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SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SHULTZ, 9 APRIL: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

SUMMARY

1. ACCOUNT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW. SHULTZ INTERESTED IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S VIEWS ON WHETHER GORBACHEV MIGHT BE TRYING TO CHANGE THE SOVIET SYSTEM AS OPPOSED TO MAKING IT WORK BETTER, AND IN HER IMPRESSIONS AND THOSE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF OTHER SOVIET LEADERS.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND HE HAD RETURNED FROM MOSCOW WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT GORBACHEV WAS GENUINELY TRYING TO MAKE CHANGES IN THE SOVIET UNION. GORBACHEV MIGHT BELIEVE THAT IMPLEMENTING INTERNAL REFORMS REQUIRED A TOLERABLE LEVEL OF STABILITY IN EXTERNAL RELATIONS. IF SO, WE SHOULD NOT STAND IN HIS WAY. THAT SAID, IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE A LONG HAUL, AS SHULTZ HAD NOTED IN HIS UCLA SPEECH IN SEPTEMBER 1984. THE RUSSIANS WOULD CONTINUE TO MISBEHAVE (THE SOVIET ESPIONAGE ATTACK ON THE US EMBASSY IN MOSCOW WAS A CURRENT CASE IN POINT) AND GORBACHEV WAS CLEARLY DETERMINED TO ADVANCE SOVIET INTERESTS. BUT WHEN PROBLEMS AROSE, IT WAS NECESSARY PATIENTLY TO WORK FOR THEIR RESOLUTION AND NOT PULL DOWN THE SHUTTERS ON EFFORTS TO IMPROVE EAST-WEST RELATIONS GENERALLY. SHULTZ SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH THIS LAST POINT. THE SOVIET ESPIONAGE ATTACK AGAINST THE US EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HAD CREATED STRONG POLITICAL PRESSURES ON HIM TO CANCEL HIS VISIT TO

CREATED STRONG POLITICAL PRESSURES ON HIM TO CANCEL HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW. BUT THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED THAT HE SHOULD GO AHEAD.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT MUCH OF THE SUCCESS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW HAD DERIVED FROM HER ABILITY TO BE PROFOUNDLY CRITICAL OF SOVIET POLICIES AND THE SOVIET SYSTEM, AND NOT TO COMPROMISE ON IMPORTANT ATSSUES, WHILE BUILDING A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH GORBACHEV. GORBACHEV HAD BEEN PREPARED TO LISTEN CAREFULLY TO WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER SAID AND TO RESPOND IN A GIVE AND TAKE MANNER. THE UNCENSORED BROADCAST OF HER TV INTERVIEW, THE ENTHUSIASM WITH WHICH CROWDS HAD GREETED HER DURING HER WALKABOUTS, AND THE LACK OF SOVIET COMPLAINTS ABOUT HER MEETINGS WITH SAKHAROV AND OTHER DISSIDENTS HAD BEEN REMARKABLE.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ESTABLISHED SOME POINTS OF AGREEMENT WITH GORBACHEV. THESE HAD INCLUDED AGREEMENT ON AN ARMS CONTROL AGENDA INCORPORATING THE CAMP DAVID PRIORITIES. BUT THERE HAD ALSO BEEN MANY POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT, FOR EXAMPLE ON THE LEGITIMACY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE (SHULTZ WONDERED HOW GORBACHEV COULD REALLY BELIEVE DETERRENCE WAS ILLEGITIMATE GIVEN THE SIZE OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCES).

5. SHULTZ ASKED WHETHER THE PRIME MINISTER THOUGHT THAT GORBACHEV WAS TRYING TO MAKE AN UNWORKABLE SYSTEM WORK BETTER OR WHETHER HE MIGHT ACTUALLY BE TRYING TO CHANGE THE SYSTEM. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT GORBACHEV HAD GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS BEGINNING TO SEE THE WEAKNESSES OF THE SYSTEM (HE HAD TALKED OF DEVELOPING A SYSTEM OF PAYMENT FOR HEALTH CARE). BUT

RADICAL MEASURES OF REFORM WERE NOT YET ACTUAATLY BELNG CARRIED OUT. GORBACHEV'S FOCUS SEEMED TO BE LARGELY POLITICAL RATHER THAN ECONOMIC, IN CONTRAST TO THE APPROACHES OF THE HUNGARIAN AND CHINESE LEADERSHIPS. GORBACHEV TENDED TO TAKE A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH (HIS PLENUM SPEECH HAD BEEN VERY MUCH IN THIS MOULD) BUT MANY OF HIS PERCEPTIONS OF THE WORLD SEEMED TO BE BASED ON SOVIET MYTHOLOGY. FOR EXAMPLE, HE CLAIMED TO BELIEVE THE CIA PLOT THEORY OF THE KAL SHOOTDOWN. IT WAS HARD TO KNOW WHETHER HE REALLY SAW THINGS IN THIS WAY.

