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FM WASHINGTON  
TO DESKBY 240900Z FCO  
TELNO 771  
OF 240410Z MARCH 88  
INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW  
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, UKDIS GENEVA, ISLAMABAD

OUR TELNO 744: SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON: 23-25 MARCH  
SUMMARY

1. AGREEMENT ON SUMMIT IN MOSCOW, 29 MAY TO 2 JUNE. SHULTZ'S  
PRESS CONFERENCE SUGGESTS NO BREAKTHROUGHS ON ARMS CONTROL OR  
AFGHANISTAN.

DETAIL

2. SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE CONCLUDED TWO FULL DAYS OF TALKS ON  
THE EVENING OF 23 MARCH. THE FINAL ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS RAN  
SEVERAL HOURS LONGER THAN PLANNED. AS A RESULT, THE BRIEFING  
WHICH MRS RIDGWAY AND NITZE HAD ARRANGED TO GIVE FOR ALLIED EMBAS-  
SIES THAT EVENING WAS DELAYED TWICE AND THEN POSTPONED TO 24 MARCH.

3. SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE ISSUED A JOINT COMMUNIQUE AT THE END  
OF THEIR TALKS. TEXT TO FOLLOW WHEN AVAILABLE. AT A LATE NIGHT PRESS  
CONFERENCE ON 23 MARCH SHULTZ MADE THE FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS:

(I) ARMS CONTROL. A GREAT DEAL OF TIME HAD BEEN SPENT ON ARMS  
CONTROL ISSUES IN THE WORKING GROUP. THE IDEA OF PRODUCING  
JOINT DRAFT TEXTS OF THE THREE START VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS HAD  
BEEN A GOOD ONE QUOTE WE HAVE GOT EACH OF THESE TEXTS UP AND  
RUNNING, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE HEAVILY BRACKETED UNQUOTE. THE US  
HAD EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF EARLY EXCHANGES OF DATA.  
THERE HAD BEEN LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF THE MAJOR OUTSTANDING  
START ISSUES QUOTE I CANNOT POINT TO ANY PARTICULAR OUTCOME  
EXCEPT THAT THROUGH THIS KIND OF DISCUSSION OUR SIDE BECOMES  
MORE REALISTIC ... WE HAVE PROVIDED SOME IDEAS IN MOST OF THESE  
AREAS AND THE SOVIETS PROVIDED IDEAS OF THEIR OWN UNQUOTE:

(II) ON DEFENCE AND SPACE, THE TWO SIDES ACCEPTED THAT  
THERE WOULD BE A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT. THE  
MAIN OUTSTANDING ISSUE IN THE US VIEW WAS THE NEED TO DO  
MORE TO REMOVE AMBIGUITIES IN THE LANGUAGE AGREED AT THE  
WASHINGTON SUMMIT:

(III) ON NUCLEAR TESTING, IT HAD BEEN AGREED TO PROCEED  
IN PARALLEL WITH THE DRAFTING OF THE VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS  
AND WITH THE PREPARATION OF JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENTS.  
QUOTE WE ARE CONTENT WITH THAT, BUT IT DOES SLOW THINGS  
DOWN. UNQUOTE:



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(IV) ON CSCE, THE US SAW SOME PROGRESS IN VIENNA ON THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS, BUT WERE NOT AT ALL PLEASED WITH THE WAY THE HUMAN RIGHTS SIDE OF THE MEETING WAS DEVELOPED. HE AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD TALKED AT LENGTH ABOUT THIS. QUOTE I HOPE THAT A RESULT MAY BE MORE MOVEMENT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SIDE IN VIENNA UNQUOTE.

(V) AFGHANISTAN: SHULTZ WELCOMED THE SOVIET INTENTION TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS, THE COMMITMENT TO FRONT-LOADING AND SHEVARDNADZE'S COMMENT THAT THEY EXPECTED ALL THEIR TROOPS TO BE OUT BY THE END OF 1988. ON THE ISSUE OF SYMMETRY, THE US HAD PROPOSED A MORATORIUM ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO RUN FROM THE PERIOD WHEN THE WITHDRAWAL BEGAN, PERHAPS INITIALLY FOR THREE MONTHS AND EXTENDABLE BEYOND THAT. SUCH A MORATORIUM WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ASSERTIONS OF LEGAL RIGHTS TO SUPPLY PARTIES BUT WOULD HELP TO PRODUCE A FRUITFUL ATMOSPHERE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF STABLE CONDITIONS IN AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIET SIDE DID NOT FEEL ABLE TO AGREE TO THAT PROPOSAL: BUT IT REMAINED ON THE TABLE. (SHEVARDNADZE ADDED LATER AT HIS OWN PRESS CONFERENCE QUOTE I RULE IT OUT... FOR THE PRESENT UNQUOTE.) IF THIS PROPOSAL OR SOMETHING LIKE IT, WAS ACCEPTED, THE US WOULD BE PLEASED TO SIGN AS A GUARANTOR AT GENEVA,

