



SECRET

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Handwritten scribbles and markings, possibly redaction or administrative notes.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

23 May 1988

SUBJECT CC MASTER
OPS

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T79/88

Dear Mr. Conacher.

The next few weeks are clearly going to be exceptionally busy for you, with both the US/Soviet Summit meeting and your Party Conference. Each in their way will be historic meetings and will influence the future of our continent and indeed of our world for many years to come. I send you my best wishes for a successful outcome to both. I hope that the Party Conference will take forward the great process of change and reform on which you have embarked. I admire enormously your resolve not to allow the difficulties to eclipse the opportunities.

My understanding on the Summit is that, while it should be possible to make progress on a number of arms control issues, it is too early to expect agreement on reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. This seems to me realistic. It would be a mistake to negotiate on such vital matters against a deadline: and the verification arrangements must be got right from all our viewpoints. I hope, however, that progress made in the negotiations to date can be recorded. Much important work has been done and the momentum should be maintained.

On other arms control issues I am very hopeful that the US Senate will ratify the INF Agreement, thus making it possible for you to exchange instruments of ratification at

SECRET

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the Summit. We seem to be close to agreement in Vienna on a mandate for the talks on conventional force reductions. At the same time we should be able to record significant new commitments on human rights, in the Vienna Concluding Document. Effective world-wide action on chemical weapons becomes more urgent in view of the continued use of these weapons in the Iran/Iraq war. I am sure you are wise to approach the limitation of nuclear testing on a step-by-step basis, focussing as a first step on the explosive force of such tests.

I understand that regional issues are likely to play a major role at the Summit and this is welcome. The beginning of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is a very important step which we have wholeheartedly welcomed. The need now is for the UN to help the Afghan parties to reach agreement on interim arrangements which will allow the earliest possible return of the refugees in peace. I hope your talks with President Reagan will contribute to this.

I am encouraged by the opening of talks between Angola, Cuba, the United States and South Africa on the implementation of UN SCR 435 in Namibia and on Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. I do not at all underestimate the difficulties once they get down to details, but the very fact of talking is important. For our part, we are urging the South African government to be positive and flexible. I hope you will use your great influence with the Cubans to bring them to negotiate seriously and to stop the advance of Cuban forces towards the Namibian border which risks a serious escalation in the fighting. As I have indicated in the past, I believe that a lasting solution in Angola will only come about through direct talks between the MPLA and UNITA.

I very much hope that you and the President will have time for a full discussion on the Middle East about which I am extremely concerned. The conflict between Iran and Iraq appears no nearer a solution and, in my view, will not be until the UN Security Council can agree on a follow-up to

UN SCR 498 which exerts real pressure on Iran to negotiate. I do once more urge you to unblock this and thus give the UN Secretary-General's efforts to bring the two sides together fresh impetus.

It is also important to maintain the momentum towards an international conference on the Arab-Israel problem. I am under no illusions where the main obstacle lies. But I believe that American efforts to surmount or circumvent that obstacle would be greatly advanced if the Soviet Union were to encourage the PLO to accept a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, to renounce violence and to accept Israel's right to a secure existence. I would hope that you would also consider moving towards the re-establishment of relations with Israel. These steps could have a profound influence on opinion in Israel and on the prospect for negotiations.

More generally, I am greatly alarmed by the proliferation of ballistic missile systems in the area, together with the growing readiness to resort to use of chemical weapons. This makes agreement on solutions to the fundamental problems more urgent still. Time is shorter than we thought.

I am also convinced that you can play a constructive role in persuading the Vietnamese to withdraw their troops from Cambodia and enter into negotiations with Prince Sihanouk.

Despite the dangers which I have described, I believe that the overall international outlook is more promising than for some time. May I applaud the personal contribution which you have made to that. I hope that the forthcoming Summit will achieve further positive steps.

Our invitation to you to visit the United Kingdom remains open and we hope that in the coming months we can settle on a time which would be convenient to us both for

you to take it up. In the meantime my husband joins me in sending warm regards to you and to Mrs. Gorbachev.

