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FM UKDEL NATO  
TO DESKBY 141600Z FCO  
TELNO 409  
OF 141255Z DECEMBER 89  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, UKDEL VIENNA

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

QUADRIPARTITE DINNER OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

SUMMARY

1. DISICSSION CENTRES ON DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE.  
DUMAS GIVES AN ACCOUNT OF DISCUSSIONS WITH GORBACHEV IN KIEV:  
PROBABLY THE FIRST TIME GENSCHER HAS HEARD OF THE TOUGH WAY IN WHICH  
GORBACHEV SPOKE. GENSCHER DESCRIBES HIS OWN TOUGH TALKS WITH  
GORBACHEV, IN WHICH GORBACHEV NONETHELESS INSISTED ON HIS DESIRE FOR  
GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE FRG. GENSCHER AND BAKER DESCRIBED THE MOOD  
IN THE GDR - WITH MODROW THE ONE CREDIBLE POLICITICAN WHO MIGHT  
ASSURE STABILITY IN THE RUN-UP TO THE MAY ELECTIONS. BOTH GENSCHER  
AND BAKER SAY THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT SOVIET BARRACKS  
HAVE COME UNDER ATTACK AND THAT EVEN THE RUSSIANS ATTRIBUTE THIS  
ONLY TO WHAT THEY HAVE BEEN TOLD BY THE GDR.

4-POWER MEETINGS ON BERLIN

2. AGREEMENT THAT MEETINGS SHOULD CONTINUE PERIODICALLY, WHEN  
NECESSARY. AGREEMENT (WITH SOME RELUCTANCE FROM GENSCHER) THAT WE  
SHOULD ALLOW THE RUSSIANS TO LET OFF STEAM IN THESE MEETINGS ABOUT  
THE SITUATION IN THE GDR BUT THAT WE OURSELVES SHOULD CONFINE OUR  
POINTS TO BERLIN ISSUES.

CSCE

3. AGREEMENT THAT WE SHOULD NOT RULE OUT A CSCE SUMMIT IN 1990 OR  
1991, PROVIDED IT IS PROPERLY PREPARED WITH A CLEAR WORK PROGRAMME.  
AGREEMENT THAT THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS OF THE FOUR SHOULD DISCUSS  
IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.

ALLIANCE ISSUES

4. AGREEMENT THAT THE 15 SHOULD TABLE THE ALLIANCE PROPOSALS ON 14 DECEMBER WITH OR WITHOUT GREEK ACQUIESCENCE. AGREEMENT THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO SHOULD RECEIVE SHEVARDNADZE DURING HIS VISIT TO BRUSSELS. SHEVARDNADZE SHOULD BE RECEIVED AS SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER, NOT AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE WARSAW PACT. THERE SHOULD BE NO MEETING BETWEEN SHEVARDNADZE AND THE NATO COUNCIL, THOUGH NO OBJECTION TO SHEVARDNADZE MEETING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES SOCIALLY. BAKER EXPANDS ON HIS SPEECH ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NATO. NO OBJECTION RAISED BY DUMAS.

CHINA

5. BAKER DESCRIBES THE VISIT OF SCOWCROFT AND EAGLEBURGER IN FAMILIAR TERMS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE BRIEFS COLLEAGUES ON OUR PROBLEMS WITH THE CHINESE OVER HONG KONG.

MIDDLE EAST

6. BRIEFING BY BAKER, SIMILAR TO WHAT HE TOLD THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN LONDON ON MONDAY.

PUBLIC LINE

7. AT THE END OF THE MEETING MINISTERS AGREED THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO SAY A LITTLE BIT MORE THAN USUAL ABOUT THEIR MEETING. THEY AGREED THAT, IN DESCRIBING THE MEETING, THEY SHOULD FOCUS ONLY ON BERLIN, THE GERMAN QUESTION AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS. THEY WOULD REFER TO THE ACCOUNT GIVEN OF RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND OF BAKER'S TALKS WITH MODROW. THEY WOULD CONFIRM THEIR SUPPORT FOR STABILITY IN EUROPE AND PEACEFUL PROGRESS TOWARDS DEMOCRACY IN THE GDR. THEY WOULD EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE PEOPLE IN THE GDR WOULD CONTINUE TO RESPOND IN A RESPONSIBLE, PEACEFUL WAY. BAKER SAID HE HOPED MINISTERS COULD ALSO REFER TO HIS IDEAS ON THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NATO AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CSCE. GENSCHER COMMENTED THAT A REFERENCE TO NATO COULD IRRITATE OTHER MEMBER STATES. BAKER TOOK THIS POINT AND IT WAS AGREED THAT IT WAS LEGITIMATE TO REFER TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CSCE (AS BEING DIRECTLY RELATED TO EAST/WEST ISSUES) BUT THAT NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE DISCUSSION OF NATO'S FUTURE ROLE.

