



Handwritten notes: Hd/FID for advice r/dfr. reply p...  
Hd/Planning Staff. Mr Wood 106  
Hd/Defence Dept Mr G...  
Mr Flower PUS Mr Wright  
Hd/News Dept Lord N. Gordon-Leslie  
Mr Gifford

CABINET OFFICE PS/PUS

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-233 8319 DEP 06119. RA

From the Secretary of the Cabinet: Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO

26/10

Ref. A09851

25th October 1982

Handwritten: m./11

Handwritten: Mr Hulce. or

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My dear Antony,

The Falklands Crisis: Operational Lessons

You wrote to me on 5th August about the way the Government machinery coped with the Falkland crisis. Frank Cooper commented on 26th August.

The OD Secretariat have conducted a detailed examination of this subject and I enclose a copy of their report. The report takes account of the points raised by you and Frank Cooper (to whom I am copying this letter) and it has also been seen and commented on, on a personal basis, by some of the officials in your Departments who were personally involved in these events. I suggest that we now hold a small meeting to discuss the report and to consider how it might be handled. If you and Frank agree, my Private Office will be in touch about a date and time.

Yours are

Robert

Mr Hulce

Handwritten: might be worth including this point in the PS's brief.

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Mr Weston

Handwritten: On reading this I am struck as I was on looking at an earlier draft by the fact that the witnesses to the chiefs of staff Committee are so few and far between. Surely in terms of the necessary preparations for decision-taking the COS Committee played a vital role

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Sir Antony Acland, KCVO, CMG

Handwritten: agree it was crucial.

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SECRET

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THE GOVERNMENT MACHINE AND THE FALKLAND CRISIS  
2 APRIL TO 15 JULY 1982  
AN ASSESSMENT

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## INTRODUCTION

1. Argentina's invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982 gave rise to the most intensive and sustained period of interdepartmental activity since the Suez crisis of 1956 and perhaps beyond. Although in many respects the Falklands crisis was, and is likely to remain, unique, situations could arise in which the lessons to be learned from it would be very relevant. The obvious examples are Belize, Gibraltar and Hong Kong. But there are other cases on which the Falklands experience would have a bearing. These could include the need for military support, perhaps in conjunction with our Allies, of a friendly country in the Gulf or the evacuation in perilous conditions of a British community threatened by the break down of law and order in a foreign country. Situations could arise where the United Kingdom, despite having no formal obligations to take military or other action, might nevertheless face difficult decisions (eg the dispute between Venezuela and Guyana). For these reasons, an examination of how the Government machine performed during the Falklands crisis is more than an academic exercise. There are important practical lessons to be drawn.

2. This paper describes the special arrangements which were set up to manage the Falklands crisis, considers the criticisms of the machinery of Government which have been made and suggests lessons for the future.

## A CRISIS IN THREE PHASES

3. The Falklands crisis, and Whitehall's response to it, fell broadly into three phases -

a. An emergency phase characterised by ad hoc arrangements, as the Government machine adjusted itself to and came to grips with the dimensions of the crisis. In the days immediately preceding the invasion when the first definite intelligence reports were received, the Prime Minister held a number of very restricted meetings which were arranged and serviced by her own staff. After the invasion had been confirmed, the Cabinet itself dealt with the immediate response, meeting twice on 2 April and authorising the despatch of the Task Force some four days before OD(SA) (the so-called War Cabinet) came into existence. The

immediate economic response was dealt with by an ad hoc meeting of economic Ministers, chaired by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on 3 April. At official level, the absence of formal machinery to co-ordinate the action of Departments in a crisis not involving a full scale confrontation with the Warsaw Pact was noticeable. It was necessary to convene the Transition to War Committee (at a lower level than that of Permanent Secretary, as provided for) and to set up ad hoc arrangements under the aegis of the Cabinet Office OD Secretariat. A special official Committee (ODO(SA)) was created on 5 April although it was concerned solely with the range of economic measures to be adopted against Argentina (arms embargo, freezing of Argentine financial assets in the United Kingdom, requisitioning of ships for the Task Force, possible Emergency Bill etc).

b. An operational phase during which first the diplomatic and then the military handling of the crisis pre-dominated. This phase effectively began on 7 April when OD(SA) held the first of its 67 meetings (a full list of OD(SA)'s meetings, with timings, is at Annex A). The operational phase came to an end with the surrender of the Argentine forces around Port Stanley on 14 June.

c. A reconstruction phase, characterised by moves to de-escalate the crisis, return prisoners of war, rehabilitate the Falkland Islands, dismantle sanctions and rebuild relations with Latin America. This phase continues. 15 July has been chosen as the cut-off date for this paper because it was when OD(SA) met for the last time.

