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CONFIRMATION HEARINGS ON SECRETARY OF STATE DESIGNATE ALEXANDER HAIG

1. HAIG'S CONFIRMATION HEARINGS OPENED IN THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE TODAY. THEY ARE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE ON SATURDAY AND PROBABLY INTO NEXT WEEK. THE FIRST MORNING'S SESSION WAS TAKEN UP WITH HAIG'S INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT, A FIRST ROUND OF QUESTIONS FROM COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND A WRANGLE OVER WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMITTEE SHOULD SUBPOENA CERTAIN DOCUMENTS AND TAPES RELATING TO HAIG'S PREVIOUS SERVICE IN GOVERNMENT, AS REQUESTED BY THE RANKING MINORITY MEMBER SENATOR PELL.

2. HAIG HAS TAKEN THE UNUSUAL STEP OF VOLUNTARILY TESTIFYING ON OATH. FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS OF HAIG'S PREPARED STATEMENT.

3. HAIG OPENED BY REFERRING TO HIS PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE. HIS ROLE IN WATERGATE HAS ALREADY BEEN CLOSELY SCRUTINISED. HE HAD PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED EIGHT TIMES BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES OR IN COURT AND NO INVESTIGATION HAD FOUND ANY CULPABILITY ON HIS PART. COMMENTING ON HIS ROLE DURING THE WATERGATE PERIOD, HAIG SAID HE HAD OPERATED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT NIXON, LIKE ANYONE ELSE, WAS ENTITLED TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT UNLESS AND UNTIL PROVED GUILTY. WITHIN THAT CONTEXT HAIG HAD SEEN HIS OVERRIDING DUTY AS BEING TO PRESERVE THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENCY FOR THE GOOD OF THE NATION AND HE HAD WORKED WITHIN THE LAW TO THIS END.

4. TURNING TO HIS VIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, HAIG REFERRED TO THE MANY AREAS OF TENSION IN THE WORLD, FROM THE THREAT OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLAND TO THE FRAGILE TRUCE IN KOREA, ALL OF WHICH MADE THE OUTLOOK ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS. BUT HE REJECTED THE IDEA THAT THE 80'S MUST BE A DECADE OF CRISIS, WHICH IMPLIED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE HELPLESS TO DO MORE THAN REACT TO EVENTS. AMERICAN STATESMANSHIP MUST AND COULD BE MOBILISED TO MASTER PROBLEMS AND DEFUSE CRISES BEFORE THEY AROSE. BUT U S IDEALS MUST BE RECONCILED WITH THE REALITIES OF THE WORLD AS IT WAS. AMONGST THOSE REALITIES HAIG INSTANCED THE DIFFUSION OF INTERNATIONAL POWER AND THE READINESS OF MANY NATIONS TO RESORT TO VIOLENCE TO ACHIEVE THEIR ENDS, WHICH MEANT THAT "ARTIFICIAL OPERATING AREAS" FOR THE ALLIANCE WHICH HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED IN SIMPLER TIMES MUST BE RE-EXAMINED; THE MAGNITUDE OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHALLENGES FACING THE

WESTERN WORLD; THE FACT THAT, AS THE IRAQ/IRAN WAR DEMONSTRATED, INSTABILITY WAS MOST LIKELY WHERE ITS EFFECT ON THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY WOULD BE GREATEST; AND THE ENORMOUS DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, MISLEADINGLY TERMED THE THIRD WORLD, FAILURE TO PERCEIVE WHICH HAD TOO OFTEN LED TO MISTAKES IN FOREIGN POLICY.

5. BUT THE MOST IMPORTANT REALITY WAS THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER FROM ESSENTIALLY A LAND ARMY DEDICATED TO PRESERVING SOVIET NATIONAL SECURITY INTO A GLOBAL LAND, SEA AND AIR INTERVENTION CAPABILITY. THIS CENTRAL STRATEGIC PHENOMENON AMOUNTED TO PERHAPS THE MOST COMPLETE REVERSAL OF GLOBAL POWER RELATIONSHIPS EVER IN PEACE-TIME. IF UNCHECKED, THE GROWTH OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER WOULD PARALYSE WESTERN POLICIES, AND OTHER DESIRABLE BUT SUBORDINATE GOALS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE IN AN ENVIRONMENT DOMINATED BY VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM.

