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REAGAN GORBACHEV SUMMIT: SHULTZ BRIEFING OF NAC 2 JUNE

SUMMARY

1. BRIEFING MUCH AS EXPECTED, EXCEPT FOR GORBACHEV'S TROOP REDUCTION PROPOSALS. SUMMIT DESCRIBED AS SUCCESSFUL AND WORKMANLIKE.

DETAIL

2. SHULTZ BRIEFED NAC TODAY (2 JUNE) ON OUTCOME OF THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. MR MELLOR REPRESENTED YOU.

3. SHULTZ DESCRIBED THE SUMMIT AS AN UNQUALIFIED SUCCESS. THE COHESION AND STRENGTH OF THE ALLIANCE AND THE RESULTS OF CONSULTATIONS WITHIN IT WERE CENTRAL TO THE SUCCESSFUL CONDUCT OF US-SOVIET BUSINESS.

MAIN CURRENTS OF SUMMIT

4. SHULTZ DESCRIBED THESE AS:

(A) THE PALPABLE FERMENT OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION, EXEMPLIFIED BY THE THESES FOR THE PARTY CONFERENCE.

(B) THE NEED TO BE CONSISTENT AND ROBUST IN REPRESENTING ONE'S OWN INTERESTS. REAGAN HAD REFUSED TO GO ALONG WITH GORBACHEV'S SUGGESTIONS FOR OUTDATED 1970 TYPE DETENTE LANGUAGE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT.

(C) CONTINUITY. THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO PASS ON TO HIS SUCCESSOR

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A STABLE FRAMEWORK IN WHICH A FIRM AND REALISTIC POLITICAL DIALOGUE COULD BE CONTINUED IN GOOD TIMES AND BAD, WITHOUT ELEMENTS OF LINKAGE.

MODALITIES AND ATMOSPHERE

5. REAGAN AND GORBACHEV HAD HAD FOUR OFFICIAL DINNERS, ONE INFORMAL DINNER AND THE WALK ON RED SQUARE. DISCUSSION HAD BEEN VERY PERSONAL BUT SERIOUS. SHULTZ HAD HAD TWO FORMAL SESSIONS WITH SHEVARDNADZE, AND CARLUCCI HAD ACCEPTED AN INVITATION AT THIS MEETING WITH YAZOV TO VISIT THE SOVIET UNION IN AUGUST. CROWE AND AKHROMEYEV WOULD ALSO MEET IN JULY. THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE A POINT OF MEETING AS BROAD A SPECTRUM OF SOVIET SOCIETY AS POSSIBLE (WRITERS AND ARTISTS, THE DANILOV MONASTERY AND MOSCOW UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, WITH WHOM HE HAD DISCUSSED FUTURE WORLD TRENDS INCLUDING THE NEED FOR A MORE OPEN SOCIETY IN THE INFORMATION AGE.) THERE HAD BEEN NO EVIDENCE OF A SOVIET POWER STRUGGLE. GORBACHEV HAD BEEN CONFIDENT, PURPOSEFUL AND IN COMMAND.

HUMAN RIGHTS

6. THE AMERICANS HAD NOT SET OUT TO MAKE IT A HUMAN RIGHTS SUMMIT, BUT (PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE CSCE END GAME) THAT WAS WHAT HAD HAPPENED. IT WAS RIGHT TO BE SCEPTICAL OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, BUT WRONG TO SAY NOTHING WAS HAPPENING. IN THE JOINT STATEMENT, THE RUSSIANS HAD GONE FURTHER ON HUMAN RIGHTS THAN IN ANY DOCUMENT HITHERTO NEGOTIATED. A NUMBER OF HUMAN RIGHTS CASES HAD BEEN RESOLVED.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

7. GORBACHEV HAD PUSHED ON THESE. REGAN HAD REPLIED THAT THERE WAS A STRONG RELATIONSHIP WITH HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THAT RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXPORT OF MILITARY RELATED TECHNOLOGY WOULD BE CONTINUED.

