become a more obviously two-pillar structure, with a distinct European command (including French forces) linked to a smaller US command under a SACEUR who could be

alternately European or American;

- we should aim to collocate the main European bodies (WEU, Eurogroup and IEPG) in Brussels. This will keep open the option of grafting this activity onto the European Community in due course;

*Why? - One of the wishes of our alliance partners*

- we should replace the UK's special WEU commitment by a commitment on all WEU members to consult before reducing forces below post CFE levels;

- we should continue our efforts to build up European equipment cooperation (IEPG) with the main focus on UK, France and Germany. The most promising route is through open markets and reciprocal purchasing rather than collaborative projects based on juste retour. CFE and more multinationality point to the need for more standardisation and increased industrial specialisation (e.g. on tanks, fighter aircraft);

*This will nearly mean no buying from Germany*

- we need to decide how to balance the European and alliance aspects of verification. Coordination of inspections and collation of data should be done in the Alliance. But we should make the most of the scope for a major European role in, for example, swapping quotas, mounting joint inspections, operating aircraft, training inspectors and analysing data;

- we will need to grasp the European nuclear dilemma: do the British and French nuclear forces have relevance or credibility for the other Europeans? If the Germans are prepared to consult with the UK and France on nuclear matters, we should create a mechanism for this purpose. If not, we should develop the fullest possible cooperation with France, against the day when Europe may need extended deterrence from us;

*This strengthens the German nuclear role*

- security problems in Europe after CFE and the demise of the Warsaw Pact (eg in the Balkans) will probably be more susceptible to treatment through the CSCE (conciliation), the Community (aid and trade) and the Twelve than through military action. These instruments will also be important in building up a glacis of well-disposed East European countries. We should therefore:

- develop the Community's network of cooperation agreements as our main long term lever on adventurist regimes in Southern and Eastern Europe;

*Working in the EEC?*

- develop the CSCE process as a supplement not substitute for NATO (separate paper).

D ARMS CONTROL AGENDA  
Likely evolution

- assumption that arms control will continue in all five

main areas: strategic, theatre nuclear, conventional, CW and CSBMs;

- German pressure to accelerate arms reduction in order to ease unification.

#### Implications for the UK

- we should accept that conventional arms control will continue after CFE and that the arms control process has an important role in reassuring the Soviet Union, anchoring the Germans in NATO and giving a sense of security to the East Europeans. But before embarking on new negotiations we will need to be clear about objectives and mandates;

- in handling German pressures, we should bear in mind the electoral benefits for Kohl of showing that the Alliance is preparing in 1990 for future conventional and SNF negotiations.

- we should take an initiative to patent the idea of minimum deterrence as a lasting feature of European security;

- there is an opening for new ideas for conventional arms control after CFE with the focus on German unification and Soviet withdrawal. We should develop proposals for negotiations under the CSCE umbrella on:

- Central Europe: lower limits on all indigenous and stationed forces (US, UK, French, Benelux, Canadian, German, Soviet, Polish and Czech);
- Southern Europe, confidence building measures and limits specific to what may well be the most unstable zone;
- CSBMs for all of Europe: tighter constraints on military activities plus some naval CSBMs;
- specific measures to encourage stability: e.g. to limit mobilisation and force generation, logistics and air deployments.

#### CONCLUSIONS

6. The challenge to the West in the 90's arises not from Soviet strength and threats but from the effects of Soviet weakness and concessions. The test will come not in CFE or the Germany debate but after Nato has succeeded in these negotiations. The danger is that the West will then lose the cohesion which is necessary not only for our security but also for the management of EC-US relations and the world trading system (C/I US-Japan relations). The problem is, therefore, basically a West-West rather than an East-West one. Managing West-West relations will be harder as the US and FRG are pulled in different directions. Hence the importance of strengthening cooperation between the four close allies.

7. From the UK point of view the balance between the Four is at present unsatisfactory. The Bush Administration takes us too much for granted and is more concerned to keep in step with the FRG (as is France). Our military involvement in the FRG is also taken for granted: although an asset in the past, it risks being seen as a liability in our relations and an obstacle to German unity. Our links with France are under-developed, prone to accident and inhibited by our differences over the EC. This core relationship needs therefore to be readjusted, retaining our assets with the US and FRG, while building them up with France through the defence cooperation initiative now launched.

8. We cannot automatically assume that the Alliance will survive the powerful adverse trends now gathering force: on defence spending, anti-nuclear sentiment, pan-Europeanism and US neo-isolationism - not to mention the prospect of Oskar Lafontaine as Chancellor. This reinforces the case for HMG to give unequivocal support for Western European defence cooperation - whether to buttress the changed Alliance or to provide the best available successor to it.

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for POC: East/West P.T.I.

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# The End of History? \_\_\_\_\_

Francis Fukuyama \_\_\_\_\_

**I**N WATCHING the flow of events over the past decade or so, it is hard to avoid the feeling that something very fundamental has happened in world history. The past year has seen a flood of articles commemorating the end of the Cold War, and the fact that "peace" seems to be breaking out in many regions of the world. Most of these analyses lack any larger conceptual framework for distinguishing between what is essential and what is contingent or accidental in world history, and are predictably superficial. If Mr. Gorbachev were ousted from the Kremlin or a new Ayatollah proclaimed the millennium from a desolate Middle Eastern capital, these same commentators would scramble to announce the rebirth of a new era of conflict.

And yet, all of these people sense dimly that there is some larger process at work, a

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Francis Fukuyama is deputy director of the State Department's policy planning staff and former analyst at the RAND Corporation. This article is based on a lecture presented at the University of Chicago's John M. Olin Center for Inquiry Into the Theory and Practice of Democracy. The author would like to pay special thanks to the Olin Center and to Nathan Tarcov and Allan Bloom for their support in this and many earlier endeavors. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect those of the RAND Corporation or of any agency of the U.S. government.

process that gives coherence and order to the daily headlines. The twentieth century saw the developed world descend into a paroxysm of ideological violence, as liberalism contended first with the remnants of absolutism, then bolshevism and fascism, and finally an updated Marxism that threatened to lead to the ultimate apocalypse of nuclear war. But the century that began full of self-confidence in the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy seems at its close to be returning full circle to where it started: not to an "end of ideology" or a convergence between capitalism and socialism, as earlier predicted, but to an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism.

