

INTRODUCTION

1. Thank for warm and courteous welcome. Moved by spontaneous friendliness of people you met yesterday.
2. Recall two earlier discussions. Both spoke frankly and laid out positions clearly and explicitly. Neither of us much attached to diplomatic niceties.
3. Suggest that we start on arms control.
4. Number of points on which we agree. We both want to avoid war. We both believe that each side has an equal right to security. We both believe that security can be found at lower levels of arms. We would agree, I think, that arms control agreements must not leave either side feeling less secure, rather than more.
5. But we have to reckon with the fact that many years of hostility have left both sides without the mutual trust and confidence necessary to build

arms control agreements. This will only come gradually and on the basis of performance. Moreover weapons and their deployment which may seem defensive to you often look like preparation for attack to us. We cannot ignore these different perceptions. It means that we need to approach agreements a step at a time, the incremental approach.

6. I welcome, therefore, your readiness to start with a separate INF agreement. We must build on that. I admit that it causes us some misgivings. We would have preferred to keep some intermediate weapons; or to eliminate them all (global zero-zero). Nonetheless, I believe that we can make progress, provided we take full account of the security concerns of both sides. In our case that concerns, in particular, shorter-range systems.

ARMS CONTROL: GENERAL

ARMS Control 1

1. Each country ^{equally} entitled to feel secure.
2. Defences should be sufficient to guarantee security, but not excessive. Otherwise they seem a threat to others.
3. Do not believe that security can be found without nuclear weapons. They have prevented both nuclear and conventional war. We feel safer with nuclear weapons than we would without.
4. So do not believe it practical to talk of elimination of nuclear weapons. Aim should be substantial reductions and removal of imbalances.
5. That should be the starting point: the aim of managing with few nuclear weapons.
6. Reductions in nuclear weapons will highlight disparities in conventional forces. Your capabilities seem to us to be geared to attack and to constitute a major potential threat to Europe. Do not accept there is a rough balance of forces.

7. So, do not think grand design of a nuclear-free world is a practical prospect. Better to focus on step-by-step approach. Welcome the fact that Soviet Union appears to accept this by readiness to pursue a separate INF agreement.

8. Also need to recognise link between arms control and establishing broader trust and confidence. Two processes need to advance in parallel. This too argues for step-by-step approach.

9. Believe these views shared by President Reagan, as agreed at our Camp David meeting last November. Also by main West European leaders: my visit to Mitterrand and Kohl.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

1. Reductions in nuclear forces will increase the importance of eliminating conventional imbalances.

2. Brussels Declaration set out NATO's proposals. Task now to agree a mandate.

3. Purpose of negotiations to achieve stability at lower levels, including the removal of those disparities which are most threatening.

4. Agree with you that the one with more should reduce, rather than the one with less build up. But not saying that reductions should be unilateral. We are prepared to reduce as well, but only if result is balanced.

5. Talks must start on the basis of factual data. Do not accept that there is a rough balance of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

/

Soviet superiority of 3:1 in tanks and artillery and 2:1 in aircraft.

6. Unrealistic therefore to call for equal or symmetrical cuts.

7. Disappointed at lack of Soviet response to our December 1985 proposals in MBFR talks. A mistake to let talks in this forum die.

UK DETERRENT

U. K

1. Welcome your decision no longer to try to include UK deterrent in INF negotiations.
2. Trident will be a minimum strategic deterrent. Less than 3 per cent of Soviet arsenal.
3. If there were 50 per cent cuts in Soviet strategic warheads as envisaged, and if we deployed the maximum possible number of Trident warheads, our deterrent would still represent a smaller proportion of Soviet strategic warheads than did Polaris in 1970.
4. We have never said never. If there are very substantial cuts in arsenals of super-powers and no significant changes in Soviet defensive capabilities, together with progress on removing imbalance in

conventional forces, we would be prepared to consider what contribution we could make.

5. But we are not ready for arms control measures which would weaken our security. Abandoning the UK deterrent for no more than equivalent reductions in Soviet weapons would do this.

START/SDI

With change and work
65 ← (Circumstances.)

