

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

This is intended to set guidelines for our discussions of the future of the European Community between now and the June European Council.

PM/85/31

PRIME MINISTER

You have agreed most of the points in it when considering earlier submissions. But you will want to consider carefully the passage on decision-making (para. 13-15): now far more modest than earlier FCO proposals. You may also like to discuss with Development of the European Community Sir G. Howe.

1. At the European Council it was agreed that the Dooge Committee should be wound up, and that there should now be consultations between governments before the substantive discussion at the Milan European Council in June.

Agree the outline guidelines?  
CDP  
16/4

2. We have, therefore, secured our objective here, as we have been able to do with the commitments to Budget discipline and to completion of the internal market, the change in direction in the CAP, and the Fontainebleau settlement itself.

Yes  
no

3. We have succeeded in this way because we have - as Delors acknowledged at a Community meeting the other day - clearer ideas than most about where we want the Community to go. By pursuing these consistently, in bilateral contacts and at Brussels, we have been able successfully to influence the Community's agenda. We

CONFIDENTIAL





need now to consider the next phase, for the run-up and follow-up to the Milan June Summit.

#### THE FRENCH AND GERMANS

4. It is my strong impression that the German Government want to try to work out something to which we can agree. In the end they took a sensible line at Brussels on an inter-governmental conference. We have urged them to aim for practical results from the June European Council. I hope this will have an increasing effect on their approach; but it is likely to remain irritatingly erratic.

5. We have both been wondering about Mitterrand's promised "surprise" initiative. Mitterrand's staff tell us that he has not yet decided what precise form this will take. The options include proposals for an extension of majority voting (ie a reduction in the number of Treaty articles requiring unanimity); completion of the internal market; an agreement on political cooperation; some largely cosmetic measures vis-a-vis the European Parliament; and increased cooperation in areas not covered by the Treaties - health, education, culture, internal security, etc. Mitterrand may propose that some more formal status might be given to the European Council. The French talk as





though they would be prepared to consider putting some or all of the above in a new agreement or Treaty. But as you know, I do not believe that the French would really be prepared to go much further than we can on most of the issues - whether majority voting, the powers of the Parliament or the formalisation of political cooperation.

Mitterrand may calculate that he can rely on us to block anything which gives the French real difficulty.

6. Many of the ideas being aired by the French, including a new Treaty, appeal, at least emotionally, to others of the original Six. They know, however, that anything which amended the existing Treaties could not be implemented without our agreement. This reinforces the desire which all of them, particularly Dumas, have expressed to work out something which we could agree.

7. Against this characteristically uncertain background, our handling of these issues will be very important to the outcome in June and thereafter. Much will depend on the Franco-German relationship. Despite the public display of cooperation, the French have been finding as much difficulty as we have in their dealings with the Germans, and for the same reasons. They will persevere: not only because they share our interest in keeping the Germans firmly tied into the west European system, but





also because it suits them well to claim that Franco-German cooperation is the key to the development of the Community.

8. Things have, however, moved on a good deal from earlier doctrinal arguments. No one now seriously suggests that a federalist structure is appropriate for a Community of Twelve. Some far-fetched ideas have, of course, been put forward. But thanks to Malcolm Rifkind's efforts in the Dooge Committee and our bilateral contacts with other member governments, we have been able to let much of the air out of this balloon and to get matters moving in a direction we could accept.

9. There is an element of theatre in Mitterrand's approach. But both he and Kohl want something to come of all this because of their genuine concern about the functioning of the enlarged Community. As we saw round the Council table in Brussels, neither is yet fully committed to the idea of a conference, though Mitterrand may still be leaning in that direction.

10. This is something we would prefer to avoid. It would quickly turn into a propaganda exercise with others trying to demonstrate how "European" they can be when it comes to the rhetoric, though not in other more practical





respects. We should insist that these questions should be decided on by the heads of government themselves. We have found some response in both Paris and Bonn to our proposal that the Milan European Council should itself proceed to take decisions on a package of measures which would be seen as a practical development of what has so far been achieved. If further decisions are required thereafter, they should be taken at the December European Council. We should continue to press this line - particularly with the Italians, who may be persuaded that it is likely to be the best way for them to be able to take some of the credit for the next steps.

