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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 November 1988

On that there things
must be done on a
multilateral
basis -
Dec Charles

Die Minister
Agree that we
should turn down the
Soviet proposal? If so,
it is probably best to do
so on the
ground that
we don't
have
statements at the
end of official
visits.
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24/11

Visit of President Gorbachev: Possible Joint
Declaration on Chemical Weapons

In your letter of 21 November you asked for guidance on the proposal raised with you by Kossov of the Soviet Embassy for a joint declaration on chemical weapons during President Gorbachev's forthcoming visit.

This is a proposal which the Russians have pressed several times in recent months during contacts with FCO officials. Their Geneva negotiator, Nazharkin, raised it during the Shikhany/Porton Down exchange. Karpov and Kossov have both broached it with John Goulden in the last six weeks. At each approach, we have stressed the need for the Russians to cooperate in solving the considerable practical problems which remain rather than in drafting misleading declarations which imply that the CW convention can, with goodwill, be concluded in the near future.

The latest Soviet draft, enclosed with your letter, contains a judicious mix of flattering gestures and unacceptable elements. I enclose a brief analysis of the latter. We would not see it as an acceptable basis for negotiation. More generally, as you have already said to Kossov, we see difficulties with a bilateral declaration on a matter which is the subject of multilateral negotiations. The Germans rejected a similar Soviet proposal in September on these grounds. Given current differences within the Alliance on CW, it would be unwise to try to negotiate a more acceptable bilateral text for use during President Gorbachev's visit.

The Foreign Secretary considers therefore that we should give the Russians a clear negative response. In rejecting their proposal, we should encourage them to back up their support for a convention by making a contribution to solving the real problems which remain. We took this line in an aide memoire which we gave to the Soviet Embassy in September, reflecting our dissatisfaction with the Shikhany/Porton Down exchange but also our readiness to cooperate for example in solving the problem of how to inspect civil chemical plants.

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/ I enclose a speaking note on which you might draw in responding to Kossov.

We will of course let you have recommendations for handling CW during President Gorbachev's visit taking account of the Prime Minister's conversations with President Reagan and Vice President Bush.

Jans
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

UNACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET DRAFT TEXT

1. Para 2 gives equal prominence to proposals made by both the UK and the Soviet Union in the Geneva CD negotiations. In fact the Soviet performance in producing new proposals has been lamentable.
2. Para 5 centres on the current preparations in Geneva for multilateral trial inspections of civil chemical production facilities, to test the verification regime for civil industry currently on the table in the CW negotiations. This exercise in fact originated from a number of Soviet bilateral proposals. The UK is playing an active part in these preparations but we would not want to commit ourselves to where, out of the 40 CD member states, these trial inspections might take place. This is a matter for multilateral negotiation. (There will be some pressure anyway on the Soviet Union to put itself forward for an inspection since it initiated the trials.)
3. Para 6 calls upon all states to declare their status with respect to chemical weapons and to presenting on a reciprocal basis data about their capabilities. Purely declaratory statements are unlikely to clarify the real extent of the Soviet arsenal. And the requirement for a reciprocal basis absolves them of any obligation to provide early details.
4. Para 6 notes with satisfaction the Porton Down/Shikhany exchange visits. The UK was dissatisfied with the Soviet performance at Shikhany which clearly showed the limits to glasnost.
5. Para 7 contains an expression of intention to be among the first participants in any chemical weapons convention. UK ratification will depend upon the degree of support for such a convention among other CW significant states (including eg. Iraq, Syria, Libya, etc).
6. Para 9 states that violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 cannot be justified by any circumstances. The UK retains reservations to the 1925 Protocol permitting retaliatory use of CW

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and use against non-States Parties. The Soviet draft could be interpreted as seeing these as "violations"; though the Soviet Union has made exactly the same reservations itself.

