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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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Briefs in folder at
rear of file.

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Prime Minister
Some additional points
for Kyprianou, plus a
copy of the Secretary-
General's documentation, which
you might glance at.

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Meeting with President Kyprianou:

4pm Monday 7 April

CDP
5/4

I enclose an up-to-date brief. Sir Geoffrey Howe will as you know also attend.

[no major change]

As I explained in my letter of 27 March enclosing a preliminary version of the briefing, this meeting will play an important part in the international community's effort to persuade Kyprianou to agree to the UN's third set of documentation, which has now been formally presented to all parties (and the Permanent Members of the Security Council) by the Secretary-General. He has set 21 April as a deadline for the parties' responses. While there has been no official reaction by any of the parties, it seems likely that Kyprianou and Papandreou will try to find a way to wriggle out of acceptance, while the Turkish side will accept. A leaked version of the proposals has appeared in Cypriot newspapers. Turkish-Cypriot press reaction has been encouraging. On the Greek-Cypriot side it has been at best muted and at worst outright rejectionist. There is speculation that Kyprianou will procrastinate, possibly by calling a referendum.

[But see separate letter in hot box]

The Greek-Cypriots fear that agreement will limit their manoeuvrability in negotiations on troop withdrawals, guarantees and the "three freedoms" of movement, settlement and property. Kyprianou will have to be persuaded that, far from tying his hands, the framework proposals open up the possibility of a unified Cyprus with a Greek-Cypriot President, a substantial return of territory and, most importantly, removal of the bulk of Turkish troops from northern Cyprus. Without an initial agreement, the prospects for achieving these objectives recede. It is difficult to see how such an opportunity could be repeated. The Soviet proposals (attached as Annex B), with which the Greek side is flirting, certainly do not offer a way forward.

/Kyprianou



Kyprianou may also use the argument that the proposed constitutional arrangements would prove unworkable in practice. We have some sympathy with that position: after all, the proposals are not dissimilar to the original 1960 Constitution which broke down. Nonetheless the differences between the two communities in Cyprus are such that only a complex set of checks and balances can give each side the prior assurance it requires. What is needed is the political will to make the system work.

It is difficult at the moment to predict Kyprianou's mood. He is in an unenviable position. He risks international odium if he rejects the documentation and accusations by his own side of a sell-out if he accepts. He may be just as difficult to deal with as when the Prime Minister saw him at No 10 in March 1985 (a record of which I attach as Annex C for ease of reference).

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

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Private Secretary

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