



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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*R. Austin*

17 May 1989

*Dear Charles,*

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Mr Baker's NATO Briefing on his visit to Moscow,  
12 May 1989

Mr Baker gave a briefing on his visit to Moscow to the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 12 May. The briefing covered the main points which came up during his discussions with Mr Shevardnadze and Mr Gorbachev, but he also circulated a fuller speaking note of which I enclose a copy. The note contains what appears to be a full account of Mr Baker's meetings with Mr Shevardnadze and Mr Gorbachev and is worth reading in detail. The following paragraphs summarise the main points of interest emerging from the briefing.

The atmosphere of Mr Baker's meetings with Mr Shevardnadze and Mr Gorbachev was very positive. Mr Baker felt he had established a friendly, personal relationship with Mr Shevardnadze, and had laid the foundations for regular future Ministerials. The standard four-part agenda extended to cover the fifth item - transnational issues. Mr Baker stressed that President Bush wanted US policy towards the Soviet Union to be marked by "much continuity". He also conveyed to Mr Gorbachev a strong message from President Bush in support of perestroika.

In discussion on Eastern Europe, Mr Shevardnadze said that the division of Europe was one of the biggest political blunders of Eastern leaders, and that although there was a time when the Russians had encouraged Eastern Europe to adopt a Soviet model that had resulted in "negative consequences". For some reason Mr Baker did not cover this revealing point at his Brussels briefing but it is in the notes which were circulated.

On human rights, which the US had put high of their priority list, Mr Shevardnadze said that the Russians were seeking a "zero option" on individual cases.

On regional conflicts, there was a hint of possible moves towards accommodation over Central America and what Mr Baker described as very good discussions on the Middle East peace process. On Libya, Mr Shevardnadze said that the Russians had halted arms supplies except for those being provided under existing commitments. Shevardnadze is described as being "sensitive" to Western concern about hi-tech weaponry there.

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He claimed that the SU24 (Fencer) was not a long-range aircraft - an assessment which we do not accept.


On arms control, you will already be aware of the key points from Moscow Telno 788 and the press.

The two sides agreed to establish a working group on trans-national issues and have drawn up a programme covering the environment, natural disasters, terrorism and drugs.

The main feature of the meeting with Gorbachev was Mr Gorbachev's initiative over the reduction of tactical warheads and the new Soviet package at CFE, on which Mr Baker stressed the need for a concerted Allied response. Mr Gorbachev's comments on perestroika (a "process ..... more painful than expected" in which "more dramatic difficulties" were in store) and his desire to maintain steady rather than sudden progress were in line with what he said to the Prime Minister a month ago.

The enclosed note, and UKDel NATO's account of Mr Baker's briefing, confirm that Mr Baker's visit to Moscow provided an opportunity for a very extensive review of the US/Soviet dialogue. While Mr Gorbachev evidently used the opportunity to steal the limelight with fresh arms control proposals, this did not impair the businesslike and positive nature of the exchange. Mr Shevardnadze appears to have spoken very frankly on Eastern Europe. Although his remarks seem to be in accordance with the current permissive Soviet attitude to developments in Hungary and Poland, they go further than a number of recent official statements and also contrast with remarks such as those made by Falin recently in Vienna when he referred to "the Americans' mistake in dividing Germany 45 years ago".

The possibility of a US/Soviet summit receives no mention in the briefing and is clearly not at the top of President Bush's agenda.

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Baker's briefing of NAC, 12/5 - Special  
 1) fax (desuby) to Soviet Dept (Mr. [unclear])  
 ii) cc / me  
     / Mr. McEwen

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May 12, 1989

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BRIEFING POINTS ON MOSCOW MINISTERIALIntroduction

