

00 FCO

00 UKDEL MADRID

GRS275

D E D I P

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 122220Z JUL 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1948 OF 12 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL MADRID

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

XX  
 SPE  
 229  
 PS  
 PS/LADY YOUNG 2  
 PS/MR GAKIND  
 PS/MR WHITNEY  
 PS/PJS  
 SIR J B JAMES  
 MR JAMES  
 HD/CSCE  
 HD/EEED  
 HD/DEFENCE  
 HD/NAD  
 RC  
 —

NY TELNO 1933: CSCE END GAME

1. SEITZ (HEAD OF SHULTZ'S OFFICE) HAS TOLD US THAT A DECISION ON THE US POSITION WILL NOT BE TAKEN UNTIL KAMPELMAN HAS SEEN THE PRESIDENT TOMORROW. SHULTZ'S RECOMMENDATION IS THAT IT WOULD THROW THE ALLIANCE INTO DISARRAY IF THE US WERE NOW TO GO INTO REVERSE IN MADRID. BUT THE AMERICANS MUST TRY TO GET CLEARER ASSURANCES THAT KOVALEV'S EARLIER UNDERTAKINGS TO KAMPELMAN ABOUT FUTURE PERFORMANCE WILL BE HONOURED.

2. SEITZ SAID THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT DID NOT YET KNOW HOW THE PRESIDENT WOULD REACT THOUGH, HAVING SEEN GENSCHER YESTERDAY, HE WAS WELL AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE THE GERMANS ATTACHED TO PROCEEDING. WHAT WORRIED SHULTZ WAS THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF THE PROBLEM. IF THE RUSSIANS DID NOT HONOUR THEIR UNDERTAKINGS ABOUT PERFORMANCE, THERE WOULD BE STRONG SUBSEQUENT CRITICISM THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION SHOULD NOT HAVE AGREED TO CONCLUDE IN MADRID WITHOUT GETTING CAST IRON ASSURANCES. SEITZ HINTED, THEREFORE, THAT IF THE PRESIDENT AGREES THAT THE US SHOULD PROCEED, WE WOULD BE TOLD PRIVATELY THAT IF THERE ARE SUBSEQUENT PROBLEMS OVER PERFORMANCE, THIS WILL AFFECT FUTURE US-SOVIET RELATIONS: AND, POSSIBLY, THAT THE US WOULD NOT NECESSARILY REGARD ITSELF AS BOUND TO PROCEED TO A CDE.

3. SEITZ ADDED THAT SHULTZ HAD SEEN MRS SHCHARANSKY WHILE HE WAS IN JERUSALEM. MRS SHCHARANSKY HAD SAID THAT SHE HOPED THAT THE US WOULD NOT SETTLE IN MADRID UNTIL THERE WAS A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO SHCHARANSKY AND OTHER DISSIDENTS WISHING TO EMIGRATE.

WRIGHT