

PRIME MINISTER

## US/SOVIET SUMMIT: SOVIET VIEWS

Mr. Kossov of the Soviet Embassy asked to see me at short notice today. He handed over the attached note describing the results of the US/Soviet Summit, as seen from the Soviet point of view. In amplifying the note, he said that good progress had been made on the START negotiations. There was only one remaining point to be resolved on ALCMs. The Soviet side regarded the outstanding problems on strategic defence as fairly easily soluble (this is surprising). On mobile missiles, there had been agreement to designate restricted areas within which such missiles would be permissible in specified numbers. The only remaining issue was the size of the areas, but that too was soluble. The main substantive problem remained with SLCMs. The Soviet military could not accept that they should remain entirely unrestricted and outside an agreement. It would of course be important to have effective verification measures for a START agreement but the experience with the INF agreement would be helpful in that respect. Mr. Kossov added that there had been a very good discussion of chemical weapons, the first time that this problem had been addressed seriously at a US/Soviet summit. The President had made a very firm statement of his commitment to the goal of a global ban on these weapons.

Mr. Kossov showed close interest in our assessment of whether the Americans were seriously interested in achieving a START agreement before the end of President Reagan's term of office. Their own impression was that President Reagan would like to reach an agreement but they were not sure that he would be "allowed" to do so by those around him. I said that our clear impression was that the Americans were ready to continue negotiating but would not be rushed into an unsatisfactory agreement. The matter was therefore open. Mr. Kossov said that the Russians faced a genuine dilemma. They recognised that it might well not be welcome to a new Democrat President of the United States to have to seek ratification of a Treaty

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signed by his Republican predecessor. On the other hand, the historical experience was that Democratic Presidents found it very difficult to get arms control agreements through Congress at all. It would be a tragedy to lose the progress made under President Reagan. This pointed to a major effort to reach agreement while he was still in office.

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Mr. Kossov went on to say that the Soviet Ambassador had seen Mr. Gorbachev at the end of the recent Central Committee meeting in Moscow. Mr. Gorbachev had expressed appreciation for your pre-summit message and in particular for its tone. He had observed that he would certainly like to take up your invitation to visit the United Kingdom before too long. It would be important to have a substantial agenda for a meeting. In reply to the Ambassador's question, he had said that the visit might well be later this year. The Ambassador had found, however, that there were conflicting counsels in the Soviet foreign ministry where some senior officials would be reluctant to see Mr. Gorbachev come to Britain once more and would prefer him to visit other Western countries. The Ambassador proposed to revert to the matter with Mr. Gorbachev in the margins of the Party Conference at the end of June. He would then hope to see you in early July to report on the outcome of that Conference and consider the substance and timing of a visit. Mr. Kossov was not exact about possible dates but thought that it could be as soon as December or shortly after the turn of the year. He had noted that you had referred in your television interview to a visit in the spring or summer. He thought that this might be a bit late. Mr. Gorbachev might like to see you fairly soon after your visit to Washington so as to be able to get your assessment of the incoming Presidency. I said that your only concern was that Mr. Gorbachev should come at a moment which would be most helpful from his point of view. I thought you would certainly be prepared to see the Ambassador in July.

Mr. Kossov continued that it would be important for a visit to have substance. We should need to look for areas where it would be possible to take a step forward. One particular area

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was chemical weapons where there was already agreement in principle to the idea of a joint UK/Soviet statement. If this could be worked up, it could be a major feature of a summit. I said that in general these were matters to be dealt with multilaterally. But I did not exclude the possibility of working out a joint statement, although it might well have to cover areas of disagreement as well as areas of agreement.

I should add that in this whole discussion of a possible visit and the agenda for it, there may well be some element of self-promotion on Zamyatin's part. We should not take all that Mr. Kossov says at face value.

