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MY TEL NO 3180: GENEVA SUMMIT: REGIONAL ISSUES

SUMMARY

1. **THE B FEATURE AT THE SUMMIT. PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL PUSH HIS REGIONAL INITIATIVE, BUT WITHOUT HOPE OF ACCEPTANCE. AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE BILATERAL EXPERTS DISCUSSIONS LIKELY.**

DETAIL

2. **FOR ALL THE ADMINISTRATION'S INSISTENCE THAT THE IMPROVEMENT OF US/SOVIET RELATIONS DEPENDS ON PROGRESS IN ALL FOUR AREAS OF THE RELATIONSHIP (ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL ISSUES, BILATERAL AFFAIRS AND HUMAN RIGHTS), NO ONE DOUBTS THAT THE FIRST IS FOREMOST, AND THAT THE PROSPECTS OF REAL US/SOVIET COOPERATION IN RESOLVING THIRD COUNTRY CRISES ARE POOR. THE PRESIDENT'S REGIONAL INITIATIVE**

3. **AT GENEVA THE PRESIDENT WILL CERTAINLY SEEK, HOWEVER TO ENGAGE GORBACHEV IN DISCUSSION OF THE CONFLICTS (AFGHANISTAN, NICARAGUA, ANGOLA, ETHIOPIA AND CAMBODIA) MENTIONED IN THE REGIONAL INITIATIVE ANNOUNCED IN HIS UNGA SPEECH ON 24 OCTOBER. BOTH SUPERPOWERS, HE WILL ARGUE, SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE FIVE AREAS, TO ALLOW SELF-DETERMINATION. IF THE RUSSIANS WILL NOT DO SO, THE WORLD WILL NOTE THAT, AND US ASSISTANCE TO DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE FORCES WILL CONTINUE. HIS PROPOSAL THEREFORE CONTAINS BOTH A GENUINE OFFER TO RESPOND CONSTRUCTIVELY IF THE RUSSIANS WERE PREPARED (EG FOR THE SAKE OF IMPROVED US/SOVIET RELATIONS) TO WITHDRAW THEIR OWN OR SURROGATE FORCES, AND A STRONG PROPAGANDA ELEMENT. NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE RUSSIANS HAVE SO FAR SHOWN NO KEENNESS TO DISCUSS IT.**

AFGHANISTAN

4. **ON AFGHANISTAN THE PRESIDENT WILL EXPRESS FIRM SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN. HE WILL DISMISS ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE FAILURE OF PAKISTAN TO ENTER INTO DIRECT TALKS WITH BABRAK KARMAL, IS AN OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS, THE PRIOR NECESSITY IS SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. BUT THE US UNDERSTAND SOVIET SECURITY CONCERNS, IF GORBACHEV IS INTERESTED IN A WAY OUT (OF WHICH THE ANALYSTS HERE SEE NO EVIDENCE) THE US WILL BE PREPARED BY GUARANTEES ETC TO HELP FACILITATE THE PROCESS.**

NICARAGUA

5. **THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT ONLY A GENUINE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SANDINISTAS AND THEIR FOES, COUPLED WITH A SHARP REDUCTION IN THE SOVIET/CUBAN ROLE, CAN SATISFY US SECURITY INTERESTS AND**

BRING PEACE TO NICARAGUA. THE IMPORTANCE OF RESTRAINT IN SOVIET/CUBAN ARMS SHIPMENTS TO NICARAGUA IS LIKELY TO BE EMPHASIZED. THE RECENT BILATERAL EXPERT LEVEL TALKS MAY HAVE INCREASED SOVIET AWARENESS OF US RESOLVE. FEW HERE HOWEVER EXPECT THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL REFRAIN, OR WISH TO RESTRAIN THE CUBANS FROM LOW-COST MEDDLING IN THE US BACKYARD. GORBACHEV, FOR HIS PART, SEEMS LIKELY TO RAISE AMERICAN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE AGAINST QUOTE DEMOCRATIC UNQUOTE NICARAGUA, AND TO BROADEN THE DISCUSSION TO INCLUDE US CONDUCT ON WIDER CARIBBEAN/CENTRAL/SOUTH AMERICAN ISSUES.

