

GRS 1677

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FM KABUL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 222

OF 100500Z AUGUST 87

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKHMS GENEVA

INFO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD; UKHMS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON; MOSCOW; NEW DELHI

SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN

1. FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS TO EMERGE FROM BRIEFING BY  
ERMACORA.

PRISONS

2. ALTHOUGH HE VISITED PRISONS IN ALL THREE CENTRES, ERMACORA ONLY SPOKE TO TWO PRISONERS (IN PUL-KH-CHARKH: A PROFESSOR ROSSMAN (PHON) AND A FORMER MINISTER, NFD). HE HAD DECIDED NOT TO QUESTION PRISONERS AT RANDOM, HAVING BEEN WARNED BY THE ICRC THAT THIS MIGHT PREJUDICE THEIR HOPES OF A MORE THOROUGH VISIT EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR. NOR DID HE INSIST ON NAMED INDIVIDUALS BEING PRESENTED TO HIM, EVEN THOUGH ICRC HAD SAID THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, BUT HE HAD SUBMITTED 'A LONG LIST' OF NAMED PRISONERS, ENQUIRING ABOUT THEIR FATE. HE HAD YET (7 AUGUST) TO RECEIVE A REPLY (COMMENT: PACE HAD TOLD US A FEW DAYS EARLIER THAT PRISON GOVERNORS HAD ORALLY DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF MANY OF THE NAMES). WAKHIL HAD CONFIRMED THAT AN ICRC WOULD BE ALLOWED TO VISIT IN JANUARY AND CONDUCT PRIVATE INTERVIEWS. ERMACORA WOULD REFER TO THIS IN HIS REPORT.

3. ERMACORA SAID PRISON CONDITIONS WERE APPALLING: OVERCROWDED, UNVENTILATED AND UNLIT CELLS, WITH PRIMITIVE SANITATION AND NO COMFORTS. AT PUL-KH-CHARKH PRISONERS ONLY HAD 1 HOUR EXERCISE A DAY, AND SPENT THE REST OF THE TIME IN THEIR CELLS. THE EXERCISE AREA WAS 'VERY SMALL AND HOT': APPARENTLY A LARGE COURT-YARD HAD BEEN SUBDIVIDED INTO TEN SMALLER ONES, TO ENSURE PRISONERS COULD NOT SEE EACH OTHER. WHEN HE EXPRESSED HIS VIEWS TO HIS HOSTS, THEY TOLD HIM NOT TO APPLY WESTERN STANDARDS: THE CONDITIONS WERE LITTLE WORSE THAN THOSE AFGHANS REGARDED AS NORMAL IN PRIVATE LIFE. ERMACORA TOLD US HE WOULD RESERVE JUDGEMENT UNTIL HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO CONSULT ICRC.

4. ERMACORA HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO VISIT DETENTION CENTRES AT SEDERAT AND SHASHDARAK. ALTHOUGH HE HAD SKETCH MAPS OF BOTH, HE COULD NOT FIND, AND HIS HOSTS DENIED THE EXISTENCE OF, UNDERGROUND CELLS. HE FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF THE PRACTICE OF TORTURE.

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AND SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO REPORTS OF ANY FOR SOME MONTHS. HOWEVER, HE ADDED, "YOU COULD DO ANYTHING YOU WANT" IN THESE PLACES, AS WELL AS IN OTHER PRISONS, ALL OF WHICH HAD MANY CELLARS AND SMALL ROOMS. HE SAID THERE WERE MANY PRISONERS ON REMAND AND THAT THEY COULD BE HELD WITHOUT TRIAL FOR UP TO SEVEN MONTHS. HE HAD DECIDED NOT TO VISIT THE PULGARH PRISON IN S. KABUL WHEN TOLD IT WAS ONLY A HOLDING CENTRE FOR TRAFFIC OFFENDERS. HE HAD VISITED THE HQ OF THE KHAD 5TH BUREAU AT DEHMAZANG IN S. KABUL, BUT FOUND IT WAS A GARRISON, WITHOUT PRISONERS.