#### THE WHITEHALL WAR MACHINE

##### Ministerial Committees

4. OD(SA) (details at Annex B) was the key policy and decision making body during the operational and reconstruction phases of the crisis. The Prime Minister, in informing the Cabinet on 6 April of its establishment, undertook that major decisions would be referred to Cabinet or to OD. In the ensuing period to 15 July, Cabinet reviewed the state of the Falklands crisis on 20 occasions. Certain of these meetings were specifically convened for Falklands business: the Cabinet tended to meet twice rather than once a week during the period. OD, however, considered Falklands business only once. This was on 4 May, after HMS SHEFFIELD was hit by an Exocet missile.

5. As noted, OD(SA) met no less than 67 times, considering 70 notes, memoranda, and papers on a wide variety of subjects before its dissolution on 12 August. It maintained day to day control of the situation and examined the political and military options open to the Government. It normally met daily, including weekends. It had to invent its modus operandi which, initially, tended to be somewhat experimental and improvised. The position improved after the Secretary of the Cabinet codified its working methods in his minute of 6 May to the Prime Minister (see Annex C). The introduction of the overnight summary of diplomatic developments and prospects was an important factor in giving shape and coherence to OD(SA)'s deliberations.

6. It should be noted that OD(SA) did not include any economic Ministers. When, therefore, economic questions relating to the future of the Falkland Islands came to the fore during the reconstruction phase of the crisis, a new Committee had to be created. This was OD(FAF) (details at Annex D) which met for the first time on 22 June.

#### Official Committees

7. During the operational phase, the only specific Committee at official level on the Falklands was ODO(SA) (details at Annex E). Its function was "To consider matters of policy involving Civil Departments which determine the United Kingdom's response to the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands". It met three times during the early part of the crisis but not at all after 13 April. However, throughout the operational phase it provided a useful distribution list for papers on a wide variety of subjects, ranging from Visa Policy, the Emergency Powers (Falkland Islands) Bill, regular assessments of economic retaliation by Latin American countries, threats to British interests etc. 48 such papers were circulated. ODO(SA) was reborn on 2 June as ODO(SA)(FE) (details at Annex F) to deal with the reconstruction phase. This Committee was supplemented on 29 June by MISC 82, an Official Group to consider the future administration of the Islands. Both Groups report to OD(FAF).

### Mandarins Groups

8. No specific body of officials was created to support OD(SA) on the politico/military aspects of the crisis. Operational matters, in the military sense of the term, were not divulged to or processed by any formal interdepartmental official level Committee. They were, of course, properly the concern of the Chiefs of Staff (COS) who met daily during the crisis. COS meetings were attended by a representative of the FCO and the defence desk in the FCO Emergency Unit followed up remits from the COS and provided a permanent point for liaison with the MOD. Nevertheless, because of the unavoidable interplay between military and diplomatic policy decisions (particularly over such sensitive issues as the Rules of Engagement for Task Force ships and aircraft), a gap was soon identified. An informal body, known as the Mandarins Group, filled this gap, meeting ad hoc to prepare the politico/military aspects of OD(SA)'s discussions. It appears normally to have consisted of the Permanent Secretaries of the FCO and MOD, CDS, the Falklands Special Adviser (see paragraph 9) and the Deputy Secretary in the OD Secretariat, and was chaired by the Secretary of the Cabinet. No meeting notices were issued, no Secretariat appointed and no minutes taken. Although the proceedings of the Mandarins Group were known only to those present, it initiated follow-up action and commissioned papers for OD(SA). The Deputy Secretary in the OD Secretariat acted as de facto Secretary. The existence of this body demonstrates that preparation by officials of some of the most sensitive politico/military aspects of OD(SA)'s work was unavoidable. The informal way in which it conducted its business has been criticised: on one occasion at least (the extension of the Maritime Exclusion Zone across the mouth of the River Plate), this informality appears to have resulted in, or at least failed to clear up, some unfortunate confusion.

