

cc/c 6A



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 March 1987

Prime Minister  
 these cover points  
 which came up in your  
 discussion with FCO & MOD  
 arms control experts.

Dear Charles,

CDP 24/3

Prime Minister's Visit to Moscow : Arms Control

I understand that at the Prime Minister's briefing meeting last week a number of specific questions were raised on the arms control front. The Moscow brief covers most of these. You may find, however, it useful to have the following additional points, on which we have consulted MOD officials, to hand during the discussions in Moscow.

INF : Non-Zero solution in Europe

Gorbachev seems most unlikely to be prepared to offer a new deal, incorporating some number of warheads in Europe above zero. Removal of US systems, especially Pershing II, is the key Soviet objective. Should he surface the idea however (perhaps under pressure from his own military who might prefer more INF systems in Asia to counter the supposed Chinese threat) the Prime Minister could show interest, while making it clear that the West is prepared to go ahead with the Reykjavik deal provided that the remaining issues can be satisfactorily resolved. Thereafter we would need to consider the matter again with the Americans and the other allies.

Scope of LRINF Agreement

It would be helpful also to press Gorbachev hard on the need for a global, rather than European, LRINF agreement; and to press the strong case for going straight to the world-wide elimination of LRINF: i.e., the NATO position of 1981. The remaining 100 warheads in Asia and in the US are of little strategic benefit to either side, but add very substantially to the problems of verification. Gorbachev may argue that some limited forces outside Europe are crucial for the Soviet Union, to counter US naval or

/land-based



land-based (Japan/South Korea) systems in place. This argument can be dismissed on the grounds that the SS20 is not matched by any current US system in the areas in question and should therefore be treated separately.

#### Siting of residual Soviet LRINF

On the siting of the Soviet forces in Asia, we should stick to the formula in the draft US Treaty: "such missiles and launchers shall not be deployed closer to any point on the territories in Europe of the parties to NATO than the distance from the Western-most missile operating base of the Soviet Union for longer-range GLBMs outside of Europe as of December 31 1985 .... to the closest point on the territories in Europe of NATO parties" (Article III para 3.) The base in question is Novosibirsk. Our estimate of the range coverage from it is shown on the attached map. In practice the constraint means that this would be the maximum coverage of NATO territory allowed under the agreement. We should also press for a US right to deploy residual systems in Alaska; even if the US eventually decide not to deploy there, we believe they will want to retain the right to do so.

#### Verification

The US draft Treaty allows for conversion of missiles and launchers to other purposes, since the US themselves may want to do this (a point about which the Russians are currently making heavy weather). The details of destruction/conversion will need to be worked out in detail. The Americans have assured us that we will be closely consulted about this. In theory an SS20 missile could be converted to form a shorter-range system or an ASAT weapon; but in practice we understand that technically this would be an unlikely option for the Soviet Union to take.

#### Shorter-range systems

We should continue to press for the SS22/23 to be frozen at present levels with a US right to match. It is possible that Gorbachev may launch with the Prime Minister an offer which some of his negotiators have already hinted at informally: to eliminate all the SS22/23s (at least in Europe) as part of the present LRINF agreement, rather than simply to freeze them. Such an offer might well require NATO to eliminate the 72 FRG Pershing Is at the same time, and would close off subsequent deployment options for both sides. If confined to Europe it would be less attractive.

/If



If global, on the other hand, such an offer would be hard to refuse. It would be widely seen as removing Soviet systems about which the West had expressed concern, both because of their intrinsic capabilities and because of the risk of circumventing agreement on LRINF. We would of course need to look carefully at our own deterrence capabilities at the SRINF level in the absence of Pershing Is. NATO studies are currently underway on how to preserve an adequate range of nuclear options following an LRINF agreement. Such a Soviet offer could also reinforce the overall trend to denuclearisation. We therefore suggest that if Gorbachev raises it the Prime Minister should merely take note, expressing some interest in the concept.

#### Follow-on negotiations on SRINF/SNF

As for other SRINF and SNF, of which you will have full details in the OD paper recently circulated, we believe that the Prime Minister should avoid being drawn into the details of how these might be addressed in follow-on negotiations. The Alliance has yet to work out its position on this and it would be premature to give any hints to Gorbachev at this stage. The US and USSR committed themselves at Reykjavik to follow-on negotiations and we know that the Americans (and other Allies, notably the Germans and Italians) want to secure a repetition of that commitment. For practical reasons they may, however, prefer not to write this into the Treaty itself. At this stage all we need to do is to emphasise the need for such negotiations to take place in due course.

#### Alternatives to European LRINF

The Prime Minister wished to know what alternative Western systems would be available in Europe after zero/zero LRINF, and what their ranges would be. A table is attached that sets these out.