The triumph of the West, of the Western *idea*, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism. In the past decade, there have been unmistakable changes in the intellectual climate of the world's two largest communist countries, and the beginnings of significant reform movements in both. But this phenomenon extends beyond high politics and it can be seen also in the ineluctable spread of consumerist Western culture in such diverse contexts as the peasants' markets and color television sets now omnipresent throughout China, the cooperative restaurants and clothing stores opened in the past year in Moscow, the Beethoven piped into Japanese department stores, and the rock music enjoyed alike in Prague, Rangoon, and Tehran.

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. This is not to say that there will no longer be events to fill the pages of *Foreign Affairs's* yearly summaries of international relations, for the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in the real or material world. But there are powerful reasons for believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world *in the long run*. To understand how this is so, we must first consider some theoretical issues concerning the nature of historical change.

J

THE NOTION of the end of history is not an original one. Its best known propagator was Karl Marx, who believed that the direction of historical development was a purposeful one determined by the interplay of material forces, and would come to an end only with the achievement of a communist utopia that would finally resolve all prior contradictions. But the concept of history as a dialectical process with a beginning, a middle, and an end was borrowed by Marx from his great German predecessor, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

For better or worse, much of Hegel's historicism has become part of our contemporary intellectual baggage. The notion that mankind has progressed through a series of primitive stages of consciousness on his path to the present, and that these stages corresponded to concrete forms of social organization, such as tribal, slave-owning, theocratic, and finally democratic-egalitarian societies, has become inseparable from the modern understanding of man. Hegel was the first philosopher to speak the language of modern social science, insofar as man for him was the product of his concrete historical and social environment

and not, as earlier natural right theorists would have it, a collection of more or less fixed "natural" attributes. The mastery and transformation of man's natural environment through the application of science and technology was originally not a Marxist concept, but a Hegelian one. Unlike later historicists whose historical relativism degenerated into relativism *tout court*, however, Hegel believed that history culminated in an absolute moment—a moment in which a final, rational form of society and state became victorious.

It is Hegel's misfortune to be known now primarily as Marx's precursor, and it is our misfortune that few of us are familiar with Hegel's work from direct study, but only as it has been filtered through the distorting lens of Marxism. In France, however, there has been an effort to save Hegel from his Marxist interpreters and to resurrect him as the philosopher who most correctly speaks to our time. Among those modern French interpreters of Hegel, the greatest was certainly Alexandre Kojève, a brilliant Russian emigre who taught a highly influential series of seminars in Paris in the 1930s at the *École Pratique des Hautes Études*.<sup>1</sup> While largely unknown in the United States, Kojève had a major impact on the intellectual life of the continent. Among his students ranged such future luminaries as Jean-Paul Sartre on the Left and Raymond Aron on the Right; postwar existentialism borrowed many of its basic categories from Hegel via Kojève.

Kojève sought to resurrect the Hegel of the *Phenomenology of Mind*, the Hegel who proclaimed history to be at an end in 1806. For as early as this Hegel saw in Napoleon's defeat of the Prussian monarchy at the Battle of Jena the victory of the ideals of the French Rev-

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<sup>1</sup>Kojève's best-known work is his *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel* (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1947), which is a transcript of the *École Pratique* lectures from the 1930s. This book is available in English entitled *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* arranged by Raymond Queneau, edited by Allan Bloom, and translated by James Nichols (New York: Basic Books, 1969).

olution, and the imminent universalization of the state incorporating the principles of liberty and equality. Kojève, far from rejecting Hegel in light of the turbulent events of the next century and a half, insisted that the latter had been essentially correct.<sup>2</sup> The Battle of Jena marked the end of history because it was at that point that the *vanguard* of humanity (a term quite familiar to Marxists) actualized the principles of the French Revolution. While there was considerable work to be done after 1806—abolishing slavery and the slave trade, extending the franchise to workers, women, blacks, and other racial minorities, etc.—the basic *principles* of the liberal democratic state could not be improved upon. The two world wars in this century and their attendant revolutions and upheavals simply had the effect of extending those principles spatially, such that the various provinces of human civilization were brought up to the level of its most advanced outposts, and of forcing those societies in Europe and North America at the vanguard of civilization to implement their liberalism more fully.

The state that emerges at the end of history is liberal insofar as it recognizes and protects through a system of law man's universal right to freedom, and democratic insofar as it exists only with the consent of the governed. For Kojève, this so-called "universal homogeneous state" found real-life embodiment in the countries of postwar Western Europe—precisely those flabby, prosperous, self-satisfied, inward-looking, weak-willed states whose grandest project was nothing more heroic than the creation of the Common Market.<sup>3</sup> But this was only to be expected. For human history and the conflict that characterized it was based on the existence of "contradictions": primitive man's quest for mutual recognition, the dialectic of the master and slave, the transformation and mastery of nature, the struggle for the universal recognition of rights, and the dichotomy between proletarian and capitalist. But in the universal homogeneous state, all prior contradictions are resolved and all human needs are satisfied. There is no struggle or conflict over "large"

issues, and consequently no need for generals or statesmen; what remains is primarily economic activity. And indeed, Kojève's life was consistent with his teaching. Believing that there was no more work for philosophers as well, since Hegel (correctly understood) had already achieved absolute knowledge, Kojève left teaching after the war and spent the remainder of his life working as a bureaucrat in the European Economic Community, until his death in 1968.

