

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

12 September 1985

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No; T161/85**

*a MASTER  
OPS*

*Dear Ron,*

I promised to let you have my thoughts on your forthcoming meeting with Gorbachev. Since you will be having a first round with Shevardnadze later this month, it may be best to give you my views now. From what I hear, they may not coincide with all the advice you are getting from your own people. But I think you would expect me to give my own views nonetheless!

As we both expected, Gorbachev is showing himself to be a deft operator. He is playing western public opinion skilfully and for all it's worth. The "Time" interview is just one example. And his performance is spoiled only by the arrogance which he cannot always conceal.

His purpose is, of course, to set opinion in Europe against the United States, to give the impression that the Soviet Union is full of initiatives and original ideas while the United States is flat-footed and unimaginative. After years of deadbeat performances by the Soviet Union on the public relations front, we must not under-estimate the vulnerability of our own public opinion to Gorbachev's more skilful tactics. But it is essential that we should not let him make all the running. Otherwise public attitudes to and expectations from the meeting itself will be irreversibly tilted against you: and this in turn will affect the way in which its results are interpreted. We must - and this is

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something for all western governments - counter Gorbachev's campaign.

But that is only part of what is needed. It is even more important that the United States should show that it has appealing proposals of its own on which you will be prepared to begin the process of negotiation when you and Gorbachev meet. This point goes right to the heart of my perception of your meeting and I should like to spend some time on it.

Clearly we must not build up your first meeting with Gorbachev as a climactic event which will at a stroke cut through the main East/West problems. That way lies certain disappointment. The differences are too profound. But it would be no less a mistake, in my view, to approach it with ambitions that are too modest. I am troubled, in particular, by the notion which is gaining ground that you see the meeting as little more than a "getting to know you" session, whose only other task will be to set an agenda for future work.

It is important that you should take the measure of Gorbachev and his style. It is even more important that he should get the full flavour of your sincerity and seriousness of purpose, the West's greatest single asset. But a meeting limited to this will not satisfy public opinion in Europe that the United States has made a really serious effort to achieve forward movement in East/West relations. If the meeting is to be judged a success, it must give a specific and measurable impetus to negotiations on a wide range of issues, above all arms control. This will mean getting into the substance of the issues. This is not just as a matter of presentation. I believe that the pressures, particularly those of resource allocation, on Gorbachev to advance negotiations on arms control are a good deal stronger than he would have us believe. There may be genuine prospects of useful progress provided that we maintain Western cohesion and, at the same time, show that we are serious in seeking balanced agreements. It remains to be seen whether he wants to, or could, deliver



against the entrenched interests in the Soviet Union. We should put him to the test.

I very much hope therefore that you will feel able to put forward concrete and specific proposals in Geneva. On arms control, you will certainly want to explain to him personally the rationale behind your Strategic Defence Initiative. I would hope that you would also, basing yourself on the four points which we agreed at Camp David, be prepared to put to him proposals on the place of strategic defence in relation to offensive forces and arms control. The key element would of course be deep cuts in offensive weapons. The proposals might also cover the clarification of activities which are permitted and prohibited under the ABM Treaty, commitments not to enter particular phases of defensive programmes before certain specific dates, and a dialogue on the relationship between offensive and defensive forces in the longer term. You might hold out too the prospect of a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty, incorporating a longer period of notice of termination, as part of a package embracing deep cuts in offensive weapons. Thus in the immediate future both sides would agree to an interim framework of restraint on strategic offensive forces as you have suggested; we would maintain and strengthen the existing arms control regime while building a better one for the future. An approach of this kind would not constrain your longer term freedom of manoeuvre on defensive systems, when the way forward on the SDI will be clearer in the light of the research programme.

I believe that agreement in principle on proposals on these lines would enable your talks with Gorbachev to unlock the door to progress in the detailed arms control talks. But I also believe that progress will be maintained only if there is direction from the top by you and Gorbachev and that, for this purpose, you should be thinking in terms of a further meeting at your level within a reasonable time.

I hope that you would also be able to review prospects in



other arms control negotiations, above all chemical weapons about which you know I am particularly concerned. Even if it is not realistic to expect a breakthrough in these areas, it will be a chance for you to bring home to Gorbachev the importance we attach to serious negotiations leading to results; and to bring home to the public that it is the Soviet Union which is reluctant to control or abolish these weapons.