#### LRINF/Conventional linkage

The US negotiating position and the NATO communiqués have made it clear by implication that we do not make a first stage INF agreement conditional on the removal of the current conventional imbalance. Discussion between Allies has confirmed this position, with the FRG particularly keen to resist any such linkage. The Government has publicly endorsed this line. At the same time, it would be worth stressing to Gorbachev that the Camp David language of 1986 ("reductions in nuclear weapons would increase the importance of eliminating conventional disparities.

/Nuclear



Nuclear weapons cannot be dealt with in isolation, given the need for stable overall balance at all times") represents a fundamental feature of our approach to nuclear arms control. This point was specifically endorsed by the DPC and NAC. Should Gorbachev be prepared to sign up to this, so much the better. The point will be of crucial importance when we come to decide with our Allies on the Western approach to follow-on negotiations on SRINF.

#### START

On the content of the 50% reductions in strategic arms, it would be useful to emphasize the need for the Russians to satisfy US concerns that superior Soviet throw-weight will be truly constrained in an agreement. The US proposal to codify such a reduction is designed to achieve this, whereas the Russians prefer to leave it (as they claim) as the practical outcome of cuts in specific systems. We would like to see the Russians confirm that they are prepared to accept sublimits on ballistic missile types, as they have done in the past. It would also be useful to emphasize that the onus lies on Moscow to provide adequate proposals for verifying the constraints which they say they want on SLCMs and the permissible deployments of mobile ICBMs. Although any commitment to strategic reductions beyond 50% should certainly be resisted, we should avoid appearing determined to prevent any cuts beyond that 50%, though they would have to have the effect of strengthening our security.

Our approach to the wholesale elimination of ballistic missiles or strategic weapons generally is covered in the Moscow brief, as is the handling of Gorbachev's inevitable attack upon our own deterrent.

#### SDI

The Moscow brief also contains ideas for handling the linkage between START and SDI. The basic approach is to emphasize that while there is no question of SDI deployment for many years, strategic reductions can and should be made now. If and when SDI deployment appeared both desirable and feasible when measured against the long-standing US criteria, actual deployment would have to be a matter for negotiation. (This does not of course mean a Soviet veto. But it does in our view mean a serious attempt to ensure that any deployment was made on the basis of agreement.) In the meantime, the key to reductions is to establish a sense of predictability on both sides (as the Prime Minister has already suggested).

/It



It would be premature to take a view on the case for moving towards a new form of deterrence based on a mix of offensive and defensive systems. The whole point of SDI research is to provide answers to some of the relevant questions. If Gorbachev raises the militarisation of space, the Prime Minister could argue that this is wholly different to the concept (which she endorsed) of "preventing an arms race in space". Some military uses of space are beneficial (satellites etc). The testing of ballistic missiles through space can also assist deterrence. (There are of course no nuclear weapons deployed in space, nor are those under test equipped with live warheads).

/ As for Soviet BMD activity, there is considerable material in the public domain which could be used to challenge him about Soviet activity in this area. A short unclassified note is attached.

#### Chemical Weapons/Nuclear Testing

We believe that the briefing adequately covers all the questions raised earlier this week. It includes an account of the outstanding areas of CW disagreement, among which challenge inspection is a key problem, but not the only one.

#### Conventional Weapons

There is no reason for the Prime Minister to enter into the detail of the form any eventual reductions of conventional forces might take, eg whether they should be of formed units rather than manpower, or whether particular items of equipment such as tanks should be singled out. The Prime Minister might however try to pin Gorbachev down on his declared willingness to deal with disparities by having the side with the greater number in a particular category reduce them rather than by the side with the fewer increasing. The Prime Minister should emphasise that if any progress is to be made in eliminating disparities and in achieving stability at lower levels of armed forces, the Soviet Union must be prepared to break with past practice and discuss openly what forces it has; and to allow verification arrangements which will permit each side to know with confidence that any future agreed, balanced force levels will indeed be respected.

/General



General

The Moscow brief includes an opening Speaking Note designed to provide an overall account of the British approach to security and arms control. Against this background we want to avoid the risk of complicating the bilateral negotiations. The prospects of a useful joint statement are probably low. We would however have done well if:

(a) at the end of the visit there had emerged (and we could say so unilaterally where appropriate):

(i) some Soviet acceptance of the US approach outlined in their draft INF Treaty, including readiness to tackle the SS22/23 and verification issues;

(ii) some sign (if only oblique) of Soviet interest in our ideas for dealing with SDI, which could be usefully passed to Washington;

(iii) Soviet agreement that the step-by-step approach outlined at Camp David, and the priorities identified there, are a sensible and practical way forward; and

(b) there was little or no public Soviet criticism of our position as a major obstacle to progress in arms control.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosures to John Howe (MOD) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

*Lyn Parker*

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
No 10 Downing St

## THE SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE PROGRAMME

### Deployments

1. The Soviet Union has the only deployed ABM system in the world. Currently being upgraded. When completed late 1980s: 100 static launchers sited around Moscow. A mix of existing nuclear-tipped GALOSH missiles, and new GAZELLE missile designed to intercept incoming missiles after they have re-entered atmosphere. Supported by a chain of early warning radars, and surveillance and target acquisition radars with target tracking and missile control radars (see attached map). Also the world's only deployed anti-satellite (ASAT) system, a space-based orbital interceptor of limited capability. Operational since the early 1970s.

