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TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 177 OF 9 MARCH

MIPT

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SADAT

1. I THOUGHT YOU MIGHT FIND IT USEFUL TO HAVE MY PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE VISIT THE PRIME MINISTER AND I MADE LAST WEEK TO WASHINGTON.
2. THE VISIT WENT VERY WELL. THE OPEN AND FRIENDLY APPROACH OF PRESIDENT REAGAN AND HIS COLLEAGUES MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO HAVE VERY USEFUL TALKS WITH THE MINIMUM OF FORMALITIES. INDEED THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THERE WAS JUST NOT SUFFICIENT TIME TO COVER EVERYTHING WE WANTED.
3. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WILL BE PAYING A GREAT DEAL OF ATTENTION TO EAST/WEST RELATIONS IN THEIR BROADEST SENSE: I THINK WE CAN EXPECT THEM TO ADOPT A ROBUST BUT VERY RATIONAL APPROACH TO THEIR DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IN OUR DETAILED TALKS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND WITH GENERAL HAIG WE EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THESE MATTERS AND IN PARTICULAR ON BREZHNEV'S SPEECH TO THE SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS. I AGREED WITH MR HAIG THAT THE SPEECH HAD BEEN A WELL-TIMED AND SOPHISTICATED MANOEUVRE BUT THAT DESPITE A NUMBER OF UNACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS, IT POINTED TO A GENUINE SOVIET WISH TO CONTINUE A DIALOGUE WHICH NEEDED TO BE EXPLORED. THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THE STRONG LANGUAGE USED EARLIER BY THEIR NEW ADMINISTRATION CONTRIBUTED TO THIS SOVIET REACTION. THEY DO NOT INTEND, HOWEVER, TO BE RUSHED INTO AN EARLY SUMMIT MEETING WHICH WOULD NEED CAREFUL PREPARATION. WE AGREED THAT PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL WOULD BE A NECESSARY COMPLEMENT TO DEFENCE AND DETERRENCE.
4. ON EL SALVADOR, THE AMERICANS EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THE DEVELOPING CONFLICT AND MADE CLEAR THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE SUPPORT WHICH THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT IS SECURING FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES. WE INDICATED THAT WE SHARED THE AMERICAN VIEW OF

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OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF EL SALVADOR. WE EXPLAINED THAT WE CONDEMNED VIOLENCE FROM ANY QUARTER AND CONSIDERED THAT THE PEOPLE OF EL SALVADOR SHOULD BE ABLE TO DETERMINE THEIR FUTURE PEACEFULLY AND DEMOCRATICALLY.

5. IN OUR TALKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST WE EXPLAINED THAT THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE WAS INTENDED TO COMPLEMENT NOT TO COMPETE WITH THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. I THINK WE HAD SOME SUCCESS IN REASSURING THE ADMINISTRATION ON THIS POINT, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT OUR POSITION ON THE PLO AND PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION. WE MADE CLEAR THAT THE TEN WILL CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE BUT THAT NO MAJOR MOVE IS LIKELY BEFORE THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS. WE WERE AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE US AND EUROPE WORKING TOGETHER TOWARDS THE COMMON OBJECTIVE OF COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. MR HAIG CLEARLY WISHES TO TAKE HIS TIME BEFORE DECIDING HOW THE PEACE PROCESS CAN BEST BE TAKEN FORWARD. I WAS ENCOURAGED TO FIND THAT HE HAS AN OPEN MIND ABOUT THIS. I KNOW HE REGARDS HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST AS A MOST VALUABLE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE THE AREA AND ITS PROBLEMS FOR HIMSELF AND LISTEN TO THE VIEWS OF THOSE MOST CONCERNED AT FIRST HAND.

6. THE PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSED WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF THE GULF AND SOUTH-WEST ASIA FOLLOWING THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. THEY BOTH SHARE THE DETERMINATION TO DO ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE TO PREVENT SOVIET ENCROACHMENT IN THIS REGION. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE STATES WHICH FACT SOVIET EXPANSION SHOULD THEMSELVES TAKE A LEAD. FOR THIS REASON WE WELCOME THE RECENT AGREEMENT BY SIX GULF STATES TO ENHANCE THEIR COOPERATION. WE BELIEVE THAT WE AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH THE GULF STATES ABOUT OUR COMMON INTEREST IN PRESERVING THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF THE REGION AND THAT WE SHOULD TAKE CAREFUL ACCOUNT OF THEIR VIEWS BEFORE ANY POLICY DECISIONS ARE TAKEN.

