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MR POWELL

The Geneva Talks: Mr McFarlane's Briefing

Purely on the basis of press reports of last night's statements in Geneva, I have jotted down a list of questions which the Prime Minister might wish to put to Mr McFarlane this morning, if they are not covered in his opening presentation. They are intended to supplement, not to supersede, the questions and areas for discussion already identified in the material which I sent to you on 7 January.

*Bryan Cartledge -*

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9 January 1985





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The Geneva Talks: Additional Questions for Mr McFarlane

1. Is it envisaged that the separate negotiating teams on strategic and intermediate range nuclear force reductions will begin from where the former START and INF negotiations left off?
2. What price, if any, did the United States have to pay to keep the resumed negotiations on INF separate? If no concessions were made to secure this, what has happened to the Soviet refusal to resume negotiations without, e.g. a moratorium on Cruise and Pershing deployment; and to their insistence that any resumed negotiation would be "new"? Will the definitions of "Strategic" and "Intermediate" offensive weapons remain as before?
3. Is it envisaged that the three sets of negotiations (Strategic, Intermediate and Outer Space) will have a common schedule, i.e. that they will take place simultaneously and over equal periods of time? How do the Americans envisage averting Soviet attempts to hold one set of negotiations hostage to the other two?
4. Secretary Shultz apparently referred in his statement last night to a possible "revision" of the ABM Treaty: could Mr McFarlane expand on this?
5. What, in general, were the points of greatest difficulty in the talks, which on the face of it, seem to have achieved much more than most observers expected at the outset?

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