### Research Programme

2. Research programmes under way in most fields relevant to defence capability against ballistic missiles:

a. Lasers. Extensive R&D programme dating from mid 1960s carried out at over half a dozen major R&D facilities. Includes testing of a ground-based laser which could be a prototype ASAT weapon.

b. Particle Beam and Radio Frequency Weapons. Vigorous programme into particle beam weapons could lead to prototype space based system by late 1990s. Research into radio frequency weapons which have potential to interfere with missiles, satellites or re-entry vehicles.

c. Kinetic Energy Weapons Use. A number of longstanding research programmes, including research and development of electro-magnetic railguns to accelerate projectiles to extra high velocities.


d. Space Capability. Eight space-launch systems to place objects in orbit. Two more under development, a medium- and a heavy-lift launch vehicle. Obvious BMD potential. Also developing equivalent to US Shuttle. With manned space programmes, acquiring experience of maintaining complex platforms in space: SALYUT and MIR space laboratories have obvious potential.

### Conclusions

3. The Soviet Union has long-standing research programmes examining new technologies with weapons potential relevant to ballistic missile defence. Current R&D programmes provide capabilities to develop SDI-type systems.



*Ballistic Missile Early Warning, Target-Tracking, and Battle Management Radars*



Source: US "Soviet Military Power" 1987 Edition

WESTERN NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ABLE TO REACH USSR, BASED IN OR AROUND EUROPE, AFTER ZERO/ZERO LRINF

EXISTING SYSTEMS

<u>Country</u>	<u>System</u>	<u>Numbers</u> (Launchers)	<u>Max Range/Radius</u> <u>of Action</u> (Kms)
<u>Land Based:</u>			
France	Medium-range Missile (S3)	18	3500
<u>Sea-Based:</u>			
UK	Polaris	64	3500
US	Poseidon (declared to SACEUR; 10 MIRV'd warheads per missile)	40	4000
US	Submarine/Ship launched cruise missiles**	up to 150	2500
France	Submarine Ballistic	M4	16
		M20	80
<u>Airborne:</u>			
US	F111s*	144	1100
France	Mirage IV	24	600-1200 (Refuelling might be required)


POSSIBILITIES FOR ENHANCING WESTERN CAPABILITY AT THESE RANGES

1. The above systems could be developed and/or increased in number.
2. Air-launched cruise missiles (range up to 2500Kms for missiles) are another option.
3. US SLBMs and UK and French missile systems are all in the process of modernisation, with new SLBMs planned for mid-1990s.
4. US strategic bombers might be deployed forward to Europe in time of crisis.

Notes

- \* With extensive air to air refuelling Tornado, Buccaneer, F-16, F4 could in theory reach the Soviet Union. US Carrier strike aircraft could also be employed to strike the Kola peninsula once the strike fleet was deployed into the North Norwegian Sea.
- \*\* US strategic reserve not declared to SACEUR.

MAXIMUM RANGE of SS-20 from NOVOSIBIRSK



SS-20 RANGE ARCS

Assumed Range SS 20 : 4600 kms .

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27th March 1987

*CD*  
*27B*

*Jan Charles,*

ARMS CONTROL BRIEFING : PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

We were grateful to receive a copy of Lyn Parker's letter of 24th March, with additional briefing for this visit.

There is only one small point to which we would draw attention, that the systems listed include British and French national strategic forces, whose role and status is clearly different from genuinely theatre systems. Their inclusion in the table without qualification could therefore be misleading. I do not know whether you might wish to annotate the table accordingly.

*Yours sincerely,*  
*Janis Ball*

(D C J BALL)  
Private Secretary

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~~CCPC~~  
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 March 1987

Prime Minister

Dear Charles,

I think that the Russians  
are going to make you a  
present of this in Moscow.

Chemical Weapons: Soviet Position on Challenge Inspection

The Soviet Delegation in Geneva approached ours on 24 March to emphasise in unambiguous terms their endorsement of the concepts behind the UK proposals on challenge inspection. I enclose a brief summary of the key points in the present position which you may wish to add to your Moscow papers as background. As the Foreign Secretary is in Geneva, I will show these papers to him this evening.

