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NAC 12 MAY: SECRETARY BAKER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

SUMMARY

1. BAKER BRIEFS NAC ON HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON PUBLIC LINE TO BE TAKEN BY ALLIES IN RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV'S LATEST ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES.

DETAIL

2. BAKER BRIEFED THE NAC THIS MORNING ON HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW. A NUMBER OF OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS WERE PRESENT. RIDGWAY AND BARTHOLEMW HAD GIVEN THE NAC AN ADVANCE BRIEFING ON 8 MAY (UKDEL NATO TELNO 144: NOT TO ALL). THIS TELEGRAM RECORDS BAKER'S BRIEFING, MIFT THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. BAKER'S DETAILED SPEAKING NOTE (FAXED TO SOVIET DEPT) WAS CIRCULATED AFTER THE MEETING: IN THE COUNCIL HE DREW OUT ONLY THE MAIN POINTS.

GENERAL

3. BAKER SAID THAT HE HAD HAD A TOTAL OF THREE AND A HALF HOURS WITH GORBACHEV. HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV HAD BEEN PRODUCTIVE, CONSTRUCTIVE AND USEFUL. HE HAD ESTABLISHED A FRIENDLY PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH SHEVARDNADZE. HIS MEETING HAD LAID THE FOUNDATIONS FOR REGULAR FUTURE MINISTERIALS. HE HAD TOLD THE RUSSIANS THAT THE U S WANTED THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO BE QUOTE CONSTRUCTIVE, POSITIVE, ACTIVE AND EXPANDING UNQUOTE. THEY HAD ADDED A FIFTH TOPIC (TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES) TO THE TRADITIONAL LIST OF FOUR. BAKER HAD SAID THAT THE U S WELCOMED PERESTROIKA, GLASNOST AND NEW THINKING IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, BUT THOUGHT IT APPROPRIATE THAT THE WEST SHOULD TEST NEW THINKING TO ENSURE THAT DEEDS MATCHED WORDS. THE CHANGING POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT ALLOWED THE EXPANSION OF CONSTRUCTIVE EAST/WEST INTERACTION.

HUMAN RIGHTS

4. BAKER SAID THAT BOTH SIDES HAD SOUGHT FURTHER PROGRESS ON INDIVIDUAL CASES, AND HAD DISCUSSED THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD GIVEN THE U S A LIST OF THOSE GRANTED PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE. THE TWO SIDES AGREED ON A MECHANISM FOR EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON CRIMINAL CASES WHICH THE OTHER COUNTRY BELIEVED TO BE POLITICAL IN NATURE. THE RUSSIANS REPORTED ON PROGRESS IN DRAFTING NEW LAWS ON FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND EMIGRATION: THESE WOULD BE TAKEN UP BY THE NEW SUPREME SOVIET WHEN IT COVENED. THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ON THE RULE OF LAW (INVOLVING EG SOVIET TRIAL JUDGES ATTENDING SESSIONS IN THE U S), HUMANITARITAN ISSUES ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE (EG THE PROBLEMS OF SUDAN RELIEF) AND MUTUAL EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH SOCIAL ISSUES (EG INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS).

#### REGIONAL ISSUES

5. THE REGIONAL TALKS HAD MADE HEADWAY TOWARDS A COMMON BASIS FOR COOPERATION TO HELP RESOLVE A NUMBER OF CONFLICTS. THE U S CHALLENGED THE RUSSIANS TO MAKE GOOD THEIR STATEMENTS. THE U S STRESSED THE PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION ATTACHED TO REGIONAL QUESTIONS, PARTICULARLY CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THE RUSSIANS INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO WORK TOWARDS POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF NICARAGUA, AND TO SUPPORT THE ESQUIPULAS AND TESORO ACCORDS. THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO EXPERT TALKS ON CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST IN JUNE. THE RUSSIANS HAD AGREED THAT SHAMIR'S PROPOSALS FOR ELECTIONS WERE WORTHY OF EXPLORATION. A JOINT APPEAL WAS ISSUED ON LEBANON. CAMODIA, KOREA AND AFGHANISTAN WERE ALSO COVERED. ON AFGHANISTAN BAKER HAD SOUGHT TO CONVINCED THE RUSSIANS (AND THOUGHT THEY ACCEPTED IT) THAT THE U S DID NOT WANT A GOVERNMENT IN KABUL HOSTILE TO THE USSR. BUT SELF- DETERMINATION WAS ESSENTIAL, AND THE MUJAHEDDIN WOULD NEVER ACCEPT POWER-SHARING WITH NAJIB.

#### TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES

6. THE TWO SIDES HAD AGREED TO ESTABLISH A WORKING GROUP AND HAD DRAWN UP A PROGRAMME. THIS WOULD COVER THE ENVIRONMENT, NATURAL DISASTERS, TERRORISM AND DRUGS. THERE WOULD BE MEETINGS IN JUNE ON AIRPORT SECURITY AND INFORMATION SHARING ON TERRORISM. THE U S WAS CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED FOR CAUTION IN THIS (TO PROTECT SOURCES ETC) BUT BELIEVED IT IMPORTANT THAT THE TWO SIDES MET REGULARLY TO DISCUSS COOPERATIVE EFFORTS.

#### BILATERAL

7. THE TWO SIDES AGREED A WORK-PLAN CONTAINING 23 SEPARATE ITEMS, INCLUDING NEGOTIATIONS ON NEW OR AMENDED COOPERATION AGREEMENTS,



CULTURAL CENTRES, EMBASSY PREMISES, CIVIL AVIATION, AND MARITIME BOUNDARIES.

#### ARMS CONTROL

8. THE U S HAD AGREED TO REENGAGE ON THE FULL RANGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. NST WOULD RESUME BETWEEN 12-19 JUNE. THE SCC WOULD MEET IN MID-JUNE AND NUCLEAR TEST TALKS BEGIN AGAIN ON 26 JUNE. THERE WOULD BE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON CW IN THE MARGINS OF THE GENEVA CD. CFE AND CSBMS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN SOME DEPTH. THE TWO SIDES HAD ALSO AGREED TO BROADEN THEIR ARMS CONTROL AGENDA TO PUT NEW EMPHASIS ON CW AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGY PROLIFERATION. THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE FOLLOW-ON TALKS ON THIS. BAKER THEN DETAILED GORBACHEV'S TWO NEW ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS, STRESSING THE NEED FOR A CONCERTED ALLIED RESPONSE.

#### CONVENTIONAL REDUCTIONS

9. GORBACHEV HAD PROPOSED THAT BY 1996-7 THE TWO ALLIANCES REDUCE THE NUMBERS OF THEIR FORCES IN EUROPE TO THE RESIDUAL LEVELS SET OUT IN PARA 1.AIII OF UKDEL VIENNA TELNO 49. GORBACHEV SAID EACH SIDE WOULD HAVE TO UNDERTAKE MAJOR REDUCTIONS TO ACHIEVE THIS. HE CLAIMED THE REDUCTIONS WOULD RESULT IN:

EACH MILITARY ALLIANCE REDUCING ITS ARMED FORCES BY MORE THAN 1 MILLION MEN

- REDUCTIONS BY NATO OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS BY APPROXIMATELY 2500 EACH. THE WARSAW PACT WOULD ALSO REDUCE SUCH SYSTEMS BY LESSER AMOUNTS.

- WARSAW PACT REDUCTIONS OF TANKS BY 40,000 ARTILLERY AND MORTARS BY APPROXIMATELY 46,000 AND INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLES BY APPROXIMATELY 42,000. NATO WOULD REDUCE SUCH SYSTEMS BY LESSER AMOUNTS. ASKED WHETHER THE ARMAMENTS IN QUESTION SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM ATTU OR DESTROYED, GORBACHEV SAID THAT THAT WAS FOR NEGOTIATION, BUT HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT THEY SHOULD BE DESTROYED.

