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CARLUCCI/YAZOV MEETING: BRIEFING OF NAC BY LEHMAN

SUMMARY

1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEHMAN BRIEFS NAC ON CARLUCCI/YAZOV MEETING IN BERNE 15-17 MARCH. YAZOV OSTENTATIOUSLY FRIENDLY: PROFESSES IGNORANCE ON DETAIL: PROMISES MORE OPENNESS IN FUTURE. FURTHER BILATERAL CONTACTS ENVISAGED.

DETAIL

2. INTRODUCING LEHMAN, THE SECRETARY GENERAL NOTED THAT THE CARLUCCI/YAZOV MEETING WAS THE FIRST EVER SUCH ENCOUNTER AS A SEPARATE BILATERAL EVENT.

3. LEHMAN RECALLED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S 1985 STRASBOURG SPEECH CALLING FOR REGULAR DEFENCE CONTACTS, AND THE INVITATION FROM THE THEN SECRETARY OF DEFENCE WEINBERGER TO THE THEN SOVIET DEFENCE MINISTER SOKOLOV IN SPRING ON 1986. SECRETARY CARLUCCI AND ADMIRAL CROWE. CROWE HAD MET SOVIET CHIEF OF STAFF AKHROMEYEV DURING THE DECEMBER 1987 WASHINGTON SUMMIT. THE CARLUCCI/YAZOV MEETING BEGAN WITH DINNER ON 15 MARCH HOSTED BY THE SWISS MOD, AND CONTINUED WITH A SERIES OF MEETINGS ON 16 MARCH, ENDING WITH BREAKFAST ON 17 MARCH. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS BUSINESSLIKE, AND THE SOVIET SIDE WAS AT PAINS TO BE CONSISTENTLY FRIENDLY.

4. THE U S SIDE ADDRESSED THE FOUR TRADITIONAL SUBJECTS OF THE BILATERAL DIALOGUE, I.E. HUMAN RIGHTS, BILATERAL RELATIONS, ARMS CONTROL AND REGIONAL ISSUES, WITH EMPHASIS ON ITEMS OF DEFENCE INTEREST. YAZOV SAID HIS MAIN PURPOSE WAS TO DISPEL THE IMAGE OF THE SOVIET UNION AS AN ENEMY. HE AND GENERAL CHERVOV WERE THE MAIN SPEAKERS: ACCOMPANYING MOD OFFICERS HARDLY CONTRIBUTED.

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5. THE DEFENCE-RELATED AGENDA ITEMS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN ADVANCE THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, COVERING DANGEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITY: MILITARY POLICY AND DOCTRINE: ARMS CONTROL: AND MILITARY/MILITARY CONTACTS. THE U S AIM, WHICH YAZOV ENDORSED, WAS TO DEEPEN UNDERSTANDING, BUT NOT TO SUBSTITUTE FOR EXISTING NEGOTIATING MECHANISMS.

6. ON DANGEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITY, THE U S SIDE EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER SOVIET ACTIONS WHICH ENDANGERED AMERICAN LIVES, SUCH AS HARRASSMENT OF THE MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS IN THE GDR: SHIP RAMMING IN THE BLACK SEA: THE USE OF LASER DEVICES TO BLIND PILOTS: AND DANGEROUS FLYING. IN REPLY, YAZOV COMPLAINED ABOUT U S ACTIVITIES BUT ADDED THAT DEFENCE MINISTRIES SHOULD ENFORCE EXISTING PROCEDURES: IN PARTICULAR NEITHER SIDE SHOULD OPEN FIRE. (LEHMAN COMMENTED THAT THE AMERICANS REQUESTED AND RECEIVED SOVIET AGREEMENT TO PUBLICISE THIS POINT). YAZOV SUGGESTED REVISING EXISTING AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE AMERICANS SAID THEY HAD NO INTEREST IN DOING THIS: BUT CROWE AND AKHROMEYEV COULD EXAMINE THE WHOLE PROBLEM AT A FUTURE MEETING. GENERAL OTIS (CINCUSAREUR) MIGHT ALSO MEET HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART AS HE HAD DONE AFTER THE SHOOTING OF LT COL NICHOLSON IN THE GDR IN 1985.