### Falklands Special Adviser

9. Sir Michael Palliser was brought out of very recent retirement to be the Prime Minister's Special Adviser on the Falklands in the second week of April. He was a regular member of OD(SA) and attended the Mandarins Group. Although made responsible for the work of the South Atlantic Presentation Unit (SAPU - see paragraph 14), his main function, as far as it was precisely determined, was to provide an independent source of experienced advice on the political and diplomatic aspects of the crisis and to ensure that account was taken of the longer-term implications. He had no staff as such but was supported by members of SAPU, the Assessments Staff and the OD Secretariat.

## Intelligence Arrangements

10. A detailed analysis of the workings of the JIC assessment process during the Falklands crisis was prepared by the Chief of the Assessments Staff and circulated on 1 July as JIC(82)(SEC) 26. For present purposes, the following points in JIC(82)(SEC) 26 should be noted -

i. The JIC decided on 4 April that in order to meet the needs of Ministers, the Chiefs of Staff and senior officials, a daily intelligence assessment should be produced on the Falkland Islands and Dependencies, covering Argentine military dispositions and intentions, Latin American and other international reactions, cease-fire negotiations and the reaction and involvement of the Soviet Union. 75 daily assessments were issued between 4 April and 18 June, together with 23 more detailed notes on specific aspects of the crisis.

ii. It was decided that daily assessments should be made available to Ministers and Departments as early as possible after lunch, in practice between 1430 and 1500. To meet this deadline, the Current Intelligence Group (CIG) met daily at 1100 to consider a draft. (The JIC itself met twice a week throughout the crisis).

iii. The JIC considered whether to attempt to produce daily assessments in time for the daily OD(SA) meeting at 0900 or 1000. However, it would have meant CIG meeting at 0600, with drafting commencing at 0400. This would have cut across the daily process of evaluation of new intelligence within Departments which took place early each morning and was a most important prior stage to interdepartmental discussion in the CIG. The JIC therefore decided that this timing was impractical, except on a small number of occasions when the needs of a particular Ministerial meeting had to be met.

11. That day's daily assessment was not therefore available for morning meetings of OD(SA). However, after the Secretary of the Cabinet's tightening of procedures on 6 May (see Annex C), it became standard practice for the CDS to brief OD(SA) on the latest military situation at the start of each

meeting. In addition, the Ministry of Defence basic military intelligence summary (INTSUM) was available daily from 0600 (with up-dates in the course of the day) and OD(SA) members would have seen them before their morning meeting. INTSUMs supplemented and complemented the basic military summary (eg tally of ships and aircraft engaged, damaged or lost on both sides), prepared by the Ministry of Defence Situation Centre (DSC) each morning. The DSC also prepared an early morning CCTV (closed circuit television) briefing covering the same ground. This was available to the JIC, FCO and COBR (see paragraph 13).

#### A point for the future

12. In the case of a limited military campaign against a not very sophisticated enemy (Argentina had no real capability for fighting at night), the geographical part of the world may be highly relevant to the best moment in each 24 hours to strike an intelligence balance. During the Falklands crisis a good deal of secret intelligence arrived around 0600 (London time), followed by a fairly long gap before any intelligence started to come in on the new day's fighting. That argued for assessment (first within the Ministry of Defence and then in the CIG) between roughly 0800 and 1200. In the case of a crisis in another part of the world, it might well be best to complete the daily intelligence summary in the late afternoon or evening.

#### The Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR)

13. It was agreed at an early meeting of officials that the nature of the Falklands crisis would not necessitate the particular kind of rapid interdepartmental co-ordination (such as arises during terrorists incidents) which would justify opening the COBR. Nevertheless, the COBR was manned throughout the crisis during the silent hours and at weekends to serve as a contact and distribution point and, as such, to complement the Defence Situation Centre in the Ministry of Defence and the Emergency Rooms in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. But the COBR had no executive functions and no attempt was made to use it in the role to which it is assigned in a NATO crisis. On two occasions OD(SA) received military briefing in the COBR.



