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TELEGRAM NUMBER 433 OF 13 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS BONN PRIORITY BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN
THE HAGUE LISBON LUXEMBOURG OSLO MADRID REYKJAVIK UKDEL VIENNA
UKDEL STOCKHOLM OTTAWA ANKARA ATHENS ROME ROUTINE MOSCOW TOKYO

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETING: SUPER-RESTRICTED

SESSION: 13 DECEMBER

SUMMARY

1. DISCUSSION CONCENTRATED ON THE RENEWAL OF US/SOVIET CONTACTS. THESE WERE WELCOMED, AS WAS SHULTZ'S FULL BRIEFING. GENERAL RECOGNITION THAT EARLY RESULTS SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTED AND THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE READY FOR THE LONG HAUL. EUROPEAN CONCERNS WERE AIRED ON SDI AND ON THE NEED TO KEEP INF IN THE PICTURE. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTATION WAS AGREED.
2. THERE WAS BRIEFER DISCUSSION ON AFRICA, TERRORISM, AND POLAND.

DETAIL

3. TODAY'S SUPER-RESTRICTED SESSION WAS ALMOST ENTIRELY DEVOTED TO THE FORTHCOMING TALKS BETWEEN SHULTZ AND GROMYKO IN GENEVA. SHULTZ OPENED THE DISCUSSION AND SPOKE FOR AN HOUR. HE SAID THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO HOPE THAT THE TALKS MARKED A NEW STAGE IN THE US/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. THE *US HAD* A BROAD AGENDA, WITH ARMS CONTROL WHICH WOULD BE HANDLED IN THE GENEVA TALKS.

ON THE ONE HAND, AND REGIONAL ISSUES (WHICH IN THE PAST HAD DERAILED ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS), BILATERAL ISSUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS (WHICH WE MUST KEEP BEFORE US AT ALL TIMES), ON THE OTHER. THE ATTEMPTS TO STRENGTHEN CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE AND THE SUCCESSFUL CARRYING THROUGH OF INF DEPLOYMENT WERE THE ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND TO THE TALKS (HE UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF DUTCH AND BELGIAN DEPLOYMENT). FIRMNESS OVER THE LAST 4 YEARS HAD PAID OFF DESPITE THE ROUGHNESS OF THE PASSAGE.

4. SHULTZ EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE THE US ATTACHED TO CONSULTATION AND STRESSED THAT THE US WOULD BE GOING TO THE GENEVA MEETING IN A POSITIVE FRAME OF MIND THOUGH THEY WERE CAUTIOUS IN THEIR ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET ATTITUDES. SPECULATION ABOUT SOVIET PROCESSES OF DECISION-MAKING WERE INTERESTING BUT HE WAS STRUCK BY HOW LITTLE WE REALLY KNEW. NEVERTHELESS THERE WERE SOME GROUNDS FOR HOPING THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT BE WILLING TO TALK SERIOUSLY E.G SOVIET CONCERN OVER THE TECHNOLOGICAL RACE: ANXIETY OVER WHAT GROMYKO HAD CALLED LAST SEPTEMBER THE QUOTE QUESTION OF QUESTIONS UNQUOTE, IE THE SIZE OF THE NUCLEAR STOCKPILES: THE PROBLEM OF RESOURCES: AND THE INTERNAL IMPERATIVE OF A NEED TO MARK THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEADERSHIP.

5. WE HAD TO BE ON OUR GUARD AS THE TALKS CONTINUED AGAINST SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN CONCESSIONS IN ADVANCE, EG THE VARIOUS CALLS OF MORATORIA. THE US GOALS WOULD BE TO ACHIEVE CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE OF ARMAMENTS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO STABILITY: EQUALITY: IF POSSIBLE, DRASTIC REDUCTIONS: AND VERIFIABILITY, ALTHOUGH THAT WAS A DIFFICULT AREA. THE US WAS WORKING ACTIVELY ON THE DETAILS AND WOULD WELCOME SUGGESTIONS. NITZE WOULD BE WORKING WITH HIM AND HE, WITH BURT, WOULD BRIEF NATO PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SCG.