1. No point in repeating utopian formula on total elimination of all strategic weapons or all ballistic missiles. In any event, US has now swung decisively against this latter option

2. Concentrate on radical but attainable objective of 50% cuts in strategic offensive weapons.

3. Detailed points, e.g., handling of long range Cruise and mobile ICBMs for negotiation with US.

4. Both US and Soviet Union engaged in research on Ballistic Missile Defence. Soviet Union modernising ABM system. No reason why this should delay cuts in strategic weapons. Note that his 28 February statement did not link START to Limitations on SDI research but to deployment.

5. As a matter of common sense, research

Relig

Relig Rec
— Dir.

502
→

Chenoweth

Conrad

S1) I. — AB on P. 1.

Shell not even
write this place for. Sketch

M. 100 — || - 1/2 dit' under
Process ||

Interpretation

must determine feasibility of ballistic missile defence. Programmes should be conducted so as to ensure predictability for other side.

Deployment a matter for negotiation.

6. No prospect of halting US programme or preventing them from establishing feasibility. But basic US criteria for deployment remain in place: survivability, military effectiveness, cost effectiveness at margin. They will be hard to meet. A system offering a complete defence is not achievable.

7. A possible solution to ensure predictability would be:

- an undertaking not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty/deploy SDI for a fixed period;
- measure of agreement on scope and time-scale of research activities (a time-table).

Willing to explore with President Reagan.

/

8. This should give sufficient confidence to move ahead with reductions in strategic weapons.

INF

1. Welcome Soviet acceptance of western proposal for separate INF agreement.
2. We would much prefer global to European LRINF agreement. Remaining 100 warheads in Asia and US of little strategic benefit, and add substantially to verification problem. Soviet Union does not need them - there is no US system in areas in question to match SS20.
3. Since 1981 the Western Allies have been agreed on the absolute need for appropriate constraints on Soviet SRINF systems, as an integral part of an LRINF agreement. Our position has been and remains consistent.
4. It is now reflected in Article IV of the US draft Treaty. We are seeking what we have always sought: equal ceilings at present Soviet levels on systems between roughly 500 kms and 1000 kms; and no production or deployment in the range between roughly

55-22 (12) 23 (13)

(Global ceilings) /

1000 kms and LRINF (where neither side currently has systems).

5. The effect would be a freeze on the SS22 and SS23 at their present levels, plus a US right to match these, i.e., equal ceilings.

6. We understand at Reykjavik you accepted the principle of constraints on shorter range systems as part of an LRINF agreement. Subsequent negotiations at Geneva have been pursued along these lines.

7. Concerned to hear that Soviet negotiators in Geneva may be retreating from that position. These constraints need agreeing now, not deferring to a later stage. They should be global and not just limited to Europe, given that the missiles are mobile. We will continue to insist on our long-standing requirements.

/

8. We also note that both sides at Reykjavik committed themselves to follow-on negotiations, to cover shorter range systems among others. We expect this commitment to be implemented. There should be a formal commitment in parallel to the INF agreement.

9. But we do not accept Soviet claims (e.g., Vorontsov in Paris) that the aim of these negotiations will be the removal of all nuclear weapons from Europe. Nuclear weapons essential to our security.

10. As I have often said, the negotiations should address primarily the massive Soviet superiority in shorter range systems (at a ratio of 9:1 over NATO).

NUCLEAR TESTING

CTB

1. Here too we should aim for achievable steps. Should not allow long term goal of CTB to block immediate, limited measures.

2. Our concerns about verification are genuine and cannot be brushed aside. No point in resuming CTB negotiations until a solution to verification problems is more apparent.

3. First step should be negotiation of effective verification provisions for 1970s Treaties so that they can be ratified.

4. Second step could be negotiations on step-by-step constraints on nuclear tests (i.e. quotas and/or thresholds), in parallel with reductions in stockpiles.

5. ● These two steps could be described as part of an overall negotiating process with the cessation of tests as the long term aim.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Chemical

1. One of our priority areas for agreement.
2. Concerned that Soviet Union appears to be continuing to modernise and upgrade its capability.
3. (If appropriate) welcome Soviet indication that they are ready to accept our proposal on challenge inspection. Will pursue in consultation with others. Many other points remain to be settled. No point in UK/Soviet agreement if others are left to one side.
4. (If appropriate) cannot agree to dilute our challenge inspection regime.
5. Many outstanding details remain to be settled, viz.

