

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification SECRET	Caveat DEDIP BURNING BUSH	Precedence PRIORITY
--	---------------------------------	-------------------------------------	-------------------------------

ZCZC
TC
CAVEAT
FM
TO
TELNO
OF
AND TO

1	ZCZC
2	SECRET
3	DEDIP BURNING BUSH
4	FM FCO
5	TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
6	TELNO
7	OF 101030Z DECEMBER 86
8	AND TO INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN

9
10
11 **QUADRIPARTITE MINISTERIAL: CHEVENING: 9 DECEMBER: CSCE**
12 Following is a record of discussion of CSCE. MIFTS contain
13 records of the discussions on USSR/Eastern Europe, Terrorism
14 and South Pacific problems.
15 **SUMMARY:**
16 1. Shultz and Genscher deny they have adopted a softer
17 stance on Soviet human rights violations in Vienna than
18 the UK. Genscher admits a difference of emphasis. French
19 proposal for a staged approach to Shevardnadze's proposal
20 for a human rights conference in Moscow, involving coordinated
21 bilateral talks with Eastern European countries and two
22 or more preparatory conferences. Shultz, Genscher and
23 Secretary of State agree to discuss further among the Four.
24 2. The Secretary of State said we had the impression that
25 the UK and Canada had been tougher on the Soviet Union
26 on human rights matters in Vienna than other Western countries:
27 he hoped that the cohesion of the Western line could be
28 improved. Shultz said that the US had been as strong as
29 it could think how to be: if we could point to any deficiencies

///
//
/

~~In their performance he would try to put them right. If Gorbachev did set out in his projected series of world travels, the United States~~

YYYY
MAIN
ADDITIONAL
NNNN

		Catchword: in	
File number	Dept PRIVATE OFFICE	Drafted by (Block capitals) A C GALSWORTHY	Telephone no
Authorised for despatch by:	Initials <i>CP Budd</i>	Date/time <i>1165 15712</i>	
For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number	Processed by

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification SECRET	Caveat DEDIP BURNING BUSH	Precedence PRIORITY
--	---------------------------------	-------------------------------------	-------------------------------

<<<<

1	<<<<
2	in their performance he would try to put them right. If
3	Gorbachev did set out on his projected series of world
4	travels, the United States would do everything it could
5	to see that the human rights problem followed him around.
6	Raimond said that the French State Secretary in charge
7	of human rights questions would go to Vienna before the
8	end of the session, and would speak toughly.
9	3. Genscher said that there might be a different focus
10	in the German position. Emigration was the most important
11	issue for them, because of the numbers of Germans in Russia
12	and Poland. Quite high numbers were being allowed to leave,
13	especially by the GDR. But the Germans had put pressure
14	on the subject of Jewish emigration. It was also an important
15	principle for them that no one who sought to monitor the
16	implementation of the Helsinki Final Act should be persecuted.
17	4. The Secretary of State said that there had been discussion
18	in several fora, including by the Twelve, on reaction to
19	the Shevardnadze proposal for a human rights conference
20	in Moscow. The Twelve and Sixteen must keep in step on
21	this. The general feeling was that we should not say yes
22	or no, but perhaps, if the conditions were right. But
23	this posed a problem of when and how we would decide whether
24	the conditions were fulfilled or not: there could be
25	opportunities for the Soviet Union to seek to divide us
26	by a partial response.
27	5. Raimond said that he did not think we should give a
28	positive response to the Russians, at least at this stage.
29	The Russians were quite capable of giving a sophisticated
30	response on conditions but then seeing that a conference
31	resulted only in rhetoric and declarations and nothing
32	practical. The French had therefore proposed that the
33	West should put the emphasis on the whole human discussion
34	(Principle Seven of Basket I as well as Basket III) so

///

//

/

For distribution order see Page

Catchword: as

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification SECRET	Caveat DEDIP BURNING BUSH	Precedence PRIORITY
--	---------------------------------	-------------------------------------	-------------------------------


<<<<

1	<<<<
2	as to cover freedom of movement and the right to leave
3	the country, as well as family reunification, mixed marriages,
4	passports etc, along the lines of the matters which had
5	been discussed at Berne. On this basis each state should
6	have separate bilateral contacts with the Soviet Union
7	and individual Eastern European countries in an attempt
8	to get results on specific human rights problems. The
9	results of these contacts should be notified to the Thirty
10	Five, so as to achieve transparency. Perhaps at the beginning
11	of 1988 there should be a preparatory meeting of the Thirty
12	Five to take stock of the bilateral contacts: this could
13	be preparatory for a possible eventual conference, which
14	could perhaps take place in Moscow. There could if necessary
15	be an additional preparatory meeting at the end of 1988.
16	There would thus be a staged process towards such a conference
17	with a guarantee of concrete results along the way. But
18	we should avoid making concessions at the beginning. Such
19	an approach might have a prospect of success: there had
20	been some movement in resolving bilateral cases recently.
21	6. Shultz said that he could see some attractions in the
22	French proposal. Given present Russian performance, he
23	could not see how the US could agree to a conference in
24	Moscow. But we should not simply say no: we should say
25	that the location for the conference should be in a country
26	where one could see some compatibility between human rights
27	behaviour and the Helsinki obligations.
28	7. Genscher said that Germany did not wish to participate
29	in a conference which only repeated commitments which had
30	been made before and not fulfilled. This would apply wherever
31	the conference was held. A conference would have to make
32	progress in defining commitments. Treatment of human rights
33	in the UN was a warning: the Soviet Union had been able
34	to divert discussion into such areas as the right to full

