

Subject  
cc Master

we  
CONFIDENTIAL

SRWABM



cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 April 1986

Dear Colin,

**PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU**

The Prime Minister saw President Kyprianou this afternoon for a discussion of the Cyprus problem. The President was accompanied by Mr. Iacovu and by the Cyprus High Commissioner. The Foreign Secretary was also present.

President Kyprianou led off with a long discourse on the inequities of the United Nations' revised documentation on Cyprus. The documentation had come as a considerable surprise to the Cyprus Government on important points of substance. There was also a question of fair play. Many things had been included which the Cyprus Government had been assured would not be dealt with. Equally many of their points had not been taken into consideration at all. Changes which had been made since the second set of documentation last April would render the constitutional structure unworkable. The provision requiring at least one Turkish Cypriot Minister to vote in favour of every proposal would make it impossible in practice for the Government ever to take decisions. Moreover, the proposals no longer provided for a federation but for a confederation. This had been the considered view of a legal expert retained by the Cyprus Government.

Mr. Iacovu took up the refrain. There were about 20 differences, large and small, between the revised documentation and that of last April. Many of them had come as a complete surprise to the Cyprus Government. Indeed the documentation was unrecognisable from earlier versions to the point that Mr. Mavromatis had felt compelled to offer his resignation. Constitutional experts agreed that the constitutional provisions were unworkable. The Cyprus Government did not understand the argument used by the Secretary-General that agreement to the documentation would buy a ticket to negotiate on the three freedoms, on guarantees, and on troop withdrawals. The Greek Cypriots did not have to concede anything to have the right to negotiate on these points. Moreover, the Secretary-General had varied the nature of the package deal. Instead of two sets of negotiations which could proceed in parallel, it was now clear that there were two completely independent packages. One had to be settled definitively before negotiations on the other could even start. The Cyprus

CONFIDENTIAL

sfw

Government had not taken a final view on the documentation and was consulting political opinions in Cyprus. But he could see no reason why the Cyprus Government should be expected to commit itself to the documentation without any guarantee about what would happen on the other major issues.

President Kyprianou took over again. He had pleaded with the Secretary-General for further consultation on matters which had been raised in lower level talks. Perez de Cuellar had promised that nothing objectionable to the Cyprus Government would be included in the documentation. Instead matters had appeared in the documentation which had not even been raised in the lower level talks. He objected with particular force to the reference to the Turkish-Cypriot share of territory being 29 per cent plus. The right way forward lay in continued negotiations on outstanding difficulties. Instead the Cyprus Government was being confronted with a fait accompli. The upshot of the documentation would be that everything in the north of Cyprus would be under Turkish-Cypriot control and everything in the south would be subject to Turkish-Cypriot veto.

The Prime Minister said that the Cyprus Government were not being asked to agree to a settlement. All that was being sought from them was provisional consent to the United Nations' documentation, subject to subsequent agreement on the vital issues of guarantees, troop withdrawals and the three freedoms. It was quite clear that a final settlement was dependent upon a satisfactory solution of these problems. The Foreign Secretary added that the basic framework of the documentation remained the same as in the earlier sets of January and April 1984. He recognised that some of the constitutional provisions could cause difficulties for the Cyprus Government. But they had not been the cause of major controversy hitherto. It had never been envisaged that this particular set of documentation would deal with guarantees or troop withdrawals: they were for later negotiation. In essence, the current documentation was the qualifying round for these further negotiations.

The Prime Minister continued that politics constantly posed difficult choices. There were very rarely ideal solutions on offer. The United Kingdom's objective was to see Cyprus continue as a single country and not be partitioned. All our efforts with the Turkish Government had been directed towards this end. We had also campaigned hard against international recognition of the Turkish State in Northern Cyprus. We had strained every sinew to help the Cyprus Government. The risk now was that if the current documentation could not be agreed, the Secretary General would lose hope and give up his efforts to find a solution which avoided a partitioned Cyprus. That would inevitably lead to creeping recognition of a Turkish-Cypriot State and remove, probably forever, any chance of achieving Greek-Cypriot goals. This was the choice that the President would have to put squarely before the Cypriot people: either to accept provisionally documentation which was not entirely

satisfactory; or to face the probability of an end to the Secretary-General's efforts and an inevitable slippage towards de iure partition of Cyprus. It was an unpleasant and difficult choice but it had to be posed in those terms.

President Kyprianou said that his Government were still studying the documentation. But their provisional conclusion was that it implied partition of Cyprus. For instance, the Turkish sector would be enabled to acquire an international personality. He handed to the Prime Minister a detailed analysis of the Secretary-General's documentation illustrating Greek-Cypriot objections to it (enclosed).