#### POLITICAL COOPERATION

11. Our success with this approach will depend to a large extent on the shape of the package which is on offer at Milan. What might this be? There is no doubt that Kohl attaches great importance to the formalisation of political cooperation in a new agreement. The French will certainly go along with that. We have always played a leading role in political cooperation and can accept a formal agreement, though it must of course be drafted in such a way as not to tie our hands if we should need to take action ourselves. Others will accept this and the French certainly would not agree to anything that would tie their hands. I suggest that we should aim to produce





our own draft agreement on political cooperation. First, because I believe this would make a very considerable impression on Chancellor Kohl. Second, because whoever puts forward their own ideas will be able to oblige the others to work on that basis. I am in the process of considering a possible text, which I will in due course pass on to you. If you are content with it, you might give it privately to Chancellor Kohl at Chequers. This would help to head him in the direction we want. Depending on his reactions, our draft might subsequently be passed privately to one or two of the other heads of government. It should then form a central part of whatever agreement is reached in June. This would be an intergovernmental agreement. There is no question of bringing political cooperation under the Treaty of Rome, though there should of course be a preambular reference to the cooperation of the participating countries on other matters under the Treaty.

#### INTERNAL MARKET

12. We must also work between now and the Milan Summit to advance our objectives on the internal market. As you know, Delors is strongly committed to progress. To give effect to the Brussels European Council conclusions on the need to achieve a common market by 1992, he will be producing a detailed timetable for action, probably in





June. This will no doubt include some proposals which could give us difficulty. We must therefore aim to influence the Commission's thinking at the drafting stage by steering them towards what is politically feasible over the next few years, and away from issues like tax approximation which are not going to be agreed. Since the Dutch and ourselves will have to carry this forward during our Presidencies next year, the Commission should have an interest in producing a programme with which we can broadly agree. But we will still need to be ready once the Commission's programme has been produced to counter with our own ideas for priorities and targets, covering not only our traditional concerns, but also the outcome of further work on our long term objectives in the internal market, on which Norman Tebbit is currently engaged. We will need to pull these elements together in our own timetable. Another priority will be to carry forward your initiative on deregulation, both in bilateral contacts with our Community partners over the next few months, and at the Milan European Council itself. I shall raise these issues with Delors at Chevening on 13 May. You will want to use your talk with Kohl to get a firmer German commitment to real progress on the internal market.



DECISION TAKING

13. There will be concern on the part of the others also to reach agreement on decision taking. Here too we should aim to achieve something positive which would not only protect but advance our interests. We share the genuine concern that is felt throughout the Community about the inordinate delays, with the attendant risks of undesirable trade-offs, which could arise in a Community of Twelve if the Council continues to seek consensus on every issue, however trivial. There is also a recognition, whatever others like at times to pretend, that no member state is really prepared to see itself voted down on a vitally important matter. The French idea is that the number of articles of the Treaty requiring unanimity might be reduced, though - and this is the crucial point - this would always be subject to the right to invoke a vital national interest. This idea would have much greater attractions for us if it were accompanied by formalisation of the Luxembourg compromise in the Treaty, since we would be getting the Luxembourg Compromise not just maintained but reinforced. By giving us juridical certainty, this would be a major prize. I am sceptical, however, as to whether it could be secured, even though the Dutch and Germans have said they might be prepared to consider it.





14. We should bear in mind, however, the possibility of using the abstention procedure (article 148 of the Treaty) to get progress on the internal market. If the European Council were to lay down that certain specific steps, eg in relation to the liberalisation of transport policy, insurance, etc, were to be taken by given dates as part of the process of completing the common market by 1992, the heads of government might consider stipulating that, since the objective had been set, Member States should not make use of the unanimity rule to impede implementation of what the European Council had already decided. This would be a political understanding, along the lines of the suggestion which you made in Dublin. It would not require Treaty amendment, and would leave the juridical position intact.

