



ATMOSPHERIC) IMPARTED BY THE SUMMIT, AND KEEPING SOVIET NEGOTIATING POSITIONS INTACT. THIS COMES OUT MOST CLEARLY IN SOME OF HIS FORMULATIONS ON SDI AND ARMS CONTROL. IT IS TRUE THAT THERE IS NO BLUNT ULTIMATUM THAT UNLESS SDI IS SCRAPPED, ANY AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE (C.F. HIS 'TIME' INTERVIEW - NY TELNO 1127 - WHEN HE NOT ONLY ATTEMPTED TO DEFINE WHAT WAS PERMISSIBLE AND WHAT WAS NOT, BUT ALSO THREATENED THAT THERE WOULD BE 'NOTHING AT ALL' ON ARMS CONTROL IF SDI WENT AHEAD). NONETHELESS HE REMAINS FIRM THAT THE DOOR ON WEAPONS IN SPACE MUST BE COMPLETELY CLOSED, OR THERE CAN BE NO RADICAL NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS. THIS FORMULA BLURS ANY DISTINCTION BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF SPACE WEAPONS, BUT STILL LEAVES A MAJOR US CONCESSION ON AS A (NEXT THREE WORDS UNDERLINED) SINE QUA NON.

4. THIS WAS A POLISHED AND SOPHISTICATED PERFORMANCE BY GORBACHEV, COMBINING THE RIGHT DEGREE OF FIRMNESS WHICH WILL REASSURE THE PARTY AND MILITARY, AND STATESMANLIKE PRESENTATION WHICH WILL APPEAL TO HIS WIDER DOMESTIC AUDIENCE AND TO THE WORLD AT LARGE (ESPECIALLY IN EUROPE). THE SPEECH NATURALLY DID NOT IDENTIFY, BUT NEITHER BY IMPLICATION, DID IT CONCEAL THE CENTRAL DILEMMA WHICH THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT HAS LAID UPON GORBACHEV (AND TO A MUCH LESSER EXTENT ON PRESIDENT REAGAN AS WELL). HE IS COMMITTED TO A POSITION ON ARMS CONTROL (NO HALT TO THE SDI PROGRAMME, NO STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS) WHICH, HE MUST NOW REALISE AFTER HIS ENCOUNTER WITH THE PRESIDENT, RULES OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUBSTANTIAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT - CONSISTENTLY CLAIMED BY THE RUSSIANS TO BE THE MAIN AND PROPER OBJECTIVE OF SUPER-POWER SUMMITRY - DURING THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY. BUT HE IS ALSO COMMITTED TO TWO FURTHER SUMMITS WITH REAGAN, THE FIRST OF THEM ON DIFFICULT AND UNFAMILIAR TERRITORY. ONE SUMMIT WITH A GOOD ATMOSPHERE BUT LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME CAN CREDIBLY BE PRESENTED - AS GORBACHEV HAS DONE - AS A SUCCESS. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO REPEAT THE TRICK ON A SECOND, LET ALONE A THIRD, OCCASION UNLESS THERE IS UNEXPECTEDLY GOOD PROGRESS AT GENEVA ON E.G. UP-DATING THE ABM TREATY OR INF (WHICH NOW SEEMS TO BE LESS DEFINITELY DECOUPLED FROM THE OTHER NEGOTIATIONS THAN BEFORE)., OR UNLESS EVENTS ELSEWHERE, E.G. IN THE MIDDLE EAST, PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A RESOUNDING INITIATIVE OR DECLARATION ON A REGIONAL ISSUE WHICH COULD DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THE ARMS CONTROL STALEMATE.

5. THIS POTENTIAL PROBLEM MUST HAVE OCCURRED TO GORBACHEV AND HIS ADVISERS BEFORE OR DURING THE SUMMIT. HIS EVIDENT READINESS TO ACCEPT AND LIVE WITH IT, RATHER THAN DUCKING A COMMITMENT TO FUTURE MEETINGS OR ENDING THE LAST ONE IN A BLAZE OF ACRIMONY, INDICATES TO ME THAT HE ATTACHES MORE IMPORTANCE, FOR THE TIME BEING, TO AT LEAST THE APPEARANCE OF ENHANCED EAST/WEST STABILITY AS AN ESSENTIAL BACKDROP TO HIS DOMESTIC PROGRAMME THAN HE DOES TO A SUBSTANTIAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT (NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) PER SE.

