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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 July 1983

John Stan

Turkish Foreign Minister's Call: 28 July: 6pm

/ I enclose briefs for Mr Turkmen's call on the Prime Minister tomorrow.

Mr Turkmen would like to be accompanied by the Turkish Ambassador, Mr Gumrukcuoglu, and one other adviser. We will let you know his name as soon as possible. On our side, Mr Mark Russell, HM Ambassador at Ankara, and Mr James are free to attend if the Prime Minister wishes.

As you know, Mr Turkmen is having talks with the Secretary of State tomorrow between 5pm and 6pm.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'R B Bone'.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing St

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VISIT OF TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER: 28 JULY

INTRODUCTION

1. This is the first official visit to the UK by any Turkish Minister since the military takeover in September 1980. Mr Turkmen has had talks with Ministers on several occasions both in London (on private visits) and elsewhere. He last visited London privately in summer 1982. President Evren visited the UK as Chief of Staff in March 1980.
2. The last visit to Ankara by a British Minister was by Lord Belstead in January this year for celebrations to mark the four hundredth anniversary of Anglo-Turkish diplomatic relations. Professor Ozdas, a Turkish Minister of State, made a reciprocal visit to London in May and met the Prime Minister.
3. Mr Turkmen is a former career diplomat. He speaks excellent English and is sophisticated and lucid. Straight-forward and normally easy to do business with, he is prepared to express himself forcefully if he thinks it necessary.
4. Turkmen attaches great importance to calling on the Prime Minister and will be grateful that a call proved possible. He will have had talks with Mr Heseltine at 9.00am and with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary of State at 5.00pm on 28 July. He is to call on Lady Young at 11.45am on 29 July and will be given various hospitality during his stay. He leaves London on Sunday 31 July.

UK Objectives

5. (a) To show our continuing support for Turkey during a period of strained relations with the West and thereby maintain our position of (limited) influence.
- (b) To encourage return to democracy and respect for human rights.
- (c) To help maintain Turkey's western orientation and within that to improve her relationship with the European Community whilst discouraging an early application for full membership.

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Likely Turkish Objectives

6. (a) To reinforce the UK's special relationship with Turkey;
- (b) To use the visit to lend respectability to the present Turkish Government and their policies;
- (c) To seek support in dealing with Armenian terrorism;
- (d) (possibly) to enlist our support in EC matters and against Greece over Cyprus and the Aegean.

Background and Tactics

7. The strategic and political importance of Turkey has been enhanced by the instability of south-west Asia. Since the military takeover in 1980 there has been much criticism of Turkey in Western Europe. Our own sympathetic dealings with the Turks have helped to prevent them feeling entirely disillusioned and isolated. There is some risk that, if constantly rebuffed, there could be a shift in Turkey's European orientation.

8. The talks might begin with internal developments in Turkey (Annex A). As the Turks had expected, the run-up to elections (due on 6 November) is proving difficult. Action taken against new political parties and the press and alleged human rights violations have caused much public concern in the West. But the Turks seem to show little regard for others' opinion and handle public relations very badly. It would be useful to encourage the speedy return to democracy.

9. Turkey's dispute with Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean (Annex B) affects our interests over Cyprus and NATO. On Cyprus we should encourage the Turks to ensure that the Turkish Cypriots co-operate fully with the UN Secretary General, resume the intercommunal talks, do not declare independence and are realistic and flexible. We should say that we have similarly impressed on Kyprianou the need for a real effort to work for a solution and to avoid present divisions becoming permanent. We favour greater involvement by the Secretary General (about which the Turks have doubts). Over Aegean questions, we should encourage restraint and the resumption of the Greek-Turkish dialogue which has not properly restarted after being broken off by Papandreou in 1981.



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10. Bilateral Relations (Annex C) between the two governments are generally excellent. 1983 is the 400th anniversary of the start of Anglo-Turkish diplomatic relations. The one potential problem, the detention of two British birdwatchers, has effectively been resolved as a result of Turkmen's personal intervention: they arrive in London on the same flight as Turkmen. There is nothing we need raise. But Turkmen will probably refer to Armenian Terrorism. The points in Annex C can be drawn on as required.

