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OCMIAN 6260
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OO BONNN
FM FCOLN TO BONNN
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FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE BONN
TELNO 566
OF 121500Z NOV 86
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, MODUK
INFO ROUTINE BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE, UKDEL CSCE VIENNA
INFO ROUTINE UKDEL MBFR
INFO SAVING MOSCOW, TOKYO, UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK

MODUK FOR PS/SOFS, DUS(P), DNPS, DACU

YOUR TELNO 938 (NOT TO ALL): EUROPEAN CONSULTATIONS POST
REYKJAVIK

SUMMARY

1. NO FORMAL RESULTS FROM THIS GERMAN INITIATIVE, BUT A USEFUL OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS POST-REYKJAVIK WITH THE MAIN EUROPEANS BEFORE THE WEU MINISTERIAL MEETING. MUCH COMMON GROUND, PARTICULARLY ON THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE, AND THE ROLE OF BALLISTIC MISSILES. FRENCH ATTEMPT TO BLOCK LRINF AGREEMENT ON TERMS NOW AGREED BETWEEN OTHER ALLIES.
2. LITTLE EVIDENCE OF FRENCH/GERMAN PRE-COOKING ON THIS OCCASION, EXCEPT ON APPROACH TO WEU MINISTERIAL (SEE MIFT). UK POSITION ON LATTER RESERVED.

DETAIL

3. FOLLOWING THE KOHL INITIATIVE AT THE FRANCO-GERMAN SUMMIT,

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VON PLOETZ (AUS, FOREIGN MINISTRY) CHAIRED A DAY'S CONSULTATIONS IN BONN YESTERDAY OF THE MAJOR EUROPEAN ALLIES. UK WERE REPRESENTED BY FALL, WITH MOD SUPPORT, AND FRENCH AND ITALIANS BY D'ABOVILLE AND NEGROTTA RESPECTIVELY. ALTHOUGH ADVERTISED AS AN EXCHANGE ON THE STRATEGIC, NOT ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS OF REYKJAVIK, THE DISCUSSIONS FOCUSSED ON THE LATTER.

4. VON PLOETZ (WITH WHOM FALL HAD MET BEFOREHAND) HELPFULLY INTRODUCED THE MEETING BY DESCRIBING IT AS A STRICTLY AD HOC AND OFF-THE-RECORD BRAIN-STORMING SESSION BEFORE THE WEU MINISTERIAL MEETING. ALL OTHERS AGREED THIS STATUS. THE FRENCH ARGUED THAT THE MEETING SHOULD REVIEW THE OPTIONS OPEN TO EUROPE NOW, WITH A VIEW TO ADVANCING THESE AT THE WEU AND NATO MEETINGS. WE SHOULD ALSO ESTABLISH THE LESSONS TO BE LEARNT FOR THE FUTURE. AN AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF REYKJAVIK WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY DAMAGING FOR EUROPE. IT POINTED TO A US READINESS TO ELIMINATE ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WOULD HAVE PLACED NEW BURDENS ON THIRD COUNTRY FORCES WHO HAD TO CONTINUE TO RELY ON BALLISTIC MISSILES.
INF