To his contemporaries at mid-century, Kojève's proclamation of the end of history must have seemed like the typical eccentric solipsism of a French intellectual, coming as it did on the heels of World War II and at the very height of the Cold War. To comprehend how Kojève could have been so audacious as to assert that history has ended, we must first of all understand the meaning of Hegelian idealism.

## II

FOR HEGEL, the contradictions that drive history exist first of all in the realm of human consciousness, i.e. on the level of ideas<sup>4</sup>—not the trivial election year proposals of American politicians, but ideas in the sense of large unifying world views that might best be understood under the rubric of ideology. Ideology in this sense is not restricted to the secular and explicit political doctrines we usually associate with the term, but can include religion, culture, and the complex

<sup>2</sup>In this respect Kojève stands in sharp contrast to contemporary German interpreters of Hegel like Herbert Marcuse who, being more sympathetic to Marx, regarded Hegel ultimately as an historically bound and incomplete philosopher.

<sup>3</sup>Kojève alternatively identified the end of history with the postwar "American way of life," toward which he thought the Soviet Union was moving as well.

<sup>4</sup>This notion was expressed in the famous aphorism from the preface to the *Philosophy of History* to the effect that "everything that is rational is real, and everything that is real is rational."

moral values underlying any society as  
etc.

Hegel's view of the relationship between the ideal and the real or material worlds was an extremely complicated one, beginning with the fact that for him the distinction between the two was only apparent.<sup>5</sup> He did not believe that the real world conformed or could be made to conform to ideological preconceptions of philosophy professors in any simple-minded way, or that the "material" world could not impinge on the ideal. Indeed, Hegel the professor was temporarily thrown out of work as a result of a very material event, the Battle of Jena. But while Hegel's writing and thinking could be stopped by a bullet from the material world, the hand on the trigger of the gun was motivated in turn by the ideas of liberty and equality that had driven the French Revolution.

For Hegel, all human behavior in the material world, and hence all human history, is rooted in a prior state of consciousness—an idea similar to the one expressed by John Maynard Keynes when he said that the views of men of affairs were usually derived from defunct economists and academic scribblers of earlier generations. This consciousness may not be explicit and self-aware, as are modern political doctrines, but may rather take the form of religion or simple cultural or moral habits. And yet this realm of consciousness in the long run necessarily becomes manifest in the material world, indeed creates the material world in its own image. Consciousness is cause and not effect, and can develop autonomously from the material world; hence the real subtext underlying the apparent jumble of current events is the history of ideology.

Hegel's idealism has fared poorly at the hands of later thinkers. Marx reversed the priority of the real and the ideal completely, relegating the entire realm of consciousness—religion, art, culture, philosophy itself—to a "superstructure" that was determined entirely by the prevailing material mode of production. Yet another unfortunate legacy of Marxism is our tendency to retreat into materialist or utilitarian explanations of political

or historical phenomena, and our disinclination to believe in the autonomous power of ideas. A recent example of this is Paul Kennedy's hugely successful *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, which ascribes the decline of great powers to simple economic overextension. Obviously, this is true on some level: an empire whose economy is barely above the level of subsistence cannot bankrupt its treasury indefinitely. But whether a highly productive modern industrial society chooses to spend 3 or 7 percent of its GNP on defense rather than consumption is entirely a matter of that society's political priorities, which are in turn determined in the realm of consciousness.

The materialist bias of modern thought is characteristic not only of people on the Left who may be sympathetic to Marxism, but of many passionate anti-Marxists as well. Indeed, there is on the Right what one might label the *Wall Street Journal* school of deterministic materialism that discounts the importance of ideology and culture and sees man as essentially a rational, profit-maximizing individual. It is precisely this kind of individual and his pursuit of material incentives that is posited as the basis for economic life as such in economic textbooks.<sup>6</sup> One small example will illustrate the problematic character of such materialist views.

Max Weber begins his famous book, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, by noting the different economic performance of

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<sup>5</sup>Indeed, for Hegel the very dichotomy between the ideal and material worlds was itself only an apparent one that was ultimately overcome by the self-conscious subject; in his system, the material world is itself only an aspect of mind.

<sup>6</sup>In fact, modern economists, recognizing that man does not always behave as a profit-maximizer, posit a "utility" function, utility being either income or some other good that can be maximized: leisure, sexual satisfaction, or the pleasure of philosophizing. That profit must be replaced with a value like utility indicates the cogency of the idealist perspective.

Protestant and Catholic communities throughout Europe and America, summed up in the proverb that Protestants eat well while Catholics sleep well. Weber notes that according to any economic theory that posited man as a rational profit-maximizer, raising the piece-work rate should increase labor productivity. But in fact, in many traditional peasant communities, raising the piece-work rate actually had the opposite effect of *lowering* labor productivity: at the higher rate, a peasant accustomed to earning two and one-half marks per day found he could earn the same amount by working less, and did so because he valued leisure more than income. The choices of leisure over income, or of the militaristic life of the Spartan hoplite over the wealth of the Athenian trader, or even the ascetic life of the early capitalist entrepreneur over that of a traditional leisured aristocrat, cannot possibly be explained by the impersonal working of material forces, but come preeminently out of the sphere of consciousness—what we have labeled here broadly as ideology. And indeed, a central theme of Weber's work was to prove that contrary to Marx, the material mode of production, far from being the "base," was itself a "superstructure" with roots in religion and culture, and that to understand the emergence of modern capitalism and the profit motive one had to study their antecedents in the realm of the spirit.

As we look around the contemporary world, the poverty of materialist theories of economic development is all too apparent. The *Wall Street Journal* school of deterministic materialism habitually points to the stunning economic success of Asia in the past few decades as evidence of the viability of free market economies, with the implication that all societies would see similar development were they simply to allow their populations to pursue their material self-interest freely. Surely free markets and stable political systems are a necessary precondition to capitalist economic growth. But just as surely the cultural heritage of those Far Eastern societies, the ethic of work and saving and family, a religious heritage that does not, like Islam, place re-

strictions on certain forms of economic behavior, and other deeply ingrained moral qualities, are equally important in explaining their economic performance.<sup>7</sup> And yet the intellectual weight of materialism is such that not a single respectable contemporary theory of economic development addresses consciousness and culture seriously as the matrix within which economic behavior is formed.