8. DETAIL IN MY 5 IFTS. TEL ON CHINA TO FCO ONLY.

FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO 10

ALEXANDER

NNNN

SECRET

DEDIP BURNING BUSH

FM UKDEL NATO

TO DESKBY 141600Z FCO

TELNO 411

OF 141330Z DECEMBER 89

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, UKDEL VIENNA

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MY TELNO 409: QUADRIPARTITE DINNER OF FOREIGN MINISTERS:

CSCE

1. DUMAS SAID THAT MITTERRAND HAD INDICATED IN KIEV THAT HE WAS IN FAVOUR OF A HELSINKI SUMMIT IN 1990. THE QUESTION HAD ALSO BEEN POSED AT THE MALTA SUMMIT BUT DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE GIVEN RISE TO A CLEAR ANSWER.

2. BAKER SAID GORBACHEV HAD MADE THE PROPOSAL IN ITALY, IE BEFORE THE MALTA SUMMIT, WHERE IT HAD HARDLY BEEN DISCUSSED AT ALL. THE U S HAD SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT A HELSINKI SUMMIT IF IT WAS NOT WELL PREPARED AND HAD NO CLEAR WORK PROGRAMME. THERE WAS A PLACE FOR SUCH A MEETING BUT WE NEEDED TO FIND OUT MORE ABOUT WHAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD IN MIND. THE PRESIDENT HAD RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF SIGNING THE CFE AGREEMENT AT HEAD OF GOVERNMENT LEVEL AND THERE WAS OBVIOUS SCOPE FOR THE 12 BEING PRESENT. THE U S, AS HE HIMSELF HAD MADE CLEAR IN HIS SPEECH THE PREVIOUS DAY, WAS IN FAVOUR OF MAKING BETTER USE OF THE CSCE, ESPECIALLY THE ECONOMIC BASKET, WHICH WAS UNDER-DEVELOPED. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED. THERE WERE ARGUMENTS INFAVOUR OF A SUMMIT AND IN FAVOUR OF BUILDING ON THE CSCE PROCESS. IF THERE WAS GOING TO BE A SUMMIT, IT MUST BE PROPERLY PREPARED WITH A NEW PURPOSE AND PREPARATORY WORK. IT WOULD BE A PITY TO HAVE A SUMMIT WHICH WAS JUST A PIECE OF THEATRE FOR THE SOVIETS. BAKER INTERJECTED THAT THIS WAS PARTICULARLY SO IF THE RUSSIANS USED THE SUMMIT AS A MEANS OF PUTTING A DAMPER ON SELF-DETERMINATION.

3. GENSCHER SAID WE SHOULD ADOPT A POSITIVE STANCE IN PRINCIPLE AND CLEARLY DEFINE OUR OBJECTIVES AND WHAT THE RESULTS SHOULD BE. THE SUMMIT WOULD ONLY MAKE SENSE IF WE WANTED FURTHER PROGRESS IN CSCE. WE SHOULD NOT GET OURSELVES INTO A DEFENSIVE POSITION. WE SHOULD BE POSITIVE AND NOT NEGATIVE. POLITICAL DIRECTORS OF THE FOUR SHOULD GET TOGETHER AND THINK ABOUT WHAT INPUT THE WEST COULD MAKE SO THAT WE HAD SOMETHING UP OUR SLEEVES WHEN THE SOVIETS TABLED A CLEAR PROPOSAL.

4. DUMAS SAID THAT, WITHOUT DISREGARDING ANYTHING THAT HAD BEEN SAID, WE MUST REALISE THAT GORBACHEV WAS THE DEMANDEUR BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTIES HE FACED. IF WE WANTED TO HELP HIM, THEN WE SHOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY, ALBEIT WITH THE CAVEATS THAT OTHERS HAD MENTIONED. BAKER SAID THAT HIS MAIN RESERVATION WAS ABOUT SIGNING UP TO SOMETHING WHICH WE KNEW VERY LITTLE ABOUT. HE AGREED ON INITIAL DISCUSSION AMONG THE 4 POLITICAL DIRECTORS BUT THIS SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY WIDER DISCUSSION WITH OTHER NATO COLLEAGUES. HE WAS NOT COMMITTED TO 1990. IT MIGHT TURN OUT THAT EARLY 1991 WAS BETTER. WE SHOULD WORK UP OUR IDEAS, INCLUDING THE ANGLO/US PROPOSAL ON FREE ELECTIONS. BAKER AGAIN EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ECONOMIC BASKET. COUNTRIES LIKE THE SOVIET UNION WERE SIMPLY NOT GEARED UP TO DEALING WITH THE IMF OR THE IBRD, WHEREAS THE CSCE MIGHT PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC DISCUSSION.

FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO 10

ALEXANDER

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