15. On decision taking generally, I consider that we should continue to take the following line:

(a) The European Council should not have to deal with matters that can be disposed of by the Council of Ministers. The Italian Presidency insisted that enlargement issues had to be resolved in the Foreign Affairs Council. Their success shows that this can be done. The European Council must be left free to





debate the larger issues and give a strategic direction to the Community's activities.

(b) The Council of Ministers must not deal with matters that can be dealt with by COREPER. Just as the Council can be directed by the European Council, so COREPER should be directed by the Council of Ministers. We must get other Member States to give the kind of delegated authority to their permanent representatives which we are prepared to give to ours.

(c) We should aim for a statement from the European Council that there can be more majority voting within the existing provisions of the Treaty on non-sensitive issues. It must remain for the Presidency to decide when votes are to be taken. Once again there would be no need for Treaty amendment. Use can also be made of the abstention procedure. It must remain open to any Member State to insist on discussion continuing until unanimous agreement is reached when very important national interests genuinely are at stake. To prevent abuse any Member State insisting that the discussion continue should be required through a special





procedure of the Council formally to explain why very important interests are in fact at stake. The purpose of this is to prevent the sort of abuses we have witnessed from the Greeks and Danes, and in those cases to oblige foreign ministers to account for the actions of their colleagues in the specialist councils. Once again we might consider giving Kohl a paper setting out what conclusions of the European Council we could accept on decision taking. I shall be letting you have a draft that we can consider.

#### THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

16. Others will continue to profess enthusiasm for giving some greater power to the Parliament. The French, however, do not want any real increase in the Parliament's powers. We should point out that the expansion of the Parliament's budgetary powers in 1975, far from reducing, has markedly increased friction with the Council. What is required is for the Parliament to make a more effective contribution through the use of the powers it already enjoys. This should be done by improvement and extension of the conciliation procedure, and in particular by more effective consultation between the Council and the Parliament at earlier stages of the





CONFIDENTIAL

consideration of proposals. The Parliament should make more use of its right to put forward proposals for consideration by the Council. Once again this can be done within the existing Treaty powers; there can be no question of extending these. I suspect that when other governments come to consider - as we have done - the realities of this subject, our line will gather increasing support.

17. Some of the others will start by wanting to go further than this, or at least by pretending that they want to do so. I think it most important that we should not sit back and let them come to us with their ideas.

We should use the period ahead to steer them in the direction we want. I believe that we shall best be able to do this by retaining the initiative, and developing our own ideas on the lines I have described.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office



15 April 1985

CONFIDENTIAL





15 APR 1985



1103





Comments given to  
Mr. Deminck.

GO.  
[Pol. Coop. in the EC].

1. This is the present state of the draft on political cooperation.
2. The preamble makes clear that the Community as such could have no competence in the matter, i.e. it is an agreement between the member states. There could be no jurisdiction for the Court or other Community institutions.
3. Except for paragraphs 19 and 20, all the language is in existing agreed documents.
4. All the agreement does, therefore, is codify existing practice. But the provisions in paragraphs 4 and 6 and 10 to 13 could give us additional help on some issues, e.g. the Falklands, and put more pressure on the Greeks.
5. Paragraphs 17 and 18 are essential for Kohl. The Irish may have to enter reservations about them, but that is their problem. Paragraph 19 is desirable. It is what we want and would put more pressure on the French over the European Fighter Aircraft.
6. Grateful for any personal thoughts before this is submitted here.



CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT AGREEMENT ON POLITICAL COOPERATIONI) Introduction

1. The Member States of the European Community, mindful of the many agreements which already bind them, notably the Treaties of Rome and Paris, have decided to confirm and strengthen the commitments they have undertaken in European Political Cooperation so as to <sup>enable them</sup> ~~provide a secure~~ <sup>to act jointly more open & more effectively</sup> ~~and lasting basis for joint action~~ in world affairs.