7. ON MILITARY POLICY/DOCTRINE, THE AMERICANS SOUGHT BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT MIGHT HAVE CHANGED IN SOVIET PRACTICE ON THE RELEASE OF DEFENCE BUDGET INFORMATION AND ON OPERATIONAL MATTERS. THE RUSSIANS REFUSED TO DISCUSS DOCTRINE IN DETAIL, SAYING ONLY THAT REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY QUOTE RELATED TO THE THREAT AND ON ARMS CONTROL SOLUTION UNQUOTE. THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT AS CLEAR ON THIS AND SIMILAR ISSUES AS THE U S SIDE HAD HOPED. THEY COULD NOT EXPLAIN HOW CURRENT, ALLEGEDLY DEFENSIVE, DOCTRINE VARIED FROM EARLIER VERSIONS, BUT CLAIMED THAT WITH TIME CHANGES WOULD BE NOTICEABLE, BOTH IN EQUIPMENT AND IN TRAINING/FIELD MANUALS WHICH WERE BEING REWRITTEN. ON MILITARY BUDGETS, YAZOV ADMITTED THAT THE OFFICIAL BUDGET DID NOT INCLUDE PROCUREMENT AND R AND D COSTS: BUT HE COULD NOT GIVE A CONSOLIDATED DEFENCE EXPENDITURE FIGURE. HE IMPLIED THAT THE U S ESTIMATE OF A GLOBAL FIGURE OF 16 PERCENT OF GNP WAS QUOTE A REASONABLE GUESS UNQUOTE.

8. LEHMAN SAID THAT YAZOV MISSED NO OPPORTUNITY TO REPEAT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT THE ENEMY, THAT THEIR DOCTRINE WAS DEFENSIVE, AND THAT MORE DETAILED INFORMATION WOULD EMERGE WITH TIME. HE PROPOSED AN EXCHANGE OF DATA ON NATO/WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE IN EUROPE. CARLUCCI REPLIED THAT

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THE PROPER FORUM FOR THIS WOULD BE THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS IN VIENNA: THE U S WAS HOWEVER PREPARED TO DISCUSS U S AND SOVIET FORCES GLOBALLY.

9. TURNING TO ARMS CONTROL, LEHMAN SAID THAT CARLUCCI STRESSED THE NEED FOR A GOOD START AGREEMENT TO BE REACHED BEFORE THE MOSCOW SUMMIT, OR IF THIS WERE NOT POSSIBLE, IN 1988. BUT THE U S WAS NOT ENVISAGING ANY DEADLINES. ON SDI, CARLUCCI STRESSED THE ADVANTAGES OF PREDICTABILITY AND A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME. HE ALSO EMPHASISED THAT KRASNOYARSK WAS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE AND AN UNDOUBTED VIOLATION OF THE ABMT. THE RUSSIANS COUNTERED THAT IF THE U S DISMANTLED ITS INSTALLATION IN THULE, THEY WOULD DISMANTLE KRASNOYARSK: ALTERNATIVELY, BOTH INSTALLATIONS COULD REMAIN. THE U S REJECTED THIS LINKAGE. (LEHMAN COMMENTED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE DEFENSIVE ON THIS POINT, YAZOV DENYING PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EXISTENCE OF KRASNOYARSK, AND CHERVOV REMAINING SILENT).

10. LEHMAN SAID THAT BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT INCREASED MILITARY/MILITARY TALKS WERE DESIRABLE: BUT CARLUCCI SAID THAT SCOPE AND PACE OF SUCH CONTACTS HAD TO REMAIN DEPENDENT ON FACTORS SUCH AS THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN, AND DANGEROUS SOVIET ACTIVITY. A MEASURED APPROACH WOULD BE ADOPTED. INCREASED ACCESS FOR ATTACHES, AND EXCHANGES AT DEFENCE COLLEGES MIGHT BE POSSIBLE: BUT IT WAS PREMATURE TO ENVISAGE SHIP VISITS OR EXCLUSIVELY SOCIAL CONTACT. CROW AND AKHROMEYEV WOULD CONSIDER THIS ASPECT ALSO AT THEIR MEETING LATER THIS YEAR.