#### SNF

10. GORBACHEV BROACHED THE PROPOSALS IN PARA 3 OF MOSCOW TELNO 788. THE WITHDRAWAL OF 500 WARHEADS WOULD TAKE PLACE IN 1989. THE USSR WAS ALSO READY DURING 1989-91 TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORY OF ITS ALLIES TO THE USSR ALL SUCH NUCLEAR WARHEADS, PROVIDED THE U S DID LIKEWISE. (BAKER CONFIRMED THIS CONDITION IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM ME) QUESTIONED BY THE FRENCH PERMREP, BAKER SAID THAT FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED. BAKER STRESSED THE

DRAWBACKS OF GORBACHEV'S SUGGESTIONS, NOTABLY THAT THE 500 WARHEADS INVOLVED WOULD NOT LEAVE EUROPE (ONLY BEING WITHDRAWN TO THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION) NOT BE DESTROYED. GORBACHEV HAD SAID NATO SNF MODERNISATION WOULD CREATE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR THE RUSSIANS, AND SUGGESTED THERE WAS NO NEED TO MODERNISE SINCE THE TWO SIDES WERE ALREDY MOVING TO BALANCE AT CFE. THE U S HAD REPLIED THAT THIS HAD NOT YET HAPPENED: DEEDS, NOT WORDS WERE WHAT COUNTED.

## OPEN SKIES

11. BAKER CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT PRESIDENT BUSH WOULD MAKE A SPEECH TODAY (12 MAY) DURING WHICH HE WOULD MAKE AN QUOTE OPEN SKIES UNQUOTE PROPOSAL THAT UNARMED AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE ABLE TO OVERFLY EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY. BUSH WOULD PROPOSE SPECIFICALLY THAT ALL NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES SHOULD JOIN IN, AND SHOULD MEET SOON TO DISCUSS THE TECHNICAL DETAILS. THIS SHOULD BE ON THE AGENDA FOR THE NATO SUMMIT.

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MIPT: NAC 12 MAY: SECRETARY BAKER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

1. RESPONDING TO BAKER'S BRIEFING GENSCHER (FRG) NOTED THAT SHEVARDNADZE WOULD BE IN BONN LATER THAT DAY. HE WELCOMED THE FACT THAT THE U S WAS ENGAGING WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON A BROAD RANGE OF SUBJECTS: TALKS SHOULD NOT BE CONFINED TO ARMS CONTROL. HE EMPHASISED THAT THE SNF WARHEADS INVOLVED IN GORBACHEV'S LATEST PRONOUNCEMENT WOULD NOT BE WITHDRAWN FROM EUROPE. THE IDEA ONLY HAD MERIT IF IT RESULTED IN THE DESTRUCTION OF WAHEADS AND WAS BASED ON A TREATY. BUT IT WAS NEVERTHELESS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. ON CONVENTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS THE NEW SOVIET IDEAS WERE COMING CLOSER TO NATO PROPOSALS, SOME OF THE NUMBERS WERE TOO HIGH AND SOME OF THE CATEGORIES STILL UNWELCOME BUT IT WAS GOOD THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE MOVING TOWARDS THE WESTERN CONCEPT. THE FRG WELCOMED THE OPEN SKIES INITIATIVE AND WOULD SAY SO PUBLICLY.
2. SMITH (CANADA) SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES ALSO WELCOMED OPEN SKIES. MULRONEY HAD ADVOCATED THE IDEA DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON LAST WEEK. CANADA WOULD BE PREPARED TO JOIN IN SUCH A REGIME AND WOULD PARTICIPATE IN ANY PREPARATORY MEETING. FERNANDEZ-ORDONEZ (SPAIN) ALSO WELCOMED THE IDEA. IT WOULD NEED FURTHER STUDY BUT SHOULD BE PUSHED WITH THE MEDIA.
3. ELLEMAN-JENSEN (DENMARK) ALSO WELCOMED OPEN SKIES, AND THE BALANCED U S PUBLIC RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV'S LATEST ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES. THERE WAS A NEED FOR A CLOSER EXAMINATION. SOVIET SNF UNILATERAL MOVEMENT WAS INTERESTING. IT MIGHT MAKE IT EASIER FOR NATO TO PREPARE FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO COMMON CEILING QUOTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REKJAVIK MANDATE UNQUOTE.
4. STOLTENBERG (NORWAY) SHARED THE VIEWS OF OTHERS ON HOW TO REACT TO GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS. OPEN SKIES WAS A VALUABLE INITIATIVE AND COULD BE OF INTEREST TO NORWAY. TINDEMANS (BELGIUM) ALSO WELCOMED THE IDEA. THE NEW GORBACHEV PROPOSALS WERE WELCOME TOO: THE QUESTION