(VI) THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS: US AND SOVIET CONCEPTS OF THE ROLE OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE DIFFERED SHARPLY QUOTE IN THEIR CONCEPT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WITH AUTHORITY IS AT THE CENTRE OF THE PROCESS AND IN OURS BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ARE AT THE CENTRE OF THE PROCESS. AND MANY THINGS FOLLOW FROM THESE DIFFERENT ORIENTATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE AGREED THAT OUR EXPERTS WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT WITH EACH OTHER UNQUOTE:

(VII) SOUTHERN AFRICA: THERE HAD BEEN USEFUL DISCUSSIONS: BUT THESE WERE NOT DETERMINATIVE IN ANY WAY,

(VIII) CENTRAL AMERICA: THE US SIDE HAD EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOVIET UNION CEASING THEIR MILITARY SUPPLIES TO NICARAGUA. THE RUSSIANS HAD APPEARED TO OFFER AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT TO DO SO IF THE US STOPPED SUPPLYING THE CONTRAS. SINCE US AID TO THE CONTRAS HAD NOW BEEN CUT OFF, IT WAS TIME THE RUSSIANS STOPPED SUPPLYING NICARAGUA. UNFORTUNATELY, THEIR CONCEPT HAD NOW BEEN ENLARGED TO COVER A BROAD SPREAD OF US MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE HEMISPHERE,

(IX) ON IRAN-IRAQ, THE US INTENDED TO MOVE TO A SECOND RESOLUTION AFTER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S CONSULTATIONS IN EARLY APRIL QUOTE WE HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION MAY SEE FIT TO JOIN US UNQUOTE:

(X) HUMAN RIGHTS: SHEVARDNADZE HAD SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WERE LOOKING AT CHANGES IN THE TREATMENT OF RELIGIOUS



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GROUPS AND IN VISA POLICY AND TRADE UNION RIGHTS. THE US HAD RAISED INDIVIDUAL CASES: WELCOMED PROGRESS ON GERMAN AND ARMENIAN EMIGRATION: BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT JEWISH EMIGRATION SEEMED TO HAVE REACHED A PLATEAU. SHEVARDNADZE RAISED A NUMBER OF ISSUES ABOUT THE US HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD. DISCUSSIONS WOULD CONTINUE ON 24 MARCH AT A ROUND-TABLE SESSION:

(XI) BILATERAL AFFAIRS: COMMERCE SECRETARY VERITY WOULD VISIT MOSCOW IN APRIL. THE TWO SIDES HAD AGREED TO ESTABLISH CULTURAL CENTRES IN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

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
OUR TELNO 771 : SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

## SUMMARY

1. BRIEFING BY RIDGWAY AND NITZE. HARD SLOGGING ON START AND SPACE/DEFENCE ISSUES. NOTHING NEW ON AFGHANISTAN OR OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES. TWO FURTHER MINISTERIAL MEETINGS BEFORE THE SUMMIT.

## DETAIL

2. MRS RIDGWAY AND NITZE BRIEFED ALLIED EMBASSIES ON 24 MARCH. THIS TELEGRAM COVERS GENERAL POINTS, AND REGIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BILATERAL ISSUES. MIFT COVERS ARMS CONTROL.
3. MRS RIDGWAY SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN A GRUELLING TWO DAYS, WITH MANY HOURS OF DETAILED DISCUSSIONS. ON START, THE NEGOTIATORS WERE GRAPPLING WITH THE HARD ISSUES. MAJOR PROGRESS HAD NEVER BEEN LIKELY. BUT THE MINISTERS HAD AGREED TO MEET AGAIN IN MOSCOW (21-25 APRIL) AND ONCE MORE BEFORE THE SUMMIT, POSSIBLY ON NEUTRAL GROUND.
4. THE RUSSIANS HAD UNVEILED TWO ENTIRELY NEW IDEAS IN WASHINGTON:
- I) A PROPOSAL FOR AN EXCHANGE OF DATA ON NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES IN ADVANCE OF THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS. THE PARAMETERS FOR SUCH AN EXCHANGE TO BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN WARSAW PACT AND NATO EXPERTS AT A MEETING IN MID-APRIL, AND THE EXCHANGE ITSELF TO TAKE PLACE IN MID-MAY. SHULTZ'S INITIAL REACTION WAS THAT THE US DID NOT DISCUSS CONVENTIONAL STABILITY ISSUES BILATERALLY, AND WOULD WANT TO CONSULT THEIR ALLIES. HE ADDED THAT HIS FIRST REACTION WAS THAT THIS PROPOSAL LEAP-FROGGED OVER THE MAIN CURRENT ISSUE, WHICH WAS ACHIEVING AGREEMENT IN THE MANDATE DISCUSSIONS AT VIENNA.
- II) AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CONSTRAINTS ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES. SOVIET IDEAS WERE VERY VAGUE: PARTICIPANTS COULD INCLUDE THE US, SOVIET UNION, UK, FRANCE, AND QUOTE OTHERS UNQUOTE. SUCH A CONFERENCE WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS AT MURMANSK AND BELGRADE. SHULTZ RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD PASS THE IDEA ON BUT DOUBTED THAT IT WOULD BE WELCOME TO ANY OF THE NAVIES CONCERNED. SHEVARDNADZE ADDED THAT