#### Press and Information Arrangements

14. The need for special arrangements to deal with the presentational aspects of the Government's Falklands policy was perceived by the Cabinet on 6 April when it was decided to set up a presentation unit in the Cabinet Office. This was SAPU (South Atlantic Presentation Unit), consisting of a First Secretary from the FCO and a Principal from the Ministry of Defence. It was initially envisaged that SAPU would be made responsible to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster but in the event the Falklands Special Adviser assumed this function. During its existence, SAPU produced 32 papers on various aspects of Government policy for public use by Ministers. It was generally felt that these papers were of greater relevance and use at the beginning than at the end of the crisis. A channel to backbench opinion in the House of Commons was maintained via the Prime Minister's PPS and the Chief Whip's Office.

15. On 7 April, ODO(SA) considered how public information should be handled, basing their discussion on the arrangements involving a Press Working Party set out in paragraphs 7.1 of the Government War Book. In the event, formal arrangements of that kind were not activated and day to day co-ordination of the Government press line centred on the Information Group on the Falklands (IGF) which met 53 times between 8 April and 25 June (details included in Annex A). The IGF consisted of representatives of the FCO, MOD, COI, SAPU and Cabinet Office, chaired by the Prime Minister's Press Secretary. From 18 May a member of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Private Office also attended meetings. The IGF saw its objective as the effective co-ordination of presentation by Government Departments of the Falklands crisis, through proper interdepartmental liaison, eliminating duplication and quickening the speed of response. The IGF habitually met at 1000, therefore often overlapping with OD(SA). This timing was dictated by the daily rhythm of press briefings, notably the No 10 Press Secretary's meeting with Lobby Correspondents at 1100, the FCO daily press conference at 1230 and Ministry of Defence press briefings, the timing of which tended to vary.

16. Public controversy surrounding the Government's presentation of its case reached such proportions that on 12 May a special Group (PGFP - see Annex A), chaired by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, was set up to

consider what improvements might be made. It consisted of the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, the No 10 and FCO Press Secretaries and representatives of the FCO, SAPU and the OD Secretariat. Although it held only four meetings, the frank ventilation of the Government's media problems between those principally concerned helped to clear the air. Another practical result was that ~~for the first time~~ the attempt was made to co-ordinate Ministerial media appearances in order to avoid bunching and periods of silence.

#### HOW THE MACHINE PERFORMED

17. The Whitehall arrangements described above are generally regarded as having worked well. The Economist of 24 April 1982 described the war machine as "a hefty apparatus but sleeker by far than the World War III model enshrined in the Cabinet Office's War Book ...". Hefty or not, it transacted a great deal of difficult and sensitive business, quickly and efficiently. Nevertheless, although it worked well as an executive instrument, it cannot be argued that interdepartmental co-ordination was flawless. Had the Falklands campaign followed the pattern of the Crimean war, rather than ending quickly in outright victory, the search for scapegoats and explanations would have reached back into the Government machine, whether justifiably or not. The following are the organisational criticisms which might have been investigated by any such inquiry.

#### (i) Role of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (OD)

18. As noted, OD met only once throughout the crisis to discuss Falklands business. Despite the fact that it is the senior Ministerial Sub-Committee on defence and foreign affairs and that all Sub-Committees, Ministerial and Official, created during the crisis were in the OD series, OD itself played no role. When wider political discussion was needed, Cabinet was convened for the purpose. The invisibility of OD during the crisis was remarkable.

(ii) Initial absence of a Permanent OD Sub-Committee to deal with emergency situations overseas

19. It has been noted that the Cabinet itself took the major initial decisions, including the despatch of the Task Force, before OD(SA) was set up on 6 April. The need for a permanent crisis management committee to handle emergency situations of this kind in future was recognised on 12 August 1982 with the creation of an OD Sub-Committee on the Management of Political and Military Emergencies Overseas (OD(EM))(details at Annex G). OD(EM) is in effect OD(SA) resurgens having precisely the same composition. The absence of any Economic Ministers on it may create difficulties in the future, if financial and economic factors play a larger part in the crisis than they did during the Falklands operations. It is worth recalling that the Suez operation was finally aborted by a threatened run on sterling, not by military difficulty or defeat.

(iii) Absence of any permanent machinery at official level to manage hostilities short of a NATO war

20. As noted, the Government's immediate economic response to the crisis and the civil support required were elaborated by ad hoc groups of officials under Cabinet Office chairmanship before ODO(SA) was created on 6 April. The machinery of the Transition to War Committee was briefly used but abandoned as inappropriate. It would be logical to consider the creation of official machinery to support OD(EM) for the future.