BILATERAL RELATIONS

8. VARIOUS BILATERAL AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN SIGNED. OTHERS ON MARITIME SHIPPING AND BASIC SCIENCES WERE UNDER NEGOTIATION, AS WERE THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE IN THE BERING STRAITS AND THE OPENING OF CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK.

NUCLEAR TESTING

9. THE JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SIGNED, PROVIDING FOR ONE EXPERIMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION AND ONE IN THE US THIS SUMMER. THIS SHOULD ENABLE PROTOCOLS TO THE TWO NUCLEAR TESTING TREATIES NOT YET RATIFIED TO BE COMPLETED. NOT ONLY WERE FOREIGNERS PRESENT FOR THE FIRST TIME AT THE SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS TEST SITE,

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BUT THE NUMBER OF AMERICANS THERE WOULD SHORTLY RISE FROM 50 TO 90.
(AND VICE VERSA).

OTHER ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS

10. AFTER A NUMBER OF HITCHES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, A LAUNCH NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SIGNED. THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSION OF BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION AND A LOT OF PROGRESS (UNSPECIFIED) ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

11. SHULTZ DESCRIBED THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE SOVIET CSCE DELEGATION IN VIENNA AS FRUSTRATING, AND HE HAD SAID SO TO GORBACHEV. THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT DISCUSS CST WITH THE RUSSIANS A DEUX, NOR WOULD THEY DISCUSS NAVAL ACTIVITIES.

12. LATER, IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT WHEN THE TIME CAME (POSSIBLY IN A WEEK OR TWO) THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE PREPARED TO SETTLE IN A HURRY AT VIENNA. THE WEST WOULD HAVE TO BE READY FOR THEM. GORBACHEV HAD REVIVED SOME OLD IDEAS ABOUT A DATA EXCHANGE, FOLLOWED BY THE ELIMINATION OF ASYMETRIES AND THEN A FORCE REDUCTION OF 500,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE SMICLN BUT NO FORMAL PROPOSAL HAD BEEN MADE. THE AMERICANS HAD STRESSED THE NEED TO SET UP THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS BEFORE DETAILED AND MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS COULD BEGIN. THESE SHOULD ANYWAY CONCENTRATE ON EQUIPMENT MORE THAN TROOPS.

REGIONAL ISSUES

13. SHULTZ DESCRIBED AFRICA AS THE MOST INTERESTING AREA. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS, HE SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS SAW THE AFGHANISTAN ARRANGEMENT AS A PRECEDENT FOR ANGOLA (WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS, NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES). WE SHOULD NEED TO ESTABLISH WHAT WOULD BE GUARANTEED IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND BY WHOM. BUT SC 435 PROVIDED A STARTING POINT. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE A COUNTER PROPOSAL TO THE CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL PROPOSALS TABLED AT THE LONDON TALKS.

NEXT STEPS

14. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE SUMMIT COULD BE MEASURED BY THE WORK PROGRAMME AHEAD. THE DIALOGUE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND REGIONAL ISSUES WOULD CONTINUE. THERE WAS A DETERMINATION TO TRY TO FINISH START. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO RATIFY THE TWO TESTING TREATIES. HE DID NOT EXCLUDE A NEW SUMMIT IF THE START TREATY WERE READY, BUT THE PRESIDENT DID NOT WANT TO GET HOOKED ON DEADLINES. THE HARMEL BASIC DOCTRINE WAS IMPORTANT: THE ALLIANCE SHOULD LOOK TO ITS STRENGTH AND

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COHESION, AS A BASIS FOR DIALOGUE WITH THE EAST.

15. FOR FURTHER ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS, SEE MIFT.

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REAGAN GORBACHEV SUMMIT: SHULTZ ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS NOT COVERED
IN MIPT.