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POINTS TO MAKE WITH MR KOSSOV

1. HMG's interest in concluding a CW convention remains as strong as ever.
2. We value the exchanges with the Soviet Union on how best we can both contribute, bilaterally and in Geneva to solving the very difficult problems which remain.
3. In our view there are two aspects which should be given priority:-
 - i) The need to achieve greater openness about CW capabilities. There is a long legacy of suspicion and uncertainty, due in large measure to the fact that the Soviet Union did not even admit to having a CW capacity until recently. Subsequent Soviet statements have raised as many questions as they have answered. Confidence building should be an essential part of our approach to a CW convention.
 - ii) The need to find workable solutions to the remaining problems. We put some suggestions to the Soviet Embassy following the Shikhany/Porton Down exchange. It would be helpful to have a reaction to these proposals before President Gorbachev's visit.
4. Our aim is to make practical progress in these two areas. This will make a more direct and significant contribution to a CW convention than the declaratory idea suggested by the Soviet Embassy.
5. The Prime Minister looks forward to discussing CW with President Gorbachev.

SOVIET UNION: Visit of Colpa Chen P.R.



Joint statement by the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern
Ireland on Chemical Weapons Ban

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland consider the earliest convention on total, universal and effectively verifiable ban of chemical weapons as one of the priorities in their efforts towards limitation of armaments and disarmament, as well as multilateral talks in this field. Such a Convention should contain provisions for total elimination of all stocks of chemical weapons and the industrial base for its production.

Both sides state with satisfaction an essential progress, achieved recently in preparation of the convention at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. Due to a constructive contribution by the participants of the talks, many questions of the future convention has been solved and the sphere of the unresolved problems has been considerably narrowed. The proposals, made by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom in various political and technical aspects of banning chemical weapons, in no small measure contributed this process. Both sides consider, that constructive cooperation between them should become a continuous positive factor at the talks and express their readiness for joint and parallel work in a search for mutually acceptable agreements on unresolved problems with a view of a possibly earlier conclusion of the convention.

First of all it concerns problems that require urgent final agreement, - such as challenge inspection, securing conditions for nonproduction of chemical weapons in civil industry, the order of chemical weapons destruction, the composition of the international institutions which will be created in accordance with the convention.

The USSR and the United Kingdom emphasize the significance of working out of a strict international verification system that can provide the highest degree of confidence of all the

conventions signatories that its provisions would be adhered to. Both sides are in favour of including into the convention provisions for challenge inspections without the right of the signatory-state to deny an access to any place or installation. A useful role in agreeing these provisions play the corresponding British proposal made in 1986.

The sides favour such a solution to the issues of non-production of chemical weapons in industry, which finds a balance between a necessity in the most scrupulous control and the legitimate industrial and commercial interests of the participants of the Convention. In this context an international experiment on testing systematic control over a non-production of chemical weapons with a view of finding the most optimal control procedures could be of major significance. The USSR and the United Kingdom are ready to take part in such experiment and will designate for this purpose one chemical enterprise on each side.

The sides attach a special significance to openness and confidence among the participants of the talks, considering practical measures in this direction as the most important factor for the success of the talks. They are calling upon the states, who have not done it yet, to declare their status with respect to chemical weapons, and the countries, possessing ~~nuclear~~^{chemical} weapons, to present on a reciprocal basis data about their military-chemical arsenals, which are needed for the progress at the talks. The USSR and the United Kingdom have agreed to step up their efforts in favour of broadening openness on multilateral and bilateral basis. In this respect they note with satisfaction an exchange of visits to the military-chemical installations of both countries.

The USSR and the United Kingdom are in favour of the universality in banning chemical weapons, providing the broadest participation of states in the Convention on banning and eliminating chemical weapons from the very start of its implementation. On their part they express an intention to be among the first participants of this Convention.

The sides emphasize the threat of proliferation of chemical weapons and stand for taking effective measures to prevent its dissemination. They state that they will not transfer chemical weapons to anybody or by any other means to contribute to its acquiring and stockpiling by other countries.

The USSR and Great Britain resolutely condemn the use of chemical weapons by anybody and anywhere. They believe that violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 cannot be justified by any circumstances and will stand in favour of creation in the world of the atmosphere of intolerance towards chemical weapons, particularly to their use.

