

SECRET

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS AT 1815 HOURS ON THURSDAY,
17 NOVEMBER 1983 AT No. 10 DOWNING STREET

Present

Prime Minister	President Kyprianou
Sir Julian Bullard	Mr. Michaelides
Mr. Wilson	Cyprus High Commissioner
Mr. Coles	Mr. Vovides

* * *

The Prime Minister said that she was pleased to see President Kyprianou. We were deeply concerned at the situation in Cyprus following the Turkish-Cypriot declaration of independence.

Mr. Kyprianou thanked the Prime Minister for seeing him at short notice. There were certain matters which he wished to explain in the strictest confidence. It was important to achieve a short resolution at the UN Security Council condemning the Turkish-Cypriot move and calling for its reversal. Following the adoption of that resolution, the debate could continue and a further, more detailed, resolution could be discussed.

He had just visited Athens where he had seen both the President and the Prime Minister. They were shocked and felt deceived by Turkey. There was a strong feeling in Greece that, following Greece's inadequate response to the events of 1974, inaction or indifference on the part of the present Greek Government would not be tolerated by public opinion. He was not suggesting that the Greeks felt stronger than the Greek-Cypriots but if the quick reversal of the Turkish-Cypriot move was not achieved, it was apparent from his talks with the Greek Government that they were seriously considering severing diplomatic relations with Turkey. Furthermore, he had been told that if he felt that Greek troops should go to Cyprus, and he so requested, the Greek Government was ready to meet his request. The Prime Minister commented that this would be a very big decision. Mr. Kyprianou said that he had replied to the effect that he would remain in consultation with the Greek Government and accelerate efforts at the Security Council. But if knowledge of this exchange

SECRET

/leaked

leaked, there could be great difficulties. It might appear that Greece was prepared to go to the bitter end.

The Greek Government had also made it clear that they were not prepared to join in direct discussions with Turkey. He had first learned of the Greek position on this point when still in Cyprus. He had therefore suggested to the Prime Minister that urgent consultations should take place, in the first instance, on a triangular basis. The Treaty permitted this. Sir Julian Bullard pointed out that the Treaty referred to an undertaking by the parties "to consult together". Mr. Kyprianou said that it went on to refer to the right of each guarantor to take action individually. Thus, individual consultations could not be excluded. The United Kingdom could be at the centre of the triangle. Mr. Papandreou said that he was ready to conduct consultations in this way, in the knowledge that Britain would be consulting with Turkey at the same time. At what level did we envisage consultations taking place? Sir Julian Bullard said that we had had messages from Athens and Ankara which set incompatible conditions for consultations. The Turks apparently wished to discuss the whole problem of Cyprus, not just the events of the last few days. But we had not yet received formal replies. We had not therefore taken a final decision.

Mr. Kyprianou enquired about the prospective visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister. Sir Julian Bullard explained that he was visiting London at his own request, en route to New York. It was possible that he would be bringing the formal Turkish response with regard to consultations.

Mr. Kyprianou said that if action was not taken quickly to reverse the UDI, we could be in for a very dangerous period. Sir Julian Bullard said that the debate in New York had begun this afternoon. We had received the text of amendments which the Cyprus Government wished to see made to our draft resolution. Our aim was to secure a convincing vote and the question arose of what was the best text to achieve that. Mr. Kyprianou said that the situation was complicated by the fact that our draft resolution incorporated matters which needed detailed discussion. The first essential step was that the Security Council should

condemn and reverse the situation. If that were achieved, Cyprus would of course be ready to pursue the debate. Sir Julian Bullard commented that we thought it desirable to secure the adoption of a constructive and forward-looking resolution. Mr. Kyprianou said that the immediate question was the action taken by Mr. Denktash and the attitude of the Turkish Government. The need was to restore the situation to that which obtained before 15 November. The representative of the UN Secretary General had made it plain to him yesterday that when Mr. Denktash made his move he was already aware of the intention of the UN Secretary General to conduct substantive negotiations. Mr. Perez de Cuellar's intentions had been embodied in a letter which he had just received (he handed over a copy).

The Prime Minister asked whether the imminence of the Secretary General's initiative had perhaps precipitated the Turkish-Cypriot move. Mr. Kyprianou said he had been under the impression that the Secretary General's initiative would have a contrary effect and the American Ambassador in Nicosia had claimed to have assurances in this direction.

Sir Julian Bullard said that our impression was that the UDI had come as a surprise to the Foreign Ministry in Turkey. Mr. Kyprianou said that that was possible. But he was certain that the Turkish military were privy to the move.

Sir Julian Bullard asked whether Mr. Kyprianou was saying that the Secretary General's initiative could not be pursued unless the declaration was rescinded. Mr. Kyprianou replied affirmatively. Nothing would change otherwise. If negotiations continued, regardless of UDI, the situation in Northern Cyprus would become a fait accompli. It was impossible for him to agree to negotiations in present circumstances.

Hence, he believed that a step by step procedure should be adopted. A short resolution should be urgently adopted. Then a Security Council debate could continue. He would have talks with the UN Secretary General. He had asked to see President Reagan or, failing the President, Mr. Shultz who had given an assurance in September that he would exercise influence in Ankara. While the Security Council debate continued,

consultations between the guarantor powers could be pursued.