CARTLEDGE

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OF 281100Z NOVEMBER 85

INFO PRIORITY : WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, MODUK (DACU)

INFO PRIORITY : UKMIS GENEVA

INFO SAVING : EAST EUROPEAN POSTS

MY TELNO 1545 : (NOT TO ALL) GORBACHEV'S SPEECH TO THE SUPREME SOVIET ON 27 NOVEMBER.

SUMMARY

1. GORBACHEV'S SPEECH CONCENTRATED ON FOREIGN POLICY, PRINCIPALLY REPORTING ON THE GENEVA SUMMIT. MIFT IS A SUMMARY OF THE "INTERNAL" POINTS. MY SECOND IFT CONTAINS COMMENT. BELOW ARE THE MAIN POINTS ON FOREIGN POLICY.

DETAIL

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

PRELUDE

2. THE ROAD TO THE SUMMIT HAD BEEN MADE DIFFICULT BY THE US CONFRONTATIONAL ATTITUDE. EXAMPLES WERE THE ASAT TEST, THE PRESENCE OF THE "IOWA" ARMED WITH LRCMS IN THE BALTIC, PERSHING DEPLOYMENT IN WEST GERMANY, THE DECISION ON BINARY CW DEVELOPMENT, A RECORD US MILITARY BUDGET, AND APPEALS TO REAGAN FROM WEINBERGER AND THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION.

3. BUT THOSE WHO HAD SOUGHT CONFRONTATION HAD MISCALCULATED.  
US.

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USAXSOVIET INTER-DEPENDENCE WAS AS IMMENSE AS THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM. THE US HAD BEEN FORCED TO "MANOEUVRE" IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET INITIATIVES. FOLLOWING THE JANUARY GENEVA AGREEMENT, THE US/SOVIET ATMOSPHERE, AND TO SOME EXTENT US INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOUR, STARTED TO CHANGE.

4. GORBACHEV HAD TOLD REAGAN THAT ARMS CONTROL WAS THE MAIN MEANING OF THE SUMMIT.

US/SOVIET PROPOSALS

5. AMONGST SOVIET PROPOSALS AT THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, THE 50% REDUCTION WAS "A BEGINNING" OF THE PROCESS TOWARDS ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN WHICH OTHER NWS SHOULD BE INVOLVED. THE SOVIET UNION WAS FOR THE COMPLETE REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MEDIUM RANGE AND TACTICAL, FROM EUROPE. FOLLOWING US AND NATO /NON AGREEMENT

NON-AGREEMENT 'WE PROPOSED TO START AT LEAST WITH PROVISIONAL DECISIONS AND THEN TO WORK TOWARD FURTHER REDUCTIONS'. SOVIET PROPOSALS MADE IT POSSIBLE TO RESOLVE US 'SPECIAL CONCERNS', INCLUDING ICBMS AND SS20S. BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS WERE A STUMBLING BLOCK, HENCE THE SOVIET SUGGESTION FOR A 'DIRECT EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS'.

6. THE ADVANCEMENT OF US COUNTER PROPOSALS WAS IN ITSELF A POSITIVE FACT. THEY WERE, HOWEVER, LARGELY INEQUITABLE, ONE-SIDED AND AIMED TOWARDS SUPERIORITY.

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7. GORBACHEV HAD NOT AGREED WITH REAGAN'S PRESENTATION ON SDI, INCLUDING THE PROPOSAL TO SHARE SYSTEMS AND OPEN LABORATORIES. SDI COULD BE BOTH 'DEFENSIVE' FOR A FIRST STRIKE ATTEMPT, AND 'OFFENSIVE' IN ITSELF. THERE WAS EVERY INDICATION THAT IT WAS CONCEIVED AS A COMPONENT OF AN INTEGRATED OFFENSIVE COMPLEX.