WAS HOW THEY COULD BE COMBINED WITH NATO'S OWN.

5. I EXPLAINED THAT YOU WERE UNABLE TO BE PRESENT AND THANKED BAKER ON YOUR BEHALF FOR HIS BRIEFING. THE UK WELCOMED THE BREADTH OF THE U S/SOVIET DIALOGUE. I AGREED WITH GENSCHER THAT IT WAS OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE THAT THE EAST/WEST RELATIONSHIP SHOULD NOT (NOT) CONCENTRATE EXCLUSIVELY ON ARMS CONTROL. THIS SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND AS WE APPROACHED THE NATO SUMMIT. STRONG LANGUAGE ON DEFENCE AND SECURITY MUST HAVE PRIORITY IN THE SUMMIT DECLARATION BUT THE REMAINDER SHOULD STRESS THE WIDER ALLIANCE AGENDA. I THEREFORE WELCOMED THE FACT THAT THE OPEN SKIES INITIATIVE WOULD BE CAST IN A MULTILATERAL CONTEXT.

6. I SAID THAT GORBACHEV'S LATEST ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS WERE BOUND TO DOMINATE THE MEDIA. IT WAS VITAL TO AGREE A COLLECTIVE LINE AND NOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE STAMPEDED BY THIS LATEST THRUST OF THE SOVIET ARMS CONTROL OFFENSIVE. IT HAD TO BE SEEN IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE DANGERS POSED BY THE GATHERING CRISIS OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. THE NEW SOVIET CFE PROPOSALS WERE IN PART ACCEPTANCE OF OUR OWN IDEAS: WE SHOULD EMPHASISE THIS IN WELCOMING THEM. AT THE SAME TIME THEY WENT WELL BEYOND OUR PROPOSALS: IF ALL WERE PROPOSED SIMULTANEOUSLY IN VIENNA THERE WAS A RISK OF OVERLOADING THE SYSTEM. THERE WAS A NEED TO FOCUS ATTENTION BACK TO OUR OWN PROPOSALS AND GET A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT ON THEM.

7. ON SNF IT HAD BEEN CLEAR AT LEAST SINCE DECEMBER THAT SOMETHING ON THE LINES PUT FORWARD BY GORBACHEV WAS IN THE OFFING. GORBACHEV'S REASON FOR MOVING NOW WAS SELF-EVIDENT. THE TIMING SHOULD BE NOTED. THE OFFER TO REMOVE 500 WARHEADS DID NOT CHANGE THE UNDERLYING REALITIES OF THE SITUATION AT ALL. GORBACHEV'S OFFER TO WITHDRAW ALL SNF IF THE U S DID THE SAME CONFIRMS THAT THE SOVIET AIM WAS TO DENUCLEARISE EUROPE. THE LATEST PROPOSALS UNDERLINED THE DANGER THE UK SAW IN NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE SYSTEMS. THE CASE FOR RETENTION OF UP-TO-DATE AND EFFECTIVE SNF WAS AS STRONG AS EVER. THIS MIGHT BE UNPOPULAR PUBLICLY IN SOME COUNTRIES, BUT HAD TO BE SAID.

8. VAN DEN BROEK (NETHERLANDS) ALSO WELCOMED EXPANSION OF THE U S DIALOGUE. HE (AND, IN STRONGER TERMS, THE TURKISH PERMREP) EXPRESSED THEMSELVES SURPRISED BY THE OPEN SKIES INITIATIVE, BUT THOUGHT IT WORTHY OF FURTHER STUDY. GORBACHEV'S OFFER TO WITHDRAW 500 WARHEADS WAS NOT THAT SIGNIFICANT GIVEN THE REMAINING SOVIET SNF SUPERIORITY. BUT IT COULD BE A START: FURTHER UNILATERAL REDUCTION SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED.



