CONFIDENTIAL

PM/84/147

PRIME MINISTER

ENLARGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY

1. I attach, in preparation for our discussion on 13 September, a paper by officials covering, with recommendations, the main outstanding points of concern to Britain in the accession negotiations with Spain and Portugal. An annex to the paper describes, for background, other unresolved difficulties between the Community and the applicants. You will also have seen the letter of 6 September to me from the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry about the negotiations.

2. For most member states and the Community as a whole enlargement will represent an economic cost. Spain will be a difficult partner, with large agricultural interests and a protectionist industrial tradition. Portugal's weak economy and backward agriculture will need support. But the damage to Western political and security interests if the negotiations were to fail would be serious. The referendum outcome on continued NATO membership, to which the Spanish Government is committed in 1985 or 1986, would be in jeopardy. All member states, including the French, recognise that there is a political need to complete the enlargement

negotiations within the next few months. For our part we are seeking through the accession negotiations to secure the removal of the Spanish restrictions on Gibraltar.

3. In defending our own major interests in the negotiations, particular objectives have been:

(a) to prevent enlargement further distorting the Community's finances, above all by placing intolerable stress on CAP expenditure.

(b) to make sure that British tax payers and producers do not pay more than their fair share of the costs of enlargement.

(c) to secure what advantage we can for British industry.

Other member states have their own interests to defend - of which those of French, Italian and Greek peasant farmers have most consistently bedevilled the negotiations.

4. Spain and Portugal's main objectives are also as much political as economic. But, with economic difficulties greater even than those of the existing Community, they too will have to defend the accession arrangements to their Parliaments as a fair balance

between their interests and those of the existing Community. Some hard negotiating still lies ahead, particularly in the agricultural, fisheries and industrial sectors.

5. Portugal should present few problems in this respect. At our instigation, she has swallowed a tough deal on textiles - her major export sector. Theoretically she might find herself a net contributor to the Community budget during the transitional period, but a number of ways have already been found to channel funds to her during the first stage of transition, including retention of levies and duties. As a result she is unlikely to become a net contributor in practice.

6. Spain, as the paper by officials makes clear, will have to accept a tough bargain:

. Spanish industry will have to come out more quickly than it wants from behind the excessive barriers of the 1970 EC/Spain Agreement;

. Spain secures minimal increase in access for 4 years for her main export sector, fruit and vegetables;

. Access by the large and important Spanish fishing fleet - mainly based in the sensitive Basque country- will be strictly limited and the number of vessels will have to be reduced;

. Spain will not be able to exploit her comparative advantage in the olive oil and wine sectors, because we and other member states are insisting that production controls be introduced before either regime applies to Spain to prevent an explosion of expenditure; (here our problems are less with Spain than with some of our partners, notably Italy and the arguments could yet seriously delay progress).

. The Spanish Government is not going to find it easy to sell a deal of this kind to Spanish opinion, and this is reflected in their present negotiating tactics and impatience with the slow pace.

7. An internal Commission paper, reflecting the hard bargain the Community has been driving over agriculture, intimates that, on accession, Spain would be a net contributor to the Community budget in the year of accession to the tune of about 1 billion ecu (declining to zero after 10 years). This problem should be dealt with as it was for British and Greek accession, by a system of degressive VAT refunds. We must insist that anything done to channel funds back to Spain in the early years after accession is fitted into the normal framework of transitional arrangements (and

that there is no question of Spain qualifying for reliefs under the Fontainebleau system). The Fontainebleau mechanism means that we will be contributing seven per cent to the costs of enlargement.

8. As the pressure increases to complete the negotiations, we shall need to fight hard to secure the objectives identified in the officials' paper. In particular, we must:

- get early relief for British exporters from the highest Spanish tariffs in the sectors of most concern to us, above all cars;
- get effective curbs on the Community's production of olive oil and wine before Spain begins her transition to Community price levels for these products (and here we must build on the common ground we have established with the French);
- prevent Spanish fishermen from making inroads into stocks of importance to our fishermen;
- hold the Community to its insistence that Spain receive only eight votes in a qualified majority set at 54 votes for the enlarged Community (but for the purposes of the negotiations we should not resist two Commissioners for Spain: we can reserve our

right to pursue the issue of a smaller Commission in the separate context of the Ad Hoc Committee on Institutions);

- tie the Spaniards down tight on their commitment to restructure their steel industry.