6. IN GREATER DETAIL SHULTZ SPOKE OF THE DESIRABILITY OF REDUCING WARHEADS AND THROW-WEIGHT AS WELL AS LAUNCHERS AS A CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY, THE PROBLEM OF ASYMMETRIES BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND US ARMAMENT STRUCTURES, THE DIFFICULTY THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT HAVE IN RETURNING TO THE INF FORUM WHERE THEY HAD LEFT OFF, GIVEN THE MANNER OF THEIR GOING, AND THE PROBLEMS OF SPACE UNDER THE TWO HEADINGS ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS AND ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES. VERIFICATION WAS A PARTICULAR PROBLEM IN THIS AREA.

7. SHULTZ SPOKE OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE AND ARGUED THAT EVEN IF IT WERE NEVER 100 PER CENT EFFECTIVE (IF IT PROVED FEASIBLE) IT WOULD REDUCE THE TEMPTATION FOR A FIRST STRIKE AND WOULD THEREFORE BE STABILISING. IT WAS IN ANY CASE A RESEARCH PROGRAMME (WHICH COMPLICATED THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM) AND UNTIL WE KNEW MORE IT WAS DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY WHAT PRECISELY SHOULD BE CONTROLLED. THERE WAS A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WEAPONS WHICH WOULD NEED TO BE DISCUSSED IN GENEVA. IN ANY CASE IT WAS PRUDENT FOR THE US TO BE THINKING ABOUT DEFENCE.

8. THE TALKS IN GENEVA, SHULTZ CONTINUED, WOULD DISCUSS PROCEDURES AND OBJECTIVES THOUGH THEY WOULD BE BOUND TO STRAY INTO SUBSTANCE TO SOME EXTENT. IF EVERYTHING WAS TAKEN TOGETHER IN ONE NEGOTIATING BODY, PROGRESS WOULD TEND TO BE AT THE RATE OF THE SLOWEST. THERE MIGHT BE SOME NEED FOR AN OVERALL BODY WITH WORKING GROUPS, GIVING GUIDANCE AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL, BUT THE SOVIET UNION DISLIKED THE PHRASE QUOTE UMBRELLA TALKS UNQUOTE, DESCRIBING IT AS QUOTE ROMANTIC UNQUOTE. SHULTZ WAS TRYING TO DISENGAGE HIMSELF AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE FROM DAY TO DAY WORK TO CONCENTRATE ON THIS WHOLE ISSUE.

9. ALL THE FOREIGN MINISTERS SPOKE IN TURN WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE CANADIAN. THE FOLLOWING POINTS WERE MADE:

A. ALL WELCOMED SHULTZ'S STATEMENT AND THE RENEWAL OF US SOVIET CONTACTS.

B. CONSULTATION WAS IMPORTANT, NOT ONLY FOR ITSELF BUT IN ORDER THAT PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WEST SHOULD BE REASSURED.

C. WE SHOULD AVOID MEGAPHONE DIPLOMACY AND NOT TEMPT THE SOVIET UNION TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE IN THE MARKET PLACE.

D. DOUBTS WERE EXPRESSED ABOUT THE SDI: AS A CONCEPT DEFENCE MUST BE ATTRACTIVE BUT THE PROCESS, EVEN IF IT WAS FEASIBLE AND NOT TOO EXPENSIVE, WAS LIKELY TO BE DESTABILISING AS IT WAS PHASED IN.

E. THE SOVIET UNION'S MAIN INTEREST WAS LIKELY TO BE TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT LIMITING THE QUOTE MILITARISATION OF SPACE UNQUOTE.

F. EAST/WEST RELATIONS INVOLVED MORE THAN ARMS CONTROL. THE OTHER FORA (CSCE, CDE, MBFR) WERE IMPORTANT AND THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FINAL ACT WOULD BE A GOOD OCCASSION TO MARK THIS AT A POLITICAL LEVEL (GENSCHER).