11. In discussing Turkey/EC relations with Turkmen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will have sought to advise the Turks gently to think hard, and sound out other EC member states, before putting in an early application for full EC membership. An application would be bound to fail, and the consequences for Turkey's relations with the West could be serious.

12. A Fact Sheet on Turkey is at Annex D.

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ANNEX A

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VISIT OF TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER 28 JULY

TURKEY INTERNAL

POINTS TO MAKE

Return to Democracy

1. Continue to watch developments in Turkey with interest and understanding. Welcome continuing process of return to democracy. Hope elections will take place, as planned, in November.



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ESSENTIAL FACTS

Return to democracy

1. Turkish authorities adhering to timetable for return to democracy. A new Constitution was adopted by an overwhelming majority (91%) in referendum on 7 November 1982.
2. President Evren (elevated to office under temporary provisions of Constitution) has set 6 November as date for elections; but has threatened postponement. In their determination to rid country of old politicians and their influence, Generals have banned one of new political parties and vetoed the membership of many of founders of the others.

Human Rights

3. Allegations of human rights violations continue. Turkish authorities maintain that, unlike their civilian predecessors, they have made genuine efforts to investigate allegations and bring culprits to court. Some police officers have been convicted. Law and order has improved considerably since 1980.

Trials

4. Western public opinion concerned by mass trials: in particular those of DISK (Confederation of Revolutionary Trades Unions) leaders, members of the Peace Association and Kurds. Military prosecutor has demanded death sentence of 68 of accused in DISK trial.

Economic Developments

5. Turkey's economic recovery continues on the basis of the present stability programme introduced in 1980. Progress in reducing inflation and the balance-of-payments deficit has been impressive. Growing international confidence in Turkey. Recently raised a US\$200m loan on the international financial markets. Should be helped by recent IMF decision to approve further one year stand-by agreement for the period 1983-84. Some ECGD cover resumed (see Annex C). But momentum behind recovery may now be slowing down.

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VISIT OF TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER: 28 JULY

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

POINTS TO MAKECyprus

1. Intercommunal talks are best way forward. Understand frustration caused by recent UN debate (which we opposed). But danger that present divisions will become frozen if realistic progress is not made.
2. We fully support the UN Secretary General's efforts and welcome his intention to increase his own involvement. I made these points to President Kyprianou on 26 July. Impressed on him need for real effort to work for solution. Otherwise present divisions will become permanent.
3. Ankara should encourage Turkish Cypriots to put to the Secretary General their views on how a settlement might be reached.
4. Declaration of independence in northern Cyprus would have a catastrophic effect on the intercommunal talks. Referendum would be almost as damaging. Rightly or wrongly Turkish Cypriot side (and Turkey) would be blamed by international community for wrecking talks. No question of HMG recognising independent North Cyprus. You should continue to use your influence with Denktash against proclaiming independence or holding referendum.

Aegean

5. Concerned at continued tension and lack of dialogue. Disputes and problems over exercises weaken NATO.
6. Welcome recent meetings of Foreign Ministers and proposal for talks on economic relations and tourism. Important to create right climate of trust. Believe key to improved relations is Cyprus.

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US Bases Agreement with Greece [If raised]

7. Believe you need have no cause for concern over the bases agreement. Appears to be nothing in it detrimental to Turkish security. Turkey will receive a great deal of military aid. Papandreou's claims about agreement are made for internal reasons and are undoubtedly exaggerated. What matters is the substance of the agreement, and the sooner it ceases to be a public issue the better for all concerned (ie US Government, NATO, Turkey).

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ESSENTIAL FACTS

Cyprus

1. Intercommunal process now at a low ebb. Following UN debate Turkish Cypriots refuse to return to the negotiating table unless treated as 'equal partners' by Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots also continue to make threatening noises about unilateral declaration of independence and referendum to test Turkish Cypriot views (bound to be in favour). We have made our attitude quite clear, by demarches in Ankara and Nicosia. There is no question of our recognising an independent Turkish Cypriot state. A declaration would ruin prospects for the intercommunal dialogue.