5. ERMACORA SAID HE HAD BEEN APPROACHED "CLANDESTINELY" BY THE ACTING HIRANMAN CHARGE, WHO ASKED HIM TO ENQUIRE ABOUT THE FATE OF 300 HIRANMANS THOUGHT TO BE IN PULGARH-CHARKH.

## RELEASED PRISONERS

6. HE HAD HAD PRIVATE TALKS WITH SOME RELEASED PRISONERS INCLUDING PROFESSOR KAKKAA (PHON) AND KOGADAH (PHON), A FORMER AMIN MINISTER OF JUSTICE, A FORMER DEPUTY MINISTER OF HEALTH, AND A FORMER WHO EXPERT. ALL WERE IN GOOD SHAPE. THE ACADEMICS HAD RESUMED THEIR CHAIRS, AND HAD WRITTEN TO 59 EXILED COLLEAGUES URGING THEM TO RETURN (COMMENT: ERMACORA ADMITTED, IN REPLY TO A QUESTION, THAT KAKKAA HAD NOT REPEAT NOT ASKED HIS FAMILY TO RETURN FROM PESHAWAR, ON THE GROUNDS THAT HIS SONS WERE SEND-WAY THROUGH UNIVERSITY COURSES). ALL THE RELEASED PRISONERS HE SPOKE TO SUPPORTED NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

7. ALTHOUGH HE HAD PERMISSION TO DO SO, ERMACORA HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO INTERVIEW 56 PRISONERS RELEASED FROM PULGARH-CHARKH ON THE DAY OF HIS VISIT, BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT BE TRACED.

## HOSPITALS

8. ERMACORA FOUND FEW CIVILIAN (WOMEN AND CHILDREN) PATIENTS IN THE HOSPITALS HE VISITED. THERE WERE 12 IN A 400 BED HOSPITAL HE VISITED, 105 IN ANOTHER. THE INJURIES HE SAW WERE MUCH LESS SEVERE THAN THOSE HE HAD ENCOUNTERED IN PAKISTAN. MANY PATIENTS SEEMED TO BE BEING TREATED FOR INJURIES SUSTAINED UP TO 2 YEARS AGO. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF INJURIES BEING CAUSED BY CHEMICAL OR SIMILAR WEAPONS. DOCTORS ASSURED HIM ALL PATIENTS WERE TREATED IN THE SAME WAY, WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION. HE ASKED ABOUT MUJAHEDDIN AND WAS SHOWN 6 PATIENTS. THEY WILL FACE LEGAL ACTION ON DISCHARGE. MEANWHILE THEY ARE DENIED FAMILY VISITS OR CORRESPONDENCE. ERMACORA WAS UNSURE WHETHER THIS WAS A VIOLATION OF THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS.

## RELIGION

9. ERMACORA SAID HE WAS SATISFIED THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION WAS RESPECTED IN AFGHANISTAN. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE MULLAHS HE SPOKE TO WERE ALL FROM THE 10,000 WHO RECEIVED GOVERNMENT SALARIES. HE HAD ALSO NOTICED THAT ALL THE MOSQUES HE VISITED HAD PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED POSTERS EXTOLLING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. LACK OF TIME, HE SAID, PREVENTED HIM SEEING THE DEVASTATED AREAS OF HERAT. HE WAS TOLD THE DRA HAD FORENSIC PROOF THAT THE DAMAGE TO THE MOSQUE THERE HAD BEEN CAUSED BY THE MUJAHEDDIN

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10. ERMACORA WAS STRUCK BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH ALL HIS INTERLOCUTORS, NOT JUST RELEASED PRISONERS (PARA 6 ABOVE) INSISTED THAT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WAS THE ONLY WAY TO PROCEED. SOME REFORMED MUJAHEDDIN HE MET IN HERAT HAD ALL SAID THEY WOULD NOT HAVE SURRENDERED IF IT HAD NOT BEEN FOR NR. THE MULLAHS WERE STRONGLY IN HIS FAVOUR. ERMACORA CONCEDED, HOWEVER, THAT NR WAS, LIKE MOTHERHOOD, AN UNDENIABLY GOOD THING AND THAT ITS IMPLEMENTATION WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE PRINCIPLE. HE TOOK NOTE OF OUR ARGUMENT THAT SELF DETERMINATION COULD ONLY FOLLOW, NOT PRECEDE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL BUT THAT REGIME/SOVIET PROPAGANDA HAD MANAGED TO REVERSE THE ORDER, USING NR AS A EUPHEMISM FOR, ALTERNATIVELY, "PEACE" AND SELF DETERMINATION.

