



*confidential*

112, EATON SQUARE,  
SW1W 9AA  
TEL: 01-235 1543  
01-235 7409

25th October, 1986

*Dear Geoffrey,*

I was in Cyprus last week (15th - 22nd October) for a short holiday as the guest of Ali Dana, a Turkish lawyer whom I have known since 1957. 'President' Denktash gave a dinner for me as did his former Foreign Minister, Nedjati Munir but the talk on these occasions was mainly anecdotal and convivial. On the fourth day, Sunday, Denktash took me in his car for an expedition to the so call Panhandle. He was driving himself without guards and the only other passenger in the car was my host's son-in-law, who is also Munir's son. We thus had several hours of talks together and I think it worth reporting the gist of what he said, to you. It is a bit detailed but may be useful to your office. I have also added some tentative thoughts of my own about our policy towards Cyprus. I stress 'tentative' as I have not been to the Greek side and don't pretend to be in close touch with Cypriot affairs.

Denktash was deeply upset by the death of his son in a motor smash earlier this year but seems to have made a good recovery in the last month or two. He retains a hearty appetite but has altogether cut out drink. He comes to London, I think, on 16th November and is due to speak to Chatham House, the Bow Group, and Tony Kershaw's committee. He very much looks forward to his visit but I think is worried on three counts:

1. His reception at Heathrow. He knows that we are not prepared to recognise him as President of an independent state but feels he should nevertheless be received officially. I think he has a point there. As the elected leader of the Turkish community he would, under the 1960 constitution, automatically be Vice President of Cyprus and that, after all, is the constitution we underwrote and guaranteed. I should have thought it would be reasonable to accord him such honours as we would give to a Vice President. If he is merely offered airline executive lounge treatment he may well prefer to go through the ordinary tourist arrival and no doubt make something of a fuss about this.

.../.

2.

2. His people are worried about his security in London, I think, with some reason. He seems to take very few precautions when in Cyprus but he would be a target here for Greek Cypriots and Turkish communists.

3. His people are very keen that he should be received at Ministerial level. He is certainly much more pro-Western and respectable than Oliver Tambo or the PLO people you were at one stage prepared to meet. I don't know how far we are concerned with the settlement of the Cyprus problem, I gather, however, that Margaret has seen Mr. Kyprianou. I don't see how we can contribute much to a settlement unless we hear the views of both the Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders - a view you have consistently taken over South Africa..

*Yr son,*

*Julian*

Julian Amery

The Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Howe, MP

N.B. I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to No. 10.

NOTE of a talk between Mr. Rauf Denktash and Mr. Julian Amery during a drive from Bogaz to St. Andrew's monastery at the eastern end of Karpass or Panhandle, Northern Cyprus, Sunday 19th October, 1986 11 a.m. - 5.00 p.m.

\*\*\*

Mr. Denktash began by recalling the sequence of events after the signature of the London/Zurich Agreements in the summer of 1960 and the establishment of the constitution guaranteed by Britain, Greece and Turkey which both Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk subscribed.

Denktash believes that Makarios never intended to abide by the Agreements. He regarded them as a stepping stone to Enosis. The advantage of them, as he saw it, was to break the straitjacket of colonial rule and avoid the risk that Britain might agree to the formal partition of the island. He believed that he could take advantage of the internal difficulties of Turkey to dilute the constitution in favour of the Greek Cypriot side. This he proceeded to do until the crisis of the winter of 1963 when Turkey for the first time threatened to intervene to re-establish the constitution from which Makarios had patently departed. Denktash believes that, if Britain and Turkey as guarantor powers had put their foot down then, Makarios would have retreated and the constitution could have been restored with some perhaps minor amendments.

(It was my own view at the time and expressed at a meeting which Alec Home called on Christmas Day 1963, that if we were firm with Makarios at the time he would have no choice but to return to legality. I thought then, as I had during the 1960 negotiations that, with Turkey, we were in a much stronger negotiating position than Makarios and the Greeks. We did not, however, take any action.)

Having got away with excluding the Turkish Cypriots from the main political process in 1963, Makarios went on to attempt a complete Greek Cypriot take-over of the island. Several

thousand Greek troops were brought in and Greek Cypriot guerrilla bands were organised and armed. In this period Makarios began to lose control of the more extreme EOKA elements in the Greek Cypriot community. In 1967 the situation came to a head and Turkey again threatened to intervene and showed its teeth by bombing Greek Cypriot positions. The Greek government was in no position to fight a war with Turkey and Makarios himself thought that Greek Cypriot provocation had gone too far for safety. Accordingly the majority of the Greek forces in Cyprus were withdrawn and Makarios returned to his earlier policy of pursuing a gradual take-over of the island. This was not to the liking of the EOKA element in the Greek Cypriot community nor of the military Junta which had taken power in Athens. Relations with the Junta were further strained by Makarios's connections with King Constantine and other opposition elements in mainland Greece. All this led the Junta to instigate Samson's coup in 1973; the Colonels believing that in the crunch Turkey would not invade. In fact, of course, they did; the result being the present partition of the island.