I am sure you will want to raise human rights. Gorbachev showed in London that when confronted with particular human rights issues (including individual cases) he could get tough. We found he reacted most often by hitting back with allegedly bad features of life in the West. This can too easily lead to an argument about the fundamentals of our two systems, or the trading of particular accusations, neither of which in my own experience is likely to get us anywhere in terms of better Soviet behaviour. I found the best tactic was to concentrate instead on putting across to Gorbachev two parallel convictions.

- that we in the West are not in the business of undermining the Soviet state. As I put it to him, we do not see his system through rose-tinted spectacles, but we know we have to live with it in a single world;
  
- nevertheless, human rights in the Soviet Union are our business: not just because both East and West have committed themselves to them at Helsinki: but also because justice at home is more likely to produce stability and responsible behaviour abroad. Our people, on whose beliefs our democratic foreign policy is founded, will continue to demand progress on these matters and the Soviet leadership have to reckon with the force of public opinion in free democratic societies.

I welcome your intention to discuss regional issues. I am sure you will stress in particular how strongly we all feel about Afghanistan. It is high time the Russians did their



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part now to unblock progress towards a settlement: and a timetable for withdrawing their forces is the key. A gesture here would be highly significant for the whole of East-West relations.

This has become a longer message than I intended. And I certainly don't want you to feel that I am lecturing (perish the thought)! These matters are immensely important and difficult to judge. But I am convinced that we must stop Gorbachev's propaganda bandwagon from gaining too much speed before your meeting by making clear now that the US is utterly serious about making the maximum progress at Geneva; and that we must set clear goals for the meeting itself with which our people on both sides of the Atlantic can identify, and by which they can measure the meeting's success.

I should be very ready to discuss these points more fully with Bud McFarlane if you were able to spare him for a day or so to come over as my guest. In the meantime I send you warmest best wishes and my fullest support in the very demanding tasks which you face. We could not have a better or braver champion.

Warm regards

Yours ever

Ronald Reagan

---

The President of the United States of America



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SH



File

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*


12 September 1985

*Dear Sir,*

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

I enclose the signed original of the Prime Minister's message to President Reagan about the US/Soviet Summit. I should be grateful if it could be sent to the Embassy in Washington to pass to the White House. We have already transmitted the text to the White House on the direct telex link.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

*Yours sincerely,*  
  
(CHARLES POWELL)

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*089*



Leave type  
fair: 1 + 4

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

I promised to let you have my thoughts on your forthcoming meeting with Gorbachev. Since you will be having a first round with Shevardnadze later this month, it may be best to give you my views now. From what I hear, they may not coincide with all the advice you are getting from your own people. But I think you would expect me to speak my mind nonetheless!

As we both expected, Gorbachev is showing himself to be a deft operator. He is playing western public opinion skilfully and for all it's worth. The "Time" interview is just one example. <sup>And</sup> His performance is spoiled only by the arrogance which ~~he occasionally breaks through.~~ <sup>he cannot always conceal</sup> I gather that he treated some of your senior senators rather disdainfully.

His purpose is, of course, to set opinion in Europe against the United States, to give the impression that the Soviet Union is full of initiatives and original ideas while the United States is flat-footed and unimaginative. After years of deadbeat performances by the Soviet Union on the public relations front, we must not under-estimate the vulnerability of our own public opinion to his <sup>and Gorbachev's</sup> more skilful tactics. <sup>make all the cunning</sup> But it is essential that we should not let him succeed in his play. Otherwise public attitudes to and expectations from the meeting itself will be irreversibly tilted against you: and this in turn will affect the way in which its results are interpreted. We must - and this is something for all western governments - counter Gorbachev's campaign. [ We must warn our people what to expect and expose his proposals and initiatives for the sham they are. I feel that not enough is yet being done to get this over, though I had a go in my own speech to the International Democratic Union in Washington in July. ]

But that is only part of what is needed. It is even more important that the United States should show that it has fresh and appealing proposals of its own on which you will be



*begin the process of negotiation*

prepared to negotiate when you and Gorbachev meet. This point goes right to the heart of my perception of your meeting and I should like to spend some time on it.