MIDDLE EAST

2. SHULZ SAID HE WOULD SET OUT ON 3 JUNE FOR CAIRO, JORDAN, SYRIA
AND ISRAEL. THIS WAS NOT BECAUSE SOME BIG BREAKTHROUGH WAS IN
PROSPECT, BUT BECAUSE THE PROBLEM WAS IMMENSE AND IT WAS IMPORTANT
TO KEEP WORKING AT IT. THE RUSSIANS SEEMED TO SHARE HIS VIEW THAT
THE MIDDLE EAST WAS POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE. HOWEVER DISCUSSION IN
MOSCOW OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE HAD NOT GOT VERY FAR. THE
RUSSIANS RECOGNISED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO HAVE TRANSITIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS, BUT PERSISTED IN REQUIRING PRIOR AGREEMENT ON STATUS.
THEY APPEARED TO SUPPORT HIS (SHULTZ') CONTINUING TO WORK AWAY AT
THE PROBLEM.

EFFECT OF REFORMS IN THE SOVIET UNION

3. IN REPLY TO MR MELLOR, SHULTZ SAID THAT GORBACHEV'S REFORMS HAD
PROBABLY NOT TOUCHED THE MILITARY AND THE KGB INTERNALLY. BUT THE
MILITARY SUPPORTED WHAT GORBACHEV WAS TRYING TO DO BECAUSE (AS
AKHROMEYEV HAD SAID TO SHULTZ IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INF AGREEMENT)
WHAT GORBACHEV WAS TRYING TO DO INVOLVED THE SURVIVAL OF THE SOVIET
UNION.

MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE

4. THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT MENTIONED THIS.

EAST EUROPE

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5. THE AMERICANS PREFERRED NOT TO DISCUS EASTERN EUROPE WITH THE SOVIET UNION, BECAUSE THIS MIGHT APPEAR TO ACKNOWLEDGE SOVIET HEGEMONY.

BERLIN

6. THE AMERICANS WERE HOWEVER HAPPY TO DISCUSS BERLIN. THIS WAS OF A DIFFERENT ORDER, BECAUSE OF THE FOUR POWER OCCUPATION. THE PRESIDENT HAD PUSHED HIS BERLIN INITIATIVE, WITH NO SIGN OF GIVE FROM THE RUSSIANS.

THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

7. ROBIN (FRANCE) ASKED HOW PRESIDENT REGAN COULD RECONCILE THE SENTENCE IN THE JOINT DECLARATION ABOUT THE FINAL OBJECTIVE OF ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH THE NEED TO MAINTAIN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. SHULTZ REPLIED THAT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE HAD KEPT THE PEACE FOR MANY YEARS, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO FOR A LONG TIME. BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT CHERNOBYL HAD MADE A DEEP IMPRESSION ON GORBACHEV, AND PRESIDENT REAGAN FELT AS A POLITICIAN THAT AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE POLITICAL AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AS THE FOUNDATION OF PEACE WOULD DWINDLE. THE SOVIET ATTITUDE WAS A BLEND OF PROPAGANDA AND GUINE FEELING.

MBFR

8. AMBASSADOR SMITH (CANADA) SERVED NOTICE THAT AT MADRID HIS MINISTER WOULD RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE OF MBFR. SHULTZ DID NOT COMMENT.

9. FOR BRIEFING ON NST ISSUES, PLEASE SEE MIFT.

ALEXANDER

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
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MIPT: REAGAN GORBACHEV SUMMIT: SHULTZ BRIEFING OF NAC 2 JUNE: NST
ISSUES.

SUMMMARY

1. SHULTZ REPORTS BUSINESS-LIKE APPROACH TO NST ISSUES IN MOSCOW.
SOME PROGRESS ON DETAILS RELATING TO ALCM AND MOBILE ICBM BUT NO
DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENTS. NO HEADWAY ON OTHER MAJOR OUTSTANDING START
AND DEFENCE AND SPACE ISSUES.