II) Objectives

2. The Member States undertake to work for the following objectives, for which purpose they have established European Political Cooperation:

- To <sup>develop</sup> ~~ensure~~ by means of regular consultations and exchanges of information <sup>to broad similarity views</sup> ~~mutual understanding~~ as regards the main problems of international relations.
- To ensure that their combined influence is deployed in the most effective way through the <sup>coordination</sup> ~~harmonisation~~ of their views, the alignment of their positions and, particularly, joint action.

CONFIDENTIAL



## CONFIDENTIAL

- Progressively, to aim towards a common external policy.

III) Basic Principles

3. Member States will consult on all important questions of Foreign Policy, including the political and economic aspects of security.

4. Such consultations will <sup>as a rule</sup> take place before Member States adopt final positions on major Foreign Policy questions of interest to them all.

5. Each Member State will take full account of the position of its partners and give due weight to the desirability of the adoption and implementation of common European positions when working out national positions and taking national action.

6. Member States will avoid action likely to damage their joint reputation as a coherent force in international relations.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

IV) Structure

7. The instruments of Political Cooperation will operate under the general guidance of the European Council. The structure is set out in Annex I, which may be amended by unanimous agreement.

V) Relations with the Institutions of the European  
Communities

8. Member States will ensure maximum coherence between the external policies of the Community and the policies agreed in European Political Cooperation. To this end the Commission will be fully associated with Political Cooperation. In particular, unless in any particular case all Member States agree to the contrary, the Commission will be invited to all meetings of Political Cooperation.

9. Member States will ensure that the European Parliament is informed of developments in Political Cooperation.

CONFIDENTIAL



## CONFIDENTIAL

VI) The Ten in International Organisations

10. Member States will work for common positions in international organisations and at major international conferences attended by one or more of them and covering questions dealt with in Political Cooperation.

11. Paras 4 and 5 above will apply to actions by Member States in such organisations on questions involving all Member States.

12. Para 6 above will also apply in such organisations.

13. In particular a Member State will not support a resolution in such organisations which directly criticises, or might gravely affect the vital interests of, another Member State. Member States will also avoid a situation where one or more of them co-sponsor a resolution which another or others of them intend to oppose.

VII) Contacts with Third Countries

14. With the aim of making their joint diplomacy effective, the Member States will ensure that Political

CONFIDENTIAL



## CONFIDENTIAL

Cooperation establishes the necessary contacts with third countries and regional groupings of interest to the Ten.

VIII) Missions of Member States

15. The Member States will work to intensify cooperation between their missions in third countries and in international organisations. The aim of such cooperation will be to enable missions to perform their functions more effectively and economically through mutual assistance, shared facilities, shared information and joint action.

16. In particular Member States will work both to take advantage of local opportunities, and to establish general schemes, for strengthened cooperation in third countries on the matters listed in Annex III, which may be amended by unanimous agreement.

IX) Security

17. The Member States agree that closer European cooperation on security matters is an essential component of the effort to develop Europe's external political identity. The aim of such cooperation will be to

CONFIDENTIAL



## CONFIDENTIAL

maximise the contribution Member States can make to the objectives of the organisations specifically established to guarantee Western security, in particular the Atlantic Alliance and the Western European Union.

18. The Member States will develop and strengthen consultation on security problems in European Political Cooperation. They will in particular exchange information and views on the effect on their security interests of international developments. They will work to concert their position on the major problems posed by the preservation of peace in Europe.

19. Member States will also work to enhance their contribution to the objectives of the Alliance and other relevant bodies by strengthened cooperation in the joint design, development and production of military equipment and systems.

20. The Member States are determined to maintain the technological and industrial conditions necessary for their security. They will work both individually and, as appropriate, through their joint institutions for this end.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX I: THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL COOPERATION

(a) The Presidency of Political Cooperation will be held by the same Member State as holds the Presidency of the Communities.