///

//

/



For distribution order see Page	Catchword: employment
---------------------------------	------------------------------

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification SECRET	Caveat DEDIP BURNING BUSH	Precedence PRIORITY
<p><<<<</p> <p>1 <<<<</p> <p>2 employment etc. The Germans had some problems with the</p> <p>3 idea of bilateral discussions: after Berne, the GDR had</p> <p>4 urged them to agree to the points which were nearly accepted</p> <p>5 at Berne on a bilateral basis. They had declined to do</p> <p>6 this, but had had difficulty with their public opinion,</p> <p>7 who could see advantages in such a bilateral arrangement.</p> <p>8 He was not against the French proposal, but there would</p> <p>9 need to be a very clear common basis for bilateral talks.</p> <p>10 He thought the French proposal should be studied by Political</p> <p>11 Directors of the Four.</p> <p>12 8. Shultz said that our object was not to have a conference,</p> <p>13 but to secure an improvement in behaviour. He agreed a</p> <p>14 re-statement of commitments already accepted and unfulfilled</p> <p>15 would be useless.</p> <p>16 9. The Secretary of State said that there were now several</p> <p>17 proposals on the table for the Western response to the</p> <p>18 Shevardnadze proposal. Vienna was probably the right place</p> <p>19 to discuss a response, but a steer was needed which could</p> <p>20 very well come from the Quadripartite group. We had to</p> <p>21 be clear that we included both Basket III and Basket I.</p> <p>22 We also needed to look for compliance with commitments,</p> <p>23 not mere assertion of them. There could well be much to</p> <p>24 be said for the French proposal, which he thought was more</p> <p>25 credible than either the Danish or Dutch proposals. But</p> <p>26 he did not think we should let go of the Moscow Conference</p> <p>27 proposal altogether, because we could use it as a lever</p> <p>28 on the Russians by demonstrating what sort of conditions</p> <p>29 would need to be fulfilled. This was not incompatible</p> <p>30 with the French proposal.</p> <p>/// 31 10. Raimond said that he agreed with Genscher that mere</p> <p>// 32 re-statement of principles was not enough. The Soviet</p> <p>/ 33 Union had to pay first. He was not thinking of a series</p> <p>34 of disparate bilateral approaches: they would be coordinated</p>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100%; height: 100%; background: repeating-linear-gradient(45deg, transparent, transparent 2px, black 2px, black 4px);"></div>		
For distribution order see Page		Catchword: following	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification SECRET	Caveat DEDIP BURNING BUSH	Precedence PRIORITY
<p><<<<</p> <p>1 <<<<</p> <p>2 following an initiative in the Thirty Five, which would</p> <p>3 be in effect the Court of Appeal. The French proposal</p> <p>4 took into account the Dutch and Danish proposals. We should</p> <p>5 not agree to a Moscow venue, but should keep the question</p> <p>6 open. We should look at the proposition in the Quadripartite</p> <p>7 framework, and then take it to the Sixteen.</p> <p>8 11. Shultz said that he generally agreed with Raimond.</p> <p>9 While expressing doubts about the Moscow venue we should</p> <p>10 not rule it out, but could look at the guided bilateral</p> <p>11 approach stratagem. Above all we needed to avoid trading</p> <p>12 agreement to Moscow at too early a stage. Political Directors</p> <p>13 should do further work on this proposition.</p> <p>14</p> <p>15 HOWE</p> <p>16</p> <p>17 YYYY</p> <p>18 MAIN</p> <p>19 LIMITED</p> <p>20 ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION</p> <p>21 PLANNING STAFF</p> <p>22 CSCE UNIT</p> <p>23 SOVIET D</p> <p>24 EED</p> <p>25 UND</p> <p>26 MR RATFORD</p> <p>27 MR THOMAS</p> <p>28 PS/PUS</p> <p>29 PS/MR RENTON</p> <p>30 PS</p> <p>31 ///</p> <p>32 //</p> <p>33 /</p> <p>34</p>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 100px; width: 100%; background: repeating-linear-gradient(45deg, transparent, transparent 2px, black 2px, black 4px);"></div>		
For distribution order see Page		Catchword:	

XY 48A (REV)