(iv) Absence of a formal analogue to ODO(SA) to prepare the politico/military aspects of OD(SA)'s discussions

21. The politico/military aspects of OD(SA)'s discussions were prepared by the Mandarins Group of which two criticisms have been made. First, that its informality was inconsistent with the orderly and systematic conduct of business. Informality, in short, meant that points and tricks were missed (extending the MEZ across the mouth of the River Plate has been mentioned). Second, that the Mandarins Group was in any case too senior for all the subjects which it discussed and a more systematic attempt should have been made to reconcile differing views at an earlier and lower level under Cabinet Office chairmanship. In fact, the Mandarins Group appears to have worked

well in preparing the most sensitive political and military subjects for discussion in OD(SA) and in commissioning the necessary follow-up action. Indeed, it is argued that this could only have been done by a Group which remained informal. Others are less convinced, seeing informality as a potential weakness which, if it may not on this occasion have had damaging consequences, might have on future occasions. As far as the second point is concerned, that of lower-level preparation, it seems clear from experience that pressure of events alone would have precluded a pre-Mandarins Group, even if problems arising from political and military sensitivities could have been overcome.

(v) JIC daily intelligence assessments were available too late for morning meetings of OD(SA)

22. The problem is explained in paragraphs 10 and 11. There can be little doubt that it would have assisted OD(SA)'s discussions if daily assessments had been available in time. They could have probably been ready by 1200, even allowing time for internal consideration by Departments of each morning's new intelligence before the CIG meeting. However, since OD(SA) invariably met much earlier, the disproportionate effort to produce them by then would not have been justified. For the future, the possibility of the Assessments Staff preparing a short intelligence digest should be kept in mind. This might have usefully filled the gap pending preparation of the fuller daily assessment. Although less elaborate than the daily assessments, the daily INTSUM's were an essential input to OD(SA)'s proceedings. Similarly the daily detailed SITREP on diplomatic developments, introduced on 10 May, was an important element in improving the decision-making process.

(vi) Press and information arrangements were too remote from OD(SA)

23. The machinery for elaborating and co-ordinating the Government press line (SAPU and the IGF) suffered from the fact that its links with OD(SA) were uncertain and often tenuous. The result was that those who were talking directly to the press each day found it difficult to establish clearly whether information/presentation factors were receiving due attention in policy formulation or to make their views known in the light of the criticisms to which they were being subjected by the press. A number of examples can be

given. The providential capture of Commander Astiz might have been exploited to greater effect with international opinion. The sinking of the Argentine cruiser "General Belgrano" might have been better explained to public opinion, in the United Kingdom and abroad. Similarly, there were internal decisions and procedures of the Ministry of Defence (eg press representation on Task Force ships and the absence of any foreign journalists, lack of pictures from the battle zone, dual censorship arrangements for press despatches from the Falkland Islands) all of which had wider and cumulative repercussions on the effectiveness and credibility of the Government's Falklands policy as a whole. These issues were not discussed, still less decided, interdepartmentally. They generated such controversy that in due course a member of OD(SA) was given a specific role in the information/-presentation field. But Mr Parkinson's Group on Falklands Publicity (PGFP) was not set up until 12 May which was late in the day and it met only four times. Experience suggests that such a group, to consider the handling of the Government's case both abroad and at home, should have existed from the beginning of the crisis. Similarly, a direct link of some kind between OD(SA) and Government spokesmen should have been established. (One solution would have been the attendance of the No 10 Press Secretary at meetings of OD(SA)).

24. Experience generally during the Falkland Islands crisis suggests that the kind of arrangements for the central control of public information envisaged in paragraph 7.1 of the Government War Book for a European war should also be re-examined. Pressure for an appraisal of the Government's press arrangements during crises is likely to come from the House of Commons Defence Committee when it reports in the autumn. Advantage might be taken of this opportunity.