- I am happy to be here to brief you on the results of two days of interesting discussions in Moscow.
- President Bush wants U.S.-Soviet relations to be active, constructive, positive and expanding, and that is how I would characterize my discussions in the Soviet capital.
  - o Active in that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and I had two plenaries with our delegations, five smaller meetings and a session with Chairman Gorbachev. We were supported, moreover, by working groups on each element of our comprehensive agenda.
  - o Constructive and positive in that we had productive discussions on a range of issues. Certainly differences remain, but it is possible to see significantly greater convergence of views on several questions.
  - o And expanding in that we are addressing issues in greater depth than before.
- The highpoint of the meeting was a lengthy session with Gorbachev on the second day, where he previewed new moves on conventional forces and SNF. I will address these later.
- Over the past two days, Shevardnadze and I established a foundation for both continuity and change in our five-part agenda.
  - o We have begun to broaden the list of topics we will address together while deepening our engagement on issues that we have discussed in the past.
  - o For example, we want to devote greater attention to regional conflicts and chemical weapons and missile proliferation. But this will not come at the expense of other elements of our agenda, such as human rights and the more traditional arms control issues.
- I explained that the President and I welcome perestroika, glasnost and the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy. They have contributed to a changing political environment, one which offers an opportunity for our two countries to expand the arena of our constructive interaction.
- During our meetings, the U.S. and Soviet Union sought to adapt old policy frameworks as well as develop new ones to fit the changing times. By forging structures for future discussions, we hope to systematize our ongoing cooperation.

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-- Let me add some specifics on my meetings in Moscow.

Overall Approach

- When Ambassador Ridgway was here on Monday, she shared with you some results of our recently concluded review of U.S.-Soviet relations. When I met with Gorbachev, I delivered a letter from President Bush that outlined some of those results and described how the President would like to see U.S.-Soviet relations develop.
- The President wrote Gorbachev that we had carefully considered what was going on in the USSR today, and that we applaud perestroika, while recognizing that its success ultimately will depend on the Soviet Union's own decisions.
- The President noted that there would be much continuity in U.S. policy toward the USSR; we want to build on the considerable progress that has been achieved since 1985, while expanding our agenda to address new problems.
- I told the Soviets there might also be some differences in emphasis in our approach to U.S.-Soviet relations and the previous Administration's.
- We believe we may be at a point in our relationship where it is possible to begin thinking in more ambitious terms, to begin to move toward a more sustainable, cooperative and predictable relationship.
- In an early session with Shevardnadze, I informed him that the President would visit Poland and Hungary prior to attending the Paris economic summit, noting our interest in the reforms in those countries.
- In reply, Shevardnadze made two interesting comments:
  - o The division of Europe was one of the biggest political blunders of Eastern leaders, and
  - o There was a time when the Soviets had encouraged Eastern Europe to adopt the Soviet model, but that had resulted in "negative consequences."
- Let me now turn to individual issues on the agenda.

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### Human Rights

- Human rights was high on our list of priorities. This has become an integral part of our agenda; our dialogue is increasingly positive and constructive.
- We sought further progress on individual cases and pressed for institutionalization of reform in Soviet society.
- First, the Soviets gave us the names of individuals who will now be free to emigrate. There is more to do, however, on remaining refusenik cases, which involve about 500 families.
  - o On individual cases, Shevardnadze said the Soviets were seeking a "zero" option. He noted that some secrecy constraints still apply, but that the situation was changing.
- Second, we have agreed in principle on a mechanism for the exchange of information on criminal cases in one country which the other believes to be political in nature.
- Third, the Soviets reported on progress in drafting new laws regarding freedom of conscience and entry/exit regulations that would affect emigration.
  - o ~~We understand that these will be taken up by the new Supreme Soviet once it convenes.~~
- Finally, we agreed to future projects in three areas:
  - o Continuing our rule of law discussions, which involve, for example, Soviet trial judges attending sessions in the U.S. and experts seminars on specific civil liberties and due process issues.
  - o Human rights and humanitarian issues arising on the international scene, particularly as they are dealt with in international organizations, for example the problems of Sudan relief.
  - o Our respective experiences in dealing with social issues, especially intergroup relations such as race and nationality questions.

### Regional Conflicts

- Our regional talks made headway in crafting common bases for U.S.-Soviet cooperation to try to resolve a number of regional conflicts. We challenged the Soviets to make their actions consonant with statements of "new thinking."