6. THE UNITED STATES MUST SEEK ACTIVELY TO SHAPE EVENTS, BUT IT COULD NOT DO SO ACTING ALONE; IT MUST FORGE A CONSENSUS WITH LIKE-MINDED POWERS. ACTING COLLECTIVELY THE WEST COULD SHAPE A PEACEFUL WORLD.

7. U S FOREIGN POLICY MUST HAVE THREE BASIC QUALITIES:

(I) CONSISTENCY, IMPLYING A LONG TERM CONCEPT OF U S INTERESTS AND A STRATEGY TO PROMOTE THEM.

(II) RELIABILITY: U S POWER SHOULD NOT BE LIGHTLY COMMITTED, BUT ONCE COMMITTED THE TASK SET MUST BE CARRIED THROUGH.

(III) BALANCE, BOTH IN THE APPROACH TO INDIVIDUAL ISSUES AND IN A RECOGNITION OF THE COMPLEXITY OF MANY PROBLEMS AND OF COMPETING PRESSURES AND AIMS. FOR EXAMPLE, VERIFIABLE AND EQUITABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WERE NECESSARY, BUT NOT ON TERMS WHICH ONLY INCREASED INSTABILITY. ANOTHER NAME FOR THIS BALANCE WAS LINKAGE, TO WHICH PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS COMMITTED. IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD LINKAGE WAS INEVITABLE.

8. IN ORDER TO RESTORE THE U S CAPACITY TO CONDUCT AN EFFECTIVE FOREIGN POLICY THREE THINGS WERE NECESSARY:

(I) THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY MUST BE REESTABLISHED. THE UNITED STATES MUST SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE, THE PRESIDENT'S. THE PRESIDENT NEEDED ONE INDIVIDUAL TO FORMULATE, CONDUCT AND EXPLAIN HIS FOREIGN POLICY, NAMELY THE SECRETARY OF STATE. THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER SHOULD AND WOULD FULFIL A STAFF ROLE.

(II) CONGRESSIONAL BIPARTISANSHIP IN FOREIGN POLICY MUST BE RESTORED. THIS MEANT THAT THERE MUST BE REAL CONSULTATION AND PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS, SINCE THE CONGRESS WOULD NOT GIVE THE PRESIDENT THE NECESSARY DISCRETION TO CONDUCT FOREIGN POLICY UNLESS IT WERE SATISFIED WITH HIS AIMS AND PURPOSES.

(III) THE EXPERTISE OF CAREER FOREIGN SERVICE PROFESSIONALS MUST BE FULLY UTILISED IN THE FORMULATION AND CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY.

9. IN ADDITION, THE UNITED STATES MUST MOBILISE ALL ITS RESOURCES. IT WAS STILL THE LARGEST AND STRONGEST ECONOMY ON EARTH; THE U S COULD AND MUST RESTORE ITS ECONOMIC STRENGTH IN ORDER FOR ITS FOREIGN POLICY TO SUCCEED. THE UNITED STATES POSSESSED MILITARY POWER WHICH NO ADVERSARY COULD IGNORE. AMERICA'S ALLIANCES MUST BE ADAPTED TO MEET NEW PROBLEMS. WE SHOULD NOT BECOME PREOCCUPIED WITH DEBATES OVER WHO WAS DOING MORE; THE CHALLENGES OF THE 80'S WOULD REQUIRE THAT WE ALL DID MORE.

10. WE SHALL BE REPORTING SEPARATELY ON HAIG'S ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS PUT BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS.

F C O PASS SAVING ALL EXCEPT UKMIS NEW YORK.

HENDERSON.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

F.C.O/WHITEHALL  
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