

be SJ
CP

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 November 1985

ANGLO-FRENCH SUMMIT: 18 NOVEMBER

Thank you for your letter of 1 November setting out proposed arrangements for the Anglo-French Summit on 18 November.

The Prime Minister is content with the proposed programme. She is prepared to meet President Mitterrand on arrival though points out that it is likely to take more than half an hour to get from Northolt to 10 Downing Street at that time of the morning. We might suggest that President Mitterrand aim to arrive at 8.15 at the latest to avoid delays later in the programme. The Prime Minister would not wish the press conference to take place in the Banqueting House: she would prefer a smaller press conference in No 12 Downing Street. Bernard Ingham will look into this.

The Prime Minister would, I think, be content with the proposed participation in the Summit, though every Minister you add risks extending the length of the plenary session which we are keen to avoid. I imagine it is not practicable to drop the plenary session altogether. But I hope we can come to an arrangement that there should be alternate reports by British and French Ministers so that it is not necessary for both to report on each bilateral discussion.

I understand that Mrs Fairweather will be available to interpret that day. You will wish to confirm the arrangements with her.

I am copying this letter to Private Secretaries to the Secretaries of State for Trade, Transport, Energy, the Home Secretary and the Minister of State for Industry and Technology and also to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

✓



Prime Minister Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Agree:

- proposed programme? Yes
- to meet President Mitterrand at Heathrow? Yes
- proposed participation? Yes

1 November 1985

Can we do a small press conference in

CDD 1/1c

No. 12 =

Anglo-French Summit: 18 November

We should be grateful for your views on the programme and participation for the Summit meeting on 18 November.

Programme

We recommend the following pattern:

- 0900-1030 Heads of Government tete-a-tete
- 1030-1100 Heads of Government joined by Foreign Ministers
- 1100-1145 Plenary. As we discussed, we might allow one report only to the plenary from each pair of Ministers.
- 1200-1240 Joint Press Conference by Heads of Government
- 1250-1430 Lunch (a working lunch attended by all participating Ministers and a few key officials)

The Queen has offered to receive President Mitterrand at 1700. (She is unable to grant an earlier audience.) On the assumption that he would wish to take this up, we are considering with the French what arrangements might be made to fill the space in his programme. We expect President Mitterrand and his Ministers to return to Paris that evening.

Arrangements for greeting and bidding farewell

President Mitterrand will arrive at Northolt at about 0830. At the last two Anglo-French Summits in London (1981 and 1983) the Prime Minister (and a representative of The Queen) met President Mitterrand at the airport. It would doubtless be welcomed by the President if the Prime Minister were able to do so again. We would also envisage the provision of an RAF Ceremonial Guard at Northolt on arrival. We propose that, as in previous years, a Cabinet Minister should bid the President farewell.

/Press

I would like more than 2 hours to prepare for Northolt in the morning.

Dear Charles,

please MB



Press Conference

We suggest that the Press Conference should be held in the Banqueting House. This would require the Lord Chamberlain's permission, which your Press Office would need to seek. The Great Hall of the Institute of Civil Engineers, which we propose to use for the Anglo/German Summit, is not available on 18 November.

Participation

To judge by precedent and initial indications from the French, it is unlikely that the French Prime Minister, M Fabius, will attend. Sir Geoffrey Howe recommends that the participants should include Foreign Ministers, Ministers of Defence (reflecting efforts in the past year to raise the profile of the bilateral defence relationship); Trade and Industry Ministers (to discuss the development of industrial collaboration and international trade issues); Transport Ministers (the Channel Fixed Link is likely to figure prominently); Ministers of the Interior/Home Affairs (to follow up contacts on counter-terrorism between Mr Brittan and his French counterpart, M Joxe); and Ministers of Research and Technology (to discuss Eureka and other collaborative ventures in this field). A meeting between the Secretary of State for Energy and the French Minister for Trade and Industry (who holds the Energy portfolio) should be included in the programme - the French are expecting to discuss energy issues, notably cross-Channel electricity and gas links and oil matters. The French would probably welcome the inclusion of Ministers of Culture, given the importance they attach to cultural matters, the closeness of M Lang to President Mitterrand, and the high level of bilateral exchanges and events in this field over the past year. Participation by Finance and Agriculture Ministers will not be practicable, as they will, under present arrangements, be attending EC ministerial meetings in Brussels on that day.