9. I am copying this minute to the Lord President of the Council, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
10 September, 1984

ENLARGEMENT

NOTE BY OFFICIALS

Introduction

1. Negotiations with Portugal and Spain since their respective applications in 1977 and 1978 have been long drawn out, not only because of their intrinsic difficulty but also because of the Community's slow progress towards agreement both on the post Stuttgart package and on the revised regime for Mediterranean agricultural products in preparation for enlargement.

2. The Fontainebleau Agreement has given a major impetus to the accession negotiations and some - but not all- of the Mediterranean agricultural problems were settled by Agriculture Ministers in October 1983. But the Fontainebleau target date of 30 September 1984 for conclusion of negotiations cannot be met. In the case of Portugal, with 11 (out of 17) chapters concluded, negotiations should be completed by the end of November. In the Spanish negotiations 10 (out of 17: see Annex B below) chapters have been substantively concluded but some of the most difficult dossiers in the negotiations remain unresolved; conclusion is unlikely before the turn of the year. Against this background, the target accession date of 1 January 1986 could slip, perhaps to 1 July 1986.

Having invested some domestic political capital in the target date of 30 September 1984, the Portuguese have asked the Community for a "Constat d'accord" or solemn declaration at the end of September or in October to record the conclusion of the substantive part of her negotiations.

3. This note identifies the problems outstanding in the negotiations of particular importance for the UK, where our concerns are not shared in equal measure by our partners. The note attached at Annex A describes general problems in the main dossiers outstanding of concern to the Community as a whole.

GENERAL

4. Our overall objective has been to limit the costs of Spanish accession to the UK. Another major aim is to improve trade access for British industry as soon as possible after accession. But in financial terms, the budgetary costs of Spanish participation in the CAP will far outweigh the trade benefits we may derive.

SPANISH INDUSTRIAL TARIFF TRANSITION

5. Most aspects of the Customs Union chapter and External Relations chapter have been satisfactorily settled. Agreement has been reached on industrial and fiscal measures providing for improved access to the Spanish market from accession; this includes Spanish

introduction of VAT by accession worth as much as a reduction in import duties of up to 10 points, according to product. But no agreement has yet proved possible on the key question of the duration and modalities of tariff dismantlement. Most member states, the Commission and Spain are now prepared to accept that the outcome will be a transitional period of 7 years (Spain asked for 10 - the UK's was 5). Spain has also agreed that in addition to the progressive reduction of tariffs during transition, the problem of her very high import duties (over 20%) must be addressed, although they have linked this with a more satisfactory overall balance of advantage to them in industry and agriculture. Commission proposals have just been introduced which reflect substantial briefing from the UK. We have been insisting on accelerated dismantlement of the very high duties on cars, domestic electrical appliances, photographic equipment, certain chemicals and some other items. On dismantling import duties below 20%, we are continuing to argue for steeper cuts in the earlier stages of transition ("front-loading"); the Spaniards want the opposite "backloading". But our partners attach less importance to tariff transition than we do; the French, for example, have major industrial investment in Spain -

they support front loading but have little interest in rapid dismantling of the higher duties. Both accelerated dismantlement of very high duties and front loading will be difficult to negotiate; backloading, which is quite unacceptable, is unlikely to run. We recommend therefore that our prime objective should be satisfactory arrangements on those tariffs over 20%.

PORTUGUESE INDUSTRIAL TRANSITION

6. The Community and Portugal have agreed on a 7 year industrial transitional period; at UK instigation, the Portuguese accepted an effective continuation of the VRA on textiles for 4 years post accession. The Portuguese are making repeated efforts to secure an increase in the agreed pre-accession limits, which would increase access levels during the transitional period. We recommend that we continue to resist these firmly .

SPANISH STEEL RESTRUCTURING

7. Spain is a large and aggressive steel exporter. There have been constant problems over Spanish compliance with the levels agreed in her VRAs with the Community, and Spain delayed providing the Community with the necessary detailed information about her restructuring. We see it as indispensable to reach agreement on a restructuring programme, on state aids

and on measures to avoid disruption post accession. The Commission and other member states share our concerns but may be susceptible to pressure at the end of negotiations to reach agreement on a vague and unenforceable form of words. We recommend that our aim should be maximum Spanish restructuring before accession and that any derogations there may have to be for Spanish steel aids after Spanish accession should be strictly limited and accompanied by corresponding restrictions on Spanish access to EC markets.