5. VON PLOETZ, QUOTING GENSCHER'S SPEECH IN VIENNA ON 7 NOVEMBER AS THE CURRENT GERMAN POSITION, STATED THAT WE COULD NOT GO BACK ON THE TERMS PROVISIONALLY AGREED IN REYKJAVIK BUT NOW NEEDED TO EXPLORE THE NEXT STEPS. D'ABOVILLE EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE GENSCHER STANCE. BUT WE REPEATEDLY ARGUED THAT THE ZERO OPTION SHOULD NOW BE REJECTED BY THE EUROPEANS BECAUSE SINCE STRATEGIC CIRCUMSTANCES HAD SO RADICALLY CHANGED SINCE THE ORIGINAL DOUBLE TRACK DECISION. IN ADDITION TO INSISTING ON A US RIGHT TO MATCH SOVIET FORCE LEVELS, AND ON A NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE AFFECTING SRINF, WE SHOULD ARGUE FOR A DISTINCTION TO BE DRAWN BETWEEN CONCLUDING THE NEGOTIATIONS AND IMPLEMENTING ANY AGREEMENT REACHED. IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD BE FIRMLY LINKED TO AGREEMENTS IN THE OTHER AREAS, AND IN PARTICULAR THE CONVENTIONAL. THE US SHOULD BE TOLD THAT ANY ZERO AGREEMENT FOR EUROPE WOULD HAVE TO DEPEND ON A GUARANTEE THAT ALL RELEVANT SYSTEMS WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AND THAT ALL EUROPEAN SECURITY INTERESTS, INCLUDING THE CHEMICAL THREAT, HAD BEEN PROTECTED.

6. AFTER SUPPORTING THE FRENCH POSITION ON BALLISTIC MISSILES

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AND THIRD COUNTRY FORCES, FALL NOTED ON INF THAT THE GERMANS WERE RIGHT TO PLACE THE EMPHASIS ON THE POLITICAL FACTORS. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO ARGUE THAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAD CHANGED SUFFICIENTLY TO JUSTIFY A MAJOR SHIFT IN ALLIANCE NEGOTIATING STRATEGY. WE COULD NOT BE SEEN TO BE MOVING THE GOAL-POSTS. IF THE RUSSIANS WERE TO REOPEN THE INF NUMBERS THEN THE WEST COULD EXPLOIT THIS TO ENSURE A MINIMUM LEVEL OF US FORCES IN EUROPE. HE AGREED WITH THE ITALIAN AND GERMAN VIEW THAT WE NEED NOT AIM TO MATCH THE RUSSIANS MISSILE FOR MISSILE ACROSS THE ENTIRE INF SPECTRUM, NOR TRY TO LINK IMPLEMENTATION OF SEPARATE AGREEMENTS TO THE CONCLUSION OF ALL. NEGROTTO ARGUED FOR AN UNCHANGED APPROACH BY THE EUROPEANS TO THE ZERO OPTION, BUT APPEARED TO WANT TO ADD CONSTRAINTS ON THE LOWER RANGE OF SRINF (PRESUMABLY THE SCUD B AND SS21), ON THE GROUNDS THAT IF WE DID NOT DO SO NOW, WE WOULD HAVE NO NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE OVER THEM LATER.

BALLISTIC MISSILES/START

7. D'ABOVILLE STARTED BY ARGUING THAT EVEN 50 PER CENT CUTS WOULD UNACCEPTABLY WEAKEN THE WEST, BUT LATER FELL OFF THIS POSITION. THERE WAS GENERAL ACCEPTANCE IN THE END THAT THE 50 PER CENT TARGET SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE PURSUED, BUT THAT THE TEN-YEAR PERIOD FOR THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES MUST BE MASSAGED AWAY. IN PARTICULAR, THE EUROPEANS SHOULD WORK TO ADD CONDITIONS TO THE CURRENT US NEGOTIATING GOALS FOR START, INCLUDING SOME FORMULA LINKING REDUCTIONS BEYOND 50 PER CENT TO REDRESSING THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE. WE SHOULD EMPHASISE PHASE ONE OF THE US PROPOSALS (HALVING OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS OVER FIVE YEARS), AND WORK TO DELINK THIS FROM THE SECOND PHASE (TOTAL ELIMINATION OF MISSILES). THE PROBABLE US/SOVIET IMPASSE ON THIS LATTER GOAL MIGHT PROVE TO BE HELPFUL.

8. IT WAS GENERALLY THOUGHT USEFUL THAT THE EUROPEANS SHOULD AIM TO FEED IN THEIR VIEWS INDIVIDUALLY TO THE CURRENT JCS STUDIES ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF REYKJAVIK, DRAWING AS APPROPRIATE ON QUESTIONS THAT HAD EMERGED FROM THE DISCUSSION.