11. ERMACORA VOLUNTEERED THAT MANY OFFICIAL PREMISES HE VISITED WERE REPLETE WITH MARXISTS AND DRA/SOVIET FRIENDSHIP POSTERS, ALTHOUGH OFFICIALS DENIED THIS WAS A COMMUNIST COUNTRY. HE SAID THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION WAS "VERY NICE", BUT SHOT THROUGH WITH LOOPHOLES TO PERMIT LEGALISED TOTALITARIANISM.

#### REFUGEES

12. DRA OFFICIALS HAD MADE THE STANDARD ALLEGATIONS ABOUT IRANIAN AND PAKISTANI EFFORTS TO PREVENT REFUGEES RETURNING. THE OFFICIALS HAD HOWEVER SAID THAT WHILE REFUGEES IN IRAN WERE BEING BAULKED BY GOVERNMENT ACTION, THOSE IN PAKISTAN'S EFFORTS TO RETURN WERE BEING FRUSTRATED BY THE MUJAHEDDIN AND MULLAHS. ERMACORA SAID HE BELIEVED THE MAJORITY WHO HAD RETURNED FROM PAKISTAN WERE EITHER HERE ONLY TEMPORARILY OR HAD FAILED, FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER, TO BE INCLUDED ON THE UNHCR REGISTER.

13. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS, ERMACORA SAID INDIRA (SIC) AND IRAN HAD CONSISTENTLY DENIED HIM ACCESS TO AFGHAN REFUGEES IN THOSE COUNTRIES. HE WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS. HE TOOK NOTE OF OUR SUGGESTION THAT INDIRA'S CONCERN WAS PROBABLY THAT MOST AFGHANS THERE WERE WELL EDUCATED AND MODERATELY WELL OFF, AND MIGHT GIVE HIM THE "WRONG" ANSWERS ABOUT WHY THEY HAD GONE THERE IN THE FIRST PLACE AND WHY THEY WOULD NOT RETURN.

#### MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATION

14. ERMACORA SAID THE ROAD INTO HERAT FROM THE AIRPORT WAS HEAVILY PROTECTED, WITH TANKS STATIONED EVERY 200 METRES, POINTING WEST, AND MANY STRONGLY FORTIFIED POSTS. IN MAZAR, THE DEFENCES WERE LESS OBVIOUS, BUT "MANY" MILITARY WERE ON DUTY IN THE STREETS. HE BELIEVED THEY WERE FROM THE 18TH (AFGHAN) INFANTRY REGIMENT. OFFICIALS IN BOTH PROVINCIAL CITIES ADMITTED THEY DID NOT CONTROL THEIR ENTIRE REGION, BUT WERE EVASIVE ABOUT THE LOCATION OF THE MUJAHEDDIN (ALTHOUGH IN HERAT THE AUTHORITIES SAID IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO VISIT THE WORST DAMAGED MOSQUE). ERMACORA HAD

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ALSO BEEN TAKEN TO SOME SELF DEFENCE UNITS, AND MENTIONED ONE AT BAGRAM, ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF KABUL, IN PARTICULAR. THEY SEEMED SECURE AND WELL ORGANISED (COMMENT: THE PAKISTANI CHARGE' SUGGESTED TO HIM THIS WAS BECAUSE THEY HAD AN ARRANGEMENT WITH THE MUJAHEDDIN). AT BAGRAM THEY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO EXPLAIN TO HIM THE HEAVY NIGHT TIME ARTILLERY BARRAGES AROUND KABUL.