SPANISH FISHERIES

8. There is a major UK interest (shared particularly by Ireland, Denmark and France) in maintaining the delicate balance of the Common Fisheries Policy, agreed only recently and after a lot of very hard negotiation. Our specific objectives are to avoid giving Spain access to TACs and quotas agreed as part of the CFP package, and more generally to maintain restrictions on the number of Spanish vessels allowed to fish in EC waters for other EC species. Moreover, we need to ensure that Spanish fishing for non-quota species, hitherto subject to varying degrees of restriction, is not allowed to increase so that it damages the current fishing activities of the UK fleet.

9. The Commission are currently revising the initial

Community position and have in mind to propose a permanent and non-discriminatory arrangement under which member states would be required to have licences issued by the Community to fish in areas deemed to be of peripheral interest to them. In the waters of interest to us, this would in practice be more restrictive on Spain than on any other Member State. The new approach should safeguard the UK's interests in principle, provided the details prove satisfactory. But, it will be a harsh package for Spain, and we are not yet clear that all member states accept it. To help make the proposal negotiable, the Commission are also proposing better terms on price support and market access, and pre-accession financial help (about 30 million ecu) to help Spain decommission 50,000 gross tonnage of her fleet (catch potential in EC waters of the order of £30 million per annum). We have so far resisted the proposal on budgetary grounds. Given our major interest in an early start to the restructuring of the Spanish fleet and in Spanish acceptance of a regime that will not endanger the CFP, we recommend that we support the expected Commission package as the best means of protecting the balance of the CFP and our fishing industry's current level of activitity subject to the necessary finance being available.

AGRICULTURE: SPAIN

10. The main problems for the Community as a whole in negotiation are covered in Annex A (paras 3-4). As far as the UK is concerned, there are three particular problem areas outstanding- preserving the term "British Sherry" and ensuring that the EC regimes to be applied to the enlarged Community for olive oil and also for wine do not lead to the creation of expensive surpluses.

11. British sherry. The Commission accept that from Spanish accession, the terms "sherry/Jerez/Xeres" will become fully protected appellations applied to fortified wines from a defined region of Spain. This is hard to contest, but the UK has lobbied hard for the legitimate continued use of "British sherry" in the UK. Our purpose is to protect a 100 year old industry which employs 2,000 people, has annual sales worth £100m and which the producers argue could not market under a different name. The Spaniards have told us informally that the most they could accept is the description "sherry type" and a derogation for phasing out the name over 10 years (the longest transition envisaged in the negotiations). Our industry would not consider this adequate. While our partners may support us in putting the case to Spain for a permanent acceptance of the

term "British Sherry" in order to preserve a Community industry, such support will not survive determined Spanish opposition. We recommend that we continue to press for protection of the term British Sherry.

12. Wine. France insists that the wine regime be reformed before negotiations are concluded with Spain to impose strict production controls, while the Spaniards refuse to commit themselves to accede to a regime whose nature is not clear. The UK has a budgetary interest in reducing the wine surplus and also an industrial one, since surplus wine alcohol threatens our alcohol producers. The French objective of agreement on a reformed regime during September is unrealistic, given Italian resistance to curbs on production. But a solution must be found before the end of the year if accession is not to be delayed. We recommend that we support the French in working for a solution which restrains surplus production, eg by a guarantee threshold, limits budgetary costs and protects the interests of our alcohol producers.

13. Our objective on olive oil is to control production in the existing Community and in Spain in order to avoid creation of a surplus with major budgetary implications. Our estimate is that the final cost of applying the existing regime to Spain taking account of

the likely increase in her production would be about 1.2bn ECU, about one quarter of which could be avoided by preventing the creation of a surplus. We also wish to avoid any arrangements which increase pressure for the imposition of import restrictions or a domestic tax on oils and fats. Our attempts to reform the existing regime during the last few years have met resolute opposition from Italy and Greece. We recommend that we continue to work for arrangements which avoid Spanish transition to EC price levels until a guarantee threshold is in effect.