*first meeting*

Clearly we must not build up your ~~encounter~~ with Gorbachev as a climactic event which will at a stroke cut through the main East/West problems. That way lies certain disappointment. The differences are too profound. But it would be no less a mistake, in my view, to approach it with ambitions that are too modest. I am troubled, in particular, by the notion which is gaining ground that you see the meeting as little more than a "getting to know you" session, whose only other task will be to set an agenda for future work.

It is important that you should take the measure of Gorbachev and his style. It is even more important that he should get the full flavour of your sincerity and seriousness of purpose, the West's greatest single asset. But a meeting limited to this will not satisfy public opinion in Europe that the United States has made a really serious effort to achieve forward movement in East/West relations. ~~In the climate which Gorbachev has created it will be essential that,~~ if the meeting is to be judged a success, it ~~should~~ <sup>must</sup> give a specific and measurable impetus to negotiations on a wide range of issues, above all arms control. This will mean getting into the substance of the issues. This is not just as a matter of presentation. I believe that the pressures, particularly those of resource allocation, on Gorbachev to advance negotiations on arms control are a good deal stronger than he would have us believe. There ~~are~~ <sup>may be</sup> genuine prospects of useful progress.

*provided that we maintain Western cohesion and, or balanced could, deliver against the extended interests in the Soviet Union. We should put him to the test*

*the same time, show that we are serious in dealing with him. It remains to be seen whether he wants to, or*

I very much hope therefore that you will feel able to put forward concrete and specific proposals in ~~Vienna~~ <sup>Geneva</sup>. On arms control, you will certainly want to explain to him personally the rationale behind your Strategic Defence Initiative. I would hope that you would also, basing yourself on the four points which we agreed at Camp David, be prepared to put to him proposals ~~in the area~~ <sup>on no place</sup> of strategic defence, *in relation to offensive forces and arms control.*



These might <sup>also</sup> cover the clarification of activities which are permitted and prohibited under the ABM Treaty, commitments not to enter particular phases of defensive programmes before certain specific dates, and a dialogue on the relationship between offensive and defensive forces in the longer term. You might hold out <sup>the</sup> prospect of a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty, incorporating a longer period of notice of termination, as part of a package embracing deep cuts in offensive weapons. Thus in the immediate future both sides would agree to an interim framework of ~~truly mutual~~ restraint on strategic offensive forces as you have suggested; we would maintain and strengthen the existing arms control regime while building a better one for the future. An approach of this kind would not constrain your longer term freedom of manoeuvre of defensive systems, when the way forward on the SDI will be clearer in the light of the research programme.

I believe that agreement in principle on proposals on these lines would enable your talks with Gorbachev to ~~set the framework for a future agreement which the negotiators at Geneva could then flesh out.~~ I believe also that progress will be maintained only if there is direction from the top by you and ~~Mr~~ Gorbachev and that, for this purpose, ~~we~~ you should be ~~seeking~~ a further meeting at your level in say 6 months' time. *within a reasonable time*

I hope that you would also be able to review prospects in other arms control negotiations, ~~MBFR, the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe~~ and above all chemical weapons about which you know I am particularly concerned. Even if it is not realistic to expect a breakthrough in these areas, it will be a change for you to bring home to Gorbachev the importance we attach to serious negotiations leading to results.

I am sure you will want to raise human rights. Gorbachev showed in London that when confronted with particular human rights issues (including individual cases) he could get tough. We found he reacted most often by hitting back with allegedly bad features of life in the West. This can too easily lead to an argument about the fundamentals of our two systems, or the trading of particular accusations, neither of which in my own experience is likely to get us anywhere in terms of better Soviet behaviour. I found the best tactic was to concentrate instead on putting across to Gorbachev two parallel convictions.

- that we in the West are not in the business of undermining the Soviet state. As I put it to him, we do not see his system through rose-tinted spectacles, but we

The key element would of course be deep cuts in offensive weapons. The proposals

thinking in terms of

unlock the door to progress in the detailed arms control talks. But I also believe



know we have to live with it in a single world;

- nevertheless, human rights in the Soviet Union are our business: Not just because ~~these rights are universal~~ <sup>have</sup> ~~and both East and West were committed to them at~~ <sup>themselves to them</sup> Helsinki, but also because justice at home is ~~linked~~ <sup>more likely</sup> with stability, ~~prosperity~~ and responsible behaviour abroad. Our people, ~~on whose beliefs our democratic foreign policy is founded~~, will continue to demand progress on these matters and the Soviet leadership have to reckon with the force of public opinion in a free democratic society.