9. GOEBBELS (LUXEMBOURG) LAMENTED THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF ALLIED DIVISION ON SNF. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY REGRETTABLE BECAUSE IT WAS UNNECESSARY. THERE WAS NO NEED FOR A RAPID DECISION ON MODERNISATION. THE NATO SUMMIT SHOULD SEND A POSITIVE SIGNAL OF A CONFIDENT VISION OF THE FUTURE. HE - AND ARNASSON (ICELAND) - ALSO WELCOMED OPEN SKIES.

10. GENSCHER TOOK THE FLOOR AGAIN AT THE END OF THE DISCUSSION. THE NATO SUMMIT SHOULD DEVELOP A STRATEGY FOR EAST/WEST RELATIONS: THE WIDER U S AGEND WAS AN EXCELLENT POINT OF DEPARTURE. THE ALLIES SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT IT WAS THEIR DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS WHICH WERE BEING REACTED TO. ON SNF THERE WAS NO NEED FOR A QUOTE RESTRICTIVE UNQUOTE APPROACH. HE RECALLED THE ALLIED STATEMENTS AT REKJAVIK AND AT THE NATO SUMMIT LAST YEAR. SNF WAS THE MOST DESTABILISING FACTOR IN THE EQUATION BECAUSE OF THE VAST EASTERN SUPERIORITY. ANY SYSTEMS INVOLVED IN REDUCTIONS OF SNF NEED TO BE TOTALLY ELIMINATED. HE AGREED WITH BAKER ON THE IMPORTANCE PROGRESS AT CFE: MODERNISATION DECISIONS SHOULD DEPEND ON THIS.

11. SUMMING UP, WOERNER SAID THAT CONSULTATION AMONGST THE ALLIES WAS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT AT THIS JUNCTURE. ALL HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY BAKER'S VISIT. THERE WAS FIRM SUPPORT FOR ENGAGING THE RUSSIANS ON THE BROAD RANGE OF TOPICS. THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT ALLOW THE SOVIET UNION OR WESTERN PUBLICS TO DWELL ONLY ON ARMS CONTROL, NOT ON ONE PART OF THE ARMS CONTROL AGENDA. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THE RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV'S LATEST PROPOSALS. THE ALLIES SHOULD STRESS THAT GORBACHEV WAS REACTING TO THE WEST. ON SNF, THEY SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT NATO HAD ALREADY UNILATERALLY WITHDRAWN AND DESTROYED 2400 WARHEADS: THAT THE LATEST SOVIET PROPOSALS DID NOT INVOLVE DESTRUCTION OR COMPLETE REMOVAL FROM EUROPE AND THAT NATO WOULD PRESS FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF THE WARHEADS INVOLVED: THAT THE ALLIANCE DID NOT ACCEPT THE DENUCLEARISATION OF EUROPE: BUT THAT THE NEW STEP WAS WELCOME, MODEST AS IT WAS. THE REMAINING SOVIET SNF SUPERIORITY SHOULD BE POINTED UP AND FURTHER SOVIET REDUCTIONS CALLED FOR. ON THE CONVENTIONAL PROPOSALS, THE ALLIES SHOULD WELCOME THE ADVENT OF SPECIFIC NUMBERS: STRESS THAT NATO PROPOSALS HAD BEEN SPECIFIC FROM THE START AND THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE APPROACHING NATO'S IDEAS: STRESS THAT ONCE NATO'S PROPOSALS HAD BEEN AGREED CONSIDERATION COULD BE GIVEN TO FURTHER STEPS, BUT THAT UNTIL THEN THE ALLIES WOULD STICK TO THEIR PROPOSALS AND PRESS FOR RAPID RESULTS.

12. THE NATO SPOKESMAN HAS SINCE ISSUED A STATEMENT ON THESE LINES.

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