ANGOLA

6. IN HIS NEW YORK SPEECH, THE PRESIDENT FOCUSED ON ANGOLA'S INTERNAL CONFLICT. HITHERTO THE US EMPHASIS HAS BEEN ON A WIDER REGIONAL APPROACH, WITH A SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA BEING COUPLED WITH CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA. RECONCILIATION WITHIN ANGOLA HAS NOT BEEN THE ADMINISTRATION'S MAIN PREOCCUPATION, NOR HAS IT YET PROVIDED MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE TO THE REGIME. THE RUSSIANS CAN HAVE LITTLE INTEREST IN RESCUING THE ADMINISTRATION'S EMBATTLED SOUTHERN AFRICAN POLICY BY SHOWING FLEXIBILITY ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THEIR RECENT INCREASED INVESTMENT IN ANGOLA, AND OF THE ANGOLAN ARMY'S SUCCESS AGAINST UNITA. BUT A RIGID SOVIET APPROACH ON ANGOLA COULD CONVINCE THE PRESIDENT OF THE NEED TO AID UNITA.

ETHIOPIA

7. THE AMERICANS ARE NOT CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN THE INTERNAL CONFLICT. THEIR INTEREST IS IN PREVENTING THE RUSSIANS FROM DOMINATING THE STRATEGIC AREA OF THE HORN, AND THE ETHIOPIANS FROM FOSTERING INSTABILITY IN SUDAN. THE AMERICANS ARE ALSO DEEPLY FRUSTRATED THAT THEIR MASSIVE HUMANITARIAN AID TO ETHIOPIA SHOULD HAVE BROUGHT THEM SO FEW POLITICAL BENEFITS. SUCH FACTORS MUST ENCOURAGE THE RUSSIANS TO KEEP THE U.S. AT BAY, AND THE ETHIOPIANS BEHOLDEN TO MOSCOW. BUT THE WAR IMPOSES A BURDEN ON THE RUSSIANS WITHOUT CAUSING THE US COMPARABLE DISCOMFORT. CROCKER HAS JUST GIVEN A SPEECH ON US OBJECTIVES IN THE HORN WHICH REPEATS THE US OFFER OF A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ETHIOPIANS.

CAMBODIA

8. THE PRESIDENT WILL URGE THE RUSSIANS TO GET THE VIETNAMESE TO WITHDRAW FROM CAMBODIA, AND WILL PRESS THE ASEAN PROPOSAL FOR PROXIMITY TALKS.

THE MIDDLE EAST

9. THE MIDDLE EAST - A CONSPICUOUS OMISSION FROM THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE-SEEMS PARADOXICALLY TO OFFER MORE SCOPE FOR GENUINE DISCUSSION AT GENEVA. THE ADMINISTRATION DO NOT HOWEVER BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS CAPABLE OF ACTING CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THE PEACE PROCESS, SHULTZ AND RABIN AGREED ON 15 NOVEMBER THAT SOVIET VIEWS DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE CHANGED. THE PRESIDENT IS LIKELY, AT PERES' BEHEST, TO SEEK RELAXATION OF SOVIET RESTRICTIONS ON JEWISH EMIGRATION, AND TO URGE GORBACHEV TO ESTABLISH FULL RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. PRE-SUMMIT

CONTACTS HAVE REVEALED NO SIGN OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON EITHER ISSUE, DESPITE THE MANY RUMOURS, THOUGH SOME DO NOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SURPRISE MOVE. IN ORDER TO KEEP JORDAN IN PLAY, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD PROBABLY AGREE TO A LIMITED SOVIET ROLE IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, PROVIDED ISRAEL'S REQUIREMENTS WERE MET. BUT THEY DO NOT EXPECT THE SOVIET UNION TO BE INTERESTED IN PLAYING ONLY A TOKEN ROLE.

10. IF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IS DISCUSSED, THE PRESIDENT WILL URGE THE SOVIET UNION TO CUT SUPPLIES OF ARMS TO IRAN THROUGH ITS FRIENDS (NORTH KOREA, EASTERN EUROPE, SYRIA AND LIBYA). SHULTZ SPOKE ON THESE LINES TO SHEVARDNADZE IN MOSCOW, BUT THERE WAS NO RESPONSE ON THIS OR ANY OTHER ASPECT OF THE WAR.

CONCLUSION

11. THE AMERICANS WILL BE AGREEABLY SURPRISED IF THE RUSSIANS BITE ON ANY OF THE ABOVE ISSUES, LET ALONE THE UMBRELLA QUOTE INITIATIVE UNQUOTE. AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE THE SERIES OF BILATERAL TALKS ON INDIVIDUAL REGIONS AT EXPERT LEVEL SEEMS A LIKELY OUTCOME.

WRIGHT

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3

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