(vii) No regular or consciously planned pattern of daily meetings

25. Analysis reveals that, although not consciously planned, a discernible pattern was in fact set during the crisis, with OD(SA) normally meeting between 0900 and 1000 followed by Cabinet at 1100 on Tuesday and Thursday. But this pattern seems to have been dictated less by operational necessities than by an instinctive urge to get down to business at the earliest possible moment. A somewhat later start might have paid dividends even

though pressures on Ministerial time, especially Parliamentary pressures, might have made it difficult. Ministers and officials would have had more time to take stock within their Departments of what had been happening overnight. The JIC might have been able to make arrangements to prepare the daily intelligence assessment in time. The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster could have attended the IGF as he intended but never managed because of the recurrent clash with OD(SA).

(viii) Circulation of OD(SA) minutes was too slow

26. The burden on the Cabinet Office, particularly the OD Secretariat and Committee Section, of setting up and servicing so many meetings was great. As a rule, OD(SA) minutes were circulated by mid-afternoon in the case of morning meetings and by the evening in the case of afternoon meetings. Where delays occurred, it was due to the need to record in precise terms Ministerial decisions (notably Rules of Engagement). This necessarily involved checking with the Departments concerned in the light of the Ministerial discussion, and the circulation of minutes was sometimes delayed in consequence. Unfortunately, these tended to be the cases where speed was particularly important. Normally, however, any delay in circulating the minutes was offset by the presence of officials at OD(SA) including the Chiefs of Staff Secretary (COSSEC). In addition to providing advice, the official participants were able to ensure that decisions, including the despatch of instructions by telegram, were followed up immediately. Members of the OD Secretariat normally conveyed urgent decisions by telephone to those officials in MOD and FCO who needed to act urgently on them.

27. It has been suggested that a summary of action points might have been disseminated immediately after meetings with fuller minutes following in slower time. This would be in line with the procedures used in WINTEX/HILEX where decisions of the Exercise Cabinet and TWC are transmitted from the COBR over the Whitehall teleprinter network (WTN) immediately after meetings. This might be further examined although it must be noted that OD(SA) minutes in the main (ROE excepted) consisted of only the briefest summary of the discussion and the decisions taken. Another possible solution would be for each operational department to nominate a point of contact,

other than their Ministerial Private Offices, who would be responsible for obtaining from the Secretary the precise terms of Ministerial decisions as soon as these were available (ie before dissemination of the minutes) and for instigating all necessary departmental action.

(ix) Failure to maintain a full historical record of events and meetings

28. Because of the pressure of events, the workings of the Government machine were not always recorded in anything like the detail regarded as normal in peacetime. Although there may be good reasons for it, the proceedings of the Mandarins Group were not recorded and have been lost to the Government archives. In certain circumstances, lack of a detailed record of the inner workings of the Government could be a serious deficiency.

#### LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

29. The main conclusion that might be drawn from the Falklands crisis is that the Government machine is capable of coping with a diplomatic and military emergency overseas, short of a European war, despite little or no advance warning, and coping well. While this conclusion is reassuring, both the analysis in this paper and the testimony of those actively involved in the Falklands crisis suggest that the Government machine might nevertheless have worked better during this period; or to put it another way, relatively minor organisational changes could have produced similar results more painlessly.

30. The most important lesson has already been acted on, with the creation on 12 August 1982 of a new OD Sub-Committee on the management of political and military emergencies overseas (OD(EM) - details at Annex G). The major recommendation of this paper is that OD(EM) should be supported by an official counterpart, to be called ODO(EM), under Cabinet Office chairmanship. The structure of ODO(EM) needs careful consideration but should take account of the following factors -

- a. to pitch it at Permanent Secretary level would be too high. A more realistic level might be Deputy Secretary;

b. it should mirror the membership of OD(EM) but have discretion to extend its membership to include the economic departments;

c. at an early stage in any future crisis, ODO(EM) should devise a synchronised work pattern, taking account of all relevant factors, notably problems arising from the time zone involved (see paragraph 12). The crucial factor would be the timing of meetings of OD(EM) which ideally should be scheduled at a time of day which would permit it to receive all the necessary intelligence and other inputs;

d. ODO(EM) should be a permanent Sub-Committee, like OD(EM), created in advance of any crisis. Membership and distribution lists should be compiled and alert procedures drawn up. However, it is not thought necessary to incorporate these arrangements in a formal supplement to the Government War Book or to make provision for their regular exercising, on the Wintex/Hilex or counter-terrorist models.