Mr. Kossov remarked rather gloomily that perestroika seemed to be in considerable difficulty. The theses approved by the Central Committee for the Party Conference were rather vague and general. There were considerable economic difficulties at present. Yeltsin's interview with the BBC had caused him a storm and made life more difficult for Mr. Gorbachev, although Yeltsin himself had been elected a delegate to the party conference from the Karelia area. In his view, matters were coming to the point where a straight choice would have to be made between Ligachev and Yakovlev: they could not both survive in the leadership. A speech by Ligachev over the weekend, which he had seen on Soviet television, made quite clear there were substantive differences between him and Mr. Gorbachev.

Mr. Kossov mentioned rather wistfully the amount of economic assistance which Germany was extending to the Soviet Union in the form of credits and loans. There was an urgent need for such help at present.

Finally, Mr. Kossov referred to your interview with Soviet television tomorrow. The interviewer would cover three broad areas: your assessment of the recent summit and the direction of Soviet/American relations, your view of the future development of Western Europe, and your opinion of Mr. Gorbachev and his role on the world scene. The interview

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would be used in an evening news programme. But you should also know that your comments on Mr. Gorbachev would be incorporated in a film about his foreign policy achievements which is being prepared for the Party Conference. He hoped you would be able to say something helpful to Mr. Gorbachev.

Mr. Kossov was at pains to say this was all very much for No.10 only. But I think I had better give the Foreign Office an account in strict confidence. Otherwise we shall get wires crossed.

C D P

(C. D. POWELL)

6 June 1988

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COP

Central to the talks between Mr. M. Gorbachev and President R. Reagan once again were the problems of strengthening of international security, curbing the arms race and strengthening the strategic stability.

The Soviet Union came to the summit with a number of proposals embracing all aspects of this issue - nuclear and space arms, limitation of nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of them, elimination of chemical weapons, conventional armaments and forces, naval forces. Granted an adequate effort were forthcoming from the American side, a substantial progress towards agreement on all these issues could be possible. We were emphasising, that the INF treaty, the entry into force of which marked the Moscow summit, proved that only purposeful joint efforts of both sides, preparedness to take into account the considerations of a partner could secure agreements concerning the issues of stopping the arms race.

2. The talks on SOW - ABM led to further consolidation of the basis fixed in the Soviet-American statement of 10 December 1987, which provides the grounds for continuing work on the agreement on 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons and on associated documents.

Two working papers were prepared fixing the areas of accords on the questions of mobile ICBMs and ALCMs.

In particular, both sides agreed for limited areas of agreed size to be established for the mobile ICBMs. A limited number of missiles and launchers will be permitted in these areas as well as a limited number of installations, used exclusively for the mobile ICBM launchers.

It was managed to widen the scope of common ground on ALCMs. Mutual understanding was achieved that all existing missiles of this kind will be considered <sup>as</sup> carrying nuclear charges.

The future conventional armed ALCMs will be distinguishable from the nuclear-armed missiles of the same kind.

Exchange of data concerning the strategic arms between the parties is a major practical step in the field of veri-

fication regime of the future treaty. Nevertheless it is worth pointing out that if the Soviet side presented data on all weapons subject to the treaty, the American side supplied to us only selected data on its strategic arms. In particular the American data does not include information concerning the heavy bombers and submarines. Data on the long-range sea-launched cruise missiles is completely missing (the USSR have submitted it).

We returned again to our proposal to have a specific agreement on observation of the decision, adopted in Washington on 10 December, 1987, on limits on SLCM deployment and on a strict and effective control over such limits on a mutually acceptable basis. The USA, proposing nothing in the field of SLCM control, tried to defend their position, submitted earlier in the talks, suggesting that the parties should limit themselves only to unilateral non-verifiable declarations about numbers of such missiles on each sides. We do not accept this: observance of the future treaty should be based on strict verification, including on-site inspections as the Soviet position implies.

In general it could be seen that the Americans tended to try forcing upon us a one-side approach in the matters of control: a comprehensive and stricter control of the Soviet strategic arms and a rather more "sparing" one of the American weapons. We declared firmly that only a regime of control equal for both sides was acceptable. Without limits on the SLCM and a strict and effective verification with the active used on-site inspections the preparation of the 50 per cent cut in the SOW would be impossible. The problem is subject to further discussion between the USA and USSR delegations on the Geneva talks.