I welcome your intention to discuss regional issues. I am sure you will stress in particular how strongly we all feel about Afghanistan. It is high time the Russians did their part now to unblock progress towards a settlement: and a timetable for withdrawing their forces is the key. A gesture here would be highly significant for the whole of East-West relations.

This has become a longer message than I intended. And I certainly don't want you to feel that I am lecturing (perish the thought)! These matters are immensely important and difficult to judge. But I am convinced that we must stop Gorbachev's propaganda bandwagon from gaining too much speed before your meeting by making clear <sup>now</sup> that the US ~~will be ready~~ <sup>is already utterly</sup> ~~to make new and far-reaching proposals;~~ <sup>serious about making the maximum progress at Geneva</sup> and that we must set clear goals for the meeting itself with which our people on both sides of the Atlantic can identify, and by which they can measure the meeting's success.

I should be very ready to discuss these points more fully with Bud McFarlane if you were able to spare him for a day or so to come over as my guest. In the meantime I send you warmest best wishes and my fullest support in the very demanding tasks which you face. We could not have a better or braver champion.



D. R.

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C.D.P.

PRIME MINISTER

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

As you requested, I have had a go at producing a message from you to President Reagan about the Summit and I attach the result. Percy Cradock has seen it and approves.

C.D.P.

Charles - brilliant -  
only 2 comments -  
on my memo -  
P.1 the other on  
should report on  
or P.3 where we  
have the  
propaganda  
advantage  
nd

C D POWELL

11 September 1985

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MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

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As we both expected, Gorbachev is showing himself to be a deft operator. He is playing western public opinion skilfully and for all it's worth. The "Time" interview is just one example. And his performance is spoiled only by the arrogance which he cannot always conceal.

His purpose is, of course, to set opinion in Europe against the United States, to give the impression that the Soviet Union is full of initiatives and original ideas while the United States is flat-footed and unimaginative. After years of deadbeat performances by the Soviet Union on the public relations front, we must not under-estimate the vulnerability of our own public opinion to Gorbachev's more skilful tactics. But it is essential that we should not let him make all the running. Otherwise public attitudes to and expectations from the meeting itself will be irreversibly tilted against you: and this in turn will affect the way in which its results are interpreted. We must - and this is something for all western governments - counter Gorbachev's campaign.

But that is only part of what is needed. It is even more important that the United States should show that it has appealing proposals of its own on which you will be prepared to begin the process of negotiation when you and Gorbachev meet. This point goes right to the heart of my perception of your meeting and I should like to spend some time on it.

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Clearly we must not build up your first meeting with Gorbachev as a climactic event which will at a stroke cut through the main East/West problems. That way lies certain disappointment. The differences are too profound. But it would be no less a mistake, in my view, to approach it with ambitions that are too modest. I am troubled, in particular, by the notion which is gaining ground that you see the meeting as little more than a "getting to know you" session, whose only other task will be to set an agenda for future work.

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I very much hope therefore that you will feel able to put forward concrete and specific proposals in Geneva. On arms control, you will certainly want to explain to him personally the rationale behind your Strategic Defence Initiative. I would hope that you would also, basing yourself on the four points which we agreed at Camp David, be prepared to put to him proposals on the place of strategic defence in relation to offensive forces and arms control. The key



D. R.

element would of course be deep cuts in offensive weapons. The proposals might also cover the clarification of activities which are permitted and prohibited under the ABM Treaty, commitments not to enter particular phases of defensive programmes before certain specific dates, and a dialogue on the relationship between offensive and defensive forces in the longer term. You might hold out too the prospect of a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty, incorporating a longer period of notice of termination, as part of a package embracing deep cuts in offensive weapons. Thus in the immediate future both sides would agree to an interim framework of restraint on strategic offensive forces as you have suggested; we would maintain and strengthen the existing arms control regime while building a better one for the future. An approach of this kind would not constrain your longer term freedom of manoeuvre on defensive systems, when the way forward on the SDI will be clearer in the light of the research programme.