15. NONE OF US WAS ABLE TO GIVE ERMACORA A DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF THE FIGHTING OUTSIDE KABUL BUT (SPEAKING PERSONALLY) HE SAID THE STALEMATE SEEMED TO BE GETTING MORE EXPENSIVE FOR BOTH SIDES, IN TERMS BOTH OF MANPOWER AND MATERIAL, PARTLY AT LEAST BECAUSE OF THE INCREASED USE OF STRONGER.

## MISCELLANEOUS

16. ERMACORA HAD HAD NO OFFICIAL CONTACT WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS OR MILITARY. HE HAD MET THE CHARGE' AND ONE OTHER DIPLOMAT AT RECEPTIONS ON 2 AND 4 AUGUST, AND AN ADVISER AT ONE HOSPITAL HE VISITED. HE HAD BEEN TOLD THERE WERE SOVIET ADVISERS IN MOST INSTITUTIONS. HE HAD ALSO BEEN ACCOMPANIED TO HERAT BY A SOVIET JOURNALIST, BUT DID NOT GIVE HIM AN INTERVIEW.

17. ERMACORA SAID, IN COMMENTING ON STORIES OF UNDER-AGE RECRUITMENT TO THE ARM ANDPRESS GANGS, THAT HE HAD SEEN 'MANY' YOUNG PEOPLE ON THE STREETS. THE PAKISTAN CHARGE' SAID THESE WERE PROBABLY FROM INFLUENTIAL FAMILIES OR HAD OTHER FORMS OF EXEMPTION (EG STUDENTS).

18. HE DESCRIBED THE WATAN NURSERY AS 'A CLEAR CADRE-BUILDING ELEMENT' AND CONFESSED TO EMBARRASSMENT ABOUT HIS VISIT TO YOUNG PIONEERS. HE HAD CALLED ON GOVERNMENT AND PARTY LEADERS, AND OTHER INFRASTRUCTURAL INSTITUTIONS, EG WOMEN'S GROUPS. HE REPORTED MANY INTERLOCUTORS AS BEING STRONGLY HOSTILE TO HEKMATYAR. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED ON MOST VISITS BY A TV CREW, AND HIS OFFICIAL ESCORTS INCLUDED THREE MFA OFFICIALS (HEAD OF UN DIVISION, MEMBERS OF PROTOCOL AND INFORMATION DEPARTMENTS) AND A PARTY INFORMATION OFFICER. NONE HAD TRIED TO IMPOSE ON HIM. IN FACT, THE GOVERNMENT HAD ACCENDED TO ALL HIS WISHES ('NOT ONE WAS UNFULFILLED') AND BEEN COURTEOUS AND HELPFUL THROUGHOUT.

19. THE VISIT TO MAZAR WAS SUBSTITUTED AT THE LAST MINUTE FOR A PLANNED TRIP TO KHOST. THE AUTHORITIES TOLD ERMACORA THAT RECENT RAHNS HAD MADE THE RUNWAY UNSAFE FOR HIS CHARTERED BAKHTR AIRCRAFT.

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20. ERMACORA ISSUED A PRESS STATEMENT IMMEDIATELY BEFORE DEPARTURE. TEXT IN MIFT.

THE FUTURE

21. ERMACORA INTENDS TO VISIT PAKISTAN IN EARLY SEPTEMBER, AND WILL THEN PREPARE A REPORT FOR UNGA. HE WAS CONVINCED THE FACT AND SUBSTANCE OF HIS VISIT WOULD BE EXPLOITED BY THE REGIME/SOVIETS, BUT HOPED HE WOULD GET THE BALANCE RIGHT IN HIS REPORT. HE HAS NO FIXED PLANS TO RETURN, BUT WOULD EXPECT TO DO SO BEFORE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MEETS NEXT YEAR. IF SO, HE WOULD LIKE TO VISIT OTHER PROVINCES, AND AREAS NOT UNDER DRA CONTROL.