We consider as an important result of the START-ABM discussion firm reaffirmation by both parties of the provision that the mutually agreed draft on the text of the separate treaty on the ABM and its non-violation during an agreed period should be based on the Soviet-American declaration text of 10 December 1987.

The Soviet side made special emphasis on the organic link between carrying out the 50 per cent cut in the strategic offensive weapons and observing the ABM Treaty as it was signed in 1972.

In the context of this discussion the Americans, contrary to the agreement reached in Washington, attempted once again to secure certain "rights" for unlimited activities in outer space with the aim of establishing the viability of the so called "effective strategic defense", as well as the "right" to deploy it after an agreed period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. This amounted to one of the most substantial problems hindering the progress towards an agreement on SOW-ABM.

During the visit the agreement on mutual notification of launches of ballistic missiles was signed. It widens the scope of confidence-building measures between the Soviet Union and United States, aimed at removal of risk of an accidental outbreak of nuclear war.

3. The principal result of the discussion of the matters, concerning nuclear testing consisted in the conclusion of work on the draft agreement on joint verification experiment, which sets specific procedure for preparing and carrying out nuclear blasts on testing sites in Nevada (August this year) and Semipalatinsk (September this year). Methods of verification of the nuclear explosion yields, proposed by both countries, will be employed. The results of the experiment will be subsequently reviewed by both countries, so that an acceptable combination of verification methods (seismic and hydrodynamic) could be found for the USSR-US Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974. It would open the possibility of this Treaty being ratified.

Besides, the sides agreed to expedite the preparation of a new protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty presently underway at the full-scale Soviet-American talks on nuclear testing.

4. The discussion of the chemical weapons ban was constructive and business-like. The positions put forward in the joint declaration can become a factor in speeding up the

negotiations process in Geneva, in improving the atmosphere at the talks. The fact that the United States not only confirmed the aim of the comprehensive global chemical weapons ban, but admitted at the highest level the urgency of the conclusion of the convention became an important political result of the meeting.

As a development of the Declaration of the two countries' leaders the delegations at the talks have been given specific instructions on a wide range of unresolved issues (elimination of chemical weapons and its production facilities, challenge inspections, ensuring the universal nature of the convention, etc.).

5. New large-scale proposals on reductions of troops and conventional armaments in Europe, put forward by Mr. M.S. Gorbachov during his talks with President Reagan, became a subject of the discussion in Moscow. Their essence is as follows.

At the first stage after an exchange of information on the strength of forces and armaments disbalances and asymmetries will be revealed and eliminated. For that purpose immediately after the start of the talks an examination of the basic data is to be carried out by means of on-site inspections.

At the second stage the sides will carry out a reduction of their forces approximately by 500000 men each.

At the third stage the forces of each side would attain a purely defensive nature in a way that would eliminate their capability of offensive operations.

During all stages of the talks we are ready to agree on mutual reduction of armaments of offensive nature - tactical nuclear weapons, strike aviation, tanks. Naturally, all reductions must be exercised under strict international control, including on-site inspections like creation of nuclear-free corridors which would separate the troops of both sides confronting each other, could be discussed.

Both sides expressed an understanding of the importance and necessity of a speedy agreement on the mandate of the talks in Vienna, first of all in the part concerning the determination of the subject of the talks.





10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 June 1988

Dear Mr.