FAILURE to understand that the roots of economic behavior lie in the realm of consciousness and culture leads to the common mistake of attributing material causes to phenomena that are essentially ideal in nature. For example, it is commonplace in the West to interpret the reform movements first in China and most recently in the Soviet Union as the victory of the material over the ideal—that is, a recognition that ideological incentives could not replace material ones in stimulating a highly productive modern economy, and that if one wanted to prosper one had to appeal to baser forms of self-interest. But the deep defects of socialist economies were evident thirty or forty years ago to anyone who chose to look. Why was it that these countries moved away from central planning only in the 1980s? The answer must be found in the consciousness of the elites and leaders ruling them, who decided to opt for the "Protestant" life of wealth and risk over the "Catholic" path of poverty and security.<sup>8</sup> That

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<sup>7</sup>One need look no further than the recent performance of Vietnamese immigrants in the U.S. school system when compared to their black or Hispanic classmates to realize that culture and consciousness are absolutely crucial to explain not only economic behavior but virtually every other important aspect of life as well.

<sup>8</sup>I understand that a full explanation of the origins of the reform movements in China and Russia is a good deal more complicated than this simple formula would suggest. The Soviet reform, for example, was motivated in good measure by Moscow's sense of *insecurity* in the tech-

... was in no way made inevitable by the material conditions in which either country found itself on the eve of the reform, but instead came about as the result of the victory of one idea over another."

For Kojève, as for all good Hegelians, understanding the underlying processes of history requires understanding developments in the realm of consciousness or ideas, since consciousness will ultimately remake the material world in its own image. To say that history ended in 1806 meant that mankind's ideological evolution ended in the ideals of the French or American Revolutions: while particular regimes in the real world might not implement these ideals fully, their theoretical truth is absolute and could not be improved upon. Hence it did not matter to Kojève that the consciousness of the postwar generation of Europeans had not been universalized throughout the world; if ideological development had in fact ended, the homogenous state would eventually become victorious throughout the material world.

I have neither the space nor, frankly, the ability to defend in depth Hegel's radical idealist perspective. The issue is not whether Hegel's system was right, but whether his perspective might uncover the problematic nature of many materialist explanations we often take for granted. This is not to deny the role of material factors as such. To a literal-minded idealist, human society can be built around any arbitrary set of principles regardless of their relationship to the material world. And in fact men have proven themselves able to endure the most extreme material hardships in the name of ideas that exist in the realm of the spirit alone, be it the divinity of cows or the nature of the Holy Trinity.<sup>10</sup>

But while man's very perception of the material world is shaped by his historical consciousness of it, the material world can clearly affect in return the viability of a particular state of consciousness. In particular, the spectacular abundance of advanced liberal economies and the infinitely diverse consumer culture made possible by them seem to both foster and preserve liberalism in the political

sphere. I want to avoid the materialist determinism that says that liberal economics inevitably produces liberal politics, because I believe that both economics and politics presuppose an autonomous prior state of consciousness that makes them possible. But that state of consciousness that permits the growth of liberalism seems to stabilize in the way one would expect at the end of history if it is underwritten by the abundance of a modern free market economy. We might summarize the content of the universal homogenous state as liberal democracy in the political sphere combined with easy access to VCRs and stereos in the economic.

### III

HAVE WE in fact reached the end of history? Are there, in other words, any fundamental "contradictions" in human life that cannot be resolved in the context of modern liberalism, that would be resolvable by an alternative political-economic structure? If we accept the idealist premises

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nological-military realm. Nonetheless, neither country on the eve of its reforms was in such a state of *material* crisis that one could have predicted the surprising reform paths ultimately taken.

"It is still not clear whether the Soviet peoples are as "Protestant" as Gorbachev and will follow him down that path.

"The internal politics of the Byzantine Empire at the time of Justinian revolved around a conflict between the so-called monophysites and monothelites, who believed that the unity of the Holy Trinity was alternatively one of nature or of will. This conflict corresponded to some extent to one between proponents of different racing teams in the Hippodrome in Byzantium and led to a not insignificant level of political violence. Modern historians would tend to seek the roots of such conflicts in antagonisms between social classes or some other modern economic category, being unwilling to believe that men would kill each other over the nature of the Trinity.

But above, we must seek an answer to this question in the realm of ideology and consciousness. Our task is not to answer exhaustively the challenges to liberalism promoted by every crackpot messiah around the world, but only those that are embodied in important social or political forces and movements, and which are therefore part of world history. For our purposes, it matters very little what strange thoughts occur to people in Albania or Burkina Faso, for we are interested in what one could in some sense call the common ideological heritage of mankind.

In the past century, there have been two major challenges to liberalism, those of fascism and of communism. The former saw the political weakness, materialism, anomie, and lack of community of the West as fundamental contradictions in liberal societies that could only be resolved by a strong state that forged a new "people" on the basis of national exclusiveness. Fascism was destroyed as a living ideology by World War II. This was a defeat, of course, on a very material level, but it amounted to a defeat of the idea as well. What destroyed fascism as an idea was not universal moral revulsion against it, since plenty of people were willing to endorse the idea as long as it seemed the wave of the future, but its lack of success. After the war, it seemed to most people that German fascism as well as its other European and Asian variants were bound to self-destruct. There was no material reason why new fascist movements could not have sprung up again after the war in other locales, but for the fact that expansionist ultranationalism, with its promise of unending conflict leading to disastrous military defeat, had completely lost its appeal. The ruins of the Reich chancellery as well as the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed this ideology on the level of consciousness as well as materially, and all of the proto-fascist movements spawned by the German and Japanese examples like the Peronist movement in Argentina or Subhas Chandra Bose's Indian National Army withered after the war.