We shall have  
no say  
thank you  
- but

This development does not alter the line to take in the Prime Minister's brief. Although we could not do anything other than welcome Soviet acceptance of a British proposal, many in the West (especially in Washington) believe that current Soviet moves are designed to do no more than delay or halt the US binary CW programme. It is for the Soviet Union to demonstrate to the US that it is genuinely serious in its wish for a ban. An attempt publicly to exploit differences within the Alliance, however tempting it might be to the Russians, would not achieve this objective.

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As the brief states, there are of course a large number of other outstanding problems to be resolved in the negotiations, although challenge inspection remains the most important.

other  
points  
to be  
resolved

I am copying this letter to John Howe (MOD).

Yours ever,

L Parker

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

27/3

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



## CHEMICAL WEAPONS: LATEST SOVIET MOVES

1. The Soviet delegation in Geneva has this week made a point of repeating its acceptance of the concepts behind the UK proposals on challenge inspection. On the five main elements which make the regime a stringent deterrent against cheating:

<u>Element</u>	<u>UK Position</u>	<u>Apparent Soviet Position</u>
Basic Obligation	Provide satisfaction to the challenging state that it is in full compliance.	Agree
Coverage	Anywhere	Agree
Right of Refusal	Exceptionally, comprehensive access can be refused <u>provided</u> the basic obligation is met by alternative means	Agree. No right of refusal for declared facilities (eg some civil industry) or where CW use is suspected.
Timescale	Demonstrate compliance within 10 days [Note: the US would like to see a shorter timescale]	Agree
What Constitutes Breach	Failure to meet basic obligation	Possibly agree. But indications that they interpret our proposal in different way from us.

2. The Soviet Union has proposed one amendment to our proposal, which they say is negotiable. It does not appear inconsistent with language we have ourselves used. Although some points may be troublesome, there is no obvious reason to suppose a UK/Soviet agreement could not be reached. Such agreement, whilst tempting for the Soviet Union, would reinforce suspicions in Washington that current Soviet flexibility was no more than tactical in order to halt the US binary CW programme.

3. Even if challenge inspection is resolved, there remains a number of other difficult issues in the negotiations.







Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 March 1987

*CP*

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Visit to Moscow: SRINF

You asked for a supplementary note on SRINF in the light of Moscow telno 467. You will also have seen the comments /26.3.87 in Washington telno 660 (copy enclosed for ease of reference). I attach a text in a form which could be drawn upon as a Speaking Note if need arose.

IN MAIN BRIEF.

We agree with the Embassy in Moscow that the question of constraints on SRINF and the need for follow up negotiations is one that the Prime Minister could very usefully underline during the visit, not least in order to bring home to Mr Gorbachev the great importance which she and her European colleagues attach to this point. We must, however, be careful with our language: the reference in the telegram to "recoupling equal SRINF" could be interpreted to mean that the Russians had already agreed to equal ceilings. In fact, their position has not advanced beyond the idea of a freeze (ie a denial of a US right to match); and there are now signs of back-tracking still further in the suggestion that the question should be dealt with separately or later. It may well be that the Soviet position is a tactical one, designed to encourage some change in the American position on this or some other outstanding issue. If so, Mr Gorbachev may not wish to surrender the point in his meetings with the Prime Minister; but that is no reason for not pressing him hard on the subject in order both to emphasise a crucial point from the Allied point of view and to strengthen the American negotiating hand.

I am sending a copy of this letter to John Howe (MOD).

*long ever,*  
*L Parker*

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

GRS 350

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MOSCOW TELNO 467: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW: ARMS CONTROL:  
SRINF

1. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE NEVER BEEN ABLE TO SECURE SOVIET AGREEMENT THAT CEILINGS ON SRINF SHOULD BE EQUAL. THERE WAS AMBIGUITY ON THIS POINT AT REKJAVIK, AND SOVIET NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA INSISTED BETWEEN REYKJAVIK AND 28 FEBRUARY THAT SRINF SHOULD BE FROZEN AT BOTH SIDE'S CURRENT LEVELS IE THAT CEILINGS SHOULD BE UNEQUAL. NOR HAVE THE RUSSIANS EVER AGREED THAT SRINF CEILINGS SHOULD BE GLOBAL. THIS ISSUE WAS NOT ADDRESSED AT REYKJAVIK AND THE SOVIET POSITION IN GENEVA UNTIL 28 FEBRUARY WAS THAT SRINF CONSTRAINTS SHOULD APPLY TO EUROPE ONLY.
2. THE PRESIDENT DID HOWEVER SECURE SOVIET AGREEMENT AT REYKJAVIK TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT CEILINGS (OF SOME SORT) ON SRINF MUST BE INCLUDED IN AN INITIAL INF AGREEMENT. THIS IS THE KEY POINT ON SRINF WHICH SOVIET NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA HAVE DISOWNED SINCE GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT ON 28 FEBRUARY: THE SOVIET SRINF POSITION SINCE 28 FEBRUARY HAS BEEN MERELY THAT SOVIET SRINF DEPLOYED FORWARD IN EASTERN EUROPE WOULD BE WITHDRAWN - NOT DESTROYED - AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS ON SRINF.
3. IF THE PRIME MINISTER WERE ABLE, DURING HER VISIT TO MOSCOW, TO WIN RENEWED SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT SRINF CEILINGS MUST BE INCLUDED IN AN INITIAL INF AGREEMENT, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD CERTAINLY VERY MUCH WELCOME IT. IF THE PRIME MINISTER COULD ALSO SECURE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF EQUALITY AND GLOBALITY (A FAR TOUGHER OBJECTIVE), THIS WOULD OF COURSE BE DOUBLY WELCOME HERE.

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4. THE PRECISE PRESENT US POSITION, SET OUT IN THEIR NEW DRAFT INF TREATY, IS THAT EQUAL AND GLOBAL SRINF CEILINGS SHOULD BE SET AS PART OF AN INITIAL INF AGREEMENT AT PRESENT SOVIET LEVELS OF SS12/22 AND SS23. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE ALSO INSISTING ON EARLY FOLLOW-ON SRINF NEGOTIATIONS.

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*Prime Minister*  
*A very important*  
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MIPT (NOT TO ALL): PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW: ARMS CONTROL SUMMARY

1. ARMS CONTROL STOCK ON THE RISE AGAIN IN WASHINGTON. CAMP DAVID AGENDA NOW FIRMLY ESTABLISHED (WITH SOME DOUBTS ON CW). AN INF AGREEMENT SEEN AS THE BEST PROSPECT, WITH SRINF AND VERIFICATION THE MAIN OUTSTANDING ISSUES. ALSO HOPES FOR PROGRESS ON NUCLEAR TESTING. IMPORTANCE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL RECOGNISED BUT UNCERTAINTY ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED. A START/DEFENCE AND SPACE AGREEMENT STILL SEEN AS THE BIG PRIZE AND NOW CONSIDERED BY MANY AS A SLIGHTLY BETTER THAN 50/50 PROSPECT.

DETAIL

2. ALTHOUGH THE CUSTOMARY INTER-AGENCY WARFARE ON THE DETAILS OF US ARMS CONTROL POSITIONS CONTINUES, THE GENERAL SENSE HERE IS THAT THE TIDE IS NOW FLOWING IN FAVOUR OF THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ONE OR MORE SIGNIFICANT ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS DURING THE PRESIDENT'S TERM.

A NUMBER OF FACTORS ARE AT WORK: THE PRO-ARMS CONTROL BIAS OF THE NEW DEMOCRAT-CONTROLLED CONGRESS; THE VIEWS OF THE ALLIES; AND THE CLEAR INCENTIVE FOR THE PRESIDENT AND HIS NEW TEAM (SEE MIPT) TO OBTAIN AN ARMS CONTROL SUCCESS TO HELP LAY THE IRAN/CONTRAS AFFAIR TO REST. AS A RESULT, THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE BEEN BROUGHT DOWN TO EARTH AFTER THE GIDDINESS OF REYKJAVIK, AND THE CAMP DAVID ARMS CONTROL AGENDA NOW SEEMS FIRMLY ESTABLISHED, WITH HELP FROM THE JCS STUDY ON THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES (WHICH CONCLUDED THAT SUCH A PROSPECT WAS NOT FEASIBLE WITHOUT MASSIVE AND UNREALISTIC NEW LEVELS OF DEFENCE EXPENDITURE - MY TELNO 579).

3. THERE IS STILL TIME FOR THE PRESIDENT TO SECURE AN ARMS CONTROL ACHIEVEMENT. THE GENERAL VIEW IS THAT AGREEMENTS MUST BE FORWARDED TO THE SENATE FOR ADVICE AND CONSENT BY EARLY NEXT YEAR, BEFORE THE 1988 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN GETS INTO FULL SWING. THE NEGOTIATING WINDOW IS THEREFORE THOUGHT TO BE CALENDAR YEAR 1987 ALTHOUGH SOME OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY HAVE MORE TIME GIVEN THAT THE DEMOCRATICALLY CONTROLLED SENATE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY WELCOME ANY AGREEMENT(S) THAT THE PRESIDENT DECIDES HE CAN ACCEPT.