AGRICULTURE: PORTUGAL

14. The Portuguese consume about 300,000 tonnes of sugar a year. Almost all of this is imported as raw cane sugar to be processed by Portuguese refineries; just over a third is supplied under long term contracts by four African countries (Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Malawi and Ivory Coast), which are also ACP (African, Carribbean and Pacific) signatories to the Lomé Sugar Protocol. The Portuguese want to meet the needs of their refineries after accession by continuing to buy sugar from ACP countries, and have asked that this be done by increasing by 300,000 tonnes the annual quota of sugar which the Community guarantees to buy from ACP countries at the Community's internal sugar price

(currently well above the world market price).

15. This demand is of course excessive; there is spare sugar in the Community which the Portuguese could buy, both beet and (from the French Overseas Departments) some cane. But their refineries, built to process cane sugar, could only take a certain amount of beet, and they will continue to want more cane sugar after enlargement than they could get from the French Overseas Departments alone.

16. Our interests are involved in three ways:

a) above all, because Tate and Lyle take 1.1 million tonnes of the 1.3 million tonnes of the present ACP quota. If Portuguese refineries start competing for this sugar, Tate and Lyle's Greenock refinery could cease to be viable, and capacity might have to be reduced at their other refinery in Silvertown. So we want some of Portuguese needs met from outside the existing ACP quota,

b) but we do not want this done at excessive cost to the Community budget. The ACP quota is balanced by the provision of export refunds for a corresponding amount of Community beet sugar; so 300,000 tonnes more on the quota would mean 300,000 tonnes more subsidised EC exports.

c) we would like, if possible, to safeguard the interests of the four ACP supplier countries, three of whom are Commonwealth members, from the permanent loss of an important market.

17. The Commission have proposed that the ACP quota should be increased by an amount (effectively, around 75,000 tonnes) sufficient to give the four ACP countries concerned returns (at the EC price level) comparable with the returns (at the much lower world price) which they presently enjoy under their long-term contracts. At the Foreign Affairs Council on 3 September, the French and Belgians refused point blank to contemplate any increase in the ACP quota. They are most unlikely to relent and any support we get from other member states will be muted. We are therefore examining other ways of meeting our criteria, perhaps incorporating a reduced levy quota for ACP suppliers to the Portuguese market in addition to, or instead of, an increase in the regular ACP quota under Lomé. Under this the ACP suppliers would continue to sell at the world price and the Portuguese could continue to buy at this price but would additionally pay a levy to bring this price up to the ACP guaranteed price; (the proceeds of the levy go to the EC budget or - during the first phase of five years - to Portugal). We

recommend that we continue to work for a solution which fully safeguards supplies to the British refineries, while taking account of the legitimate expectations of the Portuguese and interests of the ACP suppliers.

COSTS OF ENLARGEMENT

18. It is generally accepted that both Spain and Portugal should be net recipients from the Community budget. (A prosperity league for a Community of 12 is attached at Annex C). The Commission have tried in negotiations to ensure financial benefits for Spain and Portugal during their transition by the operation of Community policies, since it will be some time before both countries start to benefit from EC structural funds. Portugal will be able to benefit from the retention of receipts from duties and levies on eg cereal imports. The Community is, however, proposing rigorous terms for Spanish agriculture. While negotiations continue, no realistic estimate is possible as to the overall financial implications. By analogy with Greece, some mechanism for refunding part of VAT payments may prove necessary during the first years of transition if the detailed agricultural arrangements place Spain (or, less likely, Portugal) in the position of a net contributor. A highly speculative estimate given these uncertainties is that

by 1990 the net cost to the Community budget would be of the order of 0.15 percentage points of the 1% VAT base i.e. about 2.25 billion ecus in 1984 terms. Under the favourable arrangements negotiated at Fontainebleau, our share would be 158 million ecus.

INSTITUTIONS

19. The Community has told Spain that for qualified majority voting purposes she will have 8 votes and Portugal 5; the qualified majority vote in an enlarged Community would be 54 (of 76). No proposals have been made as to the number of Commissioners; it is generally accepted that if there are to be 17 Commissioners, Spain will have two and Portugal one. It is likely that we shall have to accept this; the Ad Hoc Committee on Institutions will, however, offer an opportunity to pursue our objective of a smaller Commission.