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QUOTE CDE II UNQUOTE WOULD IN ANY CASE HAVE TO CONSIDER NAVAL ACTIVITIES.

MRS RIDGWAY COMMENTED THAT THE US WERE NOT TAKING EITHER OF THESE PROPOSALS SERIOUSLY.

REGIONAL ISSUES

5. AFGHANISTAN. DISCUSSED AT GREAT LENGTH BETWEEN MINISTERS, AND BETWEEN ARMACOST AND ADAMISHIN. SHULTZ DESCRIBED THE OUTCOME FULLY AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE (OUR TUR). THE RUSSIANS WERE CLEARLY UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THE US PROPOSAL FOR A MORATORIUM ON AID TO THE PARTIES. (ANOTHER CONTACT IN STATE TOLD US SEPARATELY THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD MADE CLEAR IN PRIVATE THAT THEY WOULD NOT GIVE A PRIVATE ASSURANCE OF A CESSATION OF AID TO KABUL AS THE US HAD PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED, BECAUSE SUCH AN ASSURANCE WOULD IMMEDIATELY BE GIVEN TO CONGRESS AND BECOME PUBLIC. IT APPEARED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THEM IN POLITICAL TERMS TO AVOID BEING SEEN TO WRITE OFF THEIR CLIENTS IN KABUL, PARTICULARLY IF THEY WANTED NAJIB TO SURVIVE FOR A DECENT INTERVAL AFTER THEIR WITHDRAWAL). MRS RIDGWAY ADDED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT: BOTH SIDES HAD SIMPLY WELCOMED CORDOVEZ'S WILLINGNESS TO WORK IN A PERSONAL CAPACITY WITH THE AFGHAN GROUPS.
6. MIDDLE EAST. AS SHULTZ HAD MADE CLEAR TO THE PRESS, FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES REMAINED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ON THE PEACE PROCESS. BUT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO KEEP IN TOUCH. POLYAKOV HAD STAYED ON FOR A FURTHER DAY'S TALKS WITH MURPHY.
7. GULF. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE REPORTS OF THE IRAQI CW ATTACK ON HALABJA SHOULD BE FOLLOWED UP URGENTLY AT GENEVA. ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE RUSSIANS HAD AGREED UNDER PRESSURE THAT IF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S ROUND OF TALKS ON 4-5 MAY WERE UNSATISFACTORY, THEY WOULD BE READY TO TAKE QUOTE STRONG ACTION UNQUOTE. BUT THEY HAD REFUSED SHULTZ'S REQUEST TO INCLUDE THIS IN THE JOINT STATEMENT. Apr 1!
8. SOUTHERN AFRICA. DISCUSSED MAINLY BETWEEN CROCKER AND ADAMISHIN. THE MINISTERS HAD ONLY TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON THE SUBJECT, BUT HAD AGREED THAT EXPERTS SHOULD DISCUSS FURTHER.
9. HUMAN RIGHTS. THIS HAD BEEN THE SOLE TOPIC AT THE RESTRICTED MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT AND HAD BEEN DISCUSSED FURTHER AT LOWER LEVELS. IN ADDITION TO THE POINTS MADE BY SHULTZ TO THE PRESS, SHEVARDNADZE HAD RAISED THE MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE, SAYING THAT IF THE AMERICANS WERE CATEGORICALLY AGAINST IT, THE SOVIET UNION COULD LIVE WITHOUT IT. THEY DID NOT WANT TO COMPETE WITH THE UK AND FRENCH PROPOSALS, AND COULD AGREE TO CONFERENCES IN LONDON AND PARIS. A MOSCOW CONFERENCE COULD TAKE PLACE LATER. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION FROM THE MINISTER, MRS RIDGWAY SAID THAT SHE REGARDED



THIS AS ESSENTIALLY A CONTINUATION OF THE PREVIOUS SOVIET LINE ON THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE: THEY DID NOT WANT TO ABANDON THEIR PROPOSAL BUT SHE AGREED THAT THE LATEST FORMULA MIGHT REFLECT A SLIGHT CHANGE OF EMPHASIS.