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- It is clear that we still have substantive differences with the Soviets, but they say they are ready to explore with us how we might facilitate resolution of certain conflicts.
  - o We have agreed in principle to an early new round of bilateral meetings of regional experts. These will cover Africa, Middle East, Central America, Afghanistan and East Asia and the Pacific.
- Turning to individual conflicts, Central America was the first question on our regional agenda. The President is personally engaged and wrote Gorbachev in late March.
- We had a good exchange and are encouraged that the Soviets seem to understand our concerns and may be willing to take steps to support our effort to give diplomacy a chance.
- Gorbachev has informed us that the Soviet Union ceased delivery of arms to Nicaragua as of the end of 1988. We're checking this; if true, it would be a positive step.
- But, as I told Shevardnadze and Gorbachev, it would not resolve our full concerns. In particular, we look to Moscow to cut back shipments of other material that supports Nicaragua's already large armed forces and to exert its influence with both Managua and Havana to curb subversive activity and implement the Esquipulas and Tesoro accords.
- I described some benefits that would result from a more cooperative Soviet stance: it would have a positive impact on American attitudes toward the USSR and could remove an obstacle to Moscow's effort to improve relations with other Latin American countries.
- ~~I also informed Shevardnadze that, if Nicaragua takes positive steps, the U.S. is prepared to respond in terms of:~~
  - o normalizing relations with Managua,
  - o recognizing the Sandinista government if it is fairly and freely elected,
  - o supporting outside economic assistance to the entire region, and
  - o reducing U.S. military assistance to Nicaragua's neighbors once a regional military balance has been restored.

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- Shevardnadze, while unsurprisingly defending Nicaragua, commented that the U.S. approach was a good basis for further dialogue.
- Shevardnadze predictably raised Afghanistan. He reasserted Soviet interest in achieving a peaceful settlement and charged Pakistan with violations of the Geneva Accords.
- He also suggested that consideration be given to a coalition government that included representation by the Kabul regime. I replied that it was clear the Mujahidin will not accept a coalition government: the issue is one of power-transfer not power-sharing.
- We also reiterated that the U.S. did not desire an Afghanistan that is hostile to the USSR, but an independent regime that has normal relations with its northern neighbor.
- Shevardnadze suggested a ceasefire and a regional conference as a means of putting together a new government. We responded that such a conference would not be feasible for the simple reason that the Mujahidin are not about to sit down with the Kabul regime.
- We had a very good discussion on the Middle East peace process. I noted that Shamir's new elections proposal might be a way to launch a political negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians.
- I stressed that Shamir's plan went beyond Camp David agreement in that it accepted the possibility of a political negotiation that would ultimately address the permanent status of the occupied territories.
- We urged the Soviets to move toward ties with Israel and to use their influence with Syria and the PLO to promote an Arab-Israeli dialogue.
- Shevardnadze made clear that the Soviets have not dismissed the Shamir plan. He agreed it contained positive elements, while other points needed clarification.
- However, he asked whether an international conference could be pursued in parallel with the elections plan. He also floated the idea of a four-party meeting including the U.S., USSR, Israel and the PLO.

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- I responded that such approaches were not practical now, as Israel would not take part. I added that, while a properly structured international conference might be useful at an appropriate time and in the right circumstances, it would be premature now.
- During our Middle East discussion, I also reiterated our concern that the Soviets had provided SU-24 aircraft to Libya.
- 11 -- Shevardnadze claimed the SU-24 was not a long-range aircraft. More interestingly, he said that the Soviets have halted arms deliveries to Libya, except for those being provided under existing commitments, and was sensitive to Western concerns about high-tech weaponry there. We'll be watching to see if this is the reality.
- We also briefly touched on Iran. I explained our outrage at Rafsanjani's call to kill American, British and French citizens.
- Shevardnadze defended his country's relationship with Tehran, and said Moscow would be alert to Western concerns in concluding arms sales. He said that Iran is pressing for a broader military relationship, as it sees itself surrounded by military threats.
- We also briefly reviewed the situation in Lebanon. We and the Soviets agree on the need for a ceasefire and on building on Arab League efforts to develop a long-term solution. We issued a joint appeal on this.

Arms Control

- We had a productive discussion on a wide range of arms control issues.
- We began by describing some of the principles underlying the Bush Administration's approach to arms control. These include stability, equality, predictability, effective verification, compliance and the need to take account of our Allies' security.
- We emphasized that we were not pursuing reductions for their own sake, but that reductions should be carefully structured so as to enhance stability.