2. It is unlikely that the intercommunal talks will be resumed soon. UN Secretary General has instructed his Special Representative in Cyprus, Dr Gobbi, to lie low for a while. Perez de Cuellar has said he will strengthen his own involvement in the Cyprus problem. But his is unlikely to take any initiatives such as a visit to Cyprus in the next month or so.

3. Elections in Turkey likely to lead to a government which, because it has to respond to public opinion, will be more intransigent on Cyprus. Any solution will require considerable pressure by Ankara on Turkish Cypriots to make territorial and other concessions which are necessary.

Aegean

4. Long standing complex of disputes over Aegean matters include territorial sea, airspace, Flight Information Regions, continental shelf and demilitarisation of islands. Particular causes of trouble in the last 12 months have been:

(a) Airspace. Greece claims 10 miles rounds the island in the Aegean but the Turks only recognise 6 miles, the same as Greek territorial sea. From time to time the Turks fly into the disputed zone.

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- (b) Territorial sea. The Greeks claim the right to extend their territorial sea in the Aegean to 12 miles. The Turks have made clear that this would be a casus belli since it would make the Aegean virtually a Greek lake.
- (c) Demilitarisation of islands. The Turks dispute the Greeks' right to militarise the islands of Lemnos and Samothrace. Greek insistence on the inclusion of the island of Lemnos in NATO exercises, despite NATO's policy of not including areas in dispute between allies, has led to the cancellation of several NATO exercises in the last year.

5. A regular dialogue was broken off by Papandreou when he came to power in October 1981. Efforts since then to restart the dialogue have so far proved largely unsuccessful, although the two Foreign Ministers met in Paris on 9 June.

6. Disputes seriously weaken NATO: damage the cohesion of the southern flank and individual disputes make it very difficult to hold effective exercises involving both Greece and Turkey.

US Bases Agreement with Greece

7. Greek-US agreement on bases in Greece, not yet published, was initialled on 15 July. Turks object to any implied reference to Turkey in this agreement either through references to a balance of power in the region or to the ratio of military aid to Greece and Turkey. Papandreou has made remarks which suggest there may be such references in the agreement. But in fact Americans have not conceded anything new of significance. Military aid to Turkey will continue at a high level. Excessive Turkish complaints will only annoy US and fuel Greek suspicions..

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BILATERAL RELATIONS

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Fitting your official visit here should be in year of four hundredth anniversary of Anglo-Turkish diplomatic relations. Welcomed Professor Ozdas' (pronounced OEZ-DASH) visit here in May.

British Birdwatchers

2. Glad the two British birdwatchers have been allowed to leave Turkey. Grateful for your personal intervention.

ECGD Cover [If Raised]

3. Our Embassy at Ankara will have told your authorities of ECGD's decision to establish medium term cover for Turkey very shortly. Hope this will help to increase bilateral trade.

Armenian Terrorism [If raised]

4. Deeply distressed by murder of Mr Aksoy in Brussels earlier this month. Share concern at escalating level of Armenian terrorism. Must not let it get out of hand. Our determination demonstrated by trial of Bedros and Gregorian in London.

5. Hope liaison between our security services can be built on and expanded.

6. Question value of action in multilateral fora. Main emphasis should be on effective bilateral cooperation.

7. [If raised] We have no reason to believe Armenian terrorists use Cyprus for training purposes.

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Defence Cooperation [If raised]

8. Welcome recent signing of a Rapier contract. No doubt you have discussed question of defence cooperation with Mr Heseltine.



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ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Lord Belstead visited Ankara in January to attend celebrations organised by our Ambassador (Sir Peter Laurence, now retired) to mark four hundredth anniversary of Anglo-Turkish diplomatic relations. Professor Ozdas, a Minister of State (Deputy Prime Minister equivalent) came for Turkish Embassy's celebrations here in May. Prime Minister attended reception at Turkish Embassy.

British Birdwatchers

2. Two British birdwatchers (Albrecht and Buisson) were arrested on Turkish side of border with Greece on 5 June. Charged with travelling, taking photographs and birdwatching in military zone without authorisation. Trial has been delayed. Following personal intervention by Turkmen, judge ordered on 22 July that defendants could leave country pending outcome of security investigation. Charges still stand.