G. WE WOULD NEED PATIENCE AND REALISM BUT SHOULD AVOID CYNICISM.

H. THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE HAD INFLUENCED THE SOVIET DECISION AND WOULD BE HELPFUL IN NEGOTIATION.

I. THE EAST EUROPEANS HAD INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS AND SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN SOME WAY.

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J. WE SHOULD AIM AT THE LOWEST LEVEL OF ARMAMENTS POSSIBLE PROVIDED THAT A VERIFIABLE BALANCE OF FORCES WAS MAINTAINED AND A MONOPOLY BY ONE SIDE OR ANOTHER WAS EXCLUDED.

K. THE ILLUSION THAT THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT COULD BE DONE AWAY WITH IN THE NEAR FUTURE OR THAT A CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY COULD RAISE THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD SHOULD BE AVOIDED (DUMAS).

L. EUROPEAN ASPECTS NEEDED TO BE REMEMBERED, PARTICULARLY IN RELATIONSHIP TO INF.

10. YOU SAID THAT THE POLITICAL SELF-CONFIDENCE EVINced BY THE ALLIANCE DURING THE LAST TWO YEARS HAD ACHIEVED RESULTS. THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE ALLIANCE HAD ALSO STOOD UP WELL. WE SHOULD CONSIDER DECLASSIFYING AND PUBLISHING THE BASIC DOCUMENT (MC 14/3) TO SHOW ITS INHERENT DEFENSIVE NATURE. WE NOW FACED OPPORTUNITIES BUT ALSO RISKS. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF POINTS: ECONOMIC PRESSURES PROBABLY PLAYED A PART IN THE SOVIET DECISION AS ALSO DID THE FEAR, THERE AS WELL AS IN THE WEST, OF THE NATURE OF WEAPONS NOW AVAILABLE, THE SOVIETS PERHAPS BEING MORE ALARMED BY THE WEST THAN WE WERE BY THEM. THERE WAS NO REASON HOWEVER TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD ABANDONED ITS HOSTILE AND EXPANSIVE POLICIES, OR THE AIM TO SEPARATE THE US FROM EUROPE. YOU WELCOMED SHULTZ'S REMARKS ABOUT EQUALITY, LINKED TO THE ASYMMETRIES IN THE TWO STRUCTURES, WHICH WOULD GOVERN THE SEARCH FOR A BALANCE. ON SDI YOU SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS THE SOVIET FEAR THAT IT MIGHT WORK THAT MIGHT INDUCE THEM TO NEGOTIATE. IN ALL THIS WE SHOULD BE READY FOR A LONG HAUL, SHOULD PAY NO PRICE IN ADVANCE (EG MORATORIA), AND SHOULD NOT ALLOW DELAY IN ONE AREA TO HOLD UP PROGRESS ON OTHERS. THAT WAS WHY THE UMBRELLA CONCEPT HAD MERIT. INF SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN, NOR SHOULD CW. SHULTZ HAD DESCRIBED THE PROCESS AS LENGTHY AND DIFFICULT: IT SHOULD ALSO BE CEASELESS. ETERNAL DIALOGUE, LIKE ETERNAL VIGILANCE, WAS THE PRICE OF PEACE. YOU STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTATION IN ITS OWN RIGHT AND AS A SIGN OF EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE CONDUCT OF A SENSIBLE DEFENCE POLICY AND IN ARMS CONTROL. SDI WAS LIKELY TO BE DIFFICULT NOT ONLY VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION BUT VIS-A-VIS PUBLIC OPINION. YOU ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN PILLAR AND THE ROLE OF WEU AS A GINGER GROUP WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. FINALLY YOU NOTED THE COMMON INTERESTS OF THE EAST EUROPEANS IN ACHIEVING PROGRESS.