8. THE MILITARISATION OF OUTER SPACE 'WOULD INEVITABLY RESULT IN THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE VERY NOTION OF STRATEGIC STABILITY'. CATASTROPHE COULD FOLLOW FROM COMPUTER ERROR. 'THE US STAND ON STARWARS IS THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO AGREEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL'.

9. THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT RELY ON US ASSURANCES ABOUT SHARING. LABORATORIES SHOULD BE OPEN TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH A BAN, NOT DEVELOPMENT. TO REGAIN BALANCE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE TO IMPROVE THE EFFICIENCY, ACCURACY AND YIELD OF ITS WEAPONS. GORBACHEV ASKED RHETORICALLY HOW COMFORTABLE THE AMERICANS WOULD FEEL IF THERE WERE SOVIET WEAPONS IN SPACE. THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE US ELECTRONICS AND COMPUTER CHALLENGE MIGHT BE 'LESS COSTLY THAN THE AMERICAN PROGRAMME'

10. THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT FEEL ENMITY TOWARDS THE US, RESPECTED THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND DID NOT SEEK STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE. THE LEVEL OF ARMS SUFFICIENT FOR 'DEPENDABLE DEFENCE' WAS WELL BELOW PRESENT STOCKS. 'TANGIBLE, PRACTICAL STEPS IN ARMS REDUCTIONS ARE QUITE POSSIBLE'.

11. TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENTS IN PREPARING FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT, STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY AND FURTHER MUTUAL RESPECT FOR SALT II WERE NECESSARY.

12. 'WE DO NOT OVER-DRAMATISE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US AND SOVIET PROPOSALS: COMPROMISES ARE POSSIBLE HERE AND WE ARE PREPARED TO LOOK FOR THEM'. QUESTIONS OF 'DEPENDABLE VERIFICATION' COULD BE RESOLVED. 'BUT TO SOLVE ALL THESE PROBLEMS IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL HERMETICALLY TO CLOSE THE DOOR THROUGH WHICH WEAPONS COULD PENETRATE INTO SPACE. WITHOUT THIS, A RADICAL REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS IMPOSSIBLE. I WISH TO STATE THIS WITH ALL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE AND ITS HIGHEST SUPREME ORGAN OF POWER' (PROLONGED APPLAUSE). 'THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE WEAPONS CAN ONLY BLOCK THE POSSIBILITY OF ENDING THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE'. 'WE HOPE THAT WHAT THE US SAID ON SDI IN GENEVA WAS /NOT THEIR

NOT THEIR LAST WORD''. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD PRESS, AS AGREED AT GENEVA, FOR RESOLVING THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE ''IN COMPLEX WITH THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS''.

13. THE REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE TO ''STAR WARS'' WAS PEACEFUL COOPERATION IN SPACE, TO INCLUDE ''FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH PROJECTS'', DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, AND NEW SPACE TECHNOLOGY FOR THE EVENTUAL INDUSTRIALISATION OF NEAR-EARTH SPACE. US SOVIET COOPERATION COULD HELP IMPLEMENT A LONG TERM, COMPREHENSIVE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PROGRAMME.

#### TEST BAN

14. THE QUESTION OF ENDING NUCLEAR TESTS HAD BECOME MORE AND MORE ACUTE. THE SOVIET UNION WERE READY TO EXTEND THEIR TEST MORATORIUM BEYOND 1 JANUARY 1986 GIVEN US RECIPROCITY. THEY EXPECTED A CONCRETE AND POSITIVE DECISION FROM THE US. VERIFICATION COULD BE EXERCISED WITH THE HELP OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (THE SOVIET UNION HAD REGISTERED AN UNANNOUNCED LOW YIELD TEST IN THE US THIS YEAR). THEY WOULD ALSO CONSIDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL, INCLUDING THE ''SIX COUNTRIES'' SUGGESTION.