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I hope that you would also be able to review prospects in other arms control negotiations, above all chemical weapons about which you know I am particularly concerned. Even if it is not realistic to expect a breakthrough in these areas, it will be a change for you to bring home to Gorbachev the importance we attach to serious negotiations leading to results. *And to bring home to the public that it is the Soviet Union which is reluctant to <sup>control</sup> these weapons.*

I am sure you will want to raise human rights. Gorbachev showed in London that when confronted with particular human rights issues (including individual cases) he could get tough. We found he reacted most often by hitting back with allegedly



bad features of life in the West. This can too easily lead to an argument about the fundamentals of our two systems, or the trading of particular accusations, neither of which in my own experience is likely to get us anywhere in terms of better Soviet behaviour. I found the best tactic was to concentrate instead on putting across to Gorbachev two parallel convictions.

- that we in the West are not in the business of undermining the Soviet state. As I put it to him, we do not see his system through rose-tinted spectacles, but we know we have to live with it in a single world;
  
- nevertheless, human rights in the Soviet Union are our business: not just because both East and West have committed themselves to them at Helsinki: but also because justice at home is more likely to produce stability and responsible behaviour abroad. Our people, on whose beliefs our democratic foreign policy is founded, will continue to demand progress on these matters and the Soviet leadership have to reckon with the force of public opinion in free democratic societies.

I welcome your intention to discuss regional issues. I am sure you will stress in particular how strongly we all feel about Afghanistan. It is high time the Russians did their part now to unblock progress towards a settlement: and a timetable for withdrawing their forces is the key. A gesture here would be highly significant for the whole of East-West relations.

This has become a longer message than I intended. And I certainly don't want you to feel that I am lecturing (perish the thought)! These matters are immensely important and difficult to judge. But I am convinced that we must stop Gorbachev's propaganda bandwagon from gaining too much speed before your meeting by making clear now that the US is utterly serious about making the maximum progress at Geneva; and that we must set clear goals for the meeting itself with which our



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people on both sides of the Atlantic can identify, and by which they can measure the meeting's success.

I should be very ready to discuss these points more fully with Bud McFarlane if you were able to spare him for a day or so to come over as my guest. In the meantime I send you warmest best wishes and my fullest support in the very demanding tasks which you face. We could not have a better or braver champion.

VC3AGZ





MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-930 7022

*com.*  
*48*

MO 14/2V

11th September 1985

*Dear Charles.*

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

Thank you for copying to me your letter of yesterday's date to Peter Ricketts about the Prime Minister's message to President Reagan.

The Defence Secretary is out of London today and I have not been able to discuss your draft with him, but what follows reflects my earlier discussions with him on the FCO draft, about which we spoke on the telephone at the time. I believe that your re-draft both reads better and is much more in line with the Defence Secretary's own preferred approach. There were, however, two general points which struck me about it;

✓ a. The first part of the message implies that Mr Gorbachev's approach is entirely propogandist but the second half suggests that there is scope for an agreement. I wondered if we should not tone down slightly the emphasis on propoganda and bring out more on the arms control front our uncertainty over the Soviet position but the need to put it to the test;

✓ b. The message implies that we are looking to the meeting to produce an agreement. This seems unrealistic. Are we not seeking a framework to be filled in at Geneva (or by some other channel) over a specified period of time? The Defence Secretary is strongly of the view that this process will succeed only if the first meeting is followed fairly quickly by another Summit and I have worked this thought into the attached suggested re-draft of the first paragraph of page 3.

A number of largely drafting points also struck me and are offered in a spirit of helpfulness! I attach at annex a series of amendments which are I hope self-explanatory.

I am copying this letter to Peter Ricketts (FCO).

*Yours ever,*

*Richard Mottram*

(R C MOTTRAM)

C Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



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Page 2, last paragraph, line 2 - Vienna is Geneva.

line 7 to the end of the first paragraph  
on page 3. Could I offer for your consideration a re-ordering  
of this material and a fleshing out along the lines of my  
covering letter, as follows:



ANNEX

SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Page 1, paragraph 2, line 4 - delete last two sentences? I am not sure that Western public opinion noticed the way Gorbachev treated US Senators. ✓

Page 1, paragraph 3, line 8-9 - amend to read:

"tactics. It is essential that we should not let him make all the running. Otherwise...." ✓

Page 2, line 1 - amend to read: ?