11. SUMMING UP THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID:

A. SHULTZ WOULD GO TO GENEVA WITH THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT OF ALL THE ALLIES.

B. NOBODY EXPECTED AN EARLY MIRACLE.

C. ALL HOPED THAT THE GENEVA TALKS WOULD LEAD TO PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL.

D. ALL ALLIES WERE READY TO PLAY THEIR PART IN CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EAST EUROPEANS, WHO WERE IMPORTANT (A NUMBER OF MINISTERS HAD REFERRED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT ALLOWING THE INF ISSUES TO BE PUT ON ONE SIDE).

E. CONSULTATION WAS IMPORTANT IN SUBSTANCE AND ALSO SO THAT ALLIES SHOULD BE SEEN PUBLICLY TO BE INVOLVED.

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12. TURNING TO OTHER MATTERS, THE CANADIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SPOKE BRIEFLY OF CANADA'S POLICY UNDER THE NEW GOVERNMENT TOWARDS NATO AND RAISED THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY FOR ACTION IN AFRICA IN THE LIGHT OF ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES THERE, ESPECIALLY THE FAMINE. SHULTZ AGREED AND NOTED THAT THIS MAJOR CATASTROPHE WAS DUE IN PART TO DROUGHT BUT ALSO TO MISMANAGEMENT. OTHERS TOOK UP THIS POINT. ANDREOTTI URGED AID THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL AID GIVING AGENCIES IN ORDER TO AVOID CONFUSION AND BELIEVED THAT US AID TO ETHIOPIA WOULD HAVE A LASTING POLITICAL IMPACT. HALEFOGLU RECALLED A MEETING OF ISLAMIC MINISTERS OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE IN ANKARA, WHICH HAD DISCUSSED THE FAMINE PROBLEM, AND URGED THE EC TO RELEASE SOME OF ITS SURPLUS FOOD STOCKS. VAN DEN BROEK NOTED THAT THE EC HAD DECIDED AT DUBLIN TO STEP UP THE ALREADY CONSIDERABLE AID IT HAD GIVEN.

13. SHULTZ SPOKE OF TERRORISM, ESPECIALLY WHEN SPONSORED OR TOLERATED BY STATES, AS WARRANTING A HIGH PLACE ON THE AGENDA. WE SHOULD SHARE INTELLIGENCE AND WORK TOGETHER TO COUNTER IT. HALEFOGLU SUPPORTED THIS.

14. ANDROTTI SPOKE ABOUT POLAND AND RECOMMENDED THE CHURCH'S AGRICULTURAL PROJECT. HIS OWN VISIT TO POLAND WAS LIKELY TO GO AHEAD SOON. YOU SAID THAT IT WAS RIGHT TO TAKE THE VIEW THAT POLAND WAS THE MOST OPEN OF THE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, THOUGH NO DOUBT SHE WOULD NEVER FULFIL ALL THE CONDITIONS FOR LIBERALISM. YOU APPEALED TO THE US TO RECONSIDER ITS ATTITUDE TO THE POLISH APPLICATION TO THE IMF FOLLOWING THE RELEASE OF THE TWO LEADING DISSIDENTS. STRAY, AGREEING, QUALIFIED THIS BY SUGGESTING THAT POLAND WAS ALSO THE COUNTRY IN WHICH THERE WAS THE STRONGEST CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE FORCES OF COMMUNISM AND THE PEOPLE. VAN DEN BROEK AGREED: CONTACTS WITH POLAND WERE IN ORDER BUT THE ATMOSPHERE WOULD DEPEND ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT.

GRAHAM

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

LIMITED

SOVIET D
DEFENCE D
RESEARCH D
PLANNING STAFF
EED
NAD
WED
ACDD -- PED
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
SIR W HARDING
MR FERGUSSON
MR GOODALL
MR JENKINS
MR WESTON
MR DAVID THOMAS

(Repetition to REYK JAVIK
referred for departmental decision,
repeated as requested to other posts.)

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