DETAIL

2. SHULTZ SAID THAT WITH AKHROMEYEV LEADING THE SOVIET ARMS CONTROL
WORKING GROUP, THE RUSSIANS HAD ADOPTED A BUSINESS-LIKE APPROACH
TO NST DISCUSSIONS. THE MAIN FOCUS HAD BEEN ON ALCM AND MOBILE
ICBM, AND JOINT PAPERS ON EACH OF THESE ISSUES HAD BEEN DEVELOPED TO
LIST AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND THE MAIN ASPECTS STILL TO BE RESOLVED.
PROGRESS WAS MADE ON DETAILS ALTHOUGH A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF KEY
ISSUES REMAINED OUTSTANDING. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN DISCUSSION OF
OTHER MAJOR START ISSUES SUCH AS ICBM SUB-LIMITS AND SLCM, AND
DEFENCE AND SPACE BUT HE HAD NO PROGRESS TO REPORT ON THESE.
HOWEVER, SUCH DISCUSSIONS DID HELP TO LAY THE GROUND WORK FOR
FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. SHULTZ ADDED THAT BOTH PRESIDENT
REAGAN AND MR GORBACHEV WOULD LIKE TO CONCLUDE A START AGREEMENT
THIS YEAR BUT MUCH WORK REMAINED TO BE DONE AND IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE AT
THIS STAGE TO PREDICT THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCH AN OUTCOME.

3. SHULTZ CIRCULATED A FACT SHEET (COPY SENT BY FAX TO SECURITY
POLICY DEPARTMENT AND DACU MOD) WHICH SET OUT DETAILS OF THE OUTCOME

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OF DISCUSSIONS ON ALCM AND MOBILE ICBM. THE MAIN POINTS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE GIVEN BELOW.

ALCM

4. THE TWO SIDES SET DOWN IN A JOINT PAPER THE POINTS OF AGREEMENT WHICH HAD EMERGED FROM EARLIER MEETINGS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS. THESE WERE THAT:

- ALL EXISTING LONG RANGE ALCM WILL BE CONSIDERED TO BE NUCLEAR ARMED AND FUTURE CONVENTIONAL ALCM WILL BE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM NUCLEAR ALCM.

- HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPED TO CARRY NUCLEAR ALCM WILL BE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM OTHER HEAVYBOMBERS.

- BOMBERS EQUIPED FOR NUCLEAR BOMBS AND SRAM WILL COUNT AS ONE DELIVERY VEHICLE AND ONE WAR HEAD UNDER START.

- NUCLEAR CAPABLE BOMBERS MAY BE CONVERTED TO CONVENTIONAL TASKS AND A LIMITED NUMBER OF RECONNAISSANCE, JAMMING AND TANKER AIRCRAFT CONVERTED IN THIS WAY WILL NOT COUNT AGAINST START LIMITS.

5. HOWEVER, COUNTING RULES FOR ALCM, RANGE THRESHHOLD, MEANS OF DISTINGUISHING NUCLEAR FROM NON-NUCLEAR ALCM AND ON-SITE INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS HAVE YET TO BE RESOLVED.

MOBILE ICBM

6. A SIMILAR PAPER WAS PREPARED TO LIST AGREED POINTS TOGETHER WITH THE RANGE OF REMAINING ISSUES WHICH WOULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER IN GENEVA. THE POINTS OF AGREEMENT WERE:

FOR ROAD MOBILE ICBM:

- MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS TO BE CONFINED IN LIMITED NUMBERS TO RESTRICTED AREAS. LAUNCHER-ASSOCIATED STRUCTURES ALSO TO BE LIMITED WITHIN THESE AREAS.

- MOVEMENT OUTSIDE RESTRICTED AREAS FOR TRAINING, MAINTENANCE AND TESTING AND, IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES FOR EXERCISES AND OPERATIONAL DISPERSAL, TO BE ALLOWED WITH PRIOR NOTIFICATION.

- MEASURES TO ENHANCE OBSERVATION BY NTM AT RESTRICTED AREAS.

- LIMITATIONS ON NUMBER AND LOCATIONS OF NON-DEPLOYED ICBM.

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
FOR RAIL-MOBILE ICBM:

- LIMITED NUMBER OF RAIL GARRISONS, AND LIMITATIONS ON NUMBER OF MISSILES AND TRAINS IN EACH GARRISON. MOVEMENT OUT OF GARRISONS AND LIMITATIONS ON NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES COMPARABLE TO THOSE FOR ROAD MOBILE MISSILES.