(b) The Presidency will be responsible for the day to day management of Political Cooperation. It will in particular be responsible for the timetable and other arrangements for meetings, and for the preparation of and circulation of drafts, agendas, conclusions and other necessary texts.

(c) Foreign Ministers will discuss Political Cooperation matters formally at least four times per year, and informally as appropriate. These discussions may take place on the same occasion as meetings of Ministers in the Community framework.

(d) Political Directors will meet monthly in the Political Committee in order to maintain the continuity of Political Cooperation and to prepare discussions among Ministers.

(e) Working Groups of experts from Member States' Foreign Ministries, whether of a continuing nature or ad hoc to deal with particular problems, will meet as directed by the Political Committee.

CONFIDENTIAL



## CONFIDENTIAL

(f) The Political Committee or, if necessary, a Ministerial meeting, will convene within 48 hours at the request of three Member States.

(g) The Presidency will be assisted by a small Secretariat based in the main place of work of the Community. The office space and services will be provided by the Council Secretariat. The Head of the Secretariat will be appointed by agreement among the Member States.

(h) The functions of the Secretariat, which will work under the direction of the Presidency, will include those set out in Annex II, which may be amended by unanimous agreement.

(i) As is required by their functions the Head and Members of the Secretariat will be free to attend relevant meetings held in the Community framework.

(j) Formal Political Cooperation meetings at Ministerial level may take place in the capital of the Presidency. At official level they will normally take place at the Community's places of work unless otherwise agreed.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX II: FUNCTIONS OF THE POLITICAL COOPERATIONSECRETARIAT

The Secretariat will:

- (a) Advise the Presidency as necessary on the conduct of Political Cooperation, in particular in maintaining coherence between the external policies of the Community and the policies agreed in European Political Cooperation.
- (b) Provide support for Political Cooperation meetings - including as necessary the preparation and circulation of texts, keeping of records and preparation of conclusions.
- (c) Assist the Presidency in the preparation of texts to be issued on behalf of the Member States including replies to European Parliament questions.
- (d) Keep a Political Cooperation archive.
- (e) Prepare, and to update as necessary, a full codification of Political Cooperation rules and practices.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX III: AREAS FOR COOPERATION AMONG MEMBER STATES'  
MISSIONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES

1. Exchange of Political and Economic Information.
2. Shared Information on Administrative Problems.
3. Mutual Assistance and Sharing of Organisational Infrastructure.
4. Cooperation on Communications.
5. Exchange of Information and Joint Planning for Local Crises.
6. Cooperation on local Security Measures.
7. Cooperation on Consular Matters.
8. Cooperation on Health Matters.
9. Cooperation on Information Matters.
10. Cooperation on Cultural Matters.
11. Cooperation on Development Aid Matters.

CONFIDENTIAL



RT (15)

GRS 920

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED  
AMENDED DISTRIBUTION

FM BONN 271935Z MAR 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 291 OF 27 MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS

INFO PRIORITY FCO

MWE 013/11	
RECEIVED IN ROME LISBON, 27 MAR 1985	
DEPT OFF SEC	
INTELV	RA
	✓ 8

10 German Views  
1.4

EUROPEAN UNION: GERMAN VIEWS

SUMMARY

STUTT GART AND FONTAINEBLEU HAD CLEARED THE WAY FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS EUROPEAN UNION. 1985 OFFERED AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY. DOOGE COMMITTEE HAD IDENTIFIED KEY ISSUES. FRANCE AND FRG KEEN TO GO AHEAD. BENELUX AND ITALY PROBABLY TOO. BRITAIN ALSO, BUT HOW FAR, NOT CLEAR. POINTS FRG WANTED OUT OF DOOGE. BRITISH ATTITUDES EVOLVING. THAT ENCOURAGING. PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS NOT TOO BAD. UNANIMITY IMPORTANT BUT THE SLOWEST SHIP MUST NOT HOLD UP THE CONVOY. CONCEPTS OF 'CORE EUROPE' EXAMINED.