*Record*  
*1/11*

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/ IMF

INF

4. FOLLOWING GORBACHEV'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON 28 FEBRUARY OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DELINK INF FROM THE OTHER GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, MOST ATTENTION IS CURRENTLY FOCUSSED ON PROSPECTS FOR AN INF AGREEMENT. THE INF WORKING GROUP IN GENEVA, WHICH HAS REMAINED IN SESSION FOLLOWING THE END OF THE MAIN GENEVA NEGOTIATING ROUND ON 4 MARCH, WILL BREAK ON 26 MARCH AND PROBABLY RESUME WITH THE START AND DEFENCE AND SPACE WORKING GROUPS ON 23 APRIL. THE ADMINISTRATION THEN HOPE TO NEGOTIATE MORE OR LESS CONTINUOUSLY UNTIL A TREATY HAS BEEN AGREED. THE SOVIET REACTION IN GENEVA TO THE NEW US DRAFT TREATY TABLED ON 3 MARCH (WITH VERIFICATION PROVISIONS TABLED ON 12 MARCH) HAS BEEN CAUTIOUS BUT BY NO MEANS DISMISSIVE, AND THE RUSSIANS ARE THEMSELVES NOW TABLING DRAFT TREATY ELEMENTS THOUGH NOT SO FAR A COMPLETE TEXT. THE MAIN OUTSTANDING ISSUES ARE CONSIDERED TO BE CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF AND VERIFICATION.

5. ON SRINF, THE ADMINISTRATION WISH TO HOLD TO THE EXISTING NATO POSITION IE THAT THERE MUST BE EQUAL CEILINGS ON SRINF MISSILES AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF AN INITIAL INF AGREEMENT. THEY ARE ALSO READY TO INSIST, IF NECESSARY, ON EARLY FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS ON SRINF REDUCTIONS. THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT OF 28 FEBRUARY CONTAINED A STEP BACKWARDS ON SRINF: THE RUSSIANS SEEM NOW ONLY TO BE OFFERING TO WITHDRAW SRINF DEPLOYED FORWARD IN EASTERN EUROPE AND TO ENGAGE IN IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-ON SRINF NEGOTIATIONS. SOVIET ACCEPTANCE AT REYKJAVIK OF SRINF CEILINGS AS PART OF AN INITIAL INF AGREEMENT MAY THEREFORE NOT CURRENTLY BE ON THE TABLE.

ON US HANDLING OF THE SRINF ISSUE, THE ADMINISTRATION SEE THE CHOICE AS BEING BETWEEN RETAINING THE US RIGHT TO MATCH SOME SOVIET LEVEL OF SS12/22 AND SS23 (AND THEREFORE PRESERVING THE RIGHT TO CONVERT PERSHING IIS TO PERSHING IBS - A POSITION NOW UNDER STRONG SOVIET ATTACK): AND MOVING TO ZERO SRINF ON BOTH SIDES AND THEREFORE FORFEITING THE PII CONVERSION RIGHT. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE ANXIOUS TO HEAR FROM THE EUROPEAN ALLIES WHICH APPROACH THEY PREFER AND HOPE TO OBTAIN AT LEAST SOME INITIAL VIEWS AT THE SCG MEETING ON 27 MARCH. MANY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SEEM INCLINED TO THE VIEW THAT ZERO SRINF IN EUROPE (COUPLED WITH AN ACCEPTABLE GLOBAL CONSTRAINT ON SOVIET SRINF) MAY BE THE BEST OUTCOME IF THE RUSSIANS SHOW THEMSELVES READY TO GO DOWN THIS ROAD (HINTS BY KARPOV IN GENEVA ON 3 MARCH THAT THEY WERE HAVE NOT (NOT) SINCE BEEN REPEATED BY SOVIET NEGOTIATORS). WHETHER A MINIMUM RANGE WOULD HAVE TO BE IDENTIFIED IN THIS CONTEXT, AND IF SO WHAT IT SHOULD BE, IS SOMETHING ON WHICH OFFICIALS HAVE NO FIRM VIEWS. BUT ALL SEEM CLEAR THAT ARRANGEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE SUCH AS TO EXCLUDE THE SCUD AND LEAVE LANCE FOLLOW-ON OPTIONS UNCONSTRAINED.

6. ON INF VERIFICATION, SOVIET NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA HAVE CONTINUED TO THREATEN PROPOSALS EVEN MORE STRINGENT AND INTRUSIVE THAN US PROPOSALS. BUT MOST ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT EFFECTIVE INF VERIFICATION PROVISIONS WILL IN FACT PROVE NEGOTIABLE AND MANY HOPE THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY SIMPLIFY MATTERS BY AGREEING TO REDUCE LRINF TO ZERO GLOBALLY (IE TO ELIMINATE

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/ALSO

ALSO THE REMAINING 100 WARHEADS ON EACH SIDE), WHICH WOULD PROBABLY REMOVE THE NEED FOR SOME OF THE MORE INTRUSIVE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS NOW PROPOSED, NOTABLY FOR PORTAL AND PERIMETER MONITORING OF MISSILE PRODUCTION FACILITIES.