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- We addressed the question of resumption of the Nuclear and Space Talks. We have agreed to resume negotiations in Geneva in the second ten days of June for a period of about six weeks, with the exact date to be set through diplomatic channels. After that we will break and resume again in mid-September for a longer session.
- As for substance, we told the Soviets we were prepared to proceed on the basis of the START joint draft treaty text, while reserving the right to introduce new ideas and other changes.
- We did not go into specifics, noting that our review was still underway. We did assure the Soviets that we would return to Geneva with a full position, and they did not press to discuss specifics.
- On defense and space, we stated that we should build upon the Washington Summit Joint Statement language, while noting that the sides have different interpretations that will have to be tackled.
- Shevardnadze reiterated the Soviet view that a START Treaty is conditioned on observance of the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972. He specifically stated that this meant the "narrow" interpretation.
- We stressed the view that, if we are able to reach agreement in START, the agreement should be implemented without linkage to progress on Defense and Space.
- We also made clear our position that the goals of SDI are unchanged, and that we remain determined to assess what is feasible and to deploy defenses against ballistic missiles based on advanced technologies that would strengthen deterrence and stability.
- We made clear the need to correct Krasnoyarsk, a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty, and restated our policy that we cannot conclude strategic arms agreements until this violation has been corrected.
- Shevardnadze offered to dismantle the radar "totally" if the U.S. agreed to "preserve" the ABM Treaty and observe the "narrow" interpretation.
- As a matter of principle, we rejected linking a resolution of the illegal radar at Krasnoyarsk to adherence to the "narrow interpretation" of the ABM Treaty. That deployment is illegal under any and every interpretation of the Treaty.

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- We told the Soviets that we no longer considered the ABM radars at Gomel to be deployed in violation of the ABM Treaty. We made very clear, however, our view that agreements must be scrupulously adhered to.
- In this connection, we noted that the Soviets have not fully carried out the dismantlement steps specified in December at the SCC, and we identified the remaining steps necessary to put the Gomel problem behind us.
- We agreed the next session of the SCC will begin in mid-June.
- On nuclear testing, we agreed to resume negotiations in Geneva on June 26. Both countries are interested in moving forward expeditiously to complete the verification protocols to the PNET and TTBT.
- We talked about the problem of chemical weapons and agreed our experts would meet on the margins of the CD.
- Consistent with our new emphasis on curbing proliferation, we have agreed to meet to discuss CW proliferation as well.
- We also discussed missile technology proliferation. In response to my question as to whether the Soviets had changed their position on joining the MTCR, Shevardnadze replied that the Soviets remained equally interested in curbing missile proliferation.
- He called for an international program covering both suppliers and receiving states, saying the Soviets could informally abide by a regime of non-supply if we were prepared to discuss improving the control parameters and expanding it to involve other countries.
- Shevardnadze raised SNF and urged negotiations. We reiterated our well-known views on this question. We got into this question with Gorbachev as well, to which I will return in a moment.
- I urged the Soviets to publish more information on their military budget, noting it was difficult to assess the value of a 14% cut when one did not know the baseline.
- Interestingly, Shevardnadze agreed. He noted that they had problems with their military budget and had to get the baseline figures out in the open

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### Transnational Issues

- I went to Moscow with an agenda of transnational issues -- the environment, counterterrorism, natural hazard reduction and narcotics control -- where we felt we could lay the basis for future cooperation with the Soviets.
- Shevardnadze and I agreed to establish a separate working group on these issues, and it then developed a work program with targets for meetings and other activities in all four of these areas.
- In the environmental area, yesterday afternoon Shevardnadze and I signed an Agreement on Combatting Pollution in the Bering and Chukchi Seas, designed to help us deal with oil spills and the like in that area of the world.
- We also discussed the need for continued cooperation on global climate change, both bilaterally and in such international fora as the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change).
- On counterterrorism, we agreed that our experts should get together in June to explore practical ways of cooperating, and we set target dates for meetings of experts on the related topics of air and maritime transportation safety.
- On narcotics control, we agreed to get cracking with steps to implement our January agreement on combatting international trafficking.
- Finally, on natural hazard reduction, with the Armenian earthquake still very much in our minds, we agreed to work both bilaterally and multilaterally on ways to improve our capacity to deal with disasters of this sort. The Soviets to us they will be putting more resources into the UN disaster relief organization, for instance.
- All in all, I think we made a good start in this important emerging area, and we intend to build on it.

### Bilateral Matters

- In the bilateral area, our experts went over the issues and activities on the agenda from top to bottom; made progress on some; and came up with a work program of twenty-three items which Shevardnadze and I approved.

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- Some of these are bread-and-butter issues of the kind we all have, but others are more ambitious.
- For instance, we are finishing up amendments or new agreements on civil aviation -- to expand flights to help with increased emigration -- and on atomic energy cooperation and world oceans research.
- We also agreed to try to conclude negotiations on opening new cultural and information centers as soon as possible, though the Soviets made clear this would be after they settled with France in anticipation of President Mitterrand's visit.
- We also had an interesting exchange on how we might engage a dialogue on domestic developments in our two countries, which could be a potential learning device for the Soviets as reform proceeds.