(I was inclined to believe at the time that if Britain had invaded alongside of Turkey to restore a chastened Makarios and something like the 1960 constitution we could then have withdrawn together. This indeed is what Echevit then told me he wanted. Denktash, however, is inclined to think it was by then too late; too much blood had been shed and the Turkish Cypriots no longer had any confidence in Makarios.)

I asked Denktash how he saw the present position. He said that it was not without its advantages. Both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriots had paid a high price in terms of lives and property lost. Both communities, however, were now relatively homogenous each in its own zone and for the time being, relatively secure. The Greek Cypriots, however, had managed to retain international recognition as the government of the whole of Cyprus although they were undeniably responsible both for the repudiation of the 1960 constitution and for the coup which led to the Turkish invasion of 1973. As a result the Turkish

Cypriots lacked the advantages of international recognition and had to rely almost entirely on Turkey for outside support.

I asked Denktash how he saw the future. He said there were three possibilities:

1. Double Enosis, i.e. the incorporation of South Cyprus into Greece and North Cyprus into Turkey. He thought this would be unacceptable to Turkey because it would give Greece the right to station military forces too close to the south Turkish coast.

2. A bi-zonal federation or confederation on the lines proposed by the Secretary General of the United Nations. Under this each zone would be responsible for its own administration and security. Such a solution could lead to negotiations on compensation and boundaries. Denktash thought, however, that the present Greek Cypriot leadership was unlikely to accept this because it would mean abandoning their claim to the sole government of the island. Glavkos Clerides might accept it. Like Makarios, he favoured 'playing it long'. Kyprianou's game, however, was to hold fast to his claim to be the government of the whole island. Then when circumstances favoured i.e. if Turkey was in difficulties - the Greek Cypriots could resume the offensive and simply argue that they were taking control of what had always been theirs.

3. There remained the option of dividing the island, as at present, into two separate states linked by culture and interest, one to Greece the other to Turkey but, nevertheless each retaining each its own autonomy. This was the situation today and Denktash hoped that in due course the Turkish Cypriot zone would achieve an increasing measure of recognition from the outside world. There was no reason why the two states should not agree on a variety of common services. If this situation was accepted by both sides and confidence between them revived, the idea of some kind of confederation

might again come into the realm of possibility. But he doubted whether the Greek Cypriots would agree to this either. In that case the present situation would continue indefinitely.

\*\*\*

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE BRITISH INTEREST IN CYPRUS

\*\*\*

A PERSONAL VIEW:

Britain's main interest in Cyprus is the security of our two bases and of our military installations. All of these are in the Greek Cypriot zone. There is also a secondary interest in the Greek Cypriot vote in this country and thus, indirectly, the Greek vote in the United States. While, therefore, I have no doubt that it is the Greek Cypriots who deliberately wrecked the 1960 constitution and who still hanker after Enosis, our first priority must be to protect our military interests. We have therefore to avoid any undue provocation of the Greek Cypriots. I imagine they could count on the egregious Ramphal in the Commonwealth context.

At the same time there is a serious communist movement in Greek Cyprus and the attitude of mainland Greece to the western alliance seems, at times, ambivalent. We would never have got the bases and installations in 1960 without Turkish and Turkish Cypriot support. Their ultimate may well depend on the goodwill of mainland Turkey and the strong commitment of the Turkish Cypriots to the western side. I accept that our relations with Southern Cyprus must be our first concern. But I can't help thinking that our long term interests require us to maintain a balance in our relations with the two zones. We have achieved this tolerably well so far; and I suggest that the right course would be to pursue a policy of 'creeping' recognition of the Turkish Cypriot region as and when opportunity offers.

.../.

Looking ahead it must be doubtful whether it would serve our interests to allow the Greek Cypriots to take advantage of some temporary disarray in Turkey to achieve complete Enosis with Greece. The Turks would certainly hold us responsible if we did nothing to prevent this; and our bases would probably be less secure in a Cyprus united to the Greek mainland than under the present de facto partition. If so there would seem to be advantage in working gradually to legitimise the status quo.

Mr. Denktash's forthcoming visit would seem to offer an opportunity for a slight foray in creeping recognition'.

\*\*\*

27.10.86

JA/pt