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HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN

## SUMMARY

1. THE UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON HUMAN RIGHTS VISITED KABUL, HERAT AND MAZAR-~~SHARIF~~ BETWEEN 30 JULY AND 8 AUGUST. ERMACORA SAID THE DRA HAD ACCCEEDED TO ALL HIS PROGRAMME REQUESTS, ALTHOUGH (AT RED CROSS URGING) HE DID NOT SEEK RANDOM INTERVIEWS WITH PRISONERS. MOST OF THOSE HE SPOKE TO (INCLUDING RELEASED PRISONERS) PROMISED NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. ALTHOUGH HE MAY HAVE FULFILLED HIS ITINERARY, ERMACORA'S INSPECTIONS WERE PERFUNCTORY. HE RECOGNISED THAT THE DRA WOULD EXPLOIT HIS VISIT, BUT MAY WELL NOT HAVE REALISED THAT HE GAVE SEVERAL POLITICAL HOSTAGES TO FORTUNE.

## DETAIL

2. PROFESSOR FELIX ERMACORA (AUSTRIA), THE UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON HUMAN RIGHTS, VISITED AFGHANISTAN FROM 30 JULY TO 8 AUGUST; HE SPENT MOST OF HIS TIME IN KABUL, BUT HAD A DAY EACH AT HERAT AND MAZAR-~~SHARIF~~. ON 7 AUGUST HE ATTENDED A DINNER WITH NATO, CHINESE, PAKISTAN AND AUSTRIAN CHARGES; TO BRIEF THEM ON HIS EXPERIENCES AND IMPRESSIONS. HE WAS OVER AN HOUR LATE, WAS CLEARLY VERY TIRED, AND HAD NOT HAD TIME PROPERLY TO MARSHALL HIS THOUGHTS. IT IMPOSES SOME ORDER ON WHAT WAS IN FACT A PRETTY INCOHERENT DISCOURSE. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF UKMMS GENEVA WOULD FOLLOW UP WITH JOHN PACE; TO VERIFY OR AMEND THE ACCOUNT IN IT AND TO OBTAIN A READ OUT ON ERMACORA'S MEETINGS ON 8 AUGUST. THE PRESS STATEMENT ISSUED BY ERMACORA ON DEPARTURE HIS IN MY SECOND IT.

## COMMENT

3. ALTHOUGH ERMACORA IS AWARE THAT THE IMAGE HE WAS GIVEN WAS, IF NOT SQUEAKY CLEAN, NO WORSE SUPERFICIALLY THAN MANY OTHER THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES; AND THAT THIS WILL HAVE TO BE REFLECTED IN HIS REPORT; HE SOUGHT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION TO US THAT HIS CONCLUSIONS, ESPECIALLY AFTER HIS VISIT TO PAKISTAN, WOULD BE ALONG THE RIGHT LINES. I AM LESS CONFIDENT. AS MISS YOUNG POINTED OUT IN HER LETTER OF 8 JULY TO SIMTON (SAD), "EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT COUNTRIES UNDER CONSIDERATION GET A MORE FAVOURABLE REPORT ONCE THEY LET THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR IN". ERMACORA'S REPORT WILL CONTAIN MORE THAN ENOUGH TRIBUTES TO THE HELPFULNESS OF THE DRA.

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NOT TO MENTION VAGUE PROMISES OF MORE DETAIL AS A RESULT OF A FURTHER VISIT; FOR DRA AND SOVIET LOBBYISTS TO BE ABLE TO ARGUE EITHER THAT AN UPEAT UNGA HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT SHOULD BE PREPARED, OR THAT DELEGATIONS SHOULD REJECT ANY WESTER-INSPIRED CRITICISMS. EITHER WAY, THERE WILL BE KNOCK-ON CONSEQUENCES FOR THE UNGA PLenary VOTE ON THE AFGHAN RESOLUTION.