This abbreviated, interpretation in the programme may be manageable in toto by Maria Fairweather. Shall we pursue it with her, or would you prefer to do so yourself?

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of Ministers who may be involved and to PS/Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,
 Len Appleyard
 (L V Appleyard)



Handwritten text, possibly a signature or address, located at the bottom left of the page.



CLP
EDP
k/xi

70 WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AS

01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet and Head of the Home Civil Service

Sir Robert Armstrong GCB CVO

PS(85) 24

1 November 1985

Dear Private Secretary,

Anglo-French Summit: 18 November 1985

This letter sets out the briefing arrangements for the Anglo-French Summit which is to take place on 18 November 1985 in London.

The list of briefs to be prepared, with an indication of Departmental responsibility, is at Annex A. Instructions on format are at Annexes B and C. Those preparing briefs should note carefully the details on the format of briefs set out in Annex B. Departments should, therefore, aim to ensure that, apart from the General Brief, individual subject briefs do not exceed two sides of paper.

80 copies of each brief should be sent to the Cabinet Office as soon as they are ready. In any case they should reach the Cabinet Office by close of play on Monday 11 November, AT THE VERY LATEST. They should be addressed to Mr A S Victory in Committee Section, who should be consulted (tel no 233 7343) about any technical points arising.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to Sir Antony Acland, Sir Peter Middleton, Sir Clive Whitmore, Sir Brian Hayes, Sir Michael Franklin, Sir Peter Lazarus, Mr P L Gregson, Sir Brian Cubbon, Mr T M Heiser, Mr R W L Wilding and Sir Robin Nicholson, and to Charles Powell at No 10.

(Signed) ROSALIND MULLIGAN
Assistant Private Secretary

LIST OF BRIEFS FOR ANGLO-FRENCH SUMMIT
18 NOVEMBER 1985

<u>JMV(85)</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
1.	Steering Brief (to include International Issues not covered elsewhere). Programme, Personality Notes and Annex on the French Internal Scene	FCO(WED)	as appropriate
2.	East/West Relations and Arms Control	FCO(Soviet D/ACDD)	MOD
3.	European Community Topics		
a.	Intergovernmental Conference and Prospects for the December European Council	FCO(ECD(I))	Cabinet Office
b.	International Trade Problems (GATT Round, Protectionism, Relations with the United States and Japan)	DTI	FCO Cabinet Office
4.	Bilateral Relations		
a.	General (to include industrial collaboration)	FCO(WED)	DTI MOD Energy
b.	Channel Fixed Link	Transport	FCO MOD DTI Treasury
c.	Scientific Issues	Cabinet Office	DTI DES
d.	Defence Relations	MOD	FCO(Defence D)
5.	EUREKA	DTI	Cabinet Office FCO(ESSD) Treasury

CONFIDENTIAL

<u>JMV(85)</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
6.	Counter-terrorism	FCO(SCD)	Home Office MOD
7.	International Economic Issues (including Debt and North/South Issues)	FCO(ERD)	Treasury
8.	Energy	Energy	FCO(ESSD)

THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT FORMAT SHOULD BE FOLLOWED CAREFULLY

All briefs should be laid out in the same way with a top page in accordance with the specimen layout at Annex C. Those preparing briefs should pay particular attention to ensuring that the following instructions are fully observed:

Content

- (a) Briefs should be concise. Each brief should whenever possible be no more than two sides long.
- (b) The main body of each brief should comprise three sections: a very brief statement of the United Kingdom Objective (normally no more than a couple of lines); a concise list of Points to Make; and a factual Background section which distinguishes clearly between information which can be freely used and information which should not be disclosed.
- (c) Briefs should be complete and self-contained with all the information required on that particular subject.

Layout

- (d) Briefs should be typed in double spacing, using both sides of the paper. Pages should be numbered at the foot of each page.
- (e) As shown in the specimen at Annex C, the top page only of each brief should contain the following details: the symbol and number of the brief in the top left-hand corner (eg JMV(85) 10) with the date of circulation below; a copy number in red at the top right-hand corner; the visit heading; the title of the brief (in capitals) and the name of the Department responsible.
- (f) At the foot of the last page and on the left-hand side, briefs should bear the name of the originating Government Department and the date of origin.

Reproduction

- (g) Briefs should be reproduced throughout on plain white paper, with each page bearing a security classification at top and bottom (as in Annex C). Care should be taken that the reproduction method employed results in clear readable copies.
- (h) It is important that, on arrival at the Cabinet Office, briefs should be complete in all detail - collated, stapled and copy numbered and ready for immediate circulation.