- inspection regime for civil industry
- organisation of inspectorate
- what to do about non-parties

ARAB-ISRAEL

1. Present situation unstable. If it deteriorates it could complicate US/Soviet relations.

2. Appears to be growing consensus that international conference under UN auspices could help break deadlock.

3. The role of the conference would be to act as a framework for direct negotiations between the parties. Only direct negotiations produce results, as the record shows.

4. But a conference will require careful preparation, including a solution to the problem of Palestinian representation. This can only sensibly be by presence of Palestinians in the Jordanian delegation.

5. There will also need to be some understanding on how the conference will

actually work.

6. Hope that Soviet Union will consider how it can help encourage its Syrian and PLO friends towards a conference on this basis. The purpose would be to find a just and comprehensive solution, even if that probably cannot be achieved by comprehensive negotiations.

7. Encouraging the Arabs to hold out for something more does them a dis-service. Peace has only ever come about through direct contacts.

8. There are the obstacles to be overcome of the absence of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel, and Jewish emigration.

9. No need for formal preparatory committee. This would be indistinguishable from conference itself. Better to rely on

continuing informal contacts between
Permanent Members of Security Council.

10. This is an area where a co-operative effort involving all Permanent Members of the Security Council could produce a real step forward.

AFGHANISTAN

1. No wish to prolong war or humiliate Soviet Union. Soviet withdrawal would have dramatic and positive effect on East/West relations.

2. Glad to note your expressed wish for a settlement. Key is rapid withdrawal of Soviet troops.

3. To last, a settlement has to be acceptable to refugees and resistance as well as to others. Pakistanis cannot impose one against their will. There must be real power-sharing.

4. Crucial point is some indication that you will not insist on retaining the present Kabul regime in a dominant position.

5. More neutral figure or group than present regime is required, at least to manage a transition.

6. This could be established through traditional Afghan consultative methods. Ex-King could have a role to play.

7. We would join in efforts to support or reinforce Afghanistan's neutrality and non-alignment. A neutral Afghanistan should of course have friendly relations with neighbours including Soviet Union.

8. The Soviet Union has an opportunity to take a step which will be widely applauded.

9. The alternative is years more of bloodshed and damage to Soviet reputation, as well as to prospects for better East/West relations. If the war continues, so will Western support for its friends.

VIETNAM/CAMBODIA

1. Soviet Union pays heavy price for current policy in terms of damage to its reputation.
2. In your interests to persuade Vietnam to withdraw and bring about a peaceful solution.

IRAN/IRAQ

1. Strong common interest in ending the war.
2. But assessment remains that neither side likely to achieve a clear cut victory. Prospects are that conflict will drag on.
3. Action best taken through UN. Discussion of new mediation effort by Secretary-General.
4. Concerned at Iranian missiles which threaten freedom of navigation in the Gulf.

HUMAN RIGHTS

1. Following process of democratisation and openness very closely.
2. Noted in particular comments in his Central Committee Plenum speech on justice and rule of law. Also heard of possible revisions to Code of Justice.
3. Free circulation of people and ideas only true basis for lasting peace based on trust and tolerance.
4. We have warmly welcomed release of prisoners and return of Dr. Sakharov.
5. Have no wish to undermine Soviet society. Our criticism is constructive in intention.
6. Prefer to deal with these matters quietly and privately as we did on the last occasion at Chequers.

7. The fact is that there is a lot of concern among ordinary people in Britain about a number of those held in prison in the Soviet Union or refused the right to emigrate.

8. You may well have criticisms of our society which I am very ready to hear and to answer.

9. Particular points of concern are imprisonment of Helsinki Monitors (like Tengiz Gudava); incarceration of dissidents in mental hospitals (like Viktor Rafalsky); Helsinki obligations on travel and emigration not met (case of Ida Nudel); Jews not given minimum requirements for maintaining religion, culture and identity.

10. In past, Soviet Union had constructive links with world Jewry, liberating Auschwitz, birth place of Golda Meir, one of the first to recognise State of Israel.

11. Hope you will continue (and stress
wo continue) releases and step up
numbers allowed to leave the Soviet Union.
Also receive at political level a delega-
tion of European Rabbis led by our Chief
Rabbi.

12. Sir Geoffrey Howe will hand over
lists to Mr. Shevardnadze.

13. Cannot emphasise enough effect that
further steps would have on Soviet
reputation internationally. Damage
caused by treatment of dissidents and
refusal of right to emigrate quite
disproportionate to threat which they
represent to the Soviet Union.