BILATERAL

10. THE TWO SIDES HAD DISCUSSED RENEWAL OF THE CULTURAL EXCHANGES AGREEMENT. THE US HAD TABLED DRAFT AGREEMENTS ON TRANSPORTATION AND BASIC SCIENCES. BOTH SIDES HAD ALSO EXPRESSED INTEREST IN A FISHERIES AGREEMENT.

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MIPT : SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON : ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

## SUMMARY

1. ON START, US MAKE NEW PROPOSALS ON COUNTING RULES FOR ALCMS. RUSSIANS MOVE BACKWARDS ON SUB-LIMITS. NO PROGRESS ON SLCM VERIFICATION. RUSSIANS ACCEPT SEVEN YEAR PERIOD FOR START REDUCTIONS. ON DEFENCE AND SPACE, RUSSIANS WILLING TO AGREE SEVEN TO NINE YEAR NON-WITHDRAWAL COMMITMENT: BUT ARGUE THAT THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT SHOULD CONSIST OF NOTHING BEYOND THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT LANGUAGE.

## DETAIL

2. NITZE SUMMARISED THE ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS AS FOLLOWS.  
START

3. ALCMS. THE US HAD PROPOSED THAT CONVENTIONAL ALCMS SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRAINED IN ANY WAY. EACH HEAVY BOMBER EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR ARMED ALCMS WOULD COUNT AS 10 ALCMS (PREVIOUS US PROPOSAL WAS 6). VERIFICATION WOULD THEN FOCUS ON THE NUMBERS OF SUCH HEAVY BOMBERS. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE ON-SITE INSPECTION. NITZE ADDED THAT DESPITE OBUKHOV'S INITIAL NEGATIVE REACTION IN THE WORKING GROUP, GENERAL CHERVOV APPEARED INTERESTED IN THE IDEA. FOR THE PRESENT, THE RUSSIANS WERE STICKING TO THEIR PROPOSAL THAT EACH HEAVY BOMBER SHOULD COUNT FOR THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE ALCM LOAD (28 FOR B-52, AND 22 FOR B1B). THE DEFINITION OF LONG-RANGE WAS ALSO STILL UNRESOLVED: THE RUSSIANS WERE STICKING AT 600 KM. THE US WERE WILLING TO CONSIDER SOME MOVEMENT BELOW 1500 KM.

4. ICBM SUB-LIMITS. THE US HAD REAFFIRMED THEIR PROPOSED 3300 SUB-LIMIT ON RVS. AKHROMEYEV HAD SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT EXCEED THIS IF THERE WAS A START AGREEMENT. BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO AGREEMENT ON HOW SUCH AN ASSURANCE WOULD BE RECORDED. THE RUSSIANS HAD THEN GONE BACKWARDS BY REVIVING THEIR EARLIER INSISTENCE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A PARALLEL SUB-LIMIT OF 3300 ON SLBM RVS, OR ALTERNATIVELY NO SUB-LIMITS AT ALL. NITZE COMMENTED THAT THIS ISSUE WENT TO THE HEART OF WHETHER START



REDUCTIONS WOULD BE STABILISING.

5. SLCM VERIFICATION. THE RUSSIANS HAD PROPOSED A DEMONSTRATION IN APRIL OF THEIR TECHNIQUE OF VERIFYING WHETHER WAR SHIPS CARRIED NUCLEAR SLCMS. US SCIENTISTS CONSIDERED THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO USE NEUTRON GUNS WAS UNWORKABLE. GIVEN THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF SHIELDED WARHEADS, BACKGROUND RADIATION FROM NUCLEAR PROPULSION UNITS AND THE INABILITY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN NUCLEAR SLCMS AND OTHER NUCLEAR WARHEADS, THE US WERE NOT INTERESTED IN THE APRIL EXPERIMENT. BUT THEY UNDERTOOK (WITHOUT MUCH ENTHUSIASM) TO CONSIDER OTHER SOVIET IDEAS SUCH AS INSPECTORS AT PRODUCTION FACILITIES.