#### Gorbachev Meeting

- I had a very interesting discussion with Chairman Gorbachev, lasting more than three hours.
- We began with a private session between myself, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze.
- Gorbachev described the current state of perestroika.
  - o He said the Soviet Union was undergoing a profound process and revolutionary changes. He conceded the process was more painful than expected; the problems were not just with the bureaucracy, and mistakes had been made.
  - o He noted that the USSR was working toward new forms of socialism. There were debates on the tactics of perestroika: the Soviets were trying to avoid extremes and maintain a steady course, bearing in mind that earlier periods of rapid breakthroughs -- the USSR in the 1930s and China in the 1960s with the Great Leap Forward -- had been followed by backward lapses.
  - o He expressed confidence that, while the Soviet Union was in a difficult period and more dramatic difficulties were in store, perestroika would succeed.
- I responded by noting the U.S. wants to see perestroika succeed, while recognizing this depends on the Soviets.

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- I made clear that President Bush desired to have an active, constructive, positive and expanding dialogue, one that increasingly moved toward cooperation.
- We briefly reviewed our agreements to resume arms negotiations. Gorbachev repeated standard Soviet views on ALCMs, SLCMs and the link between a START Treaty and the ABM Treaty, as well as Soviet interest in a nuclear testing ban and a CW convention, but we did not go into specifics.
- After noting that the Vienna conventional talks were off to a good start, Gorbachev then "previewed" the details of the Warsaw Pact's proposal to be introduced this round. (Just after we left Moscow, Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers arrived, presumably to "bless" the new position.)
- Under the proposal, NATO and the Warsaw Pact would reduce the numbers of their armed forces and armaments in Europe by 1996-1997 so that there would be the following equal residual levels:
  - o personnel strength: 1,350,000 men
  - o frontal aviation (tactical) combat aircraft: 1500
  - o combat helicopters: 1700
  - o tanks: 20,000
  - o artillery, mortars and multiple launch rocket systems: 24,000
  - o infantry fighting vehicles: 28,000
- Gorbachev stated, that as a result of this proposal, each side would have to undertake major reductions. He offered the following examples of the reductions that would result:
  - o Each military alliance would reduce its armed forces by more than 1,000,000 men.
  - o NATO would reduce combat aircraft and combat helicopters by approximately 2500 each. The Warsaw Pact would also reduce such systems, but by lesser amounts.
  - o The Warsaw Pact would reduce tanks by 40,000, artillery and mortars by approximately 46,000 and infantry fighting vehicles by approximately 42,000. NATO would reduce such systems by lesser amounts.

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- Gorbachev then stated that the Soviet Union had taken the decision unilaterally to withdraw 500 warheads of tactical nuclear systems from the territory of its allies to the USSR in 1989. He broke this down as 284 from tactical missiles, 166 from aircraft and 50 from artillery.
- Gorbachev stated that the Soviet Union was ready to resolve radically the SNF question by not deploying nuclear warheads for tactical weapons outside of one's national territory. The Soviet Union was ready during 1989-1991 to withdraw from the territory of its allies to the USSR all such nuclear warheads provided the U.S. took an analagous step in response.
- Gorbachev pressed for negotiations on short-range nuclear forces, arguing they should proceed in parallel with the conventional negotiations in Europe.
- I told Gorbachev that we understood that proposals for negotiations make good politics, but that we could not play politics with the security of the Alliance.
- The Soviets have vast conventional superiority and will continue to do so even after the reductions they have announced are implemented. Currently we do not know whether CFE will succeed in removing this imbalance or when that might be accomplished. Before we get to the question of negotiations, the conventional imbalance must be reduced, if not corrected.
- I also noted, in particular, the crucial role nuclear weapons play in NATO's flexible response strategy, which has been successful in keeping the peace and ensuring the security of the Alliance.
- We believe unilateral steps on both sides are a better solution to the SNF problem. So I suggested that we focus on the unilateral reductions that should be made.

Closing

- In sum, it was ~~a very productive two days.~~ As you can see, we have reengaged across the entire agenda: formal arms negotiations in June, experts meetings on regional and transnational questions, continuing contacts on human rights and a very active bilateral program.
- We have a solid framework and plenty of substance for moving ahead in U.S.-Soviet relations. In the coming months, we will be working to tackle the tough issues and add even more substance to that framework.