The Prime Minister said that she was not qualified to argue the detail with President Kyprianou. But she had to keep coming back to the critical question: what was the alternative to accepting the Secretary-General's documentation? President Kyprianou said that acceptance of it would in practice mean putting the Cyprus Government's signature to partition. The Cyprus Government constantly found itself negotiating under duress. He brought up once again his objections to the procedures adopted by the Secretary General, the way in which promises made to the Cyprus Government had not been kept and the manner in which the new documentation had come out of the blue.

The Prime Minister said that she had sympathy with the difficulties which President Kyprianou faced. She could see that making a constitution on the lines set out in the documentation work in practice would be very difficult. But she had to say once again that the Greek-Cypriot people must be brought to see the full implications of failure to agree the documentation. The Foreign Secretary added that the passage of time worked against the Greek-Cypriots. The Turkish-Cypriots would continue to take steps to consolidate their position. Acceptance of the documentation should be seen as a ticket of admission to the next round of negotiations. If it was rejected there was no alternative way in which the Greek-Cypriots could hope to preserve a unitary state, or to achieve the withdrawal of Turkish troops, the return of land or the resettlement of refugees. The Prime Minister said that she had often found herself facing difficult choices in the European Community. You sometimes had to accept things which you did not like because they were better than the consequences of failing to reach any agreement.

President Kyprianou said that he failed to understand why the Secretary-General was trying to rush through the documentation. Indeed he had come to be sceptical both of the Secretary-General's control over the activities of his officials and even of his good faith. It was not his job to be a mediator, only to make available his good offices. In fact there had been no more than six hours of consultation between UN officials and the Cyprus Government since last October. Of course his aim was to avoid partition. But by accepting the documentation he would end up with it in practice anyway. It would amount to partition by consent. His preference would be to leave what had been discussed so

far in abeyance and move on to negotiation on the three freedoms, guarantees and troop withdrawals. He asked whether it was the Prime Minister's impression that the documentation was really put forward on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The Prime Minister said that while this was not formally the position, it was in practice likely to be the outcome. The Secretary-General would not persist if his present efforts failed. If Mr. Denktash were to accept the documentation and President Kyprianou not to, he would find himself blamed internationally for the subsequent break down. The rest of the world would get the impression that the Secretary-General had done his best, that the Turkish-Cypriots had accepted the outcome and that the Greek-Cypriots were the obstacle.

The Prime Minister asked President Kyprianou whether, if the partition of Cyprus were to become permanent, it would be possible to keep peace across the border between the two parts of the island. President Kyprianou said that it would not. A border in Cyprus meant conflict. The Prime Minister speculated whether there was any agreement acceptable to both communities. President Kyprianou said that he could only answer with another question. Was Turkey ready to accept a solution which provided less than partition?

President Kyprianou continued that the Cyprus Government's problem was that the documentation came from the Secretary-General. If it had come from any other party, they would have rejected it straightaway. He had not decided on the next steps. He might have to hold a plebiscite. He would continue consultations in Cyprus and let the Prime Minister know the conclusions reached. Meanwhile he hoped that, after studying the Cyprus Government's critique of the UN documentation, she would consider whether there was any alternative way forward which would allow negotiations to continue without the Cyprus Government being forced explicitly to accept the documentation. The Prime Minister said that her firm impression was that the meeting proposed by the Secretary-General was critical and intended to reach decisions. But she would make further enquiries.


As President Kyprianou was leaving No.10, he asked the Prime Minister whether she thought that the Secretary-General could be persuaded to call a high level meeting to discuss troop withdrawals, guarantees and the three freedoms without requiring explicit acceptance or signature of the existing documentation. The latter would be left on the table and if there was progress in the further negotiations, then perhaps it could be formally agreed. The Prime Minister offered no encouragement that this might be feasible.

It was agreed that the press would be told only that the Prime Minister and President Kyprianou had had a prolonged and very useful discussion of the Cyprus problem with particular regard to the initiative of the United Nations Secretary-General.

After President Kyprianou left, the Prime Minister commented that she had some sympathy with his position. She suspected that the constitutional proposals were in practice unworkable. It also sounded as though the consultations with the United Nations officials had not been adequate. She could understand that the President might not want to be formally tied to the documentation if the subsequent negotiations on other issues were likely to fail anyway. In any event, if President Kyprianou decided not to sign, it would be much better if Mr. Denktash did not sign either. We should consider whether there was any way in which we could help President Kyprianou, for instance, by following up his parting remarks about leaving what had been negotiated hitherto on one side without formal endorsement and moving on to further negotiations. This would be better than a breakdown.

11 I should be grateful if further consideration could be given to this.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,  


(C. D. POWELL)

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.