5. SHULTZ ASKED WHETHER OTHER SOVIET LEADERS, FOR EXAMPLE RYZHKOV, SHEVARDNADZE AND DOBRYNIN RESEMBLED GORBACHEV. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT RYZHKOV APPEARED TO SHARE SOME OF GORBACHEV'S OPEN-MINDNESS BUT WAS MORE LIKELY TO COME UP WITH STOCK ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ABOUT SUBJECTS OF WHICH HE HAD LITTLE EXPERIENCE, PARTICULARLY FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS. SHEVARDNADZE HAD GIVEN THE IMPRESSION, DURING THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S EIGHT HOURS OF TALKS WITH HIM IN MOSCOW, OF BEING OPEN, RELAXED, AND THOUGHTFUL. HE SEEMED TO BE ENGAGED IN A GENUINE PROCESS OF RE-EXAMINING SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND ASKING WHETHER SOVIET OBJECTIVES WERE THE RIGHT ONES AND WERE BEING PURSUED IN THE RIGHT WAY. DOBRYNIN HAD NOT PLAYED ANY SIGNIFICANT PART IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW.

6. SHULTZ WONDERED WHETHER HE MIGHT FIND, DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW ON 13-15 APRIL, THAT HIS SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS WERE AS INTERESTED IN TRYING TO PERSUADE HIM GENERALLY OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NEW DRIVE FOR REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION AS IN GOING THROUGH A DETAILED BUSINESS AGENDA. HE HAD TOLD THE RUSSIANS THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO DEVOTE A PART OF HIS VISIT TO A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF BROAD POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC ISSUES.

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YOUR TEL NO 195 : PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE
 SOVIET UNION

1. THE THAI PRIME MINISTER, GENERAL PREM THINSULANONDA, INVITED ME TO CALL ON HIM THIS MORNING (10 APRIL), TO DELIVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE TO HIM IN TUR.
2. PREM ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO THE PRIME MINISTER HIS GRATEFUL THANKS, BOTH ON HIS OWN BEHALF AS WELL AS ON BEHALF OF THE THAI PEOPLE, FOR THE ACTION WHICH MRS THATCHER HAD TAKEN IN MOSCOW IN RAISING WITH GORBACHEV OUR CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA. HE HAD FOR SOME TIME BEEN AT A LOSS TO KNOW HOW BEST TO SECURE MOVEMENT OVER THE CAMBODIAN ISSUE. NOW THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS AT LEAST PREPARED TO TALK ABOUT THE PROBLEM, HE AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE. HE FELT THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT HAD HELPED TO OPEN THE WAY AND WHEN HIS FOREIGN MINISTER VISITED MOSCOW NEXT MONTH, ACM SHIDDHAW WOULD BE ABLE TO PURSUE THE MATTER FURTHER.
3. PREM WONDERED WHETHER IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO MAKE SIMILAR OVERTURES IN MOSCOW. HE WOULD BE TALKING TO US AMBASSADOR BROWN ABOUT THIS ON BROWN'S RETURN FROM WASHINGTON (IN ABOUT 6 WEEKS' TIME). HE HAVE MENTIONED THIS TO THE US CHARGE HERE, WHO HAS TOLD ME THAT SHULTZ HAS SAID ON US TELEVISION THAT HE WILL BE RAISING CAMBODIA DURING HIS TALKS IN MOSCOW NEXT WEEK.
4. PREM SAID THAT HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETING SIR GEOFFREY HOWE ON 22 APRIL. BECAUSE HE WOULD BE FACING A NO-CONFIDENCE VOTE IN PARLIAMENT THAT DAY, HE ASKED THAT THE MEETING BE PUT FORWARD TO 0815. THIS HAS BEEN INCORPORATED IN THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S PROGRAMME.

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