31. Conclusions concerning the other criticisms identified and discussed in the paper are as follows -

i. Mandarins Group

Opinion is divided. That a body of this kind is necessary is not disputed. The question is whether its proceedings should be formalised in some way and whether the attempt should be made to reconcile differences over sensitive politico/military matters at a lower, pre-Mandarin level. However desirable the latter might appear, in principle, the practical and other difficulties are regarded as insuperable. As to formality, the suggestion that the Mandarins Group be made into a fully-fledged Steering Group of ODO(EM) on the politico/military aspects of the crisis did not find favour. But the consensus is that some record should be kept of its proceedings on a future occasion, if only in the form of a note recording that the Group met at a particular place and time, who attended and what subjects were discussed.



ii. Press and Information

A major recommendation is that in the new crisis arrangements, greater attention should be paid to the problems of press-handling and presentation, both at home and abroad. There are a number of possibilities. The possibility of attendance at OD(EM) by the No 10 Press Secretary has already been noted (paragraph 23 above). Serious consideration should also be given to making a member of OD(EM) responsible for presentation and co-ordination from the outset of any crisis. He should be in daily contact, however briefly, with the official spokesmen of the Departments concerned whose daily meeting should itself be an integral part of any new crisis arrangements.

iii. Intelligence Arrangements

If the JIC daily assessment cannot be ready for that day's OD(EM), the Assessments Staff should provide an intelligence digest to complement the diplomatic Sitrep.

iv. Circulation of OD(EM) minutes

Arrangements should be devised to minimise the risk of delays in the circulation of OD(EM) minutes. Paragraph 27 contains some suggestions.

v. Government records

A greater effort should be made, especially by the OD Secretariat, to ensure that interdepartmental meetings during any crisis are fully recorded. i. above on the Mandarins Group is relevant.

Cabinet Office, SW1

FALKLANDS CRISIS: INTERDEPARTMENTAL MEETINGS  
DURING PERIOD 2 APRIL TO 15 JULY 1982  
(EXCLUDING MEETINGS OF THE MANDARINS GROUP AND THE JIC)

OD = Oversea Policy and Defence Committee  
 OD(SA) = OD Sub-Committee on the South Atlantic and the Falkland Islands  
 ODO(SA) = OD (Official) Sub-Committee on the South Atlantic and the Falkland Islands  
 ODO(SA)(FE) = Sub-Committee of ODO(SA) on Future Expenditure  
 OD(FAF) = OD Sub-Committee on Future Arrangements for the Falkland Islands  
 IGF = Information Group on the Falkland Islands (Official)  
 PGFP = Mr Parkinson's Group on Falklands Publicity  
 MISC 82 = Official Group on the Future Administration of the Falkland Islands

Friday 2 April	CABINET 0945	Ad hoc Group of officials 1430	CABINET 1930
Saturday 3 April	Ad hoc Group of Officials 0830	Ad hoc Group of Ministers 0930	
Sunday 4 April			
Monday 5 April	Transition to War Committee 1100	ODO(SA) 1530	
Tuesday 6 April	CABINET 1000		
Wednesday 7 April	OD(SA) 0900	ODO(SA) 1130	OD(SA) 1900
Thursday 8 April	OD(SA) 1100	IGF 1230	
Friday 9 April			
Saturday 10 April			
Sunday 11 April			OD(SA) 1900
Monday 12 April	OD(SA) 1100		
Tuesday 13 April	ODO(SA) 1430	OD(SA) 1620	
Wednesday 14 April	IGF 1000	CABINET 1030	
Thursday 15 April	OD(SA) 1015		
Friday 16 April	IGF 1000	OD(SA) 1200	