The ideological challenge mounted by the

other great alternative to liberalism, communism, was far more serious. Marx, speaking Hegel's language, asserted that liberal society contained a fundamental contradiction that could not be resolved within its context, that between capital and labor, and this contradiction has constituted the chief accusation against liberalism ever since. But surely, the class issue has actually been successfully resolved in the West. As Kojève (among others) noted, the egalitarianism of modern America represents the essential achievement of the classless society envisioned by Marx. This is not to say that there are not rich people and poor people in the United States, or that the gap between them has not grown in recent years. But the root causes of economic inequality do not have to do with the underlying legal and social structure of our society, which remains fundamentally egalitarian and moderately redistributionist, so much as with the cultural and social characteristics of the groups that make it up, which are in turn the historical legacy of premodern conditions. Thus black poverty in the United States is not the inherent product of liberalism, but is rather the "legacy of slavery and racism" which persisted long after the formal abolition of slavery.

As a result of the receding of the class issue, the appeal of communism in the developed Western world, it is safe to say, is lower

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"I am not using the term "fascism" here in its most precise sense, fully aware of the frequent misuse of this term to denounce anyone to the right of the user. "Fascism" here denotes any organized ultra-nationalist movement with universalistic pretensions—not universalistic with regard to its nationalism, of course, since the latter is exclusive by definition, but with regard to the movement's belief in its right to rule other people. Hence Imperial Japan would qualify as fascist while former strongman Stoessner's Paraguay or Pinochet's Chile would not. Obviously fascist ideologies cannot be universalistic in the sense of Marxism or liberalism, but the structure of the doctrine can be transferred from country to country.



May than any time since the end of the First World War. This can be measured in any number of ways: in the declining membership and electoral pull of the major European communist parties, and their overtly revisionist programs; in the corresponding electoral success of conservative parties from Britain and Germany to the United States and Japan, which are unabashedly pro-market and anti-socialist; and in an intellectual climate whose most "advanced" members no longer believe that bourgeois society is something that ultimately needs to be overcome. This is not to say that the opinions of progressive intellectuals in Western countries are not deeply pathological in any number of ways. But those who believe that the future must inevitably be socialist tend to be very old, or very marginal to the real political discourse of their societies.

ONE MAY argue that the socialist alternative was never terribly plausible for the North Atlantic world, and was sustained for the last several decades primarily by its success outside of this region. But it is precisely in the non-European world that one is most struck by the occurrence of major ideological transformations. Surely the most remarkable changes have occurred in Asia. Due to the strength and adaptability of the indigenous cultures there, Asia became a battleground for a variety of imported Western ideologies early in this century. Liberalism in Asia was a very weak reed in the period after World War I; it is easy today to forget how gloomy Asia's political future looked as recently as ten or fifteen years ago. It is easy to forget as well how momentous the outcome of Asian ideological struggles seemed for world political development as a whole.

The first Asian alternative to liberalism to be decisively defeated was the fascist one represented by Imperial Japan. Japanese fascism (like its German version) was defeated by the force of American arms in the Pacific war, and liberal democracy was imposed on Japan by a victorious United States. Western capitalism and political liberalism when trans-

planted to Japan were adapted and transformed by the Japanese in such a way as to be scarcely recognizable.<sup>11</sup> Many Americans are now aware that Japanese industrial organization is very different from that prevailing in the United States or Europe, and it is questionable what relationship the factional maneuvering that takes place with the governing Liberal Democratic Party bears to democracy. Nonetheless, the very fact that the essential elements of economic and political liberalism have been so successfully grafted onto uniquely Japanese traditions and institutions guarantees their survival in the long run. More important is the contribution that Japan has made in turn to world history by following in the footsteps of the United States to create a truly universal consumer culture that has become both a symbol and an underpinning of the universal homogenous state. V.S. Naipaul travelling in Khomeini's Iran shortly after the revolution noted the omnipresent signs advertising the products of Sony, Hitachi, and JVC, whose appeal remained virtually irresistible and gave the lie to the regime's pretensions of restoring a state based on the rule of the *Shariat*. Desire for access to the consumer culture, created in large measure by Japan, has played a crucial role in fostering the spread of economic liberalism throughout Asia, and hence in promoting political liberalism as well.

The economic success of the other newly industrializing countries (NICs) in Asia following on the example of Japan is by now a familiar story. What is important from a Hegelian standpoint is that political liberalism has been following economic liberalism, more slowly than many had hoped but with seeming inevitability. Here again we see the vic-

<sup>11</sup>I use the example of Japan with some caution, since Kojève late in his life came to conclude that Japan, with its culture based on purely formal arts, proved that the universal homogenous state was not victorious and that history had perhaps not ended. See the long note at the end of the second edition of *Introduction à la Lecture de Hegel*, 462-3.

ory of the idea of the universal homogenous state. South Korea had developed into a modern, urbanized society with an increasingly large and well-educated middle class that could not possibly be isolated from the larger democratic trends around them. Under these circumstances it seemed intolerable to a large part of this population that it should be ruled by an anachronistic military regime while Japan, only a decade or so ahead in economic terms, had parliamentary institutions for over forty years. Even the former socialist regime in Burma, which for so many decades existed in dismal isolation from the larger trends dominating Asia, was buffeted in the past year by pressures to liberalize both its economy and political system. It is said that unhappiness with strongman Ne Win began when a senior Burmese officer went to Singapore for medical treatment and broke down crying when he saw how far socialist Burma had been left behind by its ASEAN neighbors.