7. THE ISSUES YET TO BE AGREED INCLUDE THE SIZE OF RESTRICTED AREAS, FACILITIES TO BE SUBJECT TO PERIMETER/PORTAL MONITORING, FURTHER RESTRICTIONS ON MOBILE MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS (EG SHOULD LIQUID FUELLED SYSTEMS BE ALLOWED), THE NEED TO QUOTE TAG UNQUOTE MISSILES, OTHER VERIFICATION MEASURES ADDRESSING THE POSSIBILITY OF COVER MISSILES AND SUSPECT SITE INSPECTIONS..

ALEXANDER

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Q. Mr. Kinnock, what did you think of the President's speech?

A. As the American correspondent said to me I came upstairs here it was vintage Reagan, snatches of chariots of fire, hope and glory, Tennyson, Isaiah. But nothing can take away the fact that whoever was responsible for igniting the warmer relationship, whether it was Mikhail Gorbachev or Ronald Reagan, the very least that Mr. Reagan deserves credit for is making the positive response.

Q. Do you think that this Summit has actually got somewhere?

A. Yes because it's a consolidation. It demonstrates that it can take place. And all the talk at the end despite the sprats that we understand took place, was of where to meet next time and whether it's between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev or Mr. Reagan's successor and the General Secretary, everybody knows it's going to happen. It's almost becoming conventional and I think that's the best news.

Q. The President was astonishingly fulsome at one point in his speech when he turned to the Prime Minister. At this hour in history Prime Minister the entire world salutes you and your gallant people and gallant nation. Do you have the impression that he's handing over the leadership of the West to Mrs. Thatcher?

A. No I don't get that impression at all. I think that the commentators we have already heard from would suggest that this is a personal relationship, that it's a way of the President saying thank you for the, I must say, fairly dedicated following that Mrs. Thatcher has provided for him at every twist and turn of American policy over the years and I think that's about what it says. Mr. Dukakis, for instance, who is well ahead in the polls takes a rather different view of the orientation of American foreign policy and I think that therefore the idea that a baton is being handed over would be rather over-stating it. I understand what the President was doing. I think it was a generous and gentlemanly thing to do. But I think that's about where it stops.

Q. Well, Mr. Reagan has come back from Moscow with the INF Treaty in his pocket. He was pretty bullish about the prospects for START and getting arms reduction down to 50 per cent and so forth. Now where does this put the Labour Party's defence policy, the unilateral disarmament policy. It looks almost as if you're being out-distanced by events.

A. Well, I think you'd be delighted to do that. And what does delight me and everybody who thinks like me is that as the first people to suggest the zero zero in Europe for instance, and as the people who said that there can be a significant reduction, even between the super powers in strategic arms, that these are now becoming feasible indeed. Many are straining with impatience well beyond the ranks of the Labour Party at the prospect of getting that reduction. So it delights us. The problem is there is a great log lying across the path of strategic arms reduction that of course is star wars which last Sunday Mr. Dukakis called a falacy and a fraud. I very strongly concur with that so does a lot of scientific and military establishments in the United States and consequently the end of Mr. Reagan, with all the gratitude that people have for his constructive responses, to his initiatives,

means, I think, the end of star wars and the real beginning of the prospects for significant strategic arms reduction.

Q. There is another log isn't there strewn across the path of nuclear disarmament, that is actually NATO itself because most members of NATO, for example, would not want to see total nuclear disarmament. What is your attitude on that?

A. I think there is a developing consensus. You see, if you go through the membership of NATO you see Canada that doesn't accept in any shape or form or anybody's ownership nuclear weapons on its soil. For instance, there is the continuing debate in Denmark. The Dutch manage to avoid getting any cruise missiles with a system of prolonging and the atmosphere and the attitude about dependence on nuclear weapons, especially in the European context is to say the least very mixed. We have now got Chancellor Kohl in West Germany demonstrating the majority view of the people of West Germany that they don't want to entertain the battlefield of nuclear weapons for much longer. So we are very genuinely, as the President himself said, in a new era. Gorbachev said it is the era of nuclear disarmament. And I think that there is sufficient flexibility amongst many of the very loyal NATO Governments to say we have got to assess the nuclear situation.

Mr. Kinnock, I am afraid we are being overtaken by time. Thank you for talking to us.

Right you are.