

CC OPS
MASTER.



SUBJECT
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 1A/85

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

3.1.85

Dear President Gorbachev,

Thank you for the message which Mr. Gorbachev conveyed to me on your behalf on 16 December.

I too found our own talk last February very valuable. I appreciated the opportunity of a more detailed exchange of views with Mr. Gorbachev, which I believe helped to increase our mutual understanding of one another's concerns. I am sure that Mr. Gorbachev will have reported my views to you.

I hope there will be more such exchanges at this and other levels. If we make a steady and consistent effort to increase them in all areas of interest to our two countries they could help us to achieve greater mutual trust and confidence. This is the only way in which lasting progress in the field of arms control can be achieved. We should work on the basis of mutual respect for each other's legitimate security interests and a clear acknowledgement of the differences between our two systems.

You referred to the importance you attached to the forthcoming talks in Geneva with the United States. I discussed these talks extensively with President Reagan on 22 December. He plainly shares your view of their importance, and so do I. I can assure you that President Reagan is determined to seek positive results.

/The President

The President and I discussed the implications of current research into strategic defence systems, and of the work already in hand in this area by the Soviet Union. I agreed with President Reagan that the aim of resumed negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union should be to achieve for each balanced and enhanced security, with reduced levels of offensive forces on both sides. I welcome and endorse this approach. It reflects the search by countries of the Western Alliance for greater international stability and security. I feel sure that this approach will also correspond to Soviet interests.

1985 offers genuine opportunities for tackling the most fundamental question affecting our two countries and their allies. I recognise the considerable problems that will confront all of us in our efforts to make the world a safer place, and to divert more of our resources away from military expenditure into other fields of benefit to our peoples. I believe, however, that the will now exists on all sides to begin this process.

It is in this spirit that I send my greetings and sincere good wishes to you, President Chernenko, and to the Soviet Government, in the expectation that all concerned will now make the effort to translate our hopes into concrete achievements.

Yours sincerely
Ronald Reagan

His Excellency Mr. Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko.



10 DOWNING STREET

3 January, 1985

From the Private Secretary

Message to Mr. Chernenko

Thank you for your letter of 3 January enclosing a draft message from the Prime Minister to Mr. Chernenko.

The Prime Minister would have preferred a message with rather more substance to it but concedes that this is not now feasible in the time available before the US/Soviet talks begin in Geneva. She has therefore approved the text enclosed with your letter with some amendments. I enclose a revised version and should be grateful if it could be telegraphed to Moscow for delivery as soon as possible.

The press line proposed in your letter seems very sensible.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

C. D. POWELL

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Reply to Chernenko

You might like to see the draft reply to Chernenko now, in case there are points which you want to raise with Geoffrey Howe this afternoon.

2. I attach Chernenko's message to you; e the text which you e President Reagan agreed in Washington. C.D.P. 3/1

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 January 1985

Dear Charles,

Message to Mr Chernenko

At her meeting on 16 December with Mr Gorbachev the latter conveyed a message to the Prime Minister from Mr Chernenko (copy enclosed). The Prime Minister said that she would send a considered reply.

In paragraph 2 of your letter of 23 December enclosing records of the Prime Minister's meetings with President Reagan at Camp David, you noted the Prime Minister's comment that we should draw on the text agreed with the Americans on the SDI in preparing a draft reply to President Chernenko's message.

I enclose a draft reply. Subject to the Prime Minister's comments a final text could be telegraphed to Moscow with instructions to Sir Iain Sutherland to deliver it before the US/Soviet talks in Geneva on 7/8 January.

The fact that a reply to President Chernenko's message had been delivered will probably become known to the press. Pravda would certainly report a call on either Mr Chernenko or Mr Gromyko. Clearly the content of the message should remain confidential but the press might be told that the reply referred to our approach to the development of our bilateral relations and to other international issues including the resumed US/Soviet negotiations at Geneva where we hoped to see real progress towards achieving increased security at reduced levels of weapons.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT ON SDI AT PRESS CONFERENCE
IN WASHINGTON ON 22 DECEMBER AS AGREED WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN

President Reagan and I have had a very thorough and extensive discussion of the prospects for arms control negotiations, in the course of which we also naturally touched on the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI).

I was not surprised to discover that we see matters in very much the same light. I told the President that I had made it absolutely clear to Mr. Gorbachev that there was no question of the Soviet Union being able to divide the United Kingdom from the United States on these matters. Wedge-driving is just not on.

I told the President of my firm conviction that the SDI research programme should go ahead. Research is of course permitted under existing US-Soviet treaties; and we of course know that the Russians already have their research programme, and, in the US view, have already gone beyond research.

We agreed on four points:

- 1) The US, and Western, aim was not to achieve superiority, but to maintain balance, taking account of Soviet developments;
- 2) SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiation;
- 3) The overall aim is to enhance, not undercut, deterrence;
- 4) East-West negotiation should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides. This will be the purpose of the resumed US-Soviet negotiations on arms control, which I warmly welcome.

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

PRESIDENT CHERNENKO

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for the message which Mr Gorbachev conveyed to me on your behalf on 16 December.

CAVEAT.....

I too found our ^{own} talk in ~~February~~ last February very ^{valuable} useful. I appreciated the opportunity of a more detailed exchange of views with Mr Gorbachev, which ^{Uzbeki} helped to increase ^{our mutual} my understanding of ^{one another's} Soviet concerns. I am sure that Mr Gorbachev will have reported my views to you.

I hope there will be more such exchanges at this and other levels. If we make a steady and consistent effort to increase them in all areas of interest to our two countries they could help us to achieve greater mutual trust and confidence. This is the only ^{way in} basis on which lasting progress in the field of arms control can be achieved. We should work on the basis of mutual respect for each other's legitimate security interests and a clear acknowledgement of the differences between our two systems.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/You

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You referred to the importance you attached to the forthcoming talks in Geneva with the United States. I discussed these talks extensively with President Reagan on 22 December. He plainly shares your view of their importance, ^{and so} as do I. I can assure you that President Reagan is determined to seek positive results.

~~The President dismissed~~
~~During the discussions I had with him in Washington,~~
~~we took due note of~~ the implications of current research into strategic defence systems, and of the work already in hand in this area by the Soviet Union. I agreed with President Reagan that the aim of resumed negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union should be to achieve ^{for each} balanced and enhanced security, with reduced levels of offensive forces on both sides. I welcome and endorse this approach, ^{jk} ~~which~~ reflects the search by countries of the Western Alliance for greater international stability and security. I feel sure that this approach ^{will} ~~should~~ also correspond to Soviet interests.

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It is in this spirit that I send my greetings and sincere good wishes to you, President Chernenko, and to the Soviet Government, in the expectation that all concerned will now make the effort to translate our hopes into concrete achievements.

3 JAN 1985

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