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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 March 1985

Dear Charles,

Cyprus: Prime Minister's Meeting with Kyprianou:  
8 March

You asked us to consider ways in which the message we wish President Kyprianou to accept could best be presented.

Probably the most effective approach would be for the Prime Minister to stress argument (a) on the first page of the briefing rather than argument (c). She could then deploy the argument that the new situation, which would be created if Kyprianou endorsed the 17 January documentation, would put us in a better position to renew our approaches on the Turkish side to urge flexibility and cooperation in the negotiations, and restraint on constitutional developments in the north. This is the approach most likely to appeal to Kyprianou.

Having said that, we believe the basic message, that Kyprianou must accept the substance of the 17 January documentation if progress is to be made, should be spelled out very plainly. If Kyprianou fails to understand what is required, or dodges the issue, the UN Secretary General's initiative will be imperilled. This would be a serious development which would risk jeopardising the stability of the island and the Aegean as well as our own interests in Cyprus. In addition:

- (a) the Secretary-General has specifically asked us to make clear to Kyprianou what he requires of him;
- (b) a more oblique approach would reinforce Kyprianou's tendency to try to interpret his meetings with the Prime Minister in terms of the advantages they reap for him in political terms at home and abroad without in practice taking the sensible advice which he gets. We have to make him understand that he has to take some tough decisions now, which cannot realistically be evaded.

Yours we,  
L V Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

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