Yours sincerely
Nagantshatka

Mr. Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev

PRIME MINISTER

Charles has shown the messages to Reagan and Gorbachev to the Foreign Office and Defence. They are entirely happy with the Reagan one which is now being despatched. They have three fairly small points on the Gorbachev one. Charles is confident they would not cause you trouble. He would like to amend the text to take account of them and despatch it by telegram to Moscow. You could then sign the top copy subsequently on Monday.


Are you content with that?

ECL

20 May 1988

PM said
yes of course.
cop told

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>2173</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>PM to US President dated 23 May 1988</i>	
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Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

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Enter the piece and item references, .
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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 May 1988

US/SOVIET SUMMIT:
MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR. GORBACHEV

Thank you for your letter of 20 May proposing three changes to the Prime Minister's message to Mr. Gorbachev. I agree the first and third amendments. For the second I propose that we say: "Agreement to deal with chemical weapons becomes more urgent ..." This papers over the crack between our various positions, but is not incompatible with the elimination of such weapons. If you can accept this change, the message may issue this evening and I will let you have a signed original on Monday.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Charles Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 May 1988

COO
20/5

Dear Charles,

US/Soviet Summit: Messages from the Prime Minister
to President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev

Thank you for your letter of 20 May. The Foreign Secretary is content with the message to President Reagan. He does however consider that three points in the message to Mr Gorbachev need amendment:

- the penultimate sentence of the second paragraph rules out the possibility of reaching a START agreement by the end of President Reagan's term of office. President Reagan has himself maintained publicly that he still hopes to reach an agreement by then. We would obviously not want to undercut this line. The sentence could be amended to read "I hope, however, that progress made in the negotiations to date can be recorded. Much important ...".
- The Russians would read the words "to reduce and eventually eliminate chemical weapons" (penultimate sentence of third paragraph) as a significant departure from the line the Prime Minister has taken in the past (eg the reference in her message to Gorbachev of August 1986 to "the importance the UK attaches to the abolition of chemical weapons"; her statement to Gorbachev personally last year that "chemical weapons should be banned totally"; as well as the line she has taken publicly, eg her reference in the Mansion House speech to the need to "eliminate chemical weapons"). The Foreign Secretary would prefer to say simply that "agreement to eliminate chemical weapons becomes ...".
- On nuclear testing (final sentence of third paragraph) the reference to "numbers" of such tests was an oversight on our part. The Russians have not suggested that the number of tests should be restricted. We would prefer the sentence to conclude "focussing as a first step on the explosive force of such tests".

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Hawtin (MOD) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,
L Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 May 1988

Dear Sir,

US/SOVIET SUMMIT: MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
PRESIDENT REAGAN AND MR. GORBACHEV

I enclose copies of messages which the Prime Minister has approved and signed to President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev about their forthcoming Summit. The originals will follow in due course. Subject to any comments which you have on the text, I should be grateful if the message to Mr. Gorbachev could be sent to Moscow for delivery as soon as possible. I propose to send the text to President Reagan on the direct line to the White House as soon as you notify me that the Foreign Secretary is content.

I am copying this letter and its enclosures to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,
C. D. Powell

C. D. POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

DRAFT

Dear Mr. Gorbachev,

The next few weeks are clearly going to be exceptionally busy for you, with both the US/Soviet Summit meeting and your Party Conference. Each in their way will be historic meetings and will influence the future of our continent and indeed of our world for many years to come. I send you my best wishes for a successful outcome to both. I hope that the Party Conference will take forward the great process of change and reform on which you have embarked. I admire enormously your resolve not to allow the difficulties to eclipse the opportunities.

My understanding on the Summit is that, while it should be possible to make progress on a number of arms control issues, it is too early to expect agreement on reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. This seems to me realistic. It would be a mistake to negotiate on such vital matters against a deadline: and the verification arrangements must be got right from all our viewpoints. I hope, however, that progress made in the negotiations to date and during the remainder of President Reagan's term can be recorded in such a way as to provide a basis for taking up discussions again as rapidly as possible after a new President is installed. Much important work has been done and the momentum should be maintained.