#### BILATERAL RELATIONS

15. THERE HAD BEEN CONCRETE AGREEMENTS ON SCIENTIFIC, EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES AND CONTACTS, AND ON AIR SERVICES. THERE REMAINED MAJOR DIFFERENCES ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, ''BUT WE ARE FAR FROM BELITTLING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS'', THE MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH WAS THE NON-WINNABILITY OF NUCLEAR WAR AND AVOIDANCE OF MILITARY SUPERIORITY. ALSO IMPORTANT WERE THE PLEDGES ON THE NPT REGIME, ON CW, ON THE ''EARLY COMPLETION'' OF THE CDE (WITH A DOCUMENT INCLUDING CONCRETE NUF OBLIGATIONS AND CBMS), AND ON CONTINUING POLITICAL CONTACTS, INCLUDING SUMMITS.

16. GORBACHEV HOPED THAT THERE WAS A GOOD BASE FOR INCREASING US/SOVIET TRUST. THE US POSITION HAD INCLUDED ''CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF REALISM'' : ''WE HAVE EVERY RIGHT TO SAY THAT THE OVERALL BALANCE SHEET OF THE GENEVA MEETING IS POSITIVE''. IF THE US DISPLAYED A SIMILAR APPROACH TO THE SOVIET UNION IN PRACTICE, GENEVA WOULD BEAR REAL FRUIT.

#### REGIONAL ISSUES

17. BOTH SIDES WERE CONCERNED, BUT THEIR APPROACHES TOWARDS SOLUTIONS WERE ''DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSITE''. THE US ''SPHERES OF INFLUENCE'' MENTALITY WAS AN ''ANACHRONISM''. THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT ACCEPT THE US INTERPRETATION OF THE PURSUIT OF NATIONAL LIBERATION AS COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY. IT WAS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF EVERY PEOPLE TO FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE.

18. ON AFGHANISTAN, THE SOVIET UNION WAS CONSISTENTLY FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, FOR AN INDEPENDENT NON-ALIGNED STATE AND GUARANTEED NON-INTERFERENCE: ''THE QUESTION OF SOVIET TROOP /WITHDRAWAL

WITHDRAWAL WILL ALSO THUS BE RESOLVED''. THE US, BY BACKING COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES, WERE FRUSTRATING NORMALISATION.

19. IN THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC REGION, THE SOVIET UNION WERE FOR THE BROADENING OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE AMONGST ALL STATES. IT WELCOMED CHINA'S ATTITUDE AGAINST SPACE MILITARISATION AND ON NOFUN. BETTER RELATIONS WITH JAPAN WERE POSSIBLE. THE SOVIET UNION HAD A SPECIAL REGARD FOR INDIA.

20. IN LATIN AMERICAN, AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST THE SOVIET UNION HAD ESTABLISHED RELATIONS OF EQUAL COOPERATION:

#### RELATIONS WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

21. A MECHANISM OF EFFECTIVE, CONCRETE TIES HAD BEEN CREATED. COORDINATION OF FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVITY HAD BECOME MORE INTENSIVE.

#### RELATIONS WITH CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

22. GORBACHEV SINGLED OUT THE PARIS SUMMIT, DURING WHICH 'SUBSTANTIAL STEPS' WERE TAKEN FURTHER TO DEVELOP BILATERAL COOPERATION AND CONSOLIDATE EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. BUT THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY - 'NOT A PRIVILEGE' - FOR WORLD DEVELOPMENTS WAS BORNE BY THE US/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.

23. EUROPE HAD A SPECIAL ROLE IN SECURITY QUESTIONS, FLOWING FROM HELSINKI. TRADE AND TECHNICAL EXCHANGES SHOULD BE USED NOT FOR POLITICAL 'PUNISHMENT' BUT FOR CONSOLIDATING CONFIDENCE.

24. SEE MIFT

CARTLEDGE

#### EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

LIMITED

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SOVIET D	PS
DEFENCE D	PS/LADY YOUNG
R D	PS/MR RIFKIND
PLANNING STAFF	PS/MR RENTON
EED	PS/MR EGGAR
NAD	PS/PUS
WED	MR DEREK THOMAS
ACDD	MR GOODALL
CRD	MR FERGUSSON
FED	SIR W HARDING
NED	MR SAMUEL
PUSD	MR DAUNT
NEWS .D	MR DAVID THOMAS
INFO .D	MR LONG