9. ALL AGREED THAT THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE WAS A CAUSE FOR GENUINE CONCERN. NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE NEEDED AT

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LEAST UNTIL THAT WAS RECTIFIED, WHICH THERE WAS NO LIKELIHOOD OF ITS BEING IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. HENCE THE IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING IN A SUITABLE QUALIFICATION TO THE US LANGUAGE ON ELIMINATING BALLISTIC MISSILES. BUT THERE WAS NO SUPPORT FOR THE FRENCH PROPOSAL THAT THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE SHOULD ALSO BE ATTACHED AS A CONDITION ON INF.

10. THE FRENCH AND GERMANS BOTH SPOKE TO (BUT DID NOT TABLE) SIX-POINT LISTS FOR FUTURE USE BY THE EUROPEANS. THIS MAY HAVE REFLECTED AN ATTEMPT AT PRE-COOKING THAT FAILED TO REACH FULL AGREEMENT. WHERE THEY OVERLAPPED, THE LISTS REFLECTED TRADITIONAL ALLIANCE POSITIONS ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, AND THE COUPLING OF US AND EUROPEAN FORCES (BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR). THE FRENCH ALSO WANTED TO UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE OF INDEPENDENT DETERRENENTS, AND TO INTRODUCE LINKAGES BETWEEN VARIOUS ASPECTS OF ARMS CONTROL AND ITS CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL BALANCE. THE GERMANS TACKLED THE PROBLEM OF LINKAGE BETWEEN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS MORE FLEXIBLY BY SUGGESTING THAT, WHILE PROGRESS IN ONE AREA SHOULD BE UNRELATED TO OTHERS, IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO ACCEPT SOME LINKAGE BETWEEN SEPARATE STEPS IN ARMS CONTROL WHICH, BY CROSSING A CERTAIN THRESHOLD, CHANGED THE QUALITATIVE POSITION IN OTHER AREAS. NEITHER VON PLOETZ NOR D'ABOVILLE PRESSED FOR A COMMON FOUR-POWER POSITION, AND THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH FALL'S SUGGESTION THAT ANY POINTS THAT EMERGED FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE AMERICANS MIGHT BEST BE PUT IN THE FORM OF QUESTIONS.

SALT LIMITS

11. FALL GAVE A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF HOW THINGS SEEMED TO STAND IN WASHINGTON. THERE WAS GENERAL RECOGNITION OF THE DANGER THAT TO SAY NOTHING TO THE AMERICANS MIGHT BE TAKEN AS A GREEN LIGHT. THE GERMANS AND ITALIANS AGREED THAT POST-REYKJAVIK THE IMPACT ON THE ALLIANCE OF A US BREACH OF THE LIMITS WOULD BE EVEN WORSE THAN BEFORE. THE GERMANS ADDED THAT KOHL HAD PRESSED REAGAN HARD ON THIS POINT DURING HIS WASHINGTON VISIT. THE FRENCH, WHILE NOT DISAGREEING, WERE BOTH MORE RELAXED ON SALT AND MORE CONCERNED TO CONCENTRATE THEIR FIRE ON OTHERS.

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PRESS LINE

12. IT WAS AGREED THAT, IF ASKED ABOUT THE MEETING, PARTICIPANTS WOULD REFER TO KOHL'S PRESS COMMENT AT THE END OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN SUMMIT, TO THE FORTHCOMING WEU AND NATO MINISTERIALS, AND DESCRIBE THE CURRENT MEETING AS PART OF A NORMAL PATTERN OF ALLIED CONSULTATIONS. IF PRESSED, THE COUNTRIES MENTIONED BY KOHL (IE UK, FRANCE, FRG) PLUS ITALY WOULD BE CONFIRMED AS PARTICIPANTS. THE AD HOC NATURE OF THE MEETING WOULD BE EMPHASISED.

13. SEE MIFT.

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