

CONFIDENTIAL

051542  
MDHIAN 4668

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FM WASHINGTON  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 909  
OF 062312Z APRIL 88  
INFO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD, MOSCOW, UKMIS GENEVA, KUALA LUMPUR  
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, ROME, NEW DELHI, KABUL, RIYADH

KUALA LUMPUR FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY  
UKMIS GENEVA TELNO 215 AND ISLAMABAD TELNO 471: AFGHANISTAN  
SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION SHARE THE VIEW THAT AGREEMENT AT GENEVA MAY NOW BE CLOSE. BUT THEY ARE STILL WAITING FOR A DEFINITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE RUSSIANS TO THE LATEST US PROPOSALS ON SYMMETRY. US DECISION ON WHETHER TO SIGN AT GENEVA, WILL BE TAKEN IN LIGHT OF THAT RESPONSE.  
DETAIL
2. WE HAVE TOUCHED BASE WITH CONTACTS IN THE NSC AND STATE. THEY AGREE THAT THERE HAS BEEN SOME MOVEMENT IN RECENT DAYS AND THAT AGREEMENT MAY NOW BE CLOSE. BUT THE US HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED AN UNAMBIGUOUS REPLY FROM THE RUSSIANS TO THEIR LATEST PROPOSALS FOR 'POSITIVE SYMMETRY': I.E. THAT THE RUSSIANS AND US WOULD RETAIN THE RIGHT TO CONTINUE SUPPLYING THE KABUL REGIME AND THE RESISTANCE RESPECTIVELY. THERE HAD BEEN SOME POSITIVE SIGNALS FROM THE RUSSIANS, BUT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD REQUIRE A CLEAR UNDERTAKING IN ORDER TO REASSURE CONGRESS. FINAL US DECISIONS WOULD NOT BE TAKEN UNTIL A FORMAL SOVIET RESPONSE WAS RECEIVED. THIS COULD COME AS EARLY AS 7 APRIL.
3. WE ASKED ABOUT THE PROBLEM WHICH THE POSITIVE SYMMETRY PROPOSAL WOULD POSE FOR THE PAKISTANIS GIVEN THAT IT COULD INVOLVE THEM VIOLATING THE AGREEMENTS (PARA 4 OF ISLAMABAD TUR). STATE AND THE NSC BOTH EMPHASISED THAT THE PROPOSAL HAD BEEN MADE WITH THE FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE PAKISTANIS. THE LATTER HAD FOR YEARS ROUTINELY DENIED THAT MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS REACHING THE RESISTANCE FROM PAKISTAN. THE PRIORITY NOW FOR PAKISTAN WAS TO REACH AN AGREEMENT IN GENEVA WHICH PROTECTED THEIR KEY INTERESTS. AND THE FACT OF A US/SOVIET UNDERSTANDING ON THE ISSUE OF SUPPLIES TO THE TWO PARTIES WOULD GIVE THEM SOME COVER FROM CHARGES THAT THEY WERE VIOLATING THE AGREEMENTS. THE NSC ADDED THAT THE US HAD IN RECENT WEEKS BEEN ACCELERATING SUPPLIES TO THE RESISTANCE: THERE MIGHT NOT THEREFORE BE A NEED FOR SIGNIFICANT FURTHER SUPPLIES FROM PAKISTAN IN THE CRUCIAL FIRST WEEKS AFTER THE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED.
4. ON THE BORDER ISSUE, OUR US CONTACTS HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS

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IS AN ISSUE FOR PAKISTAN RATHER THAN THE US. STATE TOLD US LATE ON 6 APRIL THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT A FORM OF WORDS HAD NOW BEEN AGREED IN GENEVA.

5. IN SHORT, OUR CONTACTS ARE CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT A DEAL CAN BE TIED UP VERY SOON IN GENEVA. STATE THOUGHT THAT PROVIDED THERE WERE NO MORE HITCHES, SIGNATURE COULD TAKE PLACE AS EARLY AS 13 APRIL. NSC EMPHASISED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD WANT TO TAKE A CAREFUL LOOK AT THE WHOLE PACKAGE, BUT THAT IF THERE WAS A POSITIVE SOVIET RESPONSE ON SYMETTRY, HE WAS LIKELY TO CONCLUDE THAT THE US SHOULD SIGN AT GENEVA.

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