**B**UT THE power of the liberal idea would seem much less impressive if it had not infected the largest and oldest culture in Asia, China. The simple existence of communist China created an alternative pole of ideological attraction, and as such constituted a threat to liberalism. But the past fifteen years have seen an almost total discrediting of Marxism-Leninism as an economic system. Beginning with the famous third plenum of the Tenth Central Committee in 1978, the Chinese Communist party set about decollectivizing agriculture for the 800 million Chinese who still lived in the countryside. The role of the state in agriculture was reduced to that of a tax collector, while production of consumer goods was sharply increased in order to give peasants a taste of the universal homogenous state and thereby an incentive to work. The reform doubled Chinese grain output in only five years, and in the process created for Deng Xiao-ping a solid political base from which he was able to extend the reform to other parts of the economy. Economic statistics do not begin to de-

scribe the dynamism, initiative, and openness evident in China since the reform began.

China could not now be described in any way as a liberal democracy. At present, no more than 20 percent of its economy has been marketized, and most importantly it continues to be ruled by a self-appointed Communist party which has given no hint of wanting to devolve power. Deng has made none of Gorbachev's promises regarding democratization of the political system and there is no Chinese equivalent of *glasnost*. The Chinese leadership has in fact been much more circumspect in criticizing Mao and Maoism than Gorbachev with respect to Brezhnev and Stalin, and the regime continues to pay lip service to Marxism-Leninism as its ideological underpinning. But anyone familiar with the outlook and behavior of the new technocratic elite now governing China knows that Marxism and ideological principle have become virtually irrelevant as guides to policy, and that bourgeois consumerism has a real meaning in that country for the first time since the revolution. The various slowdowns in the pace of reform, the campaigns against "spiritual pollution" and crackdowns on political dissent are more properly seen as tactical adjustments made in the process of managing what is an extraordinarily difficult political transition. By ducking the question of political reform while putting the economy on a new footing, Deng has managed to avoid the breakdown of authority that has accompanied Gorbachev's *perestroika*. Yet the pull of the liberal idea continues to be very strong as economic power devolves and the economy becomes more open to the outside world. There are currently over 20,000 Chinese students studying in the U.S. and other Western countries, almost all of them the children of the Chinese elite. It is hard to believe that when they return home to run the country they will be content for China to be the only country in Asia unaffected by the larger democratizing trend. The student demonstrations in Beijing that broke out first in December 1986 and recurred recently on the occasion of Hu Yao-bang's death were only the beginning of what will inev-

the mounting pressure for change in the political system as well.

What is important about China from the standpoint of world history is not the present state of the reform or even its future prospects. The central issue is the fact that the People's Republic of China can no longer act as a beacon for illiberal forces around the world, whether they be guerrillas in some Asian jungle or middle class students in Paris. Marxism, rather than being the pattern for Asia's future, became an anachronism, and it was the mainland Chinese who in fact were decisively influenced by the prosperity and dynamism of their overseas co-ethnics—the ironic ultimate victory of Taiwan.

Important as these changes in China have been, however, it is developments in the Soviet Union—the original “homeland of the world proletariat”—that have put the final nail in the coffin of the Marxist-Leninist alternative to liberal democracy. It should be clear that in terms of formal institutions, not much has changed in the four years since Gorbachev has come to power: free markets and the cooperative movement represent only a small part of the Soviet economy, which remains centrally planned; the political system is still dominated by the Communist party, which has only begun to democratize internally and to share power with other groups; the regime continues to assert that it is seeking only to modernize socialism and that its ideological basis remains Marxism-Leninism; and, finally, Gorbachev faces a potentially powerful conservative opposition that could undo many of the changes that have taken place to date. Moreover, it is hard to be too sanguine about the chances for success of Gorbachev's proposed reforms, either in the sphere of economics or politics. But my purpose here is not to analyze events in the short-term, or to make predictions for policy purposes, but to look at underlying trends in the sphere of ideology and consciousness. And in that respect, it is clear that an astounding transformation has occurred.

Emigres from the Soviet Union have been reporting for at least the last generation now

that virtually nobody in that country truly believed in Marxism-Leninism any longer, and that this was nowhere more true than in the Soviet elite, which continued to mouth Marxist slogans out of sheer cynicism. The corruption and decadence of the late Brezhnev-era Soviet state seemed to matter little, however, for as long as the state itself refused to throw into question any of the fundamental principles underlying Soviet society, the system was capable of functioning adequately out of sheer inertia and could even muster some dynamism in the realm of foreign and defense policy. Marxism-Leninism was like a magical incantation which, however absurd and devoid of meaning, was the only common basis on which the elite could agree to rule Soviet society.

WHAT HAS happened in the four years since Gorbachev's coming to power is a revolutionary assault on the most fundamental institutions and principles of Stalinism, and their replacement by other principles which do not amount to liberalism *per se* but whose only connecting thread is liberalism. This is most evident in the economic sphere, where the reform economists around Gorbachev have become steadily more radical in their support for free markets, to the point where some like Nikolai Shmelev do not mind being compared in public to Milton Friedman. There is a virtual consensus among the currently dominant school of Soviet economists now that central planning and the command system of allocation are the root cause of economic inefficiency, and that if the Soviet system is ever to heal itself, it must permit free and decentralized decision-making with respect to investment, labor, and prices. After a couple of initial years of ideological confusion, these principles have finally been incorporated into policy with the promulgation of new laws on enterprise autonomy, cooperatives, and finally in 1988 on lease arrangements and family farming. There are, of course, a number of fatal flaws in the current implementation of the reform, most notably the absence of a thoroughgoing price

form. But the problem is no longer a *central* one: Gorbachev and his lieutenants seem to understand the economic logic of marketization well enough, but like the leaders of a Third World country facing the IMF, are afraid of the social consequences of ending consumer subsidies and other forms of dependence on the state sector.

In the political sphere, the proposed changes to the Soviet constitution, legal system, and party rules amount to much less than the establishment of a liberal state. Gorbachev has spoken of democratization primarily in the sphere of internal party affairs, and has shown little intention of ending the Communist party's monopoly of power; indeed, the political reform seeks to legitimize and therefore strengthen the CPSU's rule.<sup>12</sup> Nonetheless, the general principles underlying many of the reforms—that the "people" should be truly responsible for their own affairs, that higher political bodies should be answerable to lower ones, and not vice versa, that the rule of law should prevail over arbitrary police actions, with separation of powers and an independent judiciary, that there should be legal protection for property rights, the need for open discussion of public issues and the right of public dissent, the empowering of the Soviets as a forum in which the whole Soviet people can participate, and of a political culture that is more tolerant and pluralistic—come from a source fundamentally alien to the USSR's Marxist-Leninist tradition, even if they are incompletely articulated and poorly implemented in practice.