GLOBAL MEDITERRANEAN POLICY

20. Once Spain has tariff and levy free access to EC markets, her Mediterranean produce is likely to expand considerably and displace much of the agricultural exports of the Community's Mediterranean preferential partners, in particular Tunisia, Cyprus, Morocco and Israel. The Commission have made useful if modest proposals for concessions on tariffs and entry prices for key commodities, i.e.tomatoes, citrus and table

Solutions may then be sought in individual negotiations with each of the Mediterranean countries in turn, grapes together with special arrangements for Tunisian olive oil. They have also proposed modest aid.

21. The Community is divided; the Italians and Greeks prefer aid rather than trade concessions. The French will not make any trade concessions until the Spanish negotiations are completed, lest the Spaniards reopen agreed dossiers. Under the circumstances, the Community may agree a general statement of principle but is unlikely to come to terms with the problems until after conclusion of the accession negotiations. rather than through a formal agreed framework based on the lowest common factor. This would suit the UK well by enabling us to work for concessions to Cyprus and the strategically important Maghreb Countries, while giving lower priority e.g. to Israel (which is just finalising a free trade agreement including agricultural trade with the USA).

We recommend that we continue to press for continued and effective trade access for Mediterranean agricultural products.

GIBRALTAR: COMMUNITY ASPECTS

22. The Community has made plain to Spain that obstacles to trade and to the free movement of persons with Gibraltar are incompatible with Community law and must be lifted by accession. In the context of the

External Relations chapter, Spain has already undertaken to remove obstacles to trade by accession; we expect similar agreement in the Social Affairs chapter that she will remove obstacles to the Free Movement of Persons (which would not however affect workers who will be covered by the proposed 7 year transitional period). The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has minuted his colleagues in OD separately on Gibraltar.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

10 September 1984

ANNEX A

OTHER ISSUES IN THE ENLARGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS

1. The attached tables set out the state of play in tha various chapters of the accession negotiations. This note briefly describes those outstanding problems not covered in the main paper and the likely outcome, and records agreements reached so far on points of particular concern to the UK.

AGRICULTURE

Portugal

2. In view of the underdeveloped state of Portuguese agriculture, the Community has proposed special transitional arrangements whereby 84% of Portuguese agriculture will be excluded from application of the CAP for a first "phase" of 5 (which can be reduced to 3) years to give time for adaptation and development of the necessary infrastructure (marketing organisation, quality control etc). After the first phase, conventional transition would take place for a further 5(or 7) years for a total of 10. The remainder of Portuguese agriculture would be subject to a conventional transition of 7 years. The chapter should now be resolved without particular difficulty. The Commission, however, argue that Portugal will need further balance of payments support additional to the

retention of income from duties and levies; this may need to be taken into account in the discussions on Own Resources.

AGRICULTURE

3. Spain. Spanish agriculture (particularly horticulture and wine) has proved the largest single obstacle in the negotiations. Spanish accession will increase the number of Community farmers by one third, with consequent CAP expenditure implications, and French and Italian fears of Spanish competition.

4. The French have insisted on a phased approach under which for an initial period of 4 years Spanish fruit and vegetables are excluded from the full application of the CAP and receive only a minimal increase in trade access to the EC (and indeed face the recent increase in EC protection for these products) for an initial phase of 4 years, followed by conventional transition for a further 6. Agreement on the phased approach (with a concession on citrus sought by the Spaniards) is likely with Spain receiving some balancing compensation by way of a surveillance mechanism on Northern products (dairy, beef, cereals), where she is uncompetitive. Our own horticulture sector will in general be protected by the arrangements that France and Italy secure to protect their own very much greater

concerns; we need, however, to work for the quickest possible phasing out of national controls operated by other member states to limit Spanish imports. There are no formal Commission figures yet as to the budgetary implications of the arrangements; the costs to the EC budget during the first years of transition are likely to be small .

FISHERIES

4. Portugal. Portuguese fisheries do not present a real problem; Portugal shares the general Community interest in limiting Spanish access. We have a dual interest, to help Portugal and as major consumers, in promoting access for Portuguese sardine exports to the Community.