"prepared to begin the process of negotiation when...." .

Page 2, 2nd paragraph, line 1 - amend to read:

"....build up your first meeting with..." ✓

Page 2, 3rd paragraph, line 3 - amend to read:

"....full flavour of the United States's - and the West's - genuine commitment to peace and mutual security, our greatest single asset.

lines 7-8 - delete:

"in the climate which Gorbachev has created it will be essential that,"  
(the desire for progress in Europe has not been created by Gorbachev) ✓

last sentence - amend to read:

"There may be genuine prospects of useful progress provided that we maintain Western cohesion and, at the same time, show that we are serious in seeking balanced agreements. It remains to be seen whether he wants to, or could, deliver against the entrenched interests in the Soviet Union: we should put him to the test" ✓



CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 September 1985

Dear Charles,

CD - UK -

US/Soviet Summit

Thank you for your letter of 10 September enclosing a re-draft of the message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan.

The arms control experts here have looked carefully at this. They have suggested a number of small changes marked on the text below - some as you will see intended to avoid the impression that the US will be putting forward new proposals in Geneva. They have also suggested a re-draft of the key arms control paragraph beginning at the bottom of your page 2. This I enclose as a separate draft.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL



[ New  
thought ]

On arms control, I see your meeting as a potential turning-point, offering the chance to take a giant step towards the agreement which we all wish to see concluded under your leadership, but equally risking a period of further frustration if you are unable to get to grips with the substance of these problems. Evidently, as we agreed last December the key priority will be to press Gorbachev for the sort of radical reductions in offensive nuclear forces which he appears willing, ~~or~~ at least in principle, to consider. And I hope that you will also engage him in a substantive exchange of the corollary, the role of defensive forces in the strategic equation. You will certainly want to explain to him personally the rationale behind your Strategic Defence Initiative. But I personally believe it important that you should go further, and outline the sort of wider approach, governing both offensive and defensive developments over a significant period of time, which the logic of the equation dictates.

I recognise the difficulties in accepting at this stage specific constraints beyond those in the ABM Treaty on defensive developments. I therefore see the main aim of your meeting as establishing with Gorbachev not only the extent of bona fides on both sides but, also as finding ways to agree on how the all-important element of predicatability can be built into the strategic balance, allowing offensive force deployments and



programme decisions to be properly matched against the likely development of defensive research over the next decade. The sort of elements which could contribute to this predictability would include:

- an outline of the significant cuts in offensive nuclear forces that both sides would be prepared to take;
- a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty in its present form;
- an agreement on permissible research, including where necessary an agreed clarification of any 'grey areas' especially those that bear on the distinction between research and development;
- a commitment not to enter particular phases of defensive programmes before certain dates;
- a discussion of how to preserve the elements of the SALT agreement which would continue to be relevant, within what you have called this interim framework of agreed restraint;
- to establish a new commitment to compliance with existing agreements, and to cooperation in resolving points of outstanding difficulty.

All this would, of course, need to be backed by a commitment to engage in the sort of serious and sustained dialogue on the relationship between offensive and defensive forces which you have sought to introduce already in the Geneva negotiations and which can be expected to evolve in the light of your own research programme. I realise that this is a full basket of ideas but I hope you will agree that taken together they would represent a real step forward. Obviously, the details will need



<sup>elaboration</sup>  
~~negotiation~~, and I would see much advantage in an  
agreement with Gorbachev on a structured approach  
to these further negotiations.



DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

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X prepared to <sup>discuss</sup> [negotiate] when you and Gorbachev meet. This point goes right to the heart of my perception of your meeting and I should like to spend some time on it.

Clearly we must not build up your encounter with Gorbachev as a climactic event which will at a stroke cut through the main East/West problems. That way lies certain disappointment. The differences are too profound. But it would be no less a mistake, in my view, to approach it with ambitions that are too modest. I am troubled, in particular, by the notion which is gaining ground that you see the meeting as little more than a "getting to know you" session, whose only other task will be to set an agenda for future work.