СОВМЕСТНОЕ ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ
СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК
И СОЕДИНЕННОГО КОРОЛЕВСТВА ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИИ
И СЕВЕРНОЙ ИРЛАНДИИ ПО ЗАПРЕЩЕНИЮ
ХИМИЧЕСКОГО ОРУЖИЯ

Союз Советских Социалистических Республик и Соединенное Королевство Великобритании и Северной Ирландии рассматривают скорейшее заключение конвенции о полном, глобальном и подпадающем под эффективному контролю запрещении химического оружия в качестве одной из приоритетных целей своих усилий по ограничению вооружений и разоружению, а также многосторонних переговоров в этой области. Такая конвенция должна предусматривать полное уничтожение всех запасов химического оружия и производственной базы для его изготовления.

Стороны с удовлетворением констатируют существенный прогресс, достигнутый в последнее время в разработке конвенции на Женевской конференции по разоружению. Благодаря конструктивному вкладу участников переговоров многие вопросы будущей конвенции нашли свое решение, а круг нерешенных проблем значительно сузился. Этому в немалой степени способствовали и предложения, выдвинутые Советским Союзом и Соединенным Королевством по различным политическим и техническим аспектам запрещения химического оружия. Стороны считают, что конструктивное взаимодействие между ними призвано стать постоянным позитивным фактором на переговорах, и выражают готовность к совместной или параллельной работе в направлении поиска общеприемлемых договоренностей по еще не решенным проблемам с целью заключения конвенции по возможности скорее.

В первую очередь это касается таких требующих скорейшего окончательного согласования вопросов, как проведение инспекций по запросу, обеспечение условий для непроизводства химического оружия в коммерческой промышленности, порядок уничтожения химического оружия, состав международных органов, которые будут созданы в соответствии с конвенцией.

СССР и Соединенное Королевство подчеркивают важность разработки системы строгого международного контроля, обеспечивающей самую высокую степень уверенности всех участников конвенции в том, что ее положения соблюдаются. Они высказываются за включение в конвенцию положений об инспекциях по запросу без права отказа любого места или объекта государства-участника. Полезную роль в согласовании положений на этот счет играет соответствующее британское предложение 1986 года.

Стороны выступают за такое решение вопросов производства химического оружия в промышленности, при котором был бы найден баланс между необходимостью в самом тщательном контроле и законными промышленными и коммерческими интересами участников конвенции. В этом контексте важное значение мог бы иметь международный эксперимент по опробованию систематического контроля за производством химического оружия с целью нахождения наиболее оптимальных контрольных процедур. СССР и Соединенное Королевство готовы участвовать в таком эксперименте и выделяют для целей его проведения по одному химическому предприятию.

Стороны придают особое значение открытости и доверию между участниками переговоров, считая практические меры на этом направлении важнейшим фактором успеха переговоров. Они призывают государства, которые еще не сделали этого, объявить о своем статусе в отношении химического оружия, а государства, обладающие химическим оружием, представить на основе взаимности данные о своих военно-химических арсеналах, необходимые для прогресса на переговорах. СССР и Соединенное Королевство договорились активизировать усилия в пользу расширения открытости на многосторонней и двусторонней основе. В этой связи они с удовлетворением отмечают обмен визитами на военно-химические объекты двух стран.

СССР и Соединенное Королевство выступают за универсальность запрета на химическое оружие, обеспечение самого широкого участия государств в конвенции о запрещении и уничтожении химического оружия с самого начала ее действия. Со своей стороны они выражают намерение войти в число первоначальных участников этой конвенции.

Стороны отмечают опасность распространения химического оружия и высказываются за принятие действенных мер по предотвращению его расползания. Они заявляют, что не будут передавать кому бы то ни было химическое оружие или каким-либо другим способом содействовать его приобретению или накоплению другими странами.

СССР и Великобритания решительно осуждают применение химического оружия кем бы то ни было и где бы то ни было. Они считают, что нарушения Женевского протокола 1925 года не могут быть оправданы никакими обстоятельствами и будут выступать в пользу создания в мире атмосферы нетерпимости к химическому оружию, в особенности к его применению.

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From the Private Secretary

26 November 1988

**VISIT OF PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: POSSIBLE JOINT
DECLARATION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS**

Thank you for your letter of 24 November setting out the case against agreeing to a joint declaration on chemical weapons during President Gorbachev's visit. I will speak as proposed to Mr. Kossov.

(C. D. POWELL)

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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