## US/SOVIET SUMMIT: SOVIET VIEWS

Mr. Kossov of the Soviet Embassy asked to see me at short notice yesterday. He handed over the enclosed note summarising the results of the US/Soviet Summit, as seen from the Soviet point of view. In amplifying - and in some cases contradicting - the note, he said that good progress had been made on the START negotiations. There was only one remaining point to be resolved on ALCMs. The Soviet side regarded the outstanding problems on strategic defence as fairly easily soluble (this cannot be reconciled with the note, but it is what he said). On mobile missiles, there had been agreement to designate restricted areas within which such missiles would be permissible in specified numbers. The only remaining issues were the size of the areas and the number of missiles, but that too was soluble. The main substantive problem remained with SLCMs. The Soviet military would never accept that they should remain entirely unrestricted and outside an agreement. It would of course be important to have effective verification measures for a START agreement but the experience with the INF agreement would be helpful in that respect. Mr. Kossov added that there had been a very good discussion of chemical weapons, the first time that this problem had been addressed seriously at a US/Soviet summit. The President had made a very firm statement of his commitment to the goal of a global ban on these weapons.

Mr. Kossov showed close interest in our assessment of whether the Americans were seriously interested in achieving a START agreement before the end of President Reagan's term of office. Their own impression was that President Reagan would like to reach an agreement but they were not sure that he would be "allowed" to do so by those around him. I said that our understanding was that the Americans were ready to continue negotiating but would not be rushed into an unsatisfactory agreement. The matter was therefore open. Mr. Kossov said that the Russians faced a real dilemma. They recognised that it might well not be welcome to a new Democrat President of the United States to have to seek ratification of a Treaty signed by his Republican predecessor. On the other hand, the historical experience was that Democratic Presidents found it very difficult to get arms control agreements through Congress at all. It would be a tragedy to lose the progress

made under President Reagan. This pointed to a major effort to reach agreement while he was still in office.

Mr. Kossov went on to say that the Soviet Ambassador had seen Mr. Gorbachev at the end of the recent Central Committee meeting in Moscow. Mr. Gorbachev had expressed appreciation for the Prime Minister's pre-summit message and in particular for its tone. He had observed that he would certainly like to take up the Prime Minister's invitation to visit the United Kingdom before too long. It would be important to have a substantial agenda for a meeting. In reply to the Ambassador's question, Gorbachev had said that the visit might well be later this year. The Ambassador had found, however, that there were conflicting counsels in the Soviet foreign ministry where some senior officials would be reluctant to see Mr. Gorbachev come to Britain once more and would prefer him to visit other Western countries. The Ambassador proposed to revert to the matter with Mr. Gorbachev in the margins of the Party Conference at the end of June. He would then hope to see the Prime Minister in early July to report on the outcome of that Conference and consider the substance and timing of a visit. Mr. Kossov was not exact about possible dates but thought that it could be as soon as December or shortly after the turn of the year. He had noted that the Prime Minister had referred in her television interview to a visit in the spring or summer. He thought that this might be a bit late. Mr. Gorbachev might find it helpful to meet fairly soon after her visit to Washington so as to be able to get her assessment of the incoming Presidency. I said that the Prime Minister's concern was that Mr. Gorbachev should come at a moment which would be most helpful from his point of view. I thought she would certainly be prepared to see the Ambassador in July.

Mr. Kossov continued that it would be important for a visit to have substance. We should need to look for areas where it would be possible to take a step forward. One particular area was chemical weapons where there was already agreement in principle to the idea of a joint UK/Soviet statement. If this could be worked up, it could be a major feature of a summit. I said that in general these were matters to be dealt with multilaterally. I did not exclude the possibility of working out a joint statement, although it would probably have to cover areas of disagreement as well as areas of agreement.

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Mr. Kossov was very much at pain to emphasise that he had been instructed by the Ambassador to pass on these points to No. 10 in strict confidence. They should not be conveyed more widely. His remarks about the possibility of an early visit by Gorbachev may well be another case of Zamyatin paddling his own canoe and will need to be handled with care. But so long as what he is doing serves our interest, in particular in a relatively early visit by Gorbachev, I think that we should be ready to play along. I should be grateful if recipients of this letter would not refer to this exchange in their own contacts with the Russians here or in Moscow.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely,  
C. D. Powell*

C. D. POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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At the third stage the forces of each side would attain a purely defensive nature in a way that would eliminate their capability of offensive operations.

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