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GERMANY: PM's  
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Part 6

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PRIME MINISTER

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MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND AND  
CHANCELLOR KOHL, MONDAY 23 MARCH 1987

You are to meet President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl in the course of Monday. Your programme is attached.

There is considerable interest in your meetings. Kohl has welcomed them as introducing a new dimension to consultation of Europe. We envisage that you will see the press briefly at the end of each meeting in company with Mitterrand and Kohl respectively. I think that you should make clear that you are also consulting President Reagan, so that there is no impression that the Americans are somehow being left out.

The visits are to a large degree demonstrative. The fact of making them before you go to Moscow is as important as what you say. But they will undoubtedly allow you to speak with an even greater authority in Moscow and will increase Gorbachev's interest in what you have to say.

Some detailed briefs are in the attached folder. I have included the Steering Brief and the Arms Control Brief for your Moscow visit.

Allowing for interpretation you will have only just over an hour with Mitterrand and Kohl. Inevitably most of the discussion will be taken up with your Moscow visit. You will want to make clear that you are not going to Moscow with great expectations. Your main purpose is to convince Gorbachev of the continued firmness of purpose and unity of the NATO Alliance. We do not take Soviet declarations at face value. And shall not weaken our defences simply because of a few interesting speeches. You will want to drive home that



Gorbachev is not going to be able to divide Europe from the United States. At the same time you will want to make your own first-hand assessment of Gorbachev's intentions and prospects of succeeding in his plans for reform. You will want to show that arms control is not the only issue in East/West relations, important though it is. You intend to cover the whole gamut of issues: regional problems, human rights, bilateral issues as well as having a broader and more philosophical discussion of the future relations between our competing systems.

On arms control, you will be making clear to Gorbachev your view that the defence of the West will continue to rely for as far ahead as you can see on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. You will base yourself on the three priorities established at Camp David and explore with Gorbachev how progress can be made on each of them. On INF you will place particular stress on strict verification and on the need to constrain the Soviet advantage in shorter-range systems (this point is shared by Mitterrand and Kohl). At the same time you will want to point out to both Mitterrand and Kohl the dangers of being drawn down a path towards a de-nuclearised Europe. The West must act quickly to formulate a position for follow-on negotiations on shorter-range systems and decide what substitute the Alliance needs for the deterrent and striking power of the Cruise and Pershing. We shall need to have a common position on this by the time of the NATO Defence Ministers' meeting in May.

On the complex of space issues, you will want to explain to Mitterrand and Kohl your ideas for a commitment by both sides not to deploy a strategic defence system for a fixed number of years, and then only after negotiations; and to set out publicly their timetable for research and testing to give the re-assurance of predictability. This should give both sides sufficient confidence in the intentions of the other about strategic defence to allow them to negotiate reductions in strategic weapons. You will want to explain your



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scepticism about the likelihood of progress in negotiations to reduce conventional weapons. But you will also want to make the point that there must be a clear linkage established between follow-on negotiations on shorter-range nuclear missiles and conventional force reductions.

Both Mitterrand and Kohl may raise the proposal by M. Delors to convene a special European Council to discuss these issues of East/West relations. We think this is unnecessary. There is a European Council any way in June. What is needed is for Foreign Ministers to prepare thoroughly for discussion there.

The other subject which you ought to try to raise with both Mitterrand and Kohl is the review of Community finances. You will want to stress to them the importance of Britain, France and Germany working closely together to deal with Delors' impractical ideas. You will want to make clear in particular that we shall not be ready to reach agreements at the June European Council. We see discussion there as an opportunity to inject greater realism into the discussions.

There are one or two issues which may come up bilaterally. With Mitterrand you might refer to his speech at Chatham House in which he talked particularly of the prospects for defence co-operation between Britain and France. You could refer to the recent meeting between Mr. Younger and the French Defence Minister at which practical co-operation in a number of areas, including nuclear matters, was agreed. You may also wish to mention briefly the subject of hostages in Lebanon. As you know, there is a threat to execute one of the French hostages.

With Kohl it would be very helpful if you could raise the issue of David Williamson's candidature for the post of Secretary General of the Commission. We are now very close to the point of decision and the Germans are still running their own candidate (Mr. Krenzler). Your line might be that we

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would certainly support a good German candidate to succeed Delors as President of the Commission. You would also support Mr. Krenzler for the post of Director General of External Relations (which we at present hold) in return for their agreement to support David Williamson for the Secretary General post. If Kohl asks you to raise in Moscow the case of Rudolph Hess, I suggest that you say that you already have a considerable number of important and sensitive questions on the Agenda and would only want to mention this if there was any evidence beforehand of a change in the Soviet position.

CHARLES POWELL

20 March 1987

COB ADW