Updating

- (i) If late developments require a brief to be amended or updated, a revise should be prepared. It should be set out in the form described at (e) above, with the brief number amended to show that it is a revise (eg JMV(85) 10 (Revise)). Subsequent revises should be numbered (eg JMV(85) 10 (Revise 2), etc). If it is a question of adding material to the brief rather than revising its existing contents, an addendum may be prepared, in the form described at (e) above with the brief number (eg JMV(85) 10 Addendum) and title to which it relates at the top of the front page. The Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet should be informed when a revise or an addendum is in preparation and also about corrigenda to briefs.
- (j) Additions to the list of briefs in Annex A require the authorisation of the Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet.

[CLASSIFICATION]

ANNEX C

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

[Leave
1½"
margin]

JMV(85) [Serial No as specified in Annex A] COPY NO [in red]

[Date]

ANGLO-FRENCH SUMMIT
18 NOVEMBER 1985

[SUBJECT] [Insert subject in capitals]

Brief by [name of originating Department, eg Foreign and
Commonwealth Office]

[At foot of last page on left-hand side:-]

[Originating Government Department, eg Foreign and Commonwealth
Office or Department of Energy, not a subordinate section or
division]

[Date of origin]

[CLASSIFICATION]

SECRET



3

W
be Sir P.C.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

31 October 1985

Anglo-French Summit

Thank you for your letter of 30 October about the Anglo-French Summit. On reflection, the Prime Minister has decided that changing the date of the Anglo-French Summit causes too many complications and might be embarrassing were it subsequently to become necessary to postpone the Anglo-Irish meeting. She has therefore decided firmly to go ahead with the Anglo-French Summit on Monday 18 November on the explicit and very important condition that it will finish at 1500 hours promptly.

I should be grateful if you could reassure me that arrangements can be made to ensure that the meeting is over by this time. I should be grateful also if you would now ask Mrs Fairweather if she would be able to interpret on 18 November.

I am copying this letter to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(CHARLES POWELL)

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

TJG



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

SUSPENSE

I am dismayed to have to write to you at this late stage to ask you to consider an alternative date for our meeting in London on 18 November. I would not be doing so if the circumstances were not wholly exceptional. Let me explain the background.

You know, I think, that Garret Fitzgerald and I have been discussing for many months the extremely delicate question of relations between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Given the acute sensitivities on both sides, these talks have been conducted in the greatest secrecy. But I am able to tell you in strictest confidence that we are now very near to agreement. If such an agreement is indeed achieved, as I confidently expect, we shall have to move rapidly to signature. Otherwise there is a risk that the agreement will unravel. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this breakthrough. I believe it offers a real opportunity to reduce the level of violence in Northern Ireland and make progress towards reconciliation between the two communities.

After canvassing a wide range of alternatives, we have found that mid-November is literally the only time which both Garret Fitzgerald and myself can manage during the next few weeks. If we were to let it slip, we would risk losing this crucial opportunity.

You will understand that in view of the enormous interest that this will create, the agreement will need to be announced to Parliament at the first opportunity after signature, which may turn out to be the afternoon of 18 November. To wait even a day more would be to risk facing a public outcry which could jeopardise the whole agreement. My statement to Parliament will lead to a difficult discussion for which I shall need to prepare myself very carefully indeed. I fear that it would be impossible for me to do justice to an Anglo/French Summit meeting at the same time. To attempt to do so would be a grave discourtesy to you.

I am very conscious of the extent of inconvenience this will involve for you and I apologise for it. I am asking Sir Robert Armstrong to bring this letter to Paris personally and to explain the circumstances to Monsieur Attali. I do hope you will understand. And I would of course be grateful if you could treat the reasons as very strictly confidential.

I still attach great importance to our having an opportunity to talk together before the Inter-Governmental Conference in Luxembourg in December. It will be an important meeting and we need to prepare carefully for it. We shall also both want, I am sure, to give further impetus to the work that has been done on the Channel Fixed Link since we last met. And there may be important things to discuss on broader international questions on the eve of President Reagan's meeting with Mr. Gorbachev. I very much hope therefore that it will be possible to find an alternative date that would be manageable for us both.

What I would like to suggest is that, given the circumstances, instead of a full Summit format, we should aim on this occasion to have a more intimate meeting, involving just ourselves and our Foreign Ministers. I suggest that, if this is convenient for you, we should try to do this on Saturday 23 November or, if that is not convenient for you, Saturday 16 November. I would be happy to invite you for a

private discussion at Chequers on one of these days. Or, if it would suit you better, I could come to Paris.

Let me say again how very sorry I am to be suggesting this change in our arrangements so late in the day. I would not be doing so for a less compelling reason.

His Excellency Monsieur Francois Mitterrand

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

I am dismayed to have to write to you at this late stage to ask you to consider an alternative date for our meeting in London on 18 November. I would not be doing so if the circumstances were not wholly exceptional. Let me explain the background.

You know, I think, that Garret Fitzgerald and I have been discussing for many months the extremely delicate question of relations between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Given the acute sensitivities on both sides, these talks have been conducted in the greatest secrecy. But I am able to tell you in strictest confidence that we ~~have~~ ^{are} now ~~reached~~ ^{very near to} agreement, ~~and victory to our hope is realised, as I confidently~~ ^{expect, we shall have to move rapidly to signature. Otherwise} on a number of important steps that will be included in a document to be signed in ~~on 15 November. It~~ ^{There is a risk that we agree with unravel. It} would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this break-

through. I believe it offers a real opportunity for making ~~progress towards reconciliation in a murderous conflict which has beset our two peoples for several centuries.~~ ^{to reduce to minimum the level of violence which has beset our two peoples for several centuries.} ~~between the two communities.~~ ^{between the two communities.}

Now that agreement has at last been reached, it is vital to move to signature as soon as possible. The Parliamentary timetable here, which includes the State Opening of Parliament on 6 November followed by a three-day debate on The Queen's speech, blocks out much of the first part of the month and Garret Fitzgerald's timetable is equally intractable. After canvassing a wide range of alternatives, we have found that ~~15~~ ^{mid-} November is literally the only ~~date~~ ^{time} which both Garret Fitzgerald and myself

/ can ...

Such
an
agreement
is
indeed
advised

in manage during the next few weeks. If we were to let it slip, we would risk losing this crucial opportunity.

You will understand that in view of the enormous interest that this will create, the agreement will need to be announced to Parliament at the first opportunity after signature, ^{may)} ~~that means the afternoon of 18 November.~~ ^{which would turn out to be} To wait ^{even a} ~~until the~~ following day ^{more} would be to risk facing a public outcry which could jeopardise the whole agreement. ~~I assure you that I do not exaggerate.~~ My statement to Parliament, ~~even on Monday,~~ ^{difficult} will lead to a heated and emotional discussion for which I shall need to prepare myself very carefully indeed. I fear that it would be impossible for me to do justice to an Anglo/French Summit meeting at the same time. To attempt to do so would be ^a ~~the~~ gravest discourtesy to you.

^{and I apologise for it.} I am very conscious of the extent of inconvenience this will involve for you. I am ~~therefore~~ asking Sir Robert Armstrong to bring this letter to Paris personally and to explain the circumstances to M. Attali. I do hope you will understand. ^{would of course be grateful if you could meet he reasons as ~~some~~ my ~~writing~~ ~~capitalised~~ ^{our}} I still attach great importance to having an opportunity to talk together before the Inter-Governmental Conference in Luxembourg in December. It will be an important meeting and we need to prepare carefully for it. We shall also both want, I am sure, to give further impetus to the work that has been done on the Channel Fixed Link since we last met. And there may be important things to discuss on broader international questions on the eve of ^{President} ~~Ronald~~ Reagan's meeting with Mr Gorbachev. I very

/ much

much hope therefore that it will be possible to find an alternative date that would be manageable for us both.

What I would like to suggest is that, given the circumstances, instead of a full Summit format, we should aim on this occasion to have a more intimate meeting, involving just ourselves and our Foreign Ministers. I suggest that, if this is convenient for you, we should try to do this on Saturday ~~23~~ ^{or, if that is not convenient for you, Saturday 16 November} November, which would involve bringing the Summit forward two days. I would be happy to invite you ^{(for a private discussion at) (one of these days.)} to Chequers on that day. Or, if it would suit you better, I could come to Paris. ~~If this date is not suitable for you, may I propose Saturday 23 November or Sunday 24 November?~~

Let me say again how very sorry I am to be suggesting this change in our arrangements so late in the day. I would not be doing so for a less compelling reason.