11. ON REGIONAL ISSUES, LEHMAN SAID THAT YAZOV DID NOT ELABORATE ON THE CONDITIONS FOR OR THE TIMING OF WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN. ON NICARAGUA, CARLUCCI STRESSED THAT SOVIET EQUIPMENT WAS BEING USED TO INVAD A DEMOCRATIC STATE. THIS WAS DANGEROUS FOR THE REGIONAL PEACE PROCESS. YAZOV CLAIMED NOT TO BE WELL INFORMED.

12. IN CONCLUSION, LEHMAN SAID THAT YAZOV INVITED CARLUCCI TO VISIT MOSCOW.

13. LORD CARRINGTON ASKED ABOUT YAZOV'S PERSONALITY. LEHMAN SAID HE WAS VERY BRIGHT AND CONFIDENT: HE SHOWED NO ARROGANCE, AND APPEARED TO HAVE A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH JUNIOR COLLEAGUES.

14. SMITH (CANADA) ASKED WHETHER THE TWO SIDES HAD COMPARED THEIR ALERT SYSTEMS: AND WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSION OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. BOTH MIGHT BE SUITABLE SUBJECTS FOR A FUTURE MEETING. LEHMAN REPLIED THAT THE ONLY MENTION OF ALERT SYSTEMS WAS A

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REFERENCE BY CARLUCCI TO A CRISIS STABILITY PROPOSAL IN THE START CONTEXT. THE AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTRES WAS BEING IMPLEMENTED. THE U S SIDE SUGGESTED NOTIFICATION OF ICBM/SLBM TESTS GOING BEYOND THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF NOTAMS. IN RESPONSE TO A SOVIET QUERY, THE U S REPLIED THAT EVEN TEST FIRINGS WHICH LANDED ON NATIONAL TERRITORY COULD GIVE RISE TO CONCERN. ON RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, CARLUCCI HAD SAID THAT THE RAMMING OF SHIPS WAS NOT AN ACCEPTABLE SIGNAL. YAZOV DENIED DETAILED KNOWLEDGE.

15. BERG (NORWAY) ASKED WHETHER FORCE LEVELS AND ASYMMETRIES HAD BEEN RAISED IN THE CONTEXT OF CST. LEHMAN SAID THAT THERE WAS NOT MUCH DISCUSSION OF CST. THE EXCHANGES ON DOCTRINE TOUCHED ASYMMETRIES, AND THE RUSSIANS SAID THEY WERE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE ON THIS, AND BY IMPLICATION ON OTHER ISSUE SUCH AS DATA AND MILITARY BUDGETS.

16. ROBIN (FRANCE) ASKED WHETHER ANY CONCLUSION WAS REACHED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE DRAWBACKS OF AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON MILITARY DOCTRINE ON THE FRINGES OF THE CST: AND WHETHER THE RUSSIANS SEEMED TO BE IN A HURRY OVER START. LEHMAN SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS SAID LITTLE WHICH COULD DIRECTLY BE RELATED TO OTHER MEETINGS. IT WAS CLEAR THAT FOR THEM, THE FACT OF THE MEETING WITH CARLUCCI WAS THE IMPORTANT FACTOR. THEY TRIED TO SIDE-STEP CONTROVERSY. ON START, THEY REPEATED THE OFFICIAL LINE OF WANTING A TREATY IN TIME FOR THE SUMMIT. BUT THEY ACCEPTED THAT THIS COULD NOT BE GUARANTEED. THEIR OVERALL ATTITUDE WAS RESPONSIBLE.

17. HANSEN (FRG) ASKED WHETHER THE QUESTION OF DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT, OR BETWEEN KULIKOV AND SACEUR, WAS RAISED: AND WHETHER THE RUSSIANS GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF REALLY BELIEVING IN THE EXISTENCE OF A NATO THREAT. HE ALSO COMMENTED THAT MILITARY/MILITARY MEETINGS RAISED QUESTIONS WHICH OUGHT TO BE CLARIFIED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WITH A VIEW TO A QUOTE MORE CONFORMIST UNQUOTE ALLIED POSITION. LEHMAN REPLIED THAT THE RUSSIANS DID NOT FEEL DIRECTLY THREATENED BY WESTERN EUROPE OR THE U S, ALTHOUGH THEY DID HAVE OTHER FEARS. BUT YAZOV ADDED THAT WHILE WESTERN FORCES EXISTED, THEY COULD NOT BUT BE A CAUSE OF CONCERN.