ECGD Cover

3. ECGD resumed short-term cover in March after withdrawal of normal cover in 1977. ECGD have now agreed to establish a measure of medium term cover with British bankers taking part in a 50/50 risk-sharing arrangement. Decision not yet publicised, pending settlement of ECGD's administrative arrangements.

Armenian Terrorism

4. Armenian terrorists, demanding official admission by Turkish Government of the 'Armenian genocide' in last decade of Ottoman Empire and an independent Armenian in eastern Turkey, have pursued campaign of violence since 1973. Latest incidents earlier this month: assassination of Turkish diplomat in Brussels; fatal bomb explosion at Orly airport; and defusing of bomb in London.

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5. Trial in London of two Armenian terrorists plotting to assassinate Turkish Ambassador just concluded. Gregorian found not guilty on all charges. Bedros sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment on fire arms charges but cleared on main charge of conspiracy to murder. Armenian terrorists previously threatened to attack British targets unless these two released.
6. Turkey calls for international action to combat the problem. She has tried to raise it in NATO and tried to gain admittance to TREVI (EC counter terrorism forum). In our view, multilateral fora ineffective and cumbersome for exchanging views on policy and tactics. Also not an appropriate channel for intelligence.
7. We have told Turks we could not tolerate Turkey's use of retaliatory 'hit squads', and that we very much doubt their assertion that Armenian terrorists are trained in Cyprus.

Defence Cooperation

8. Turkish Armed Forces signed Rapier missile contract in June worth £146m. BAe anticipate prospect of further sales of Rapier and sales of Sea Skua missile, and possibly Tornado and Harrier.
9. Turks have suggested further industrial defence cooperation following earlier granting of free licence to them for manufacture of 105mm tank gun. They have put forward specific proposals which MOD are studying. Turkmen will probably have raised this with Mr Heseltine (Meeting at 9am on 28 July)

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FACT SHEETTHE REPUBLIC OF TURKEYDEMOGRAPHY

Population	46.8 million (preliminary)
Growth	2.3% per annum
Distribution	Urban 44.2%; rural 55.8%. Predominantly in the West and Central Anatolia
Religion	Turkey is a secular state. Some 98% of the population is Moslem, predominantly Sunnis.
Language	National and official - Turkish. Kurdish is also spoken in the East.

POLITICS Military rule since September 1980. Elections due 6 November 1983.

GEOGRAPHY

Area	779,452 square kilometres
Neighbours	USSR (NE), Iran (E), Iraq, Syria (SE), Greece, Bulgaria (W and NW).
Capital	Ankara (2,203,729).
Principal cities	Istanbul (2,853,539); Izmir (753,749); Adana (568,513); Bursa (466,178).
Principal port	Istanbul

ECONOMY

Basis	Agricultural and Industrial
GDP (1982)	US\$ 52.5 bn
GDP growth rate	1.9% per annum (1977-82)
GDP per capita	US\$ 1,122 (1982)
Balance of Trade (1982):	(minus) US\$ 2,988 million
Balance of Payments on current account (1982):	(minus) US\$ 1158 m
Gross official reserves (1982):	US\$ 925 million
Budgetary deficit (1980):	(minus) US\$ 722 million (1.6% GNP)
Inflation (consumer prices, Istanbul, average 1982):	32.7%

TRADE

Total Merchandise Exports (cif) (1982)

Principal commodities Textiles and clothing, processed agricultural products, tobacco, cotton, cereals, nuts, dried fruit.

Total Merchandise Imports (cif) (1982)

Principal commodities Crude oil, non-electrical machinery, chemicals, oil products, iron and steel.

TRADE WITH UNITED KINGDOM

	<u>1977</u>	<u>1982</u>
Exports to UK	£56.7m	£207.8m
Imports from UK	£210.2m	£213.1m

DEFENCE

Defence expenditure of US\$ 3.1 bn in 1981 represented 4.5% of GNP, an increase of 0.3% over 1980. Principal suppliers of NATO military aid: United States and FRG.