6. MOBILE ICBMS. THE US STUCK TO THEIR POSITION THAT IF THE SIDES COULD AGREE ON AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION REGIME, THE US WOULD CONSIDER A SUB-LIMIT. THE RUSSIANS OFFERED A SUB-LIMIT OF 800 MOBILE MISSILES, WHICH WAS PATENTLY RIDICULOUS GIVEN THAT SOVIET TRAIN-MOBILE ICBMS CARRIED 10 WARHEADS (I.E. A TOTAL OF 8000 PERMITTED RVS). THE US HAD MADE CLEAR THAT IF THERE WAS TO BE A SUB-LIMIT, THE UNIT OF COUNTING SHOULD BE WARHEADS ON MOBILE LAUNCHERS. THEY HAD PUT FORWARD SOME NEW IDEAS ON VERIFICATION, INCLUDING THE TAGGING OF MISSILES, TO PERMIT THE IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL MISSILES.

7. HEAVY ICBMS. THE RUSSIANS HAD PROPOSED THAT NEW TYPES SHOULD BE BANNED, BUT THAT FLIGHT TESTING AND MODIFICATION OF EXISTING HEAVY ICBMS WOULD BE ALLOWED. THE US HAD RESPONDED THAT THIS WOULD GIVE THE RUSSIANS A MONOPOLY OF INCREASINGLY MODERN HEAVY ICBMS.

8. REDUCTIONS UNDER A START AGREEMENT. THE RUSSIANS HAD ACCEPTED THE US PROPOSAL OF A SEVEN YEAR REDUCTION PERIOD.

#### DEFENCE AND SPACE

9. THE RUSSIANS HAD ACCEPTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A SEPARATE AGREEMENT. IN RESPONSE TO US PRESSURE FOR A JOINT DRAFT TEXT, THE RUSSIANS HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY CONSIDERED THAT THE SUBSTANCE SHOULD BE THE AGREED LANGUAGE ON THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE WITH THE MINIMUM ADDITIONS NECESSARY TO TURN THIS INTO TREATY LANGUAGE. NITZE ADDED THAT THE US COULD NOT ACCEPT THE AMBIGUITIES IN THE CURRENT TEXT. THE RUSSIANS HAD SUGGESTED THAT ONCE AN AGREEMENT ON THE LINES THEY HAD IN MIND WAS SIGNED, US CONCERNS ABOUT AMBIGUITY COULD BE ADDRESSED IN A PROTOCOL. NITZE ADDED THAT THIS WAS NOT GOOD ENOUGH.

10. ON THE NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD FROM THE ABM TREATY, THE RUSSIANS HAD SAID THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT A PERIOD OF 7-9 YEARS. THIS WAS CLOSE TO WHAT THE AMERICANS WERE SEEKING.

11. THE US HAD PUT FORWARD A NUMBER OF NEW IDEAS IN THE SPACE/ DEFENCE FIELD. THEY HAD TABLED A PACKAGE OF PREDICTABILITY



MEASURES, INCLUDING VISITS TO LABORATORIES, ATTENDANCE AT MISSILE LAUNCHES, AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON PROJECTED TEST PROGRAMMES. THEY HAD ALSO SUGGESTED THAT EACH SIDE SHOULD AGREE NOT TO OBJECT TO SPACE-BASED SENSORS DEPLOYED BY THE OTHER SIDE, EVEN WHERE THESE MIGHT BE RELEVANT TO ABM DEFENCE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT EARLY WARNING WAS INHERENTLY STABILISING.

CONVENTIONAL STABILITY

12. THE RUSSIANS HAD CONTINUED TO INSIST ON A REFERENCE TO DUAL- CAPABLE SYSTEMS IN THE SCOPE SECTION OF THE MANDATE. THE US HAD REAFFIRMED THE NATO POSITION, ADDING THAT THE PROPER PLACE FOR DISCUSSION WAS VIENNA.

12. MRS RIDGWAY SAID THAT IN DRAFTING THE JOINT STATEMENT (COPY WAS SENT BY BAG ON 24 MARCH) THE RUSSIANS OBJECTED TO A REFERENCE TO A QUOTE SUCCESSFUL AND BALANCED OUTCOME OF THE VIENNA MEETING. BESSMERTNYK HAD ARGUED THAT THE QUESTION OF WHETHER BALANCED OUTCOME WAS DESIRABLE HAD BECOME AN ISSUE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

13. ON NUCLEAR TESTING, NITZE ADDED NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE TO SHULTZ'S COMMENTS TO THE PRESS.

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