4. MY AUSTRALIAN COLLEAGUE HAS TOLD ME ERMACORA WAS A 'CRAFTY OLD FOX'. HE CERTAINLY RECOGNISED THAT HIS VISIT WOULD BE EXPLOITED IN SOME WAY OR ANOTHER. IT MAY THEREFORE BE THAT ERMACORA AND HIS ENTOURAGE WILL RATIONALISE THEIR ACTION AND COMMENTS AS DESIGNED TO PLAY THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE LONG, AND KEEP THE DOOR OPEN FOR A MORE SUBSTANTIVE VISIT LATER. IF SO, THEIR SINGLE-MINDED DETERMINATION TO STICK TO HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS HAS BLANKETED THEM TO THE IMMEDIATE POLITICAL REALITIES. THE FACT OF THE VISIT ALONE RISKED A DIMINUTION OF ANTI-REGIME SENTIMENT AT UNGA. ERMACORA'S ASSERTIONS THAT HE RECEIVED FULL COOPERATION; HIS FAILURE TO FIND SUBSTANTIVE FAULT; AND HIS AMBIGUOUS BUT QUOTABLE ENDORSEMENT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION VIRTUALLY GUARANTEE IT. AS SOON AS ERMACORA DECIDED TO VISIT, THE REGIME WAS IN A NO-LOSE SITUATION. IT IS NO DOUBT NOW CONGRATULATING ITSELF THAT IT HAS IN FACT GAINED FURTHER PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE.

5. ERMACORA ALSO SEEMS TO HAVE FAILED TO THINK THROUGH SOME OF THE THINGS HE WAS TOLD AND SOME OF HIS ACTIONS, EG:
- (A) GIVEN THE SHORT TIME AVAILABLE, AND THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN VISITING THE COUNTRYSIDE, ERMACORA SHOULD HAVE CONCENTRATED ON PRISONERS (THE MAJOR ALTERNATIVE SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS), RATHER THAN SPEND SO MUCH TIME WITH REGIME OFFICIALS AND APOLOGISTS.
  - (B) HE TOOK TOO MUCH FOR GRANTED IN ACCEPTING HCRC CONFIDENCE THAT THEIR PROTECTION TEAM WILL BE ALLOWED BACK AND THAT, EVEN IF NOT HIS, IT WILL ACHIEVE ANY MORE THAN LAST TIME.
  - (C) HE SEEMED UNCLEAR HOW HCRC CAN COMMENT ON PRISON CONDITIONS WHEN THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO VISIT.
  - (D) HE UNCRITICALLY ACCEPTED THE EXCUSE FOR THE CANCELLATION OF THE VISIT TO KHOST, WHICH WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY FABRICATED. EVEN THE LOCAL MEDIA REPORTED FIGHTING IN THE AREA AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME, AND THAT WAS MORE LIKELY TO BE THE REASON.
  - (E) IT WAS NAIVE TO ACCEPT THAT PULGARM IS A DETENTION CENTRE FOR TRAFFIC OFFENDERS. THERE ARE NO SUCH THINGS AS PARKING TICKETS IN KABUL, AND WE HAVE NEVER SEEN ANYONE UPBRADED, LET ALONE ARRESTED FOR A DRIVING OFFENCE. THERE ARE NO DRINK AND DRIVE LAWS. DEHMAZANG CERTAINLY USED TO CONTAIN A KHAD PRISON.

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6. ALTHOUGH ERMACORA MAY HAVE INTENDED HIS PRESS STATEMENT TO BE FACTUAL, AND TO RESERVE JUDGEMENT UNTIL AFTER HIS VISIT TO PAKHSTAN, HE HAS GIVEN SOME HOSTAGES TO FORTUNE, EG
- (A) UNCRITICAL (AND UNECESSARY) REPETITION OF SOVNET REVERSAL OF THE FACTS ON BOOBY TRAPPED TOYS (PARA 2).
  - (B) THE PERHAPS UNINTENTIONAL IMPLICATION IN PARAGRAPH 3 THAT HE MET ALL SHADES OF OPINION, WHEN IN FACT NONE OF HIS INTERLOCUTORS VOLUNTEERED COMMENTS CRITICAL OF THE REGIME.
  - (C) THE UNECESSARILY FULSOME PRAISE OF DRA COOPERATION (PARA 4); WITH ONLY A PASSING REFERENCE (IN PARA 6) TO THE BACKGROUND TO HIS VISIT.
  - (D) THE REFERENCE TO "RECONCILIATION" AS A POSITIVE STEP (PARA 5), COUPLED WITH THE IMPLICATION THAT MEASURES TAKEN SO FAR WERE ON THE RIGHT LINES.

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