

2038/1

THE FALKLAND ISLANDS INVASIONRELEVANT PAPERS

1. I attach:

Minutes of DOPC Meeting, Fri 2 Apr 82	cc(82)144	<u>FLAG A</u>
Minutes of Chiefs of Staff Committee 2nd/82 Fri 2 Apr 82	+ Conf Annex	<u>FLAG B</u>
Minutes of Chiefs of Staff Committee 3rd/82 Sat 3 Apr 82	+ Conf Annex	<u>FLAG C</u>
Minutes of Chiefs of Staff Committee 4th/82 Sun 4 Apr 82	+ Conf Annex	<u>FLAG D</u>
Capability of Argentine Armed Forces COS SI5(I) dated 3 Apr 82	A3876	<u>FLAG E</u>
Argentina Strengths and Weaknesses by DCDS(I)	A3796	<u>FLAG F</u>
"Operation Corporate" - Force Tote Sitrep at 041800A Apr 82	A3874	<u>FLAG G</u>
Prime Minister's Speech to Commons 3 Apr 82		<u>FLAG H</u>
Sequence of Events at Port Stanley 2 Apr 82	MONTVIDEO TEL NO 41 & 42 31/4/82	<u>FLAG J</u>
Summary of Security Council Meeting 3 Apr 82		<u>FLAG K</u> UKMIN NEW YORK TEL 308 of 3/4/82
Initial reaction of Chilean Military (The Chilean Option)		<u>FLAG L</u> SANTIAGO TEL 66 of 3 Apr 82
Press Conference for HE The Governor of Falklands and RM Detachment		<u>FLAG M</u> - MONTVIDEO TEL 36 3 Apr 82
Agenda for Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting 0930 Mon 5 Apr 82		<u>FLAG N</u> Agenda 3/4/82
ACDS(Ops)' outline for DPS Military Appreciation Paper for COS Committee Meeting 1430 Mon 5 Apr 82		<u>FLAG O</u> A3798

AIM

2. The aim of this paper is to update CDS prior to the Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting at 0930A on Mon 5 Apr 82. There will be a further COS Meeting at 1400 today to review a Military Appreciation Paper prepared by the Defence Policy Staff and the Secretariat. A separate brief for this meeting will be available for CDS after the morning meeting.

BACKGROUND

3. CDS will have seen A/PSO's signals but a summary of the background starts with trilateral talks in New York between the UK, Argentina and two members of the Falkland Islands Council at the end of February. The atmosphere at the meeting was cordial

and positive but unfortunately the joint communique which had been agreed was not published in Buenos Aires. On 19 March, a relatively minor incident occurred when 60 Argentine scrap metal workers landed at Leith, South Georgia, set up camp and hoisted the Argentine Flag. The Base Commander of the British Antarctic Survey Team told the Argentines that they had no right to land without permission; they should go to GRYPVIKEN to get the necessary clearances or leave. The great majority left on 22 March but 10 remained behind. The Argentine Government was asked to arrange for the departure of the remaining men or ensure they obtained the necessary permission. At this stage, CDS will remember HMS ENDURANCE was despatched to the area just prior to his departure to Colorado Springs.

4. HMG informed the Argentine Government that if the party failed to regularise their position or depart then HMS ENDURANCE would take them off, without using force, and return them to Argentina. In order not to escalate the situation, ENDURANCE was ordered to go to GRYPVIKEN and not approach the party at Leith. After little apparent interest by the Argentines, the Argentine Navy ship BAHIA PARAISO arrived at Leith on 25 March to deliver supplies to the men ashore. On 28 March after much diplomatic activity, the Argentine Foreign Minister informed Lord Carrington that he intended taking no action and restated Argentina's claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The FCS approached the US Secretary of State asking him to intervene and urge restraint.

5. On Tuesday 30 March, the MOD learnt that the Argentine Government had taken further military action on 25 March by despatching two Exocet fitted A69 Corvettes and one SSK to the Falklands area. The DOE met later in the day to prepare military advice for acting CDS to present to S of S on the evening of Wed. 31 March. The military options were an SSN deployment, a small surface force from Gibraltar (Ex Spring Train) or a carrier task group deployment. Air reinforcement, without staging through Uruguay or Chile was considered impracticable particularly as Port Stanley runway can only operate Hercules whose only diversion would have been an Argentinian airfield. That evening (30 March), Ministers decided to sail two SSNs (HMS SPARTAN and SPLENDID) and RFA FORT AUSTIN from Gibraltar to replenish ENDURANCE. On Wed 31 March, intelligence reported an Argentine task force at sea 800 miles to the North of the Falkland Islands, heading for Port Stanley and at noon further intelligence was received of a merchant ship sailing towards the Falkland Islands from Commodoro Rivadavia, allegedly with certain command personnel embarked. The DOE met but considered little could be done in the short term but invited ACDS(Ops) and ACNS(Ops) to study the deployment options for HMS ENDURANCE. It was decided to despatch ENDURANCE to Port Stanley later that evening. On the diplomatic front, FCS had proposed to the Argentines that HMG send a special emissary to Buenos Aires and the PM invited President Reagan to intervene with the Argentine President.

6. OD met on Thursday 1 April with A/CDS and CNS in attendance. It was agreed that a third SSN be deployed (CONQUEROR) but that no surface forces would be sent. Plans to fly out a RM Company group to Ascension Island to link up with RFA Fort Austin were

Thurs
1st Apr
cancelled due to the FCO request that no action be taken which might prejudice diplomacy. The Argentines rejected the idea of an emissary and told our Ambassador that the Diplomatic Channel for solving the dispute was closed. President Reagan had a long conversation with President Galtieri but his strong representations fell on deaf ears. A representation to the UN was made and an emergency meeting of the Security Council was called later that evening. It has since been reported that the Argentine Government made the decision to invade at 1900 local that evening.

Fri
2nd Apr.
7. Early on Friday 2 April, it became apparent from intelligence sources that the Argentines would invade Port Stanley at first light (1100Z). A full Cabinet Meeting was held at 0930 (FLAG A). An overnight decision had been made to bring an RN Task Group, consisting of INVINCIBLE and HERMES, 3 Cdo Groups and Brigade HQ with supporting escorts, RFA's and LSL's to immediate notice with the intention of sailing on Mon 5 Apr, subject to Cabinet approval. Also 6 DD/FF and RFA Appleleaf were detached from Ex Spring Train under the command of FOF1 to head slowly South and await the arrival of the main group. The Cabinet reviewed the situation and stated military preparations should continue as planned. The Argentines landed at first light and quickly overcame the RM defences. Details of the invasion are at FLAG J, as recounted by HE The Governor and the OC RM.

Fri
2nd Apr.
8. Confirmation of the Argentine landing was difficult to obtain as the main means of communications with Port Stanley was TELEX. Communication was lost at 1040A when HE Governor reported that Government House was surrounded. A statement was made in the Commons by Mr H Atkins during the forenoon that no confirmation of the landing had yet been received; regrettably the island had already fallen. When the house was told of the invasion, the Government was considerably embarrassed by the lack of information and came under pressure from not only the Opposition but Conservative backbenchers as well. Calls were made for S of S and FCS' resignations. A decision was made that the House of Commons should be recalled and sit on Saturday 3 April when the Prime Minister and S of S would make a full statement to the House. After a ministerial meeting which CNS attended, the COS Committee convened. The minutes of this first COS Meeting are at FLAG B. Decisions taken were to despatch ENDURANCE to South Georgia to give assistance to the RM party at GRYTIVIKEN and establish communications. RFA's Fort Austin and Appleleaf were to continue South but hold north of the area and await the arrival of the main task force. CNS reported that the main task force except for two ships would be ready to sail on 5 April. The use of air bases in Chile was also addressed but the FCO was continuing with delicate negotiations. Later in the day, diplomatic relations were broken with Argentina and Argentinian assets in the UK were frozen.

Sat
3rd
9. The Prime Minister addressed the House of Commons at 0930 on Sat 3 Apr and her speech, FLAG H, was on the whole well received, particularly her statement that "it is the Government's objective to see that the Islands are freed from occupation and are returned to British administration at the earliest possible moment". The Secretary of State concluded the debate but his

XIII performance was not of the best and he came under 'heavy fire' from all sides of the House. The main criticisms directed at Mr Nott were a lack of preparedness and the failure of the intelligence services in providing adequate warning. The mood of the country and Parliament is one of determination to regain the islands as soon as possible. Further diplomatic activity took place at the UN and the Security Council adopted the resolution that the Argentine forces should withdraw; the vote was 10 to 1 (Panama) with the Soviet Union, China, Poland and Spain abstaining.

10. The COS Committee convened during the morning of Saturday 3 April and the minutes are at FLAG C. Preparations for the despatch of the Task Force continue and the movement of men and equipment to Ascension Island for Operation Corporate progresses satisfactorily. The Navy department are attempting to take up SS CANBERRA from trade to embark men of 3 Cdo Bde and 3 Para Group but an Order in Council will be required. HMS HERMES will be used in the CVS role. During the late afternoon, an Argentine Corvette put 40 Marines ashore at Grytviken. The RMs did well by damaging the Corvette and destroying the ship's Puma helicopter before surrendering. The whereabouts of the RM party and the BAST are unknown at present. The Argentines continue to consolidate their position at Port Stanley.

11. The COS Committee met at 0930 on Sunday 4 April and the minutes are at FLAG D. The FCO representative stressed that the UN resolution on Argentine aggression was very gratifying but that every speaker supported eventual Argentine sovereignty of the islands. The Committee discussed ROE's for the SSN's and agreed to delay HMS SPLENDID by 16 hours to pick up SBS and SAS at Ascension Island. HMG is not at a state of war or belligerency but is operating under the UN Charter Article 51. British nationals are being invited to leave Argentina and the Home Office are taking steps to stop Argentines entering the UK. The Committee agreed to meet at 0930 on Monday 5 April when CDS will have returned and to meet again at 1400 to study a Military Appreciation Paper. ACDS(Ops)'s outline for this paper is at FLAG O. S of S hopes that this paper can be presented to OD this evening.

12. HE The Governor, Mr Hunt and the RM detachment from Port Stanley arrived at Brize Norton just before midnight last night. Ministers have decided not to allow the Press access to Brize Norton but to hold a press conference pm today. FLAG M.

13. CDS may wish to glance at FLAG E which is the detailed capability of the Argentine Armed Forces but may find DCDS(I)'s short review of the 'strengths and weaknesses', particularly the conclusion at FLAG F, of more value.

HANDLING THE MEETING

14. A forecast of the decisions taken at the meeting on 3 April

is at Sideflag 1 and those at the meeting on 4 April at Sideflag 2. The Agenda for this morning's meeting is at FLAG N. The Agenda items are:

- a. Intelligence Assessment. DCDS(I)'s short review is at FLAG F. Any intelligence on the build up of forces at Port Stanley will be of value.
- b. Own Forces. The RN forces involved and details of RAF and chartered Belfast flights to Ascension Island are at FLAG G. CDS will remember that HMS SPLENDID is diverting to Ascension Island and the approval of the Order in Council for the take-over of SS CANBERRA is awaited.
- c. Public Relations. There is intense press interest in the current situation. Four UK journalists have been expelled from Port Stanley but there are still many journalists in Buenos Aires. Ten places have been offered to the Press to sail with the Task Force.
- d. Decisions Required. These will be mainly to do with the build up of forces for the Operation. Decisions on the military appreciation will be addressed during the afternoon COS Meeting.
- e. Military Appreciation. The skeleton outline for this paper is at FLAG O.

15. A/PSO wished that you should be made aware of the following general points:

- a. CNS has been running the show.
- b. At the COS Meeting on 4 April, S of S sat at the Head of the table which CNS clearly thought inappropriate.
- c. CNS attended a ministerial meeting without A/CDS being present.
- d. VCGS has represented CGS at all the COS Meetings.
- e. ACDS(Ops) returned pm Friday from his tour of the Persian Gulf.
- f. S of S appeared on ITV Weekend World yesterday midday and came across well.

LINE TO TAKE

16. CDS will need to listen carefully to the briefs. CDS will note that the two SSNs (SPARTAN and SPLENDID) arrive in the area on 12 and 15 Apr (FLAG G); this is a good two weeks before the arrival of the Combined Task Group. It is most important to tell the politicians that the SSN's and the political will to use them are the key military factor in this

SEN'S
12 Apr
18 Apr

situation. I trust this will be made crystal clear in the
military options paper.

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Drafted by: Cdr P A Voute
Dated: 04 Apr 82