Gorbachev's repeated assertions that he is doing no more than trying to restore the original meaning of Leninism are themselves a kind of Orwellian doublespeak. Gorbachev and his allies have consistently maintained that intraparty democracy was somehow the essence of Leninism, and that the various liberal practices of open debate, secret ballot elections, and rule of law were all part of the Leninist heritage, corrupted only later by Stalin. While almost anyone would look good compared to Stalin, drawing so sharp a line between Lenin and his successor is question-

able. The essence of Lenin's democratic centralism was centralism, not democracy; that is, the absolutely rigid, monolithic, and disciplined dictatorship of a hierarchically organized vanguard Communist party, speaking in the name of the *demos*. All of Lenin's vicious polemics against Karl Kautsky, Rosa Luxemburg, and various other Menshevik and Social Democratic rivals, not to mention his contempt for "bourgeois legality" and freedoms, centered around his profound conviction that a revolution could not be successfully made by a democratically run organization.

Gorbachev's claim that he is seeking to return to the true Lenin is perfectly easy to understand: having fostered a thorough denunciation of Stalinism and Brezhnevism as the root of the USSR's present predicament, he needs some point in Soviet history on which to anchor the legitimacy of the CPSU's continued rule. But Gorbachev's tactical requirements should not blind us to the fact that the democratizing and decentralizing principles which he has enunciated in both the economic and political spheres are highly subversive of some of the most fundamental precepts of both Marxism and Leninism. Indeed, if the bulk of the present economic reform proposals were put into effect, it is hard to know how the Soviet economy would be more socialist than those of other Western countries with large public sectors.

The Soviet Union could in no way be described as a liberal or democratic country now, nor do I think that it is terribly likely that *perestroika* will succeed such that the label will be thinkable any time in the near future. But at the end of history it is not necessary that all societies become successful liberal societies, merely that they end their ideological pretensions of representing different and higher forms of human society. And in this respect I believe that something very important has happened in the Soviet Union in the past few years: the criticisms of the Soviet

<sup>12</sup>This is not true in Poland and Hungary, however, whose Communist parties have taken moves toward true power-sharing and pluralism.

...em sanctioned by Gorbachev have been so thorough and devastating that there is very little chance of going back to either Stalinism or Brezhnevism in any simple way. Gorbachev has finally permitted people to say what they had privately understood for many years, namely, that the magical incantations of Marxism-Leninism were nonsense, that Soviet socialism was not superior to the West in any respect but was in fact a monumental failure. The conservative opposition in the USSR, consisting both of simple workers afraid of unemployment and inflation and of party officials fearful of losing their jobs and privileges, is outspoken and may be strong enough to force Gorbachev's ouster in the next few years. But what both groups desire is tradition, order, and authority; they manifest no deep commitment to Marxism-Leninism, except insofar as they have invested much of their own lives in it.<sup>15</sup> For authority to be restored in the Soviet Union after Gorbachev's demolition work, it must be on the basis of some new and vigorous ideology which has not yet appeared on the horizon.

IF WE ADMIT for the moment that the fascist and communist challenges to liberalism are dead, are there any other ideological competitors left? Or put another way, are there contradictions in liberal society beyond that of class that are not resolvable? Two possibilities suggest themselves, those of religion and nationalism.

The rise of religious fundamentalism in recent years within the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim traditions has been widely noted. One is inclined to say that the revival of religion in some way attests to a broad unhappiness with the impersonality and spiritual vacuity of liberal consumerist societies. Yet while the emptiness at the core of liberalism is most certainly a defect in the ideology—indeed, a flaw that one does not need the perspective of religion to recognize<sup>16</sup>—it is not at all clear that it is remediable through politics. Modern liberalism itself was historically a consequence of the weakness of religiously-based societies which, failing to agree on the nature

of the good life, could not provide even the minimal preconditions of peace and stability. In the contemporary world only Islam has offered a theocratic state as a political alternative to both liberalism and communism. But the doctrine has little appeal for non-Muslims, and it is hard to believe that the movement will take on any universal significance. Other less organized religious impulses have been successfully satisfied within the sphere of personal life that is permitted in liberal societies.

The other major "contradiction" potentially unresolvable by liberalism is the one posed by nationalism and other forms of racial and ethnic consciousness. It is certainly true that a very large degree of conflict since the Battle of Jena has had its roots in nationalism. Two cataclysmic world wars in this century have been spawned by the nationalism of the developed world in various guises, and if those passions have been muted to a certain extent in postwar Europe, they are still extremely powerful in the Third World. Nationalism has been a threat to liberalism historically in Germany, and continues to be one in isolated parts of "post-historical" Europe like Northern Ireland.

But it is not clear that nationalism represents an irreconcilable contradiction in the heart of liberalism. In the first place, nationalism is not one single phenomenon but several, ranging from mild cultural nostalgia to the highly organized and elaborately articulated doctrine of National Socialism. Only systematic nationalisms of the latter sort can qualify as a formal ideology on the level of liberalism or communism. The vast majority

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<sup>15</sup>This is particularly true of the leading Soviet conservative, former Second Secretary Yegor Ligachev, who has publicly recognized many of the deep defects of the Brezhnev period.