5. Spain. The main paper covers access; there are two other outstanding problems. The original Community proposals to Spain called for a long transitional period and a licensing system for Spain alone, with special arrangements to exclude her from a defined area in the Irish Sea called the "Irish box". The "Irish Box" is hard to justify biologically and the Commission have made clear that it will almost certainly need to be dropped in the final package. We are reconciled to this , but it will be difficult for the Irish. In addition, Spain has asked that the Canaries, the source of a large proportion of Spanish canned fish, be

outside the CFP but have free access to EC markets, which would create a loophole in the Community's marketing system. The Community is likely to insist that the Canaries be included in the CFP if they are to profit from free access.

SOCIAL AFFAIRS

6. The Community is insisting on a 7 year transitional period on the free movement of of workers both for Spain and Portugal, as was the case for Greece. Both applicant states have moved towards public acceptance of any transitional period with great reluctance, given the large number of Spanish and Portuguese migrant workers. The UK is well placed in the middle of the pack; the Germans and Luxembourg in particular are taking an extremely hard line. The chapter may well not be finalised until a late stage in negotiations.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

4 September 1984

ANNEX B

PORTUGAL - STATE OF PLAY

CHAPTER	STATE OF PLAY	COMMENT
CAPITAL MOVEMENTS	Agreed in full	
TRANSPORT	Agreed in full	
REGIONAL POLICY	Agreed in full	
EURATOM	Agreed in full	
RIGHTS OF ESTABLISHMENT	Substantially agreed	
ECOFIN	Substantially agreed	(except for inclusion of escudo in ecu)
TAXATION	Agreed in full	(except for Azores/ Madeira)
CUSTOMS UNION	Agreed in full }	(includes trans- itional 3/4 years arrangements for textiles)
ECSC	Agreed in full }	
EXTERNAL RELATIONS	Substantially agreed }	7 years transition
HARMONISATION OF LAWS	Agreed in full	(including Environment and consumer protection but excluding patents)
PATENTS	In progress	
SOCIAL AFFAIRS	Under negotiation	Community want 7 years transition.
AGRICULTURE	Under negotiation	(Community have proposed 'phased approach' with first phase of 5 years)
FISHERIES	In progress	
INSTITUTIONS	In progress	
OWN RESOURCES	To be negotiated	

PORTUGAL/GREECE }	To be negotiated as separate protocol to the Act of Accession.	
PORTUGAL/SPAIN }		

7.9.84

ANNEX B

SPANISH ACCESSION - STATE OF PLAY

CHAPTER	STATE OF PLAY	COMMENTS
CAPITAL MOVEMENTS	Agreed in full	
TRANSPORT	Agreed in full	
REGIONAL POLICY	Agreed in full	
EURATOM	Agreed in full	Spain to apply full scope safeguards. No undertaking as regards NPT
RIGHTS OF ESTABLISHMENT	Agreed in full	
ECOFIN	Agreed	Except for inclusion of peseta in ECU.
TAXATION	Agreed in full	Spain to introduce VAT by accession.
CUSTOMS UNION	In progress }	Only length and modalities of tariff transitional period outstanding; also steel restructuring
ECSC	In progress }	
EXTERNAL RELATIONS	Substantially agreed}	
HARMONISATION OF LAWS	Agreed in full	(including environment and consular protection
PATENTS	Agreed in full	
SOCIAL AFFAIRS	In progress	EC insisting on 7 years transition
AGRICULTURE	In progress	
FISHERIES	In progress	
OWN RESOURCES	To be negotiated	
INSTITUTIONS	In progress	

SPAIN/PORTUGAL }	To be negotiated as a separate protocol to the Act of Accession
SPAIN/PORTUGAL:GREECE }	

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ANNEX C

Country	GDP as a % of total GDP OF A COMMUNITY OF 12	Relative prosperity (GDP per head as % of EC average)
Belgium	3.3	108
Denmark	2.3	142
Germany	26.4	137
Greece	1.4	46
France	21.0	123
Ireland	0.69	63
Italy	14.4	82
Luxembourg	0.14	116
Netherlands	5.3	119
United Kingdom	17.6	100
Spain	6.5	54
Portugal	0.90	28