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FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW: COMMUNITY BRIEFING BY GERMAN POLITICAL DIRECTOR ON TALK WITH GORBACHEV AND FIRST SESSION WITH SHEVARDNADZE

SUMMARY

1. IN THREE-HOUR MEETING ON 21 JULY GORBACHEV MADE AN OPENING PITCH VERY CRITICAL OF GERMAN POLICY AND THEN, IN CHANGED TONE, STRESSED THE NEED FOR COOPERATION AMONG THE INHABITANTS OF THE 'EUROPEAN HOUSE'. RE-STATEMENT OF SOVIET POSITIONS IN FOUR-HOUR EXCHANGE WITH SHEVARDNADZE DEVOTED TO EAST/WEST MATTERS AND ARMS CONTROL. NO SURPRISES. AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL COOPERATION AND PROTOCOL ON OPENING OF CONSULATES IN KIEV AND MUNICH SIGNED.

MEETING WITH GORBACHEV

2. GENSCHER DELIVERED AN ORAL MESSAGE FROM CHANCELLOR KOHL RE-STATING FRG POSITIONS ON EAST/WEST AND DISARMAMENT MATTERS. GORBACHEV MADE A STATEMENT VERY CRITICAL OF THE FRG ESPECIALLY OVER PERSHING MISSILES, SDI, THE INTERPRETATION OF THE EASTERN TREATIES, GENERAL SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED STATES AND COCOM. HE THEN SWITCHED TO A MORE POSITIVE TONE AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR COOPERATION AND FOR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO LIVE TOGETHER IN THE 'EUROPEAN HOUSE'. ALTHOUGH THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE PAST COULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN IT WAS TIME TO OPEN A NEW CHAPTER.

3. ON SOVIET/US RELATIONS GORBACHEV EXPRESSED SOVIET CONCERN OVER THE INCREASED MILITANCY OF US POLICIES, ALTHOUGH HE ACKNOWLEDGED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DIFFICULTIES IN THE FACE OF PRESSURES FROM CONFLICTING FACTIONS IN WASHINGTON. THE RUSSIANS WERE AWAITING A REPLY TO THEIR PROPOSALS OF 11 JUNE. THE DELAY WOULD BE JUSTIFIED ONLY IF THE ANSWER WAS POSITIVE. GORBACHEV COMPLAINED OF THE LACK OF WIDER WESTERN INTEREST IN PROGRESS ON RELATIONS WITH THE EAST. THE WEST WOULD WAIT IN VAIN FOR SOVIET CONCESSIONS BUT IF IT SOUGHT A COMPROMISE THIS WOULD BE MET BY COOPERATION ON THE SOVIET SIDE.

4. GORBACHEV SAID HE WANTED A SUMMIT MEETING BUT NOT ONE FOR THE

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BENEFIT OF THE TELEVISION CAMERAS. SUCH A SUMMIT WOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD EITHER BY THE SOVIET POPULATION OR BY THEIR ALLIES. IT HAD TO BE CLEAR IN ADVANCE THAT THERE WOULD BE POSITIVE RESULTS. IMPROVEMENT IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS WAS URGENT. IN TWO OR THREE YEARS TIME NEW SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS WOULD HAVE MADE AGREEMENTS MORE DIFFICULT.

5. IN RESPONSE GENSCHER EXPLAINED GERMAN POLICY AND ALLIANCE AND EUROPEAN POSITIONS. HE RAISED HUMAN RIGHTS AND SPECIFICALLY URGED THE RUSSIANS TO MAKE ACTION TO EAST THE PROBLEM CAUSED BY THOSE SEEKING ASYLUM IN WEST BERLIN. THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF DETAILS ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS.

MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE

6. SHEVARDNADZE SAID, AS HE HAD DONE IN LONDON, THAT THE CSCE MEETING IN VIENNA SHOULD BE MORE DYNAMIC AND SHORTER THAN IN MADRID AND THAT THE ATMOSPHERE SHOULD BE IMPROVED. HE COMPLAINED THAT THE SOVIET IMAGE IN THE WESTERN PRESS WAS UNREASONABLY BAD. SHEVARDNADZE CALLED FOR COOPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, BOTH BILATERALLY AND WITHIN THE IAEA, AND FOR COOPERATION ON NUCLEAR FUSION.

7. SHEVARDNADZE DESCRIBED THE RECENT BRITISH CW PROPOSALS AS DESERVING ATTENTION AND SAID THEY WOULD BE CAREFULLY STUDIED. HE THOUGHT IT COULD BE POSSIBLE TO AGREE A BAN BY CHRISTMAS OR EARLY 1987. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN AT A POSSIBLE ATTEMPT FROM THE WESTERN SIDE TO EXCLUDE BINARY WEAPONS.

8. ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL GENSCHER SAID THAT PROGRESS AT MBFR AND A SUBSTANTIAL CONCLUSION TO THE CDE COULD BE THE BASIS FOR FURTHER PROGRESS. SHEVARDNADZE WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT MBFR: FRANCE WAS NOT REPRESENTED; PROBLEMS AROSE FROM THE PROPOSED EXTENSION OF THE VERIFICATION MEASURES TO THE SOVIET UNION; THE CENTRAL AREA WAS TOO SMALL. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO ACHIEVE A "SYMBOLIC" AGREEMENT IN MBFR AND TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS IN A EUROPE-WIDE FORUM. HE (ON WHICH REHEARSED THE WARSAW PACT'S BUDAPEST PROPOSALS) SHEVARDNADZE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CDE AND PROMISED SOVIET FLEXIBILITY. HE ADVOCATED THE NATO/WARSAW PACT CONTACT GROUP, ALSO PROPOSED IN THE BUDAPEST APPEAL, ON WHICH GENSCHER EXPRESSED SCEPTICISM.

9. ON A NUCLEAR TEST BAN SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT SINCE THE RUSSIANS HAD MOVED ON VERIFICATION THEY BELIEVED THEY NOW HAD INCREASING SUPPORT WORLD-WIDE. HE SAID DIRECTLY THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO APPEAL TO WORLD OPINION ON THIS SUBJECT.

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10. QUESTIONED BY COLLEAGUES VON BRAUN-MUHL DENIED THAT THE GERMANS HAD BRIEFED THE PRESS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE MEETING WITH GORBACHEV HAD BEEN AS SHARP AS REPORTED, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE BBC WORLD SERVICE. BUT IT WAS TRUE THAT GORBACHEV'S OPENING STATEMENT HAD DWELT ON POINTS OF DISSENT IN A VERY FRANK WAY.

11. ASKED WHETHER THE RUSSIANS HAD RAISED 'REVANGHISM' VON BRAUN-MUHL SAID THAT, WITHOUT USING THAT WORD, THE RUSSIANS HAD COMPLAINED ABOUT PEOPLE IN WEST GERMANY WHO SOUGHT TO INTERPRET THE EASTERN TREATIES IN THEIR OWN WAY; AND ABOUT SOME MEETINGS HELD BY THEM WITH OFFICIAL PARTICIPATION.

12. VON BRAUN-MUHL SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT BY GORBACHEV TO BONN.

BILATERAL AGREEMENTS

13. GORBACHEV AND GENSCHER SIGNED A FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION AND INITIALLED THREE SPECIFIC PROGRAMMES ON AGRICULTURE, HEALTH AND PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN IN PROGRESS SINCE 1973 PENDING A FORMULA RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF APPLICATION TO BERLIN, WHICH HAD NOW BEEN AGREED. THEY ALSO SIGNED A PROTOCOL FOR THE OPENING OF CONSULATES IN KIEV AND IN MUNICH.

MARSHALL

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

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