1. YESTERDAY AT A SEMINAR IN BONN, TELTSCHIK, THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR'S PRINCIPAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER, DELIVERED AN ADDRESS ENTITLED 'THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'.

2. TELTSCHIK SPOKE AS FOLLOWS. EUROPEAN STATESMEN HAD TO DEAL WITH DIFFICULT DAY TO DAY PROBLEMS AND THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNITY. WITHOUT A COMMITMENT TO THE LATTER, THE COMMUNITY COULD NOT PROGRESS. MUCH HAD BEEN ACHIEVED AT STUTT GART AND FONTAINEBLEAU. THAT RANGE OF PROBLEMS SOLVED, IMPORTANT TASKS WERE WAITING. DID THE CONDITIONS EXIST FOR A NEW STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF:

- ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION,
- A COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY,
- A POLITICAL UNION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON INSTITUTIONS.

3. TELTSCHICK BELIEVED THAT 1985 OFFERED AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY. IT ~~WAS~~ WOULD BE UP TO THREE GOVERNMENTS - THE FRENCH, THE GERMAN AND THE BRITISH. 1985 OFFERED THE FOLLOWING ADVANTAGES. THERE WAS WIDE RANGING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE THREE GOVERNMENTS ON KEY FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY ISSUES AND, IN GROWING MEASURE, ON ECONOMIC ISSUES TOO. IN ALL 1 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THERE WAS RECOGNITION THAT MANY PROBLEMS EG OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY, UNEMPLOYMENT, R AND D AND ENVIRONMENT COULD NO LONGER BE SATISFACTORY DEALT WITH AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL ALONE. ALL THREE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT HAD SPOKEN OUT FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF THE COMMUNITY, IN PARTICULAR

<sup>1</sup>  
RESTRICTED

2/



IN THE FOREIGN, SECURITY AND ECONOMIC SPHERES. BETWEEN THE THREE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, A CLOSE PERSONAL CONFIDENCE EXISTED. FINALLY, THE THREE GOVERNMENTS HAD IN FRONT OF THEM AN ELECTION FREE YEAR.

4. TELTSCHIK NOTED THAT THE DOOGE COMMITTEE REPORT IDENTIFIED THREE ITEMS AS KEY COMPONENTS OF A EUROPEAN UNION - THE GOAL OF COMMON FOREIGN POLICY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON SECURITY POLICY AND THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION. IN JUNE THE QUESTION WHETHER THERE WAS A CONSENSUS TO TAKE A QUALITATIVE STEP FORWARD, WOULD ARISE. KOHL AND MITTERAND WERE FIRMLY DETERMINED TO GO IN THE DIRECTION OF EUROPEAN UNION. ITALY AND THE BENELUX WOULD PROBABLY JOIN IN. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO GO AS FAR AS POSSIBLE IN THE SAME DIRECTION: HOW FAR, WAS NOT CLEAR. OTHER GOVERNMENTS WERE LIKELY TO BE MORE HESITANT. TURNING TO METAPHOR, TELTSCHIK SAID THAT SIX OR SEVEN GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO A 100 METRES, ONE OR TWO ONLY 40, TWO OR THREE PROBABLY ONLY 10. SHOULD THE DECISION BE FOR 100 OR 40? NO WAY SHOULD IT BE FOR 10. IF OTHERS WOULD JOIN IN, MITTERAND AND KOHL WOULD GO FOR THE FURTHEST REACHING PROPOSAL. BUT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD DO EVERYTHING TO FIND A CONSENSUS WHICH BRITAIN COULD JOIN. IN ANY CASE, THE DOOR WOULD NOT BE CLOSED ON THOSE NOT YET READY.

5. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD WORK TO RETURN TO THE RULES OF MAJORITY VOTING IN THE TREATY. THE DOOGE COMMITTEE OFFERED TWO OPTIONS. THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT ALSO WANTED TO STRENGTHEN THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION. A FURTHER AIM OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS TO STRENGTHEN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT WHICH SHOULD HAVE A SAY IN THE FORMATION OF COMMUNITY POLICY AND GRADUALLY DEVELOP INTO A REAL LEGISLATURE. TELTSCHIK NOTED THAT THE SOLEMN DECLARATION REFERRED TO THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE TOTALITY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES INTO A EUROPEAN UNION AS A GOAL. PROGRESS WOULD BE REVIEWED IN 1988 TO SEE WHETHER WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED COULD BE PUT INTO A TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION.

6. TURNING TO THE QUESTION OF HOW REAL THIS PROSPECT WAS FOR A TWELVE MEMBER COMMUNITY, TELTSCHIK SAID THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS CONVINCED THAT REAL PROGRESS COULD ONLY BE ACHIEVED IF IT WERE TREATY BASED. FRANCE SEEMED SIMILARLY MINDED. AS FOR THE BRITISH, THEIR POSITION WAS EVOLVING. TELTSCHIK QUOTED FROM 'EUROPE - THE FUTURE' AND, MORE EXTENSIVELY FROM YOUR ARTICLE IN HANDELSBLATT ON 31 DECEMBER. ENCOURAGED BY THESE REFERENCES, TELTSCHIK SUGGESTED THAT IF BENELUX, ITALY AND IRELAND WERE ALSO READY, THE CHANCES FOR A TREATY BASED EUROPEAN UNION WERE NOT TOO BAD.

7. TELTSCHIK THEN ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER PROGRESS COULD IN FACT BE ACHIEVED IF ALL MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY WERE NOT READY TO GO FORWARD. HE REFERRED TO THE CONCEPT OF A CORE EUROPE WITHIN THE COMMUNITY THAT TRIED TO HANDLE MATTERS ALREADY PART OF THE ACQUIS, POCO MATTERS AND OTHERS OUTSIDE THE TREATY, SUCH AS CULTURE. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD REQUIRE THE AGREEMENT OF ALL, THOSE

<sup>2</sup>  
RESTRICTED

20



## RESTRICTED

NOT READY TO JOIN IMMEDIATELY COULD DO SO LATER. A FURTHER POSSIBILITY WOULD BE A 'CORE EUROPE' THAT CONCENTRATED ON AREAS OUTSIDE THE TREATY OF ROME AND WAS ESTABLISHED WITHOUT THE ACQUISITION OF THE SUCH A UNION WOULD BE A PROVISIONAL STRUCTURE, SUI GENERIS, OUTSIDE THE COMMUNITY. THAT COULD BE, BUT DID NOT HAVE TO BE, DANGEROUSLY DIVISIVE IE PROVIDED IT DID NOT EXCLUDE FURTHER PROGRESS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY AND WAS OPEN TO PARTICIPATION BY OTHER MEMBER STATES AT DIFFERENT LEVELS.

### COMMENT

B. TELTSCHIKS ADDRESS COVERS FAMILIAR GROUND. BUT IN DOING SO OFFERS A HANDY ACCOUNT, IN EXTENSO, OF GERMAN ASPIRATIONS. HIS PRESENTATION IS REASONABLE, UNPOLEMICAL AND FREE OF EXTRAVAGANT FLIGHTS OF FANCY. NOTEWORTHY ARE HIS QUOTATIONS FROM BRITISH SOURCES AND HIS EXPLICIT RECOGNITION OF BRITAIN'S CENTRAL ROLE. (FULL TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG).

FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO:

NO 10 - POWELL

FCO - BRAITHWAITE, RENWICK, FAIRWEATHER

CAB OFF - WILLIAMSON, JAY

~~ADVANCED~~ AS REQUESTED

BULLARD

FRAME INSTITUTIONAL  
ECO (1)