The Prime Minister asked what mechanism was envisaged for reversing the situation. Would Mr. Denktash and his Assembly have to take a new decision? Would those states which had recognised the new entity have to withdraw recognition?

Mr. Kyprianou said that one course would be for Denktash to resign. Alternatively, perhaps a face-saving device could be arranged whereby it was agreed that the UN Secretary General should proceed with his initiative. Another approach was for the Turkish-Cypriots to take a decision of principle reversing the situation subject to further discussion of the modalities. Contrary to some reports, Bangladesh had not decided on recognition. The Commonwealth Secretary General had sent a message saying he was trying to prevent this.

The Prime Minister said that the Treaty laid down a maximum number of troops which Greece and Turkey might station in Cyprus. Could we attempt to return to the Treaty?

Mr. Kyprianou said that he favoured the withdrawal of all foreign troops. But as a first step the levels provided for in the Treaty could be restored.

The Prime Minister enquired what the likely voting pattern in the Security Council was. Mr. Wilson said that Turkey and some of Turkey's friends had strongly criticised our draft resolution on the grounds that it was too antagonistic to Northern Cyprus. Mr. Kyprianou said that he believed that a resolution on the lines he had suggested would secure approval without much difficulty. Sir Julian Bullard commented that any resolution which implied that the UN Secretary General's efforts had come to an end would be very unfortunate. Mr. Kyprianou stated that could be dealt with in the detailed resolution which he envisaged being adopted at a later stage. The Prime Minister observed that a provision calling on the Secretary General to use his good offices was almost standard in such cases.

Mr. Kyprianou asked what the United Kingdom's real objective was. The Prime Minister said that it was to restore the unitary

ate of Cyprus. Sir Julian Bullard said that we were trying to turn recent events to the advantage of Cyprus.

The Prime Minister asked what the mood in Northern Cyprus was. It would not be surprising if the initial euphoria began to evaporate. Mr. Kyprianou said that there was a lack of news from the North. Martial law prevented the many people who wished to oppose the move from speaking out. Few people in Northern Cyprus had wanted it. Sir Julian Bullard observed that this situation might change if Greek troops moved to Cyprus. The effect of this might be to consolidate Turkish/Cypriot opinion. The Prime Minister said that the hazards of military intervention should be avoided. Mr. Kyprianou said he was trying to be helpful. He said he could have invited the United Kingdom to intervene militarily. If the news leaked that the Greek Prime Minister had offered to send troops to Cyprus - and he then had to say that he was still studying the offer - he would be forced to resign. So he was taking the line with his own public opinion that his first step was to see what could be obtained from the Security Council. It was possible that another country might put forward the simple resolution that he envisaged. Sir Julian Bullard pointed out that our resolution would have priority for voting purposes if we so wished. Mr. Kyprianou agreed but said that it would not be logical for the UK to object if the non-aligned countries were to table a resolution. Guyana might be persuaded to do so. Sir Julian Bullard said it was all a question of securing a convincing vote. He reiterated that we should be most reluctant to lose altogether a reference to the Secretary General's good offices. Which countries, apart from the US, might have influence on Denktash and on the Turkish Government? Mr. Kyprianou said that Saudi Arabia was a possibility. The Saudis had assured Cyprus that they would not agree to partition. The Federal Republic of Germany was another possibility. Mr. Genscher had given them an assurance that he would support the UK initiative. Certain Muslim countries were under pressure from Turkey. They would like a simple resolution to be rapidly adopted so that they could take refuge in its terms. He had already been asked by the British press whether he favoured military action and he had replied in the negative.

The Prime Minister said that the turn of events had been most upsetting. We had felt that we were making some progress through the UN Secretary General and President Kyprianou had agreed to meet Denktash. Mr. Kyprianou recalled his last meeting with the Prime Minister which had been a starting point for the Secretary General's initiative. Twenty days ago both he and Denktash had agreed to consultations with Mr. Perez de Cuellar.

The Prime Minister enquired whether President Kyprianou would feel able to attend CHOGM. Mr. Kyprianou said that he was not sure. Commonwealth support was important to him. He might attend for a day or so. He wished to solve the situation by peaceful means. If a solution was not possible, Cyprus could be destroyed. In some ways the latest situation was worse than that of 1974 because it appeared to make the 1974 situation permanent. A further worry was that until now he had kept Cyprus outside the East/West conflict. But if there was a further deterioration, particularly given events in the Middle East, he did not know what would happen. The situation in the Lebanon had caused questions to be asked about the facilities provided in the sovereign base areas. In reply to a question from the Prime Minister, he said that the majority of members of the Communist Party in Cyprus were Cypriots first and Communists second.

Concluding the discussion, the Prime Minister said that our two delegations would be in touch in New York. We wanted a resolution which would command the greatest possible number of votes. The question of consultations would be pursued. Perhaps she and President Kyprianou could meet again at CHOGM.

The discussion ended at 1930.

A.J.C.

SECRET

SUBJECT

FILE

cc of Dis



2

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 November 1983

In Reply,

PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS

I enclose a record of the conversation between the Prime Minister and President Kyprianou which took place when the latter called at No. 10 Downing Street this evening.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*for use
for Col.*

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CT

SECRET