<sup>16</sup>I am thinking particularly of Rousseau and the Western philosophical tradition that flows from him that was highly critical of Lockean or Hobbesian liberalism, though one could criticize liberalism from the standpoint of classical political philosophy as well.

the world's nationalist movements do not have a political program beyond the negative desire of independence from some other group of people, and do not offer anything like a comprehensive agenda for socio-economic organization. As such, they are compatible with doctrines and ideologies that do offer such agendas. While they may constitute a source of conflict for liberal societies, this conflict does not arise from liberalism itself so much as from the fact that the liberalism in question is incomplete. Certainly a great deal of the world's ethnic and nationalist tension can be explained in terms of peoples who are forced to live in unrepresentative political systems that they have not chosen.

While it is impossible to rule out the sudden appearance of new ideologies or previously unrecognized contradictions in liberal societies, then, the present world seems to confirm that the fundamental principles of socio-political organization have not advanced terribly far since 1806. Many of the wars and revolutions fought since that time have been undertaken in the name of ideologies which claimed to be more advanced than liberalism, but whose pretensions were ultimately unmasked by history. In the meantime, they have helped to spread the universal homogeneous state to the point where it could have a significant effect on the overall character of international relations.

#### IV

WHAT ARE the implications of the end of history for international relations? Clearly, the vast bulk of the Third World remains very much mired in history, and will be a terrain of conflict for many years to come. But let us focus for the time being on the larger and more developed states of the world who after all account for the greater part of world politics. Russia and China are not likely to join the developed nations of the West as liberal societies any time in the foreseeable future, but suppose for a moment that Marxism-Leninism ceases to be a factor driving the foreign policies of these states—a pros-

pect which, if not yet here, the last few years have made a real possibility. How will the overall characteristics of a de-ideologized world differ from those of the one with which we are familiar at such a hypothetical juncture?

The most common answer is—not very much. For there is a very widespread belief among many observers of international relations that underneath the skin of ideology is a hard core of great power national interest that guarantees a fairly high level of competition and conflict between nations. Indeed, according to one academically popular school of international relations theory, conflict inheres in the international system as such, and to understand the prospects for conflict one must look at the shape of the system—for example, whether it is bipolar or multipolar—rather than at the specific character of the nations and regimes that constitute it. This school in effect applies a Hobbesian view of politics to international relations, and assumes that aggression and insecurity are universal characteristics of human societies rather than the product of specific historical circumstances.

Believers in this line of thought take the relations that existed between the participants in the classical nineteenth century European balance of power as a model for what a de-ideologized contemporary world would look like. Charles Krauthammer, for example, recently explained that if as a result of Gorbachev's reforms the USSR is shorn of Marxist-Leninist ideology, its behavior will revert to that of nineteenth century imperial Russia.<sup>16</sup> While he finds this more reassuring than the threat posed by a communist Russia, he implies that there will still be a substantial degree of competition and conflict in the international system, just as there was say between Russia and Britain or Wilhelmine Germany in the last century. This is, of course, a convenient point of view for people who want to admit that something major is chang-

<sup>16</sup>See his article, "Beyond the Cold War," *New Republic*, December 19, 1988.

the Soviet Union, but do not want to accept responsibility for recommending the radical policy redirection implicit in such a view. But is it true?

In fact, the notion that ideology is a superstructure imposed on a substratum of permanent great power interest is a highly questionable proposition. For the way in which any state defines its national interest is not universal but rests on some kind of prior ideological basis, just as we saw that economic behavior is determined by a prior state of consciousness. In this century, states have adopted highly articulated doctrines with explicit foreign policy agendas legitimizing expansionism, like Marxism-Leninism or National Socialism.

THE EXPANSIONIST and competitive behavior of nineteenth-century European states rested on no less ideal a basis: it just so happened that the ideology driving it was less explicit than the doctrines of the twentieth century. For one thing, most "liberal" European societies were illiberal insofar as they believed in the legitimacy of imperialism, that is, the right of one nation to rule over other nations without regard for the wishes of the ruled. The justifications for imperialism varied from nation to nation, from a crude belief in the legitimacy of force, particularly when applied to non-Europeans, to the White Man's Burden and Europe's Christianizing mission, to the desire to give people of color access to the culture of Rabelais and Molière. But whatever the particular ideological basis, every "developed" country believed in the acceptability of higher civilizations ruling lower ones—including, incidentally, the United States with regard to the Philippines. This led to a drive for pure territorial aggrandizement in the latter half of the century and played no small role in causing the Great War.

The radical and deformed outgrowth of nineteenth-century imperialism was German fascism, an ideology which justified Germany's right not only to rule over non-European peoples, but over *all* non-German ones. But

in retrospect it seems that Hitler represented a diseased bypath in the general course of European development, and since his fiery defeat, the legitimacy of any kind of territorial aggrandizement has been thoroughly discredited.<sup>17</sup> Since the Second World War, European nationalism has been defanged and shorn of any real relevance to foreign policy, with the consequence that the nineteenth-century model of great power behavior has become a serious anachronism. The most extreme form of nationalism that any Western European state has mustered since 1945 has been Gaullism, whose self-assertion has been confined largely to the realm of nuisance politics and culture. International life for the part of the world that has reached the end of history is far more preoccupied with economics than with politics or strategy.

The developed states of the West do maintain defense establishments and in the post-war period have competed vigorously for influence to meet a worldwide communist threat. This behavior has been driven, however, by an external threat from states that possess overtly expansionist ideologies, and would not exist in their absence. To take the "neo-realist" theory seriously, one would have to believe that "natural" competitive behavior would reassert itself among the OECD states were Russia and China to disappear from the face of the earth. That is, West Germany and France would arm themselves against each other as they did in the 1930s, Australia and New Zealand would send military advisers to block each others' advances in Africa, and the U.S.-Canadian border would become fortified. Such a prospect is, of course, ludicrous: minus Marxist-Leninist ideology, we are far more likely to see the "Common Marketization" of world politics than the disintegration of the EEC into nineteenth-century competitiveness.

<sup>17</sup>It took European colonial powers like France several years after the war to admit the illegitimacy of their empires, but decolonialization was an inevitable consequence of the Allied victory which had been based on the promise of a restoration of democratic freedoms.