CONFIDENTIAL

Saturday  
17 April

Sunday  
18 April

Monday  
19 April OD(SA)  
1115

IGF  
1445

OD(SA)  
2200

Tuesday  
20 April OD(SA)  
1200

CABINET  
1715

OD(SA)  
1330

Wednesday  
21 April OD(SA)  
0930

IGF  
1000

Thursday  
22 April OD(SA)  
1000

IGF  
1000

CABINET  
1030

Friday  
23 April IGF  
1000

Saturday  
24 April

OD(SA) 1815

Sunday  
25 April

OD(SA)  
1445

Monday  
26 April OD(SA)  
1115

IGF  
1445

Tuesday  
27 April OD(SA)  
0900

IGF  
1000

Wednesday  
28 April OD(SA)  
0900

IGF  
1000

CABINET  
1015

Thursday  
29 April OD(SA)  
0900

IGF  
1000

CABINET  
1000

Friday  
30 April OD(SA)  
0945

IGF  
1000

OD(SA)  
1430

Saturday  
1 May

Sunday  
2 May

OD(SA)  
1430

IGF  
1600

Monday  
3 May

IGF  
1600

Tuesday  
4 May OD(SA)  
0900

IGF  
1000

CABINET  
1030

OD(SA)  
1830

OD  
2015

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday 5 May	OD(SA) 0900	IGF 1000	CABINET 1145	
Thursday 6 May	OD(SA) 0900	IGF 1000		CABINET 1030
Friday 7 May	OD(SA) 0900	IGF 1000		
Saturday 8 May				
Sunday 9 May		OD(SA) 1500		IGF 1615
Monday 10 May	IGF 1000	OD(SA) 1030		
Tuesday 11 May	OD(SA) 0930	IGF 1000	CABINET 1100	
Wednesday 12 May	OD(SA) 0930	IGF 1000		PGFP 1500
Thursday 13 May	OD(SA) 0930	IGF 1000		CABINET 1100
Friday 14 May	OD(SA) 1000	IGF 1000		
Saturday 15 May				
Sunday 16 May	OD(SA) 1000			IGF 1615
Monday 17 May	OD(SA) 1000	IGF 1000		
Tuesday 18 May	OD(SA) 0930	IGF 1000		CABINET 1100
Wednesday 19 May	OD(SA) 0930	IGF 1000		PGFP 1700
Thursday 20 May	OD(SA) 1000	IGF 1000	CABINET 1100	
Friday 21 May	IGF 1000	OD(SA) 1030		
Saturday 22 May		OD(SA) 1100		

Sunday 23 May				IGF 1616
Monday 24 May	IGF 1000	OD(SA) 1030		PGFP 1800
Tuesday 25 May	OD(SA) 1000	IGF 1000		CABINET 1100
Wednesday 26 May	OD(SA) 1000	IGF 1000		
Thursday 27 May	OD(SA) 0930	IGF 1000		CABINET 1030
Friday 28 May	OD(SA) 0930	IGF 1000		
Saturday 29 May				
Sunday 30 May				OD(SA) 1600
Monday 31 May				
Tuesday 1 June	IGF 1000	OD(SA) 1030		
Wednesday 2 June	OD(SA) 0930	IGF 1000	ODO(SA)(FE) 1530	PGFP 1800
Thursday 3 June	OD(SA) 0945	IGF 1000	CABINET 1100	
Friday 4 June	OD(SA) 0915	IGF 0945		
Saturday 5 June				
Sunday 6 June				
Monday 7 June	OD(SA) 0930	IGF 1000		
Tuesday 8 June		IGF 1000		ODO(SA)(FE) 1430
Wednesday 9 June	IGF 1000	OD(SA) 1030		CABINET 1115

Thursday 10 June	IGF 1000		
Friday 11 June	OD(SA) 1000		ODO(SA)(FE) 1530
Saturday 12 June			
Sunday 13 June			
Monday 14 June	IGF 1000	OD(SA) 1030	
Tuesday 15 June	OD(SA) 0930	IGF 1000	CABINET 1015
Wednesday 16 June	OD(SA) 1000	IGF 1000	
Thursday 17 June	OD(SA) 1000	IGF 1000	CABINET 1100
Friday 18 June	OD(SA) 1000	IGF 1000	
Saturday 19 June			
Sunday 20 June			
Monday 21 June	IGF 1000	OD(SA) 1015	
Tuesday 22 June	OD(SA) 1000	IGF 1000	OD(FAF) 1035
Wednesday 23 June			
Thursday 24 June	OD(SA) 1000	CABINET 1030	
Friday 25 June	IGF 1000		
Tuesday 29 June	MISC 82 1100		
Thursday 1 July	OD(SA) 0930		
Monday 5 July	OD(SA) 1015		

Tuesday  
6 July OD(FAF)  
0935

Thursday  
8 July OD(SA) CABINET  
0930 1000

Monday  
12 July OD(SA)  
1015

Wednesday  
14 July MISC 82  
1000

Thursday  
15 July OD(SA)  
0915