It is important that you should take the measure of Gorbachev and his style. It is even more important that he should get the full flavour of your sincerity and seriousness of purpose, the West's greatest single asset. But a meeting limited to this will not satisfy public opinion in Europe that the United States has made a really serious effort to achieve forward movement in East/West relations. In the climate which Gorbachev has created it will be essential that, if the meeting is to be judged a success, it should give a specific and measurable impetus to negotiations on a wide range of issues, above all arms control. This will mean getting into the substance of the issues. This is not just a matter of presentation. I believe that the pressures, particularly those of resource allocation, on Gorbachev to advance negotiations on arms control are a good deal stronger than he would have us believe. There are genuine prospects of useful progress.

Geneva  
I very much hope therefore that you will feel able to put forward concrete and specific proposals in [Vienna] [On arms control, you will certainly want to explain to him personally the rationale behind your Strategic Defence Initiative. I would hope that you would also, basing yourself on the four points which we agreed at Camp David, be prepared to put to him proposals in the area of strategic defence.



These might cover for instance agreement on permitted research, a dialogue on the relationship between offensive and defensive forces, and commitments not to enter particular phases of defensive programmes before certain specific dates. This would be part of a wider approach designed to govern both offensive and defensive developments over a significant period of time. It would be combined with proposals for deep cuts in offensive weapons and a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty. The aim would be to achieve predictability in terms of the possible deployment of defensive systems against which offensive force deployments and programme decisions over the next decade could be matched. I believe that proposals on these lines would enable your talks with Gorbachev to unlock the door to progress in Geneva.]

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I hope that you would also be able to review prospects in other arms control negotiations - MBFR, the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe and above all chemical weapons about which you know I am particularly concerned. Even if it is not realistic to expect a breakthrough in these areas, it will be a change for you to bring home to Gorbachev the importance we attach to serious negotiations leading to results.

I am sure you will want to raise human rights. Gorbachev showed in London that when confronted with particular human rights issues (including individual cases) he could get tough. We found he reacted most often by hitting back with allegedly bad features of life in the West. This can too easily lead to an argument about the fundamentals of our two systems, or the trading of particular accusations, neither of which in my own experience is likely to get us anywhere in terms of better Soviet behaviour. I found the best tactic was to concentrate instead on putting across to Gorbachev two parallel convictions.

- that we in the West are not in the business of undermining the Soviet state. As I put it to him, we do not see his system through rose-tinted spectacles, but we



know we have to live with in in a single world;

- nevertheless, human rights in the Soviet Union are our business. Not just because these rights are universal, and both East and West were committed to them at Helsinki: but also because justice at home is linked with stability, prosperity and responsible behaviour abroad. Our people, on whose beliefs our democratic foreign policy is founded, will continue to demand progress on these matters and the Soviet leadership have to reckon with the force of public opinion in a free democratic society.

I welcome your intention to discuss regional issues. I am sure you will stress in particular how strongly we all feel about Afghanistan. It is high time the Russians did their part now to unblock progress towards a settlement: and a timetable for withdrawing their forces is the key. A gesture here would be highly significant for the whole of East-West relations.

This has become a longer message than I intended. And I certainly don't want you to feel that I am lecturing (perish the thought)! These matters are immensely important and difficult to judge. But I am convinced that we must stop Gorbachev's propaganda bandwagon from gaining too much speed before your meeting by making clear <sup>now</sup> that the US <sup>is deeply serious about</sup> ~~will be ready~~ to make new and far-reaching proposals; and that we must set clear goals for the meeting itself with which our people on both sides of the Atlantic can identify, and by which they can measure the meeting's success.

*X*  
 (I know that Geoffrey Howe will be seeing George Shultz later this month on these and other issues.)  
 I should be very ready to discuss these [points] more fully with Bud McFarlane if you were able to spare him for a day or so to come over as my guest. In the meantime I send you warmest best wishes and my fullest support in the very demanding tasks which you face. We could not have a better or braver champion.







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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

10 September 1985

**US/SOVIET SUMMIT**

Len Appleyard's letter of 6 September enclosed a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan about the forthcoming US/Soviet Summit.

The Prime Minister was very far from content with this draft, which she has decided not to send. At her request, I have tried my hand at an alternative version. I do not know whether it will appeal to her any more than the FCO draft. But on a personal basis it would be helpful to have any comments particularly on the arms control aspects by 3.00 pm tomorrow, before I put the draft to her.

BF

I am copying this letter and enclosure on the same personal basis to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

C D POWELL

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

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