18. FOR THE UK, I SAID THAT HOWEVER GOOD THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE MEETING, CAUTION WAS NEEDED. ON MILITARY DOCTRINE, I RECALLED THAT THERE HAD BEEN AGREEMENT IN THE ALLIANCE TO WAIT FOR THE EAST TO RAISE THE SUBJECT. THE UK VIEW WAS THAT IF IT WERE TO BE DISCUSSED, WE SHOULD TIE THE EXCHANGES TO FORCE STRUCTURES AND DISPOSITIONS. ON MILITARY CONTACTS, I REFERRED TO THE POST-AFGHANISTAN GUIDELINES,

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AND NOTED THAT THE U S HAD ARRANGED VARIOUS CONTACTS. DID THIS REFLECT A CHANGE IN U S POLICY? IF SO, THE ALLIANCE SHOULD DISCUSS THE SITUATION. I ALSO ASKED ABOUT YAZOV'S COMPLAINTS RELATING TO U S MILITARY ACTIVITY: AND HOW LONG IT WAS LIKELY TO TAKE THE RUSSIANS TO PRODUCE CREDIBLE DEFENCE BUDGET FIGURES, AND INDEED WHETHER THEY WERE CAPABLE OF SUCH AN EXERCISE. LEHMAN REPLIED THAT THE MEETING WAS INTENDED AS A SERIOUS DISCUSSION. THE U S SIDE TRIED TO LINK THE EXCHANGES ON DOCTRINE TO FORCE STRUCTURES AND DISPOSITIONS. THE DATA DISCUSSED DID NOT GO BEYOND IISS FIGURES. ON MILITARY CONTACTS, CARLUCCI EMPHASISED THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE WIDER CONTEXT, ESPECIALLY AFGHANISTAN, BUT ALSO TO EVENTS SUCH AS THE NICHOLSON SHOOTING. A STEP BY STEP APPROACH WAS NECESSARY: OTHER THAN THE MEETINGS OF CROWE AND POSSIBLY OTIS, NO FURTHER IMMEDIATE STEPS WERE ENVISAGED. ON THE NICHOLSON SHOOTING, YAZOV SAID THAT THE INCIDENT TOOK PLACE BEFORE THIS TIME: BUT HE EXPRESSED REGRET, AND PROMISED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WHEN GENERAL CHERVOV ACCOMPANIED SHEVARDNADZE TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK. LEHMAN SAID THAT YAZOV MADE NO SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS ABOUT U S ACTIVITY: BUT IN RESPONDING TO U S COMPLAINTS HE CLAIMED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BROKEN THE RULES. CARLUCCI STRESSED AGAIN THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD AGREE THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO POLICY OF SHOOTING TO KILL AND NO RAMMING OF SHIPS. ON THE PREPARATION OF BUDGET FIGURES, THE RUSSIANS SPOKE OF A TIME SCALE OF A FEW YEARS.

19. COMMENTING, LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE CONSISTENT ON MILITARY CONTACTS. IF THERE WERE FUTURE U S/SOVIET CONTACTS, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE REST OF THE ALLIANCE TO HOLD TO THE UNDERTAKING TO AVOID THESE.

20. THUYSBAERT (BELGIUM) REFERRED TO TRADITIONAL SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO GIVE INFORMATION ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES. IT WAS CURIOUS THAT THE RUSSIANS NOW SEEMED WILLING TO GIVE THIS, BUT IN A BILATERAL FRAMEWORK OUTSIDE USUAL CHANNELS. LEHMAN SAID THAT IN HIS JUDGMENT THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN READY IN PRINCIPLE TO BE OPEN, BUT UNABLE IN PRACTICE TO DO SO SINCE THEY HAD NO RELIABLE FIGURES. HE REITERATED THAT THEY HAD NOT GONE BEYOND IISS DATA.

21. ROBIN (FRANCE), REFERRING TO MY INTERVENTION, SAID THAT HE DID NOT SHARE THE BRITISH UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE HANDLING OF MILITARY DOCTRINE IN FUTURE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EAST.

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