#### NUCLEAR TESTING

7. THE SECOND MOST PROMISING AREA FOR EARLY PROGRESS MAY BE NUCLEAR TESTING. MANY OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT AGREEMENT WAS ALMOST REACHED AT REYKJAVIK ON A SEQUENTIAL APPROACH INVOLVING, FIRST, THE NEGOTIATION OF EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS FOR THE UNRATIFIED THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY (TTBT) AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY (PNET) AND, SECOND, NEGOTIATIONS ON STEP-BY-STEP CONSTRAINTS ON NUCLEAR TESTING (IE QUOTAS AND/OR THRESHOLDS) IN PARALLEL WITH REDUCTIONS IN STOCKPILES. SINCE REYKJAVIK, THE RUSSIANS HAVE INSISTED THAT BOTH ITEMS CAN ONLY BE ADDRESSED IN PARALLEL WITH NEGOTIATIONS ON A CTB. AT THE MOST RECENT ROUND OF US/SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA (ON 16-20 MARCH), THERE WERE SOME SLIGHT SIGNS OF POSSIBLE SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A MORE SEQUENTIAL APPROACH AND SHULTZ WILL BE TRYING TO BUILD ON THIS DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW ON 13-15 APRIL. HE WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST ON A SEQUENTIAL APPROACH IN PRACTICE BUT MAY BE PREPARED TO DESCRIBE THE FIRST TWO STEPS AS PART OF AN OVERALL NEGOTIATING PROCESS WITH A CESSATION OF TESTS AS THE LONG-TERM AIM. IF THE CIRCLE CAN IN FACT BE SQUARED IN THIS WAY,

THE PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION PROVISIONS FOR THE UNRATIFIED TREATIES (AND PERHAPS ON SOME FURTHER STEP-BY-STEP CONSTRAINTS) DURING THE PRESIDENT'S TERM MAY BE QUITE GOOD.

#### CW AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

8. THE GENERAL POINT THAT PROGRESS IN NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL INCREASES THE NEED FOR CORRECTING INBALANCES IN CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL ARMS CONTROL IS ACCEPTED HERE.

BUT THE PENTAGON REMAIN FIRMLY

OPPOSED TO A CW BAN ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT CANNOT BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIED. SINCE THE LOGIC OF THIS POSITION WOULD REQUIRE US WITHDRAWAL FROM EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A CW CONVENTION, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE PENTAGON POSITION WILL PREVAIL. BUT THE ADMINISTRATION WILL WISH TO TAKE THE CW NEGOTIATIONS AT A STEADY PACE IN GENEVA AND AVOID CREATING EXPECTATIONS THAT A CONVENTION CAN BE CONCLUDED IN 1987, OR GIVING UNDUE PROMINENCE TO THE DIFFICULT ISSUE OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION. ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL, NO FULLY WORKED UP IDEAS HAVE YET EMERGED FOR WESTERN PROPOSALS TO BE MADE IN THE NEW NEGOTIATING FORUM. BUT THE ADMINISTRATION'S WATCHWORDS ARE STABILITY AND BALANCE, AND A GOOD DEAL OF EFFORT IS NOW BEING PUT INTO TRYING TO IDENTIFY ROBUST AND VERIFIABLE WESTERN PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD CUT INTO SOVIET COMBAT CAPABILITY ON THE CENTRAL FRONT.

START/SDI

9. A START/DEFENCE AND-SPACE AGREEMENT IS OF COURSE REGARDED AS THE BIG ONE HERE. THE MORE VISIONARY ASPECTS OF REYKJAVIK, NOTABLY THE US PROPOSAL FOR THE ELIMINATION OF OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES, HAVE NOW EFFECTIVELY BEEN SET ASIDE BY ALL PARTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION (ALTHOUGH THE PROPOSAL STILL LIES ON THE TABLE IN GENEVA) AND IT IS ACCEPTED THAT THE PROPER OBJECTIVE IS NOW AGREEMENT ON 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. SINCE THE RUSSIANS CONTINUED TO LINK ANY SUCH AGREEMENT TIGHTLY TO AN AGREEMENT ON THEIR TERMS ON STRATEGIC DEFENCES, NO MAJOR PROGRESS WAS MADE IN START DURING THE MOST RECENT GENEVA ROUND.

SOME ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS

BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED RELATIVELY EASILY IF THE RUSSIANS WOULD (A) ACCEPT SUB-LIMITS CONSTRAINING THEIR FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY AND ESPECIALLY THEIR HEAVY ICBM FORCE: AND (B) ACCEPT THAT SDI CANNOT BE STOPPED (THE SLCM PROBLEM ALSO REMAINS A FORMIDABLE ONE). SINCE THE RUSSIANS HAVE IN THE PAST COME CLOSE TO ACCEPTING THE NECESSARY SUB LIMITS IN START (MY TELNO 51 ), ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY DO SO IF SATISFIED ON SDI. THE KEY QUESTION THEREFORE REMAINS THE SAME AS IT ALWAYS HAS BEEN: ARE THERE CONSTRAINTS ON SDI WHICH BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND THE RUSSIANS ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT?

10. SENATOR NUNN'S INTERVENTION ON THE ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION ISSUE (MY TELNOS 548 AND 589) IS UNLIKELY TO CAUSE THE ADMINISTRATION TO ABANDON ITS POSITION THAT THE BROAD INTERPRETATION IS LEGALLY FULLY JUSTIFIED. BUT NUNN'S INTERVENTION SEEEMS LIKELY SIGNIFICANTLY TO HAVE DIMINISHED ANY PROSPECT THAT CONGRESS

WILL BE WILLING IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO FUND SDI DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING ACTIVITIES PERMITTED ONLY UNDER THE BROAD (NOT THE NARROW) INTERPRETATION. THE NARROW INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY MAY THEREFORE NOW BE FALLING INTO PLACE AS A DE FACTO CONSTRAINT ON SDI, PERHAPS FOR THE REST OF PRESIDENT'S TERM, OR UNTIL ANY NEW ARRANGEMENTS ARE AGREED WITH THE RUSSIANS.

11. A NEW DEVELOPMENT IS THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE NOW ARGUING FOR A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV PROPOSING AN AGREEMENT ON 50 PER CENT START REDUCTIONS (THERE WOULD BE NO MENTION OF RUTHER CUTS IN OFFENSIVE FORCES) COUPLED WITH A COMMITMENT NOT TO DEPLOY SDI FOR 10 YEARS. THE LETTER WOULD ALSO PROPOSE THAT THE ISSUES OF PERMITTED SDI-TYPE ACTIVITY AND ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION BE ADDRESSED AT THE ABM TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE, WHICH MUST BE HELD IN THE PERIOD OCTOBER 1987 - OCTOBER 1988. SUCH AN OFFER WOULD THEREFORE INCORPORATE US WILLINGNESS TO TRY TO AGREE WITH THE RUSSIANS CLEAR CONSTRAINTS ON SDI-TYPE ACTIVITY UNDER THE ABM TREATY, BUT SUGGEST THAT THE

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MATTER BE HANDLED SEPARATELY FROM (AND PROBABLY LATER THAN) NEGOTIATION OF A 50 PER CENT START REDUCTIONS/10 YEAR SDI NON-DEPLOYMENT AGREEMENT. THE PENTAGON ARE DOUBTFUL ABOUT THIS PROPOSITION ON THE FAMILIAR GROUNDS THAT NO ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO AGREE SDI CONSTRAINTS WITH THE RUSSIANS, EITHER IN GENEVA OR AT THE ABM TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE. AND DECOUPLING NEGOTIATIONS ON SDI CONSTRAINTS (OTHER THAN ON DEPLOYMENT) MAY PROVE UNSATISFACTORY TO THE RUSSIANS EVEN GIVEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE NARROW INTERPRETATION OF THE ABMT MAY NOW STANDS AS A DE FACTO CONSTRAINT. BUT THE FACT THAT SUCH AN APPROACH IS BEING SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED HERE MAY REFLECT A NEW ADMINISTRATION READINESS TO ACCEPT THAT SOME CONSTRAINTS ON SDI, AND THE PREDICTABILITY THAT WOULD FLOW FROM THEM, WILL NEED TO BE CONCEDED IN THE CONTEXT OF ACHIEVING A START AGREEMENT.

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS  
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(COPIES TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.)

SOVIET D.  
DEFENCE D.  
RESEARCH DEPT.  
PLANNING STAFF  
EED  
NAD  
SAD  
WED  
ACDD  
CRD  
NEWS DEPT.  
INFO DEPT.  
ECD(E)  
POD  
FED  
NED  
PUSD  
CSCE UNIT  
PROTOCOL DEPT.  
ESSD

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/MR EGGAR  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
CHIEF CLERK  
MR BOYD  
MR MUNRO  
MR GILLMORE  
MR RATFORD  
MR FALL  
MR FEARN  
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