On other arms control issues I am very hopeful that the US Senate will ratify the INF Agreement, thus making it possible for you to exchange instruments of ratification at the Summit. We seem to be close to agreement in Vienna on a mandate for the talks on conventional force reductions. At the same time we should be able to record significant new commitments on human rights, in the Vienna Concluding Document. Agreement to reduce and eventually eliminate chemical weapons becomes more urgent in view of the continued use of these weapons in the Iran/Iraq war. I am sure you are wise to approach the limitation of nuclear testing on a step-by-step basis, focussing on the numbers and explosive force of such tests.

I understand that regional issues are likely to play a major role at the Summit and this is welcome. The beginning of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is a very important step which we have wholeheartedly welcomed. The need now is for the UN to help the Afghan parties to reach agreement on interim arrangements which will allow the earliest possible return of the refugees in peace. I hope your talks with President Reagan will contribute to this.

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am extremely concerned. The conflict between Iran and Iraq appears no nearer a solution and, in my view, will not be until the UN Security Council can agree on a follow-up to UN SCR 498 which exerts real pressure on Iran to negotiate. I do once more urge you to unblock this and thus give the UN Secretary-General's efforts to bring the two sides together fresh impetus.

It is also important to maintain the momentum towards an international conference on the Arab-Israel problem. I am under no illusions where the main obstacle lies. But I believe that American efforts to surmount or circumvent that obstacle would be greatly advanced if the Soviet Union were to encourage the PLO to accept a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, to renounce violence and to accept Israel's right to a secure existence. I would hope that you would also consider moving towards the re-establishment of relations with Israel. These steps could have a profound influence on opinion in Israel and on the prospect for negotiations.

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
Our invitation to you to visit the United Kingdom remains open and we hope that in the coming months we can settle on a time which would be convenient to us both for you to take it up. In the meantime my husband joins me in sending warm regards to you and to Mrs. Gorbachev.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Mr. Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>2173</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Draft message from PM to US President attached to Powell to Parker dated 20 May 1988</i>	
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Enter the piece and item references, .
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Agreed

PRIME MINISTER

UNITED STATES SUMMIT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

You have seen the draft of a message to Mr. Gorbachev about the US/Soviet Summit. I have now done the attached companion-piece to President Reagan. I have tried to make it brief and general and put it in a way which will attract his interest. It spells out in very general terms the main priorities for the Summit as you see them. I don't think there is a need for a detailed message this time.

I also attach the FCO draft which is rather different in nature.


C.D.R.

CHARLES POWELL

20 May 1988

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Agreed~~PRIME MINISTER~~

US/SOVIET SUMMIT: MESSAGE TO MR. GORBACHEV

I attach a message from you to Mr. Gorbachev about the forthcoming US/Soviet Summit. It is very similar to the draft you saw last night which the FCO have now agreed with minor amendments. I have also modified the first paragraph to take account of your comments.

Agree to sign?

"Dear General Secretary"

CD?

CDP

19 May 1988

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Prime Minister

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

✓ you may like to
see this as
work in hand.

From the Private Secretary

18 may 1988

The FCO
are also working on a draft.
Dear Lynn,

CAP

18/5

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR GORBACHEV

I know that you are working on a draft message from the Prime Minister to Mr Gorbachev. I have also had a go at one myself and enclose the result, in case it is of any help.

Yours sincerely

Charles Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR. GORBACHEV

The next few weeks are clearly going to be exceptionally busy for you, with both the US/Soviet Summit meeting and your Party Conference. We are watching the preparations for these events with great interest, and I send you my best wishes for a successful outcome to both of them. I hope that the Party Conference will take forward the great process of change and reform on which you have embarked. I have continued to make clear publicly my support for what you are trying to achieve.

Your Ambassador has kindly briefed me on the preparatory talks for the Summit between Secretary Shultz and Mr. Shevardnadze and I have also, of course, received an account from the Americans. My understanding is that, while it should be possible to make progress on a number of arms control issues, it is too early to expect agreement on reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. This seems to me realistic. It would be a mistake to negotiate on such vital matters against a deadline: and the verification arrangements will be crucial and must be got right. I hope, however, that the progress made in the negotiations to date and during the remainder of President Reagan's term can be recorded in such a way as to provide a basis for taking up discussions again as rapidly as possible after a new President is installed. Much important work has been done and the momentum should be maintained.

On other arms control issues I am confident that the US Senate will ratify the INF Agreement, thus making it possible for you to exchange instruments of ratification at the Summit. We seem to be close to agreement on a mandate for the talks on conventional force reductions. The importance of reaching agreement to reduce and eventually eliminate

chemical weapons is underlined by the Iran/Iraq war. I am sure you are wise to approach the limitation of nuclear tests on a step-by-step basis. So long as there are nuclear weapons, there will be a need to test them and the scope for restraint will concern the numbers and explosive force of such tests.

I understand that regional issues are likely to play a major role at the Summit and I think this is welcome. The beginning of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is a very important step which we have publicly welcomed. The need now is for the UN to help the Afghan parties to reach agreement on interim arrangements which will allow the earliest possible return of the refugees in peace. I hope your talks with President Reagan will contribute to this.

I am encouraged by the opening of talks between Angola, Cuba, the United States and South Africa on the implementation of UN SCR 435 in Namibia and on Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. I do not at all underestimate the difficulties once they get down to details, but the very fact of talking is important. For our part, we are urging the South African government to play a positive part. I hope you will use your undoubted influence with the Cubans to bring them to negotiate seriously and to discontinue the advance of Cuban forces towards the Namibian border which risks a serious escalation in the fighting. As I have told you in the past, I believe that a lasting solution in Angola will only come about through direct talks between the MPLA and UNITA. I am encouraged by recent contacts with a number of African governments to believe that this may be nearer.

I very much hope that you and the President will have time for a full discussion on the Middle East about which I am extremely concerned. The conflict between Iran and Iraq appears no nearer a solution and, in my view, will not be until the UN Security Council can agree on a follow-up to UN SCR 498 which exerts real pressure on Iran to negotiate. I do once more urge you to unblock this and thus give the UN

Secretary-General's efforts to bring the two sides together fresh impetus.

I believe it is also important to maintain the momentum of efforts to reach agreement on an international conference on the Arab-Israel problem. I am under no illusions where the main obstacle lies. But I believe that American efforts to surmount or circumvent that obstacle would be greatly advanced if the Soviet Union were to encourage the PLO to accept the concept of participating in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, to renounce violence and to accept Israel's right to exist. I would hope that you would also consider moving towards the establishment of relations with Israel. These steps could have a profound and beneficial influence on opinion in Israel and on the prospect for negotiations.

More generally, I am greatly alarmed by the proliferation of ballistic missile systems in the area. Taken with the growing readiness to resort to use of chemical weapons, this development poses enormous dangers. I hope you will discuss with President Reagan how to restrain the spread of missile technology.

Despite these dangers, I believe that the overall international outlook is more promising than for some time, with the potential for progress in many areas. I give you full credit for your personal contribution to that and hope that the forthcoming Summit will achieve further positive steps in the areas I have indicated.

Our invitation to you to visit the United Kingdom remains open and we hope that you will feel able to take it up. In the meantime my husband joins me in sending warm regards to you and to Mrs. Gorbachev.

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SECRET

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR. GORBACHEV

Mr. Dobrynin has kindly briefed ^{and} Ambassador on the prospects for the Party Conference.

The next few weeks are clearly going to be exceptionally busy for you, with both the US/Soviet Summit meeting and your Party Conference. We are watching the preparations for these events with great interest, and I send you my best wishes for a successful outcome to both of them. I hope that the Party Conference will take forward the great process of change and reform on which you have embarked. I have continued to make clear publicly my support for what you are trying to achieve.

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hopeful

in Vienna

But at the same time we must see satisfactory progress on human rights, else we are looking for

looking for significant new commitments in the Vienna concluding document

chemical weapons is underlined by the Iran/Iraq war. I am sure you are wise to approach the limitation of nuclear tests on a step-by-step basis, ~~So long as there are nuclear weapons, there will be a need to test them and the scope for restraint~~ ^{foundations on} will concern the numbers and explosive force of such tests.

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