7. AS FOR A RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE, THIS WAS, AS YOU KNOW, ORIGINALLY THE IDEA OF THE PREVIOUS US ADMINISTRATION. THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING IT SINCE THEN. THERE IS STILL A



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GREAT DEAL OF CONSULTATION AND DISCUSSION TO BE DONE. AS MRS THATCHER HAS MADE CLEAR, WE ARE NOT SEEKING TO CONNECT A RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE WITH ANY PARTICULAR AREA OUTSIDE NATO, ALTHOUGH IN VIEW OF THE RUSSIANS' OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN, THEIR STRONG PRESENCE IN ADEN AND THEIR INTEREST IN THE GULF IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT WE SHOULD KEEP THE GULF IN THE FOREFRONT OF OUR THOUGHTS. SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF THE GULF WAR IN OCTOBER WE HAVE HAD A NUMBER OF VESSELS IN THE AREA, THOUGH NOT IN THE GULF ITSELF, AND WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT IF A RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE WERE TO BE CREATED, THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD IN PRINCIPLE BE READY TO CONTRIBUTE TO IT. THERE IS NO QUESTION OF THE PERMANENT STATIONING OF BRITISH TROOPS IN THE GULF AREA. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE RECOMMENDED THAT MEMBERS OF NATO SHOULD INDIVIDUALLY RECOGNISE THE GLOBAL NATURE OF THE SOVIET CHALLENGE, WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF TRYING TO EXTEND THE COMMITMENT OF NATO ITSELF OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA.

8. OUR AMBASSADDR WILL BE PASSING ON TO YOU MRS THATCHER'S INVITATION FOR YOU TO SPEND A FEW DAYS IN LONDON AS A GUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ISSUES ON WHICH IT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL FOR US TO HAVE TALKS WITH YOU AND IT WOULD ALSO GIVE US GREAT PLEASURE TO BE ABLE TO REPAY THE HOSPITALITY YOU HAVE OFFERED MYSELF AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT RECENTLY. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THE PRIME MINISTER'S INVITATION.

CARRINGTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

LIMITED	PS/MR HURD
NENAD	PS/PUS
MED	SIR J GRAHAM
PCD	SIR A ACLAND
DEFENCE DEPT	MR BULLARD
PS	MR P MOBERLY
PS/LPS	MR J C MOBERLY

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signed on  
USA; PM's visit to  
Washington (PDR): PT 2.

*Copy*

9 March 1981

Messages to President Sadat  
and King Hussein

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 6 March and has agreed that the draft messages enclosed with it may be despatched.

MODBA

F.J. Richards, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

VLS



Original on: USA  
Pm's visit to  
Washington. (Pm's) P12

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

A speed  
not

6 March 1981

(1)

Prime Minister

Dear Michael, ✓

All this seems unambitious:  
I think "briefing" messages of this kind ~~can~~ go  
better from the FCS than from you except where allies  
are concerned. You can reserve you file for substantial  
messages.

Messages to President Sadat and King Hussein

When the Egyptian Ambassador called on Lord Carrington last month, he said that President Sadat would find it useful to be briefed on the Prime Minister's and Secretary of State's visit to Washington; Lord Carrington undertook to see that this was done. HM Ambassador in Amman has also recommended that a message on the Washington talks be sent to King Hussein.

2. Hope texts  
can come.  
Amk

I attach the texts of messages which, if you see no objection, Lord Carrington has it in mind to send to President Sadat and King Hussein.

Yours ever,  
Francis P. Chil  
(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing St



OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats  
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Precedence/Desk/By  
IMMEDIATE

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GRS	2	GRS
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DESKBY	5	
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PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	YOUR TELNO 153 of 3 MARCH
	10	1. MIFT contains personal message from me to Sadat giving
	11	account of the visit by the Prime Minister and myself to
	12	Washington.
	13	2. The Prime Minister has agreed that President Sadat should
	14	be invited to visit Britain <u>as a guest of the government</u> if
	15	<u>suitable dates can be found.</u> It would only be possible for the
	16	Prime Minister to participate in a programme for President
	17	Sadat on <u>24-25 June.</u>
	18	3. Please now seek an audience with President Sadat to hand
	19	over my message and extend the invitation from the Prime
	20	Minister. We hope that President Sadat will be able to come on
	21	the above dates.
///	22	4. We understand from the IISS that he had accepted their
//	23	invitation to deliver a lecture in London and proposed July, but
/	24	sent a later message cancelling this because of Ramadan. We
	25	have told the IISS of our plans to invite Sadat for June. IISS

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File number	Dept S/S Office	Distribution Limited NENAD MED PCD Defence Dept PS PS/LPS
Drafted by (Block capitals) F N Richards		Copies to: PS/Mr Hurd PS/PUS Sir J Graham Mr J C Moberly Sir A Acland Mr P Moberly Mr Bullard
Telephone number 233 4831		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

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 have asked that we should not mention their dealings, which were through Ghorbal, to the London Embassy or MFA.  
 5. We would hope that President Sadat could spend at least two nights in London. A programme would include talks with the Prime Minister and myself. We hope to be able to arrange for Sadat to be received by the Queen. It would be useful in due course to know if Sadat has any ideas of his own on what he might do in London.

CARRINGTON  
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Classification and Caveats  
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7	TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO
8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
9	MIPT
10	MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SADAT
11	1. I thought you might find it useful to have my personal
12	impressions of the visit the Prime Minister and I made last
13	week to Washington.
14	2. The visit went very well. The open and friendly approach
15	of President Reagan and his colleagues made it possible for us
16	to have very useful talks with the minimum of formalities.
17	Indeed the problem was that there was just not sufficient time
18	to cover everything we wanted.
19	3. It is clear that the new Administration will be paying a
20	great deal of attention to East/West relations in their broadest
21	sense: I think we can expect them to adopt a robust but very
22	rational approach to their dealings with the Soviet Union. In
23	our detailed talks with President Reagan and with General Haig
24	we exchanged views on these matters and in particular on
25	Brezhnev's speech to the Soviet Party Congress. I agreed with

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Mr Haig that the speech had been a well-timed and sophisticated manoeuvre but that despite a number of unacceptable elements, it pointed to a genuine Soviet wish to continue a dialogue which needed to be explored. The Americans believe that the strong language used earlier by their new Administration contributed to this Soviet reaction. They do not intend, however, to be rushed into an early summit meeting which would need careful preparation. We agreed that progress on arms control would be a necessary complement to defence and deterrence.

4. On El Salvador, the Americans expressed their concern about the developing conflict and made clear their opposition to the support which the guerrilla movement is securing from external sources. We indicated that we shared the American view of outside interference in the internal affairs of El Salvador. We explained that we condemned violence from any quarter and considered that the people of El Salvador should be able to determine their future peacefully and democratically.

5. In our talks on the Middle East we explained that the European initiative was intended to complement not to compete with the Camp David process. I think we had some success in reassuring the Administration on this point, although they have reservations about our position on the PLO and Palestinian self-determination. We made clear that the Ten will continue their efforts to contribute to peace but that no major move is likely before the Israeli elections. We were agreed on the importance of the US and Europe working together towards the common objective of comprehensive peace. Mr Haig clearly wishes to take his time before deciding how the peace process can best be taken forward. I was encouraged to find that he has an open mind about this. I know he regards his forthcoming visit to the Middle East as a most valuable opportunity to see the area and its problems for himself and listen to the views of those most concerned at first hand.

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2 6. The Prime Minister discussed with President Reagan the  
3 stability and security of the Gulf and South-West Asia following  
4 the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. They both share the  
5 determination to do all that is possible to prevent Soviet  
6 encroachment in this region. We continue to believe that the  
7 states which face Soviet expansion should themselves take a  
8 lead. For this reason we welcome the recent agreement by six  
9 Gulf states to enhance their cooperation. We believe that we  
10 and other Western countries should continue to consult closely  
11 with the Gulf states about our common interest in preserving the  
12 stability and security of the region and that we should take  
13 careful account of their views before any policy decisions are  
14 taken.

15 7. As for a rapid deployment force, this was, as you know,  
16 originally the idea of the previous US Administration. The  
17 Americans have been considering it since then. There is still a  
18 great deal of consultation and discussion to be done. As  
19 Mrs Thatcher has made clear, we are not seeking to connect a  
20 rapid deployment force with any particular area outside NATO,  
21 although in view of the Russians' occupation of Afghanistan,  
22 their strong presence in Aden and their interest in the Gulf it  
23 is only natural that we should keep the Gulf in the forefront of  
24 our thoughts. Since the outbreak of the Gulf war in October we  
25 have had a number of vessels in the area, though not in the  
26 Gulf itself, and we have made clear that if a rapid deployment  
27 force were to be created, the United Kingdom would in principle  
28 be ready to contribute to it. There is no question of the  
29 permanent stationing of British troops in the Gulf area.  
30 Although we have recommended that members of NATO should  
31 individually recognise the global nature of the Soviet challenge,  
32 we have no intention of trying to extend the commitment of NATO  
33 itself outside the NATO area. The Prime Minister looks forward  
34 to discussing all these matters during her visit to the Gulf in

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2 April.

3 8. Our Ambassador will be passing on to you Mrs Thatcher's  
 4 invitation for you to spend a few days in London as a guest of  
 5 the Government. There are a number of important issues on which  
 6 it would be most useful for us to have talks with you and it  
 7 would also give us great pleasure to be able to repay the  
 8 hospitality you have offered myself and other members of the  
 9 government recently. I very much hope that you will be able to  
 10 accept the Prime Minister's invitation.

11  
 12 CARRINGTON

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