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INFO PRIORITY MODUK, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, PARIS

MODUK FOR DUS(P) AND DACU

GERMAN VIEWS ON SNF

SUMMARY

1. CHANCELLOR'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISER UNWILLING TO EXCLUDE AN INITIATIVE ON SNF ARMS CONTROL BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL LEVELS ARE COMPLETED. FORESEES A FEDERAL DECISION TO STATION FOLLOW-ON TO LANCE (FOTL) IN DUE COURSE, IN THE CONTEXT OF A DECISION ON FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARTILLERY, AFTER COORDINATED CONSIDERATIONS OF THESE MATTERS AND OF AIR LAUNCHED STAND OFF MISSILES, DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT AND SLCM.

DETAIL

2. TELTSCHIK TOLD ME TODAY THAT THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR, LIKE WOERNER AND GENSCHER, DID NOT FAVOUR A MOVE TO ZERO IN SNF ARMS CONTROL. AS TO THE TIMING OF ARMS CONTROL MOVES IN THIS FIELD, THE CHANCELLOR WAS NOT WILLING TO EXCLUDE SOME INITIATIVE BEFORE THE CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL BALANCE, NOT LEAST SINCE THOSE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD INEVITABLY LAST A LONG TIME. WHEN I SET OUT OUR MORE NEGATIVE VIEW ON SNF ARMS CONTROL, TELTSCHIK TOOK COMFORT IN THE FACT THAT NEITHER THE UNITED KINGDOM NOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC FAVOURED ANY MOVE ON THIS FOR THE TIME BEING.

3. ON SNF MODERNISATION, TELTSCHIK SPOKE, LIKE WOERNER (MY TELNO 312), IN TERMS OF A PACKAGE LINKING A DECISION TO GO AHEAD ON FOTL WITH A DECISION TO REDUCE FURTHER THE NUMBERS OF WARHEADS FOR NUCLEAR ARTILLERY. HE SAID THAT A NUMBER OF OPTIONS FOR MODERNISATION WERE POSSIBLE, WHICH SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE ALLIANCE. ONE QUESTION WAS THE RANGE THAT FOTL SHOULD HAVE: IN THE GERMAN VIEW IT SHOULD BE OVER 400 KMS. ANOTHER QUESTION WAS WHETHER A DECISION ON TASM WOULD ALTER THE RANGE OR THE NUMBERS OF FOTL SYSTEMS THAT WOULD BE NEEDED. THE QUESTIONS OF STATIONING MORE DCA IN EUROPE AND OF SLCMS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE SAME PROCESS. WHEN THE TIME CAME FOR GOING AHEAD ON FOTL, BY FAR THE HARDEST OF THESE MATTERS FOR THE GERMANS, THE CHANCELLOR WOULD TAKE THE DECISIONS TO STATION. IT SEEMED LIKELY THAT THE NEW AMERICAN

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ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT DECIDE WHAT IT WANTED ON FOTL BEFORE LATE 1989 AT THE EARLIEST. BUT THE CHANCELLOR WOULD BE WILLING TO DECIDE IN PRINCIPLE ON STATIONING THEN OR EVEN IN 1990 (DESPITE THE BUNDESTAG ELECTIONS LATE THAT YEAR) IF THAT PROVED NECESSARY.

COMMENT

4. IN SUBSTANCE THIS IS IN LINE WITH WHAT OTHERS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN SAYING, BUT TELTSCHIK'S PRESENTATION IS MORE ROBUST IN MODERNISATION THAN WHAT ONE HEARS IN THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT. THE GENERAL SENSE THAT I AM GETTING FROM CONTACTS WITH SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS THAT THEY ARE NOT GOING TO TRY TO RUSH THINGS ON SNF ARMS CONTROL BUT EQUALLY ARE HOPING TO AVOID AN EARLY DECISION ON FOTL. ONE FACTOR IS A FEAR THAT THE NEXT US ADMINISTRATION MIGHT SEE THE VARIOUS SNF ISSUES - WHETHER FOR BUDGETARY OR OTHER REASONS - DIFFERENTLY FROM THE PRESENT ONE.

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ARMS CONTROL: NUCLEAR
LIMITED
SEC POL D
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DEFENCE
NED
SOVIET
CSCE